2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include "statem_local.h"
15 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
24 #include <openssl/bn.h>
25 #include <openssl/md5.h>
26 #include <openssl/trace.h>
27 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
28 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
29 #include <openssl/comp.h>
31 #define TICKET_NONCE_SIZE 8
35 ASN1_TYPE *opaqueBlob;
38 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
40 ASN1_SEQUENCE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE) = {
41 ASN1_SIMPLE(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, kxBlob, ASN1_ANY),
42 ASN1_OPT(GOST_KX_MESSAGE, opaqueBlob, ASN1_ANY),
43 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
45 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(GOST_KX_MESSAGE)
47 static CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
50 static ossl_inline int received_client_cert(const SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
52 return sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL || sc->session->peer != NULL;
56 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
57 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
58 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
59 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
61 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
62 * (transition not allowed)
64 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
66 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
69 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
70 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
71 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
73 switch (st->hand_state) {
77 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
78 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
79 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
80 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
84 } else if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
85 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
86 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
93 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
94 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
95 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
96 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
97 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
101 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
102 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT;
108 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
109 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
115 case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
117 if (!received_client_cert(s)) {
118 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
119 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
123 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
130 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
131 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
139 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
140 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
142 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
145 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
146 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
147 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
151 if (mt == SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE
152 && s->ext.compress_certificate_sent) {
153 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
173 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int mt)
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
183 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
184 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
189 switch (st->hand_state) {
195 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
196 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
197 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
202 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
204 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
205 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
207 * 2) If we did request one then
208 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
210 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
211 * list if we requested a certificate)
213 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
214 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
215 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
216 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
217 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
219 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
220 * not going to accept it because we require a client
223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
224 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
231 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
234 } else if (s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
235 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
236 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
243 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
249 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
251 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
252 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
253 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
254 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
255 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
258 if (!received_client_cert(s) || st->no_cert_verify) {
259 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
261 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
262 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
263 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
264 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
277 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
278 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
284 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
286 if (s->s3.npn_seen) {
287 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
288 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
293 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
294 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
303 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
304 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
305 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
311 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
312 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
313 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
320 /* No valid transition found */
321 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
325 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
326 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
329 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
330 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
331 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
332 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
335 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
340 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
342 * Valid return values are:
346 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
348 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
351 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
352 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
353 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
354 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
355 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
358 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
360 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
364 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
365 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
366 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
367 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
368 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
371 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
372 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
382 * Used to determine if we shoud send a CompressedCertificate message
384 * Returns the algorithm to use, TLSEXT_comp_cert_none means no compression
386 static int get_compressed_certificate_alg(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
388 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
389 int *alg = sc->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer;
391 if (sc->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
392 return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
394 for (; *alg != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; alg++) {
395 if (sc->s3.tmp.cert->comp_cert[*alg] != NULL)
399 return TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
403 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
405 * Valid return values are:
409 int send_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
412 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
413 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
415 * don't request if post-handshake-only unless doing
416 * post-handshake in TLSv1.3:
418 && (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
419 || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE)
420 || s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING)
422 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
425 && (s->certreqs_sent < 1 ||
426 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
428 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
429 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
432 && (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
434 * ... except when the application insists on
435 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
438 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
439 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
440 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
442 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
445 && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
452 static int do_compressed_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *sc)
454 /* If we negotiated RPK, we won't attempt to compress it */
455 return sc->ext.server_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_x509
456 && get_compressed_certificate_alg(sc) != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
460 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
461 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
464 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
466 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
469 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
470 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
473 switch (st->hand_state) {
475 /* Shouldn't happen */
476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
477 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
480 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
481 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
492 /* Try to read from the client instead */
493 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
495 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
496 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
499 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
500 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
501 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE)
502 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
503 else if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
504 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
509 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
510 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
511 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
513 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
514 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
516 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
519 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
520 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
521 else if (do_compressed_cert(s))
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT;
524 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
528 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
529 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
530 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
531 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
532 } else if (do_compressed_cert(s)) {
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT;
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
537 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
539 case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT:
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
544 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
548 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
549 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
550 s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
551 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
553 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
554 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
556 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
557 s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
559 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
560 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out any session tickets
563 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
564 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
565 } else if (!s->ext.ticket_expected) {
567 * If we're not going to renew the ticket then we just finish the
568 * handshake at this point.
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
573 if (s->num_tickets > s->sent_tickets)
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
576 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
577 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
580 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
584 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
585 /* In a resumption we only ever send a maximum of one new ticket.
586 * Following an initial handshake we send the number of tickets we have
587 * been configured for.
589 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0) {
590 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
591 } else if (s->hit || s->num_tickets <= s->sent_tickets) {
592 /* We've written enough tickets out. */
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
601 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
603 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
605 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
608 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
609 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
612 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
613 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
615 switch (st->hand_state) {
617 /* Shouldn't happen */
618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
619 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
622 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
623 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
624 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
625 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
626 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
628 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
629 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
630 /* SSLfatal() already called */
631 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
636 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
637 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
639 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
640 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
641 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
643 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
644 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
645 && (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) {
646 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
647 } else if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
648 /* We must have rejected the renegotiation */
649 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
650 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
652 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
654 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
656 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
657 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
659 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
661 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
662 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
664 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
666 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
667 /* normal PSK or SRP */
668 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
669 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
670 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
671 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
672 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
673 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
674 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
676 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
679 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
682 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
683 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
684 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
688 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
689 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
690 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
691 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
695 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
696 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
697 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
698 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
702 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
703 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
704 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
706 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
707 s->ts_msg_write = ossl_time_now();
708 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
710 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
711 s->ts_msg_read = ossl_time_now();
713 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
714 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
715 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
716 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
718 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
720 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
722 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
723 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
724 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
726 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
727 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
728 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
730 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
732 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
734 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
735 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
740 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
741 * the server to the client.
743 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
745 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
746 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
748 switch (st->hand_state) {
750 /* No pre work to be done */
753 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
755 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
756 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
759 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
761 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
762 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
763 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
768 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
769 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
771 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
772 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
778 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
780 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(ssl))) {
781 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
782 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
785 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
787 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
788 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->sent_tickets == 0
789 && s->ext.extra_tickets_expected == 0) {
791 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
792 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
793 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
795 * Calls SSLfatal as required.
797 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 0);
799 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
801 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
802 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
808 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
809 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))
811 /* Writes to s->session are only safe for initial handshakes */
812 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
813 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
814 } else if (s->session->cipher != s->s3.tmp.new_cipher) {
815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
818 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
819 /* SSLfatal() already called */
822 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
824 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
825 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
826 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
827 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
831 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
833 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
834 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
835 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
836 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
840 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
841 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
844 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
847 static ossl_inline int conn_is_closed(void)
849 switch (get_last_sys_error()) {
854 #if defined(ECONNRESET)
858 #if defined(WSAECONNRESET)
868 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
869 * server to the client.
871 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
873 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
874 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
878 switch (st->hand_state) {
880 /* No post work to be done */
883 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
884 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
886 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
887 /* SSLfatal() already called */
892 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
893 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
895 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
896 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
897 /* SSLfatal() already called */
901 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
902 * treat like it was the first packet
907 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
908 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
909 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
910 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0
911 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
916 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
917 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
918 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
922 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
925 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
926 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
928 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
929 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
930 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
933 if (SSL_export_keying_material(ssl, sctpauthkey,
934 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
941 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
942 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
945 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
946 || ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
947 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_COMPLETE))
951 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
952 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
953 if (!statem_flush(s))
958 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
959 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
960 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
961 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
962 /* SSLfatal() already called */
966 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
967 && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
968 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
969 /* SSLfatal() already called */
973 * We don't yet know whether the next record we are going to receive
974 * is an unencrypted alert, an encrypted alert, or an encrypted
975 * handshake message. We temporarily tolerate unencrypted alerts.
977 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
978 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 1);
982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
983 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
985 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
988 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
992 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
993 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
994 /* SSLfatal() already called */
998 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
999 dtls1_increment_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
1002 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1003 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
1007 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1008 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
1010 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1011 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1013 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1016 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(ssl), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
1020 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1021 /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */
1023 if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1024 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
1026 || !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1027 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
1028 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1033 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1034 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
1035 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
1038 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1039 || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
1040 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
1044 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1045 if (!s->hit && !send_certificate_request(s)) {
1046 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1047 || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TX_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION) != 0)
1048 s->ext.compress_certificate_from_peer[0] = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none;
1052 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1053 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
1055 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
1056 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1061 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1063 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1) {
1064 if (SSL_get_error(ssl, 0) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
1065 && conn_is_closed()) {
1067 * We ignore connection closed errors in TLSv1.3 when sending a
1068 * NewSessionTicket and behave as if we were successful. This is
1069 * so that we are still able to read data sent to us by a client
1070 * that closes soon after the end of the handshake without
1071 * waiting to read our post-handshake NewSessionTickets.
1073 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1082 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1086 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
1089 * Valid return values are:
1093 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1094 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
1096 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1098 switch (st->hand_state) {
1100 /* Shouldn't happen */
1101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
1104 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
1105 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1106 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1108 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
1109 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1112 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1113 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
1114 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
1117 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
1118 /* No construction function needed */
1120 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
1123 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
1124 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
1125 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1128 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT:
1129 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
1130 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
1133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1134 case TLS_ST_SW_COMP_CERT:
1135 *confunc = tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate;
1136 *mt = SSL3_MT_COMPRESSED_CERTIFICATE;
1140 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
1141 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
1142 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
1146 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
1147 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
1148 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1151 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
1152 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
1153 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1156 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
1157 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
1158 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1161 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
1162 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
1163 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
1166 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
1167 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
1168 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
1171 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
1172 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
1173 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
1176 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
1178 *mt = SSL3_MT_DUMMY;
1181 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1182 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
1183 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
1186 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
1187 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
1188 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
1196 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
1197 * calculated as follows:
1199 * 2 + # client_version
1200 * 32 + # only valid length for random
1201 * 1 + # length of session_id
1202 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
1203 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
1204 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
1205 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
1206 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
1207 * 2 + # length of extensions
1208 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
1210 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1212 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1213 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1216 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1217 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1219 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1221 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1223 switch (st->hand_state) {
1225 /* Shouldn't happen */
1228 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1229 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1231 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1232 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1234 case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
1235 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1236 return s->max_cert_list;
1238 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1239 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1241 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1242 return CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_MAX_LENGTH;
1244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1245 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1246 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1249 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1250 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1252 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1253 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1255 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1256 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1261 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1263 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1266 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1268 switch (st->hand_state) {
1270 /* Shouldn't happen */
1271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1272 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1274 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1275 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1277 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1278 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1280 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1281 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
1284 case TLS_ST_SR_COMP_CERT:
1285 return tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(s, pkt);
1288 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1289 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1291 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1292 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1295 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1296 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1299 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1300 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1302 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1303 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1305 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1306 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1312 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1315 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1318 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1320 switch (st->hand_state) {
1322 /* Shouldn't happen */
1323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1327 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1329 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1330 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1335 /* Returns 1 on success, 0 for retryable error, -1 for fatal error */
1336 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1339 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1341 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1342 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1343 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1345 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY,
1349 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1352 ret = ssl_srp_server_param_with_username_intern(s, &al);
1355 if (ret == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1357 al == SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY
1358 ? SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND
1359 : SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1368 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1371 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1372 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1373 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1379 CON_FUNC_RETURN dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1382 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1383 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1385 if (sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL
1386 || sctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s), s->d1->cookie,
1388 || cookie_leni > DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH) {
1389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1390 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1392 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1394 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1395 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1397 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
1400 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
1404 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1405 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1406 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1410 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1412 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1413 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1414 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1415 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1417 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1418 const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1420 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1421 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1422 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1423 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1424 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1425 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1426 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1428 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1429 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1430 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1431 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1432 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1433 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1434 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1435 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1436 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1437 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1438 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1439 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1440 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1442 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1443 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1448 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1450 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1451 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1452 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1456 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1459 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(
1460 SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1461 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1463 s->s3.is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1467 #define RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(options) \
1468 ((options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION) == 0 \
1469 && (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION) != 0)
1471 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
1473 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1474 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1475 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1476 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = NULL;
1478 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1479 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1480 if (!ossl_assert(!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1484 if (!RENEG_OPTIONS_OK(s->options)
1485 || (!s->s3.send_connection_binding
1487 & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) == 0)) {
1488 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1489 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1495 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1496 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1502 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1504 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1505 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1507 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1510 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
1511 || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1517 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1518 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1519 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1520 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1522 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1523 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1525 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1526 * 7-8 session_id_length
1527 * 9-10 challenge_length
1531 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1532 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1534 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1535 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1536 * in the first place
1538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1543 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1548 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1549 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1551 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1552 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1553 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1555 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1558 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1559 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1560 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1565 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1570 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1572 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1573 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1574 /* No extensions. */
1575 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1576 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1579 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1581 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1582 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1583 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1584 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1586 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1587 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1588 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1589 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1590 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1591 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1592 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1593 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1594 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1598 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1600 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1601 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1602 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1603 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1604 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1605 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1610 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1611 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1612 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1615 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1616 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1617 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1622 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1623 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1624 * So check cookie length...
1626 if (SSL_get_options(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1627 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
1628 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1629 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1634 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1639 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1644 /* Could be empty. */
1645 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1646 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1648 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1649 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1656 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1657 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1658 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1664 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1665 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1666 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts,
1667 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1668 /* SSLfatal already been called */
1671 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1673 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1676 if (clienthello != NULL)
1677 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1678 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1680 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1683 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
1686 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1691 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1693 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1694 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1695 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1696 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1697 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1698 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1699 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1701 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1702 /* Give the ClientHello callback a crack at things */
1703 if (sctx->client_hello_cb != NULL) {
1704 /* A failure in the ClientHello callback terminates the connection. */
1705 switch (sctx->client_hello_cb(ssl, &al, sctx->client_hello_cb_arg)) {
1706 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_SUCCESS:
1708 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_RETRY:
1709 s->rwstate = SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_CB;
1711 case SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_ERROR:
1713 SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
1718 /* Set up the client_random */
1719 memcpy(s->s3.client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1721 /* Choose the version */
1723 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1724 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1725 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1726 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1728 * This is real SSLv2 or something completely unknown. We don't
1731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1735 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1738 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1739 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1741 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1742 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1743 } else if (ssl->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1744 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1745 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1751 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1752 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1753 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
1759 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1760 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1761 && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1766 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1767 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1768 if (SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1769 if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1770 if (sctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(ssl, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1771 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1773 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1775 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1777 /* default verification */
1778 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1779 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1780 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1784 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1786 if (ssl->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1787 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1788 if (protverr != 0) {
1789 s->version = s->client_version;
1790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, protverr);
1798 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1799 clienthello->isv2) ||
1800 !ossl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1801 &scsvs, clienthello->isv2, 1)) {
1802 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1806 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 0;
1807 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1808 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1809 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1810 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1811 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1812 if (s->renegotiate) {
1813 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1815 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1818 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1819 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1820 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1822 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1823 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1824 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1825 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1826 * an insecure downgrade.
1828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK,
1829 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1835 /* For TLSv1.3 we must select the ciphersuite *before* session resumption */
1836 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1837 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher =
1838 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
1840 if (cipher == NULL) {
1841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1844 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
1845 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL
1846 || s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id)) {
1848 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1849 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1854 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1857 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1858 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1859 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1860 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0)) {
1861 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1866 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1867 * In TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1869 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1870 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1871 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1872 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1873 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1874 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1875 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1876 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1877 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1878 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1881 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1883 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1884 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1885 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1889 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello);
1891 /* previous session */
1893 } else if (i == -1) {
1894 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1898 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) {
1899 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1905 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1906 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->clienthello->session_id,
1907 s->clienthello->session_id_len);
1908 s->tmp_session_id_len = s->clienthello->session_id_len;
1912 * If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list. In TLSv1.3 we check
1913 * ciphersuite compatibility with the session as part of resumption.
1915 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit) {
1917 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1919 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
1920 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1921 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1923 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1924 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1925 if (trc_out != NULL)
1926 BIO_printf(trc_out, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i,
1927 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1935 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1939 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1940 OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
1943 OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
1946 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1947 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1951 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1957 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1958 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1960 /* TLS extensions */
1961 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1962 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1963 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1968 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1969 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1970 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1971 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1975 pos = s->s3.server_random;
1976 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1983 && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1984 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
1985 && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1986 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL) {
1987 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1989 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1990 * backwards compat reasons
1992 int master_key_length;
1994 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1995 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(ssl, s->session->master_key,
1996 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1998 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1999 && master_key_length > 0) {
2000 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
2002 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2003 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
2007 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
2008 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
2009 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
2010 SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
2011 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
2012 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2016 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
2017 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
2018 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
2019 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
2020 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->peer_ciphers);
2025 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
2026 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
2027 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
2029 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = NULL;
2030 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2032 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
2033 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
2034 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
2036 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
2037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2038 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2043 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
2044 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2045 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
2047 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
2048 /* Can't disable compression */
2049 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
2050 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2051 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2054 /* Look for resumed compression method */
2055 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods); m++) {
2056 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
2057 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
2058 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2062 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
2063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2064 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
2067 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
2068 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
2069 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
2072 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
2073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2074 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
2077 } else if (s->hit) {
2079 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && sctx->comp_methods) {
2080 /* See if we have a match */
2081 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
2084 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sctx->comp_methods);
2085 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
2086 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sctx->comp_methods, m);
2088 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
2089 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
2098 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
2104 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
2105 * using compression.
2107 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
2108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
2114 * Given s->peer_ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
2117 if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2118 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers);
2119 s->peer_ciphers = ciphers;
2120 if (ciphers == NULL) {
2121 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2128 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2129 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
2131 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
2133 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
2134 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2139 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2140 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2141 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2142 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2143 s->clienthello = NULL;
2146 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
2147 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
2148 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
2149 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
2150 s->clienthello = NULL;
2156 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2157 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2159 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2161 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2163 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2166 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2167 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2168 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2169 * influence which certificate is sent
2171 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && sctx != NULL
2172 && sctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2175 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2176 if (s->s3.tmp.cert != NULL) {
2178 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2179 * et al can pick it up.
2181 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2182 ret = sctx->ext.status_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2183 sctx->ext.status_arg);
2185 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2186 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2187 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
2189 /* status request response should be sent */
2190 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2191 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
2192 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
2194 /* something bad happened */
2195 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2207 * Call the alpn_select callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
2208 * Upon failure, returns 0.
2210 int tls_handle_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
2212 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
2213 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
2214 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2216 if (sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3.alpn_proposed != NULL) {
2217 int r = sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2218 &selected, &selected_len,
2219 s->s3.alpn_proposed,
2220 (unsigned int)s->s3.alpn_proposed_len,
2221 sctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg);
2223 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2224 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
2225 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
2226 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2227 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
2228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2231 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2233 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2237 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2238 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
2239 || selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
2240 || memcmp(selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
2241 selected_len) != 0) {
2242 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2243 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2247 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have
2248 * been initialised to NULL. We should update it with the
2251 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
2252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2253 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2256 s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected,
2258 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
2259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2260 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2263 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
2268 } else if (r != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK) {
2269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL,
2270 SSL_R_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL);
2274 * If r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK then behave as if no callback was
2279 /* Check ALPN is consistent with session */
2280 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
2281 /* Not consistent so can't be used for early_data */
2282 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
2288 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2290 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
2291 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
2293 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2294 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s);
2296 /* SSLfatal() was already called */
2303 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2304 if (!s->hit || SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2305 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
2306 if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
2307 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(ssl, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2309 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
2313 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2316 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2319 /* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
2320 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2322 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->peer_ciphers,
2323 SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
2325 if (cipher == NULL) {
2326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2327 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
2330 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
2333 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 1)) {
2334 /* SSLfatal already called */
2337 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
2338 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
2339 s->session->not_resumable =
2340 s->not_resumable_session_cb(ssl,
2341 ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey
2342 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
2343 if (s->session->not_resumable)
2344 /* do not send a session ticket */
2345 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2348 /* Session-id reuse */
2349 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2353 * we now have the following setup.
2355 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2356 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2357 * compression - basically ignored right now
2358 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2359 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2360 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2361 * s->s3.tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
2365 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2366 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2368 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s)) {
2369 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2373 * Call alpn_select callback if needed. Has to be done after SNI and
2374 * cipher negotiation (HTTP/2 restricts permitted ciphers). In TLSv1.3
2375 * we already did this because cipher negotiation happens earlier, and
2376 * we must handle ALPN before we decide whether to accept early_data.
2378 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_handle_alpn(s)) {
2379 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2386 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2388 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s)) == 0) {
2390 * callback indicates further work to be done
2392 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2396 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2402 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2407 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_hello(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2412 unsigned char *session_id;
2413 int usetls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2414 || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING;
2416 version = usetls13 ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
2417 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2419 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2420 * tls_process_client_hello()
2422 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt,
2423 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2424 ? hrrrandom : s->s3.server_random,
2425 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2427 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2431 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2432 * back in the server hello:
2433 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2434 * we send back the old session ID.
2435 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2436 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2437 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2438 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2440 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2441 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2442 * - In TLSv1.3 we echo back the session id sent to us by the client
2444 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2445 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2448 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2449 (!(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2451 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2454 sl = s->tmp_session_id_len;
2455 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
2457 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2458 session_id = s->session->session_id;
2461 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2462 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2463 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2466 /* set up the compression method */
2467 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2470 if (usetls13 || s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2473 compm = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
2476 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, session_id, sl)
2477 || !SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher,
2479 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)) {
2480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2481 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2484 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2485 s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING
2486 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
2487 : (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
2488 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2489 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO),
2491 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2492 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2495 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
2496 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
2497 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2502 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
2503 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
2505 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
2506 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2507 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2509 } else if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2510 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2511 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
2512 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2515 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
2518 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_done(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2520 if (!s->s3.tmp.cert_request) {
2521 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2522 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2523 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2526 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
2529 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2532 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2533 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2534 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2536 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
2540 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2541 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2542 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2544 CON_FUNC_RETURN ret = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2545 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2547 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2552 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2557 type = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2559 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2561 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2562 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2564 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2565 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2566 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2567 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2569 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2570 pkdh = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2577 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2579 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0)
2580 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2581 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2590 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2591 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2594 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2595 EVP_PKEY_get_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2599 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2604 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, pkdhp);
2605 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2610 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2613 /* These BIGNUMs need to be freed when we're finished */
2615 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P,
2617 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G,
2619 || !EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2620 OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, &r[2])) {
2621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2624 } else if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2626 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2631 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2632 curve_id = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2633 if (curve_id == 0) {
2634 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2635 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2638 /* Cache the group used in the SSL_SESSION */
2639 s->session->kex_group = curve_id;
2640 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2641 s->s3.tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
2642 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2643 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2647 /* Encode the public key. */
2648 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(s->s3.tmp.pkey,
2650 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2656 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2657 * can set these to NULLs
2664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2665 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2666 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2667 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2668 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2672 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2673 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2674 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2675 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2679 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2683 if (((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2684 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2686 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2692 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2693 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2694 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2697 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2698 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2700 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2701 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2709 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2710 unsigned char *binval;
2713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2714 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2715 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2718 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2721 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2726 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2727 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2730 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2731 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2734 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2735 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2738 memset(binval, 0, len);
2742 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2743 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2744 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2748 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2751 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2753 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2754 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2755 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2758 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2759 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2760 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2761 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2765 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2766 encodedPoint = NULL;
2771 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
2773 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2, *tbs;
2774 size_t siglen = 0, tbslen;
2776 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) {
2777 /* Should never happen */
2778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2781 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2782 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2786 /* send signature algorithm */
2787 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
2788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2792 if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2793 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
2794 sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey,
2796 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2799 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2800 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2801 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2806 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs,
2807 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2810 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2814 if (EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, NULL, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <=0
2815 || !WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2816 || EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, tbs, tbslen) <= 0
2817 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2818 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2826 ret = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
2828 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2829 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2830 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2840 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
2843 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2844 /* Send random context when doing post-handshake auth */
2845 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING) {
2846 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2847 s->pha_context_len = 32;
2848 if ((s->pha_context = OPENSSL_malloc(s->pha_context_len)) == NULL) {
2849 s->pha_context_len = 0;
2850 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2851 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2853 if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
2854 s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len, 0) <= 0
2855 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context,
2856 s->pha_context_len)) {
2857 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2858 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2860 /* reset the handshake hash back to just after the ClientFinished */
2861 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
2862 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2863 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2866 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2868 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2872 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2873 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2875 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2876 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2881 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2882 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2883 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2885 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2888 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2889 const uint16_t *psigs;
2890 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2892 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2893 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2894 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2895 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2896 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2897 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2901 if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
2902 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2903 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
2908 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 1;
2909 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
2912 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2915 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2917 PACKET psk_identity;
2919 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2923 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2927 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2932 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2933 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2937 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
2938 s->session->psk_identity,
2941 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2942 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2944 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2946 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2948 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2952 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2953 s->s3.tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2954 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2956 if (s->s3.tmp.psk == NULL) {
2957 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
2958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
2962 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2966 /* Should never happen */
2967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2972 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
2975 PACKET enc_premaster;
2976 EVP_PKEY *rsa = NULL;
2977 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2979 EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2980 OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
2981 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
2983 rsa = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey;
2985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2989 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2990 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2991 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2993 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2994 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3000 outlen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3001 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(outlen);
3002 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
3003 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3007 ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, rsa, sctx->propq);
3009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3014 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
3015 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
3016 * section 7.4.7.1). We use the special padding type
3017 * RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING to do that. It will automatically decrypt the
3018 * RSA, check the padding and check that the client version is as expected
3019 * in the premaster secret. If any of that fails then the function appears
3020 * to return successfully but with a random result. The call below could
3021 * still fail if the input is publicly invalid.
3022 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
3024 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ctx) <= 0
3025 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING) <= 0) {
3026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3030 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_CLIENT_VERSION,
3031 (unsigned int *)&s->client_version);
3032 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) != 0)
3033 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(
3034 OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION,
3035 (unsigned int *)&s->version);
3036 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
3038 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)
3039 || EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ctx, rsa_decrypt, &outlen,
3040 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
3041 PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster)) <= 0) {
3042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3047 * This test should never fail (otherwise we should have failed above) but
3048 * we double check anyway.
3050 if (outlen != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
3051 OPENSSL_cleanse(rsa_decrypt, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
3052 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3056 /* Also cleanses rsa_decrypt (on success or failure) */
3057 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt, outlen, 0)) {
3058 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3064 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
3065 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
3069 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3071 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
3073 const unsigned char *data;
3074 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3077 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
3078 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
3081 skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3087 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
3091 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3092 /* We already checked we have enough data */
3093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3096 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3097 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
3098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
3102 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i)) {
3103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3107 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3108 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3113 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3114 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3116 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3120 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3122 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
3123 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
3126 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
3127 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
3128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3132 const unsigned char *data;
3135 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
3136 * ClientKeyExchange message.
3139 /* Get encoded point length */
3140 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
3141 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
3150 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
3151 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
3152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
3156 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(ckey, data, i) <= 0) {
3157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
3162 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
3163 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3168 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
3169 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
3171 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3176 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3180 const unsigned char *data;
3182 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
3183 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
3184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
3187 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
3188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
3191 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
3192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
3195 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3196 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3197 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3202 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
3203 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3209 /* Should never happen */
3210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3215 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3218 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
3219 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
3220 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3221 const unsigned char *start;
3222 size_t outlen = sizeof(premaster_secret), inlen;
3223 unsigned long alg_a;
3224 GOST_KX_MESSAGE *pKX = NULL;
3225 const unsigned char *ptr;
3227 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3229 /* Get our certificate private key */
3230 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3231 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3233 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3235 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3237 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3240 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3242 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3243 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3246 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
3247 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3251 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3256 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3257 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3258 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3259 * client certificate for authorization only.
3261 client_pub_pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s);
3262 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3263 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3267 ptr = PACKET_data(pkt);
3268 /* Some implementations provide extra data in the opaqueBlob
3269 * We have nothing to do with this blob so we just skip it */
3270 pKX = d2i_GOST_KX_MESSAGE(NULL, &ptr, PACKET_remaining(pkt));
3272 || pKX->kxBlob == NULL
3273 || ASN1_TYPE_get(pKX->kxBlob) != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
3274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3278 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, ptr - PACKET_data(pkt))) {
3279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3283 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3288 inlen = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->length;
3289 start = pKX->kxBlob->value.sequence->data;
3291 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start,
3293 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3296 /* Generate master secret */
3297 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, outlen, 0)) {
3298 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3301 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3302 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2,
3304 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3308 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3309 GOST_KX_MESSAGE_free(pKX);
3312 /* Should never happen */
3313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3318 static int tls_process_cke_gost18(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
3320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3321 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32];
3322 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3323 EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
3324 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
3325 const unsigned char *start = NULL;
3326 size_t outlen = sizeof(premaster_secret), inlen = 0;
3328 int cipher_nid = ossl_gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3329 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3331 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3336 if (ossl_gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3341 /* Get our certificate private key */
3342 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey != NULL ?
3343 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey :
3344 s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
3350 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(sctx->libctx, pk, sctx->propq);
3351 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3355 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3360 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code depending on size */
3361 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3362 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3367 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT,
3368 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) <= 0) {
3369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3372 inlen = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3373 start = PACKET_data(pkt);
3375 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3379 /* Generate master secret */
3380 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, outlen, 0)) {
3381 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3387 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3390 /* Should never happen */
3391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3396 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3399 unsigned long alg_k;
3401 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3403 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3404 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
3405 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3409 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3410 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3411 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3415 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3416 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3417 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3420 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3421 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt)) {
3422 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3425 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3426 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt)) {
3427 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3430 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3431 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt)) {
3432 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3435 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3436 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt)) {
3437 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3440 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3441 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt)) {
3442 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3445 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3446 if (!tls_process_cke_gost18(s, pkt)) {
3447 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3455 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3457 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3458 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3459 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3460 s->s3.tmp.psklen = 0;
3462 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3465 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3469 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3470 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3471 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3472 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3475 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3478 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3479 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3481 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3482 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3483 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3486 if (SSL_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
3488 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3495 BIO_ctrl(s->wbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3496 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3501 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !received_client_cert(s)) {
3503 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3504 * the handshake_buffer
3506 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3507 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3510 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3512 if (!s->s3.handshake_buffer) {
3513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3517 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3518 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3520 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3521 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3526 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3529 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
3531 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3532 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3533 EVP_PKEY *peer_rpk = NULL;
3535 if (!tls_process_rpk(sc, pkt, &peer_rpk)) {
3536 /* SSLfatal already called */
3540 if (peer_rpk == NULL) {
3541 if ((sc->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)
3542 && (sc->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
3543 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3544 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3548 if (ssl_verify_rpk(sc, peer_rpk) <= 0) {
3549 SSLfatal(sc, ssl_x509err2alert(sc->verify_result),
3550 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3556 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3557 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3558 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3559 * a new RPK (or certificate) is received via post-handshake authentication,
3560 * as the session may have already gone into the session cache.
3563 if (sc->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3564 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(sc->session, 0)) == NULL) {
3565 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3569 SSL_SESSION_free(sc->session);
3570 sc->session = new_sess;
3573 /* Ensure there is no peer/peer_chain */
3574 X509_free(sc->session->peer);
3575 sc->session->peer = NULL;
3576 sk_X509_pop_free(sc->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3577 sc->session->peer_chain = NULL;
3579 EVP_PKEY_free(sc->session->peer_rpk);
3580 sc->session->peer_rpk = peer_rpk;
3583 sc->session->verify_result = sc->verify_result;
3586 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3589 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) {
3590 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(sc, 1)) {
3591 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3595 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3596 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(sc, sc->cert_verify_hash,
3597 sizeof(sc->cert_verify_hash),
3598 &sc->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3599 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
3603 /* resend session tickets */
3604 sc->sent_tickets = 0;
3607 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3610 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_rpk);
3614 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3618 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3621 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3622 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3623 PACKET spkt, context;
3625 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = NULL;
3626 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3629 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We no
3630 * longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than TLSv1.3
3632 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL)
3633 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0);
3635 if (s->ext.client_cert_type == TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk)
3636 return tls_process_client_rpk(s, pkt);
3638 if (s->ext.client_cert_type != TLSEXT_cert_type_x509) {
3639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE,
3640 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3644 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3649 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
3650 && (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)
3651 || (s->pha_context == NULL && PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0)
3652 || (s->pha_context != NULL
3653 && !PACKET_equal(&context, s->pha_context,
3654 s->pha_context_len)))) {
3655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT);
3659 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(pkt, &spkt)
3660 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3665 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3666 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3667 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3672 certstart = certbytes;
3673 x = X509_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
3675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
3678 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l) == NULL) {
3679 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3683 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3688 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3689 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3692 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3696 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3697 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3698 NULL, chainidx == 0)
3699 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3700 rawexts, x, chainidx,
3701 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3702 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3705 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3708 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3709 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3715 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3716 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3717 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3719 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3722 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3723 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3724 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED,
3726 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3729 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3730 if (s->s3.handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3731 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3736 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3738 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
3739 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3742 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3744 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3745 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3751 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
3752 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
3753 * we replace them with a duplicate. Here, we need to do this every time
3754 * a new certificate is received via post-handshake authentication, as the
3755 * session may have already gone into the session cache.
3758 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3759 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
3760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3764 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3765 s->session = new_sess;
3768 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3769 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3770 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3772 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->session->peer_chain);
3773 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3775 /* Ensure there is no RPK */
3776 EVP_PKEY_free(s->session->peer_rpk);
3777 s->session->peer_rpk = NULL;
3780 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3783 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3784 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3789 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3790 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3793 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3794 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3795 if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3796 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3797 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3798 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3802 /* Resend session tickets */
3803 s->sent_tickets = 0;
3806 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3810 OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(sk);
3814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
3815 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt)
3817 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3819 BUF_MEM *buf = BUF_MEM_new();
3821 if (tls13_process_compressed_certificate(sc, pkt, &tmppkt, buf) != MSG_PROCESS_ERROR)
3822 ret = tls_process_client_certificate(sc, &tmppkt);
3829 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3831 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3.tmp.cert;
3834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3835 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3839 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3840 * for the server Certificate message
3842 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3844 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3846 switch (s->ext.server_cert_type) {
3847 case TLSEXT_cert_type_rpk:
3848 if (!tls_output_rpk(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3849 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3853 case TLSEXT_cert_type_x509:
3854 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, 0)) {
3855 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3864 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
3867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
3868 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_server_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt)
3870 int alg = get_compressed_certificate_alg(sc);
3871 OSSL_COMP_CERT *cc = sc->s3.tmp.cert->comp_cert[alg];
3873 if (!ossl_assert(cc != NULL)) {
3874 SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3878 * Server can't compress on-demand
3879 * Use pre-compressed certificate
3881 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, alg)
3882 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u24(pkt, cc->orig_len)
3883 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
3884 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cc->data, cc->len)
3885 || !WPACKET_close(pkt))
3888 sc->s3.tmp.cert->cert_comp_used++;
3893 static int create_ticket_prequel(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3894 uint32_t age_add, unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3896 uint32_t timeout = (uint32_t)ossl_time2seconds(s->session->timeout);
3899 * Ticket lifetime hint:
3900 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3901 * timeout, limited to a 1 week period per RFC8446.
3902 * For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this unspecified for
3903 * resumed session (for simplicity).
3905 #define ONE_WEEK_SEC (7 * 24 * 60 * 60)
3907 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3908 if (ossl_time_compare(s->session->timeout,
3909 ossl_seconds2time(ONE_WEEK_SEC)) > 0)
3910 timeout = ONE_WEEK_SEC;
3914 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, timeout)) {
3915 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3919 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3920 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add)
3921 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tick_nonce, TICKET_NONCE_SIZE)) {
3922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3927 /* Start the sub-packet for the actual ticket data */
3928 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3936 static CON_FUNC_RETURN construct_stateless_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
3939 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
3941 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3942 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3943 SSL_HMAC *hctx = NULL;
3944 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3945 const unsigned char *const_p;
3946 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3949 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3950 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3951 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3953 CON_FUNC_RETURN ok = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
3954 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3955 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
3956 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
3958 /* get session encoding length */
3959 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3961 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3964 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3965 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3968 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
3974 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3976 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3979 hctx = ssl_hmac_new(tctx);
3981 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
3986 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) {
3987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3992 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3995 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION_ex(NULL, &const_p, slen_full, sctx->libctx,
3998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4002 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
4003 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) {
4004 /* shouldn't ever happen */
4005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4006 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
4010 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
4011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4012 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
4015 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
4018 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
4019 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
4021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4022 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL || tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
4024 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
4029 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb != NULL)
4030 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_evp_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
4031 ssl_hmac_get0_EVP_MAC_CTX(hctx),
4033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
4034 else if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb != NULL)
4035 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
4036 ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(ssl, key_name, iv, ctx,
4037 ssl_hmac_get0_HMAC_CTX(hctx), 1);
4042 * In TLSv1.2 we construct a 0 length ticket. In TLSv1.3 a 0
4043 * length ticket is not allowed so we abort construction of the
4046 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4047 ok = CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND;
4050 /* Put timeout and length */
4051 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
4052 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
4053 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4057 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4058 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
4059 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4062 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
4065 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ctx);
4067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4071 EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(sctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
4074 if (cipher == NULL) {
4075 /* Error is already recorded */
4076 SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4080 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(cipher);
4082 || RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, iv, iv_len, 0) <= 0
4083 || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
4084 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, iv)
4085 || !ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
4086 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
4088 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
4089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4092 EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
4093 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
4094 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
4097 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4098 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4102 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
4103 /* Output key name */
4104 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
4106 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
4107 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
4109 /* Encrypt session data */
4110 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
4111 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
4112 || encdata1 != encdata2
4113 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
4114 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
4115 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
4116 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
4117 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
4118 || !ssl_hmac_update(hctx,
4119 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
4120 macendoffset - macoffset)
4121 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
4122 || !ssl_hmac_final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)
4123 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
4124 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
4125 || macdata1 != macdata2) {
4126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4130 /* Close the sub-packet created by create_ticket_prequel() */
4131 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4136 ok = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4139 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
4140 ssl_hmac_free(hctx);
4144 static int construct_stateful_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
4146 unsigned char *tick_nonce)
4148 if (!create_ticket_prequel(s, pkt, age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4149 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4153 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
4154 s->session->session_id_length)
4155 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
4156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4163 static void tls_update_ticket_counts(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
4166 * Increment both |sent_tickets| and |next_ticket_nonce|. |sent_tickets|
4167 * gets reset to 0 if we send more tickets following a post-handshake
4168 * auth, but |next_ticket_nonce| does not. If we're sending extra
4169 * tickets, decrement the count of pending extra tickets.
4172 s->next_ticket_nonce++;
4173 if (s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)
4174 s->ext.extra_tickets_expected--;
4177 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4179 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
4180 unsigned char tick_nonce[TICKET_NONCE_SIZE];
4182 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
4185 CON_FUNC_RETURN ret = CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4187 age_add_u.age_add = 0;
4189 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4192 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
4193 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
4194 int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
4196 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
4197 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
4198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4201 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
4204 * If we already sent one NewSessionTicket, or we resumed then
4205 * s->session may already be in a cache and so we must not modify it.
4206 * Instead we need to take a copy of it and modify that.
4208 if (s->sent_tickets != 0 || s->hit) {
4209 SSL_SESSION *new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0);
4211 if (new_sess == NULL) {
4212 /* SSLfatal already called */
4216 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
4217 s->session = new_sess;
4220 if (!ssl_generate_session_id(s, s->session)) {
4221 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4224 if (RAND_bytes_ex(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx,
4225 age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u), 0) <= 0) {
4226 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4229 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
4231 nonce = s->next_ticket_nonce;
4232 for (i = TICKET_NONCE_SIZE; i > 0; i--) {
4233 tick_nonce[i - 1] = (unsigned char)(nonce & 0xff);
4237 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
4239 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
4242 s->session->master_key,
4244 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4247 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
4249 s->session->time = ossl_time_now();
4250 ssl_session_calculate_timeout(s->session);
4251 if (s->s3.alpn_selected != NULL) {
4252 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
4253 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
4254 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
4255 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
4256 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
4257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
4260 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
4262 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
4265 if (tctx->generate_ticket_cb != NULL &&
4266 tctx->generate_ticket_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
4267 tctx->ticket_cb_data) == 0) {
4268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4272 * If we are using anti-replay protection then we behave as if
4273 * SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set - we are caching tickets anyway so there
4274 * is no point in using full stateless tickets.
4276 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)
4277 && ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0
4278 || (s->max_early_data > 0
4279 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0))) {
4280 if (!construct_stateful_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add, tick_nonce)) {
4281 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4285 CON_FUNC_RETURN tmpret;
4287 tmpret = construct_stateless_ticket(s, pkt, age_add_u.age_add,
4289 if (tmpret != CON_FUNC_SUCCESS) {
4290 if (tmpret == CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND) {
4291 /* Non-fatal. Abort construction but continue */
4292 ret = CON_FUNC_DONT_SEND;
4293 /* We count this as a success so update the counts anwyay */
4294 tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
4296 /* else SSLfatal() already called */
4301 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
4302 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
4303 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
4305 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4308 tls_update_ticket_counts(s);
4309 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
4312 ret = CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4318 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
4319 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
4321 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4323 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
4324 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
4325 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
4326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4333 CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_status(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt)
4335 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
4336 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4337 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4340 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
4345 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
4346 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
4348 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
4350 PACKET next_proto, padding;
4351 size_t next_proto_len;
4354 * The payload looks like:
4356 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
4357 * uint8 padding_len;
4358 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
4360 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
4361 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
4362 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
4363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4364 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4367 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
4369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4370 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4373 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
4375 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
4379 static CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
4382 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
4384 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4385 return CON_FUNC_ERROR;
4388 return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS;
4391 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
4393 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
4394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
4395 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4398 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
4399 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
4400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
4401 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4405 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
4406 * a record boundary.
4408 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
4409 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
4410 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4413 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
4414 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
4415 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
4416 /* SSLfatal() already called */
4417 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
4420 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;