2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
65 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
68 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
69 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
70 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
71 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
73 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
74 * (transition not allowed)
76 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
78 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
81 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
82 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
83 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
85 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
97 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
98 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
99 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
100 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
104 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
105 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
112 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
113 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
114 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
118 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
119 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
125 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
134 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
135 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
137 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
146 /* No valid transition found */
147 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
148 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
149 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
154 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
155 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
156 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
157 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
159 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
160 * (transition not allowed)
162 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
164 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
166 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
167 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
172 switch (st->hand_state) {
178 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
179 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
180 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
185 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
187 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
188 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
190 * 2) If we did request one then
191 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
193 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
194 * list if we requested a certificate)
196 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
197 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
198 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
199 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
200 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
202 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
203 * not going to accept it because we require a client
206 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
207 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
208 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
209 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
212 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
216 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
219 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
221 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
228 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
229 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
234 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
236 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
237 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
238 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
239 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
240 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
243 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
244 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
246 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
247 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
248 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
249 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
251 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
255 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
256 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
262 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
269 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
271 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
272 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
278 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
288 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
289 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
296 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
297 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
298 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
305 /* No valid transition found */
306 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
307 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
312 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
314 * Valid return values are:
318 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
320 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
323 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
324 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
325 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
326 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
327 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
330 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
332 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
336 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
337 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
338 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
339 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
340 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
343 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
344 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
354 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
356 * Valid return values are:
360 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
363 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
364 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
366 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
367 * during re-negotiation:
369 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
370 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
372 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
373 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
376 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
378 * ... except when the application insists on
379 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
382 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
383 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
384 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
386 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
389 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
397 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
398 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
401 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
403 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
406 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
407 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
410 switch (st->hand_state) {
412 /* Shouldn't happen */
413 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
416 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 /* Try to read from the client instead */
421 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
423 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
424 if (s->hello_retry_request)
425 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
427 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
428 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
430 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
431 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
433 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
440 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
456 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
459 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
464 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
466 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
468 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
469 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
471 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
472 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
475 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
478 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
479 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
485 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
486 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
493 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
494 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
496 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
498 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
501 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
502 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
506 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
508 switch (st->hand_state) {
510 /* Shouldn't happen */
511 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
514 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
515 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
517 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
520 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
521 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
522 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
523 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
528 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
529 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
531 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
533 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
535 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
536 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
537 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
538 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
540 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
541 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
543 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
544 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
546 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
548 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
549 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
551 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
553 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
554 /* normal PSK or SRP */
555 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
556 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
557 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
558 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
560 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
561 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
575 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
576 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
583 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
589 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
593 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
594 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
596 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
599 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
609 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
611 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
613 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
615 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
617 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
619 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
625 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
626 * the server to the client.
628 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
630 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
632 switch (st->hand_state) {
634 /* No pre work to be done */
637 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
640 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
643 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
645 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
646 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
647 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
652 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
653 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
655 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
656 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
662 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
664 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
665 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
667 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
669 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
670 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
672 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
673 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
674 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
676 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
677 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
679 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
680 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
686 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
687 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
688 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
689 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
692 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
694 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
695 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
696 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
697 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
701 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
703 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
704 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
705 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
709 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
712 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
716 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
717 * server to the client.
719 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
721 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
725 switch (st->hand_state) {
727 /* No post work to be done */
730 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
731 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
735 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
736 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
738 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
739 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
744 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
745 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
747 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
748 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
749 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
753 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
754 * treat like it was the first packet
759 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
761 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
762 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
763 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
766 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
769 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
770 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
772 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
773 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
774 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
776 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
780 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
781 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
785 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
786 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
787 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
788 * something clever in the record layer for this.
790 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
791 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
792 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
793 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
796 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
797 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
798 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
803 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
805 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
807 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
810 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
814 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
815 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
817 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
822 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
825 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
826 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
830 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
831 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
834 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
836 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
839 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
843 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
844 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
845 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
846 &s->session->master_key_length)
847 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
848 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
853 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
854 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
856 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
860 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
861 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
866 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
870 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
873 * Valid return values are:
877 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
878 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
880 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
882 switch (st->hand_state) {
884 /* Shouldn't happen */
887 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
889 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
891 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
892 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
895 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
896 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
897 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
900 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
901 /* No construction function needed */
903 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
906 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
907 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
908 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
912 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
913 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
916 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
917 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
918 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
922 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
923 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
924 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
927 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
928 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
929 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
932 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
933 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
934 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
937 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
938 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
939 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
942 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
943 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
944 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
947 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
948 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
949 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
952 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
957 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
958 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
959 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
962 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
963 *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
964 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
967 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
968 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
969 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
977 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
978 * calculated as follows:
980 * 2 + # client_version
981 * 32 + # only valid length for random
982 * 1 + # length of session_id
983 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
984 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
985 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
986 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
987 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
988 * 2 + # length of extensions
989 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
991 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
993 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
994 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
997 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
998 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1000 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1002 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1004 switch (st->hand_state) {
1006 /* Shouldn't happen */
1009 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1010 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1012 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1013 return s->max_cert_list;
1015 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1016 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1018 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1019 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1022 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1023 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1026 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1027 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1029 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1030 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1032 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1033 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1038 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1040 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1042 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1044 switch (st->hand_state) {
1046 /* Shouldn't happen */
1047 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1049 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1050 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1052 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1053 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1055 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1056 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1058 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1059 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1062 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1063 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1066 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1067 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1069 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1070 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1072 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1073 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1079 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1082 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1084 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1086 switch (st->hand_state) {
1088 /* Shouldn't happen */
1091 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1092 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1094 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1095 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1097 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1098 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1099 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
1100 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
1101 /* Are we renegotiating? */
1102 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1103 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1104 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1105 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1106 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1107 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1110 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1113 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1115 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1118 int ossl_statem_finish_early_data(SSL *s)
1120 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1121 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
1127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1128 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1130 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1132 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1134 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1135 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1136 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1138 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1141 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1142 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1144 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1151 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1154 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1155 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1156 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1162 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1164 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1165 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1166 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1167 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1168 cookie_leni > 255) {
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1170 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1173 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1175 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1176 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1186 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1187 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1188 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1193 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1194 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1195 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1196 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1198 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1200 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1201 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1202 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1203 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1204 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1205 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1206 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1208 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1209 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1210 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1211 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1212 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1213 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1214 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1215 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1216 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1217 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1218 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1219 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1220 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1222 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1223 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1228 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1230 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1231 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1232 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1236 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1239 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1240 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1242 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1245 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1247 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1249 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1250 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1251 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1252 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1253 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
1255 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1256 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1261 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1267 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1269 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1270 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1272 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1275 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
1276 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1282 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1283 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1284 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1285 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1287 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1288 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1290 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1291 * 7-8 session_id_length
1292 * 9-10 challenge_length
1296 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1297 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1299 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1300 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1301 * in the first place
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1308 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1309 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1314 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1315 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1317 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1318 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1319 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1321 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1324 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1325 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1326 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1328 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1329 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1333 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1334 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1339 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1341 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1342 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1343 /* No extensions. */
1344 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1346 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1347 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1350 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1352 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1353 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1354 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1355 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1357 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1358 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1359 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1360 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1361 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1362 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1363 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1364 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1366 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1370 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1372 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1373 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1374 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1375 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1376 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1377 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1378 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1383 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1384 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1385 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1389 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1390 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1391 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1392 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1397 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1398 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1399 * So check cookie length...
1401 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1402 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1407 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1408 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1413 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1414 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1415 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1419 /* Could be empty. */
1420 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1421 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1423 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)) {
1424 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1431 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1432 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1433 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1434 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1439 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1440 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1441 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1442 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, &al,
1443 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len)) {
1444 /* SSLerr already been called */
1447 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1449 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1451 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1453 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1455 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1456 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1458 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1461 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, int *al)
1468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1469 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1471 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1472 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1473 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1474 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1476 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1477 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1478 /* Give the early callback a crack at things */
1479 if (s->ctx->early_cb != NULL) {
1481 /* A failure in the early callback terminates the connection. */
1482 code = s->ctx->early_cb(s, al, s->ctx->early_cb_arg);
1486 s->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_WORK;
1491 /* Set up the client_random */
1492 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1494 /* Choose the version */
1496 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1497 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1498 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1499 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1501 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1508 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1511 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1512 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1514 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1515 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello);
1516 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1517 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1518 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1525 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1526 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1527 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1529 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1533 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1534 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1535 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1536 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1537 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1538 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1539 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1541 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1543 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1545 /* default verification */
1546 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1547 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1548 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1549 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1553 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1555 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1556 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello);
1557 if (protverr != 0) {
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1559 s->version = s->client_version;
1560 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1568 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1569 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1571 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, al)) {
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1577 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1578 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1580 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1581 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1582 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1583 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1584 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1585 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1586 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1587 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1588 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1589 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1592 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1594 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1595 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1598 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello, al);
1600 /* previous session */
1602 } else if (i == -1) {
1606 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1611 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1612 clienthello->isv2, al) ||
1613 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1614 clienthello->isv2, al)) {
1618 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1619 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1620 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1621 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1622 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1623 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1624 if (s->renegotiate) {
1625 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1627 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1628 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1631 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1632 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1633 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1635 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1636 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1637 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1638 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1639 * an insecure downgrade.
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1642 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1643 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1649 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1652 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1655 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1657 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1658 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1660 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1661 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1670 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1673 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1675 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1680 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1681 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1685 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1687 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1693 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1694 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1695 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1697 /* TLS extensions */
1698 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1699 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, al)) {
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1705 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1706 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1707 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1708 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1712 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1713 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1718 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1719 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1721 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1722 * backwards compat reasons
1724 int master_key_length;
1726 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1727 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1728 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1730 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1731 && master_key_length > 0) {
1732 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1734 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1735 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1739 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1740 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1741 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1742 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1743 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1744 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1749 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1750 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1751 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1752 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1753 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1758 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1759 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1760 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1762 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1764 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1765 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1766 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1768 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1769 /* Can't disable compression */
1770 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1772 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1775 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1776 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1777 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1778 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1779 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1783 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1785 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1788 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1789 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1790 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1793 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1794 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1796 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1799 } else if (s->hit) {
1801 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods
1802 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1803 /* See if we have a match */
1804 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1807 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1808 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1809 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1811 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1812 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1821 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1827 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1828 * using compression.
1830 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1837 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1841 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1842 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1844 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1846 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1847 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1848 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1849 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1854 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1860 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1861 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1862 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1863 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1864 s->clienthello = NULL;
1867 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1869 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1870 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1871 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1872 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1873 s->clienthello = NULL;
1879 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1880 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1882 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
1884 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1887 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1888 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1889 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1890 * influence which certificate is sent
1892 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1893 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1896 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1897 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1899 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1900 * et al can pick it up.
1902 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1903 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1905 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1906 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1907 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1909 /* status request response should be sent */
1910 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1911 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1912 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1914 /* something bad happened */
1915 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1917 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1926 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1928 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1929 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1931 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1932 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s, &al);
1934 /* SSLErr() was already called */
1941 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1943 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1944 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1945 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1947 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1949 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1953 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1956 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1959 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1961 if (cipher == NULL) {
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1963 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1966 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1967 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al))
1969 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1970 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1971 s->session->not_resumable =
1972 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
1973 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1975 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1976 /* do not send a session ticket */
1977 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1979 /* Session-id reuse */
1980 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1984 * we now have the following setup.
1986 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1987 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1988 * compression - basically ignored right now
1989 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1990 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1991 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1992 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1996 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
1997 * certificate callbacks etc above.
1999 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2001 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2008 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2010 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
2012 * callback indicates further work to be done
2014 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2017 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
2019 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
2020 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
2022 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2024 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2027 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2033 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2035 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2036 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2040 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2042 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2046 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
2047 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
2048 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2050 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2051 * tls_process_client_hello()
2053 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2059 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2060 * back in the server hello:
2061 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2062 * we send back the old session ID.
2063 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2064 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2065 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2066 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2068 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2069 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2070 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2071 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2074 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2075 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2077 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2079 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2080 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2085 /* set up the compression method */
2086 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2089 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2092 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2095 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2096 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
2097 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2098 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2099 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
2100 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2102 ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2103 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
2105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2109 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2110 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2111 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2121 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2123 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2124 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2125 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2132 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2135 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2138 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2139 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2142 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2143 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
2146 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2147 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2148 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2150 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2155 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2160 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2162 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2164 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2165 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2167 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2169 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2170 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2172 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2175 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2176 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2177 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2178 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2181 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2184 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2187 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2189 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2190 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2191 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2194 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2199 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2200 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2202 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2205 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2206 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2207 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2209 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2212 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2214 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2218 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2220 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2225 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2227 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2230 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2231 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2235 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2238 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2240 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2244 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2245 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2246 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2247 if (curve_id == 0) {
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2249 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2252 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2253 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2254 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2259 /* Encode the public key. */
2260 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2262 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2268 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2269 * can set these to NULLs
2276 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2278 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2279 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2280 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2281 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2283 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2286 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2287 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2288 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2289 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2293 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2295 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2299 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2300 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2302 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2303 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2308 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2309 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2310 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2313 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2314 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2316 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2317 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2320 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2326 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2327 unsigned char *binval;
2330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2331 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2332 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2335 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2339 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2345 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2346 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2349 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2350 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2353 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2355 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2358 memset(binval, 0, len);
2362 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2363 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2365 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2369 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2373 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2375 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2376 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2377 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2380 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2381 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2382 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2383 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2385 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2388 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2389 encodedPoint = NULL;
2395 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2396 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
2397 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2400 if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) {
2401 /* Should never happen */
2402 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2404 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2408 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2409 * points to the space at the end.
2412 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2413 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2415 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2418 /* send signature algorithm */
2419 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg))
2422 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2423 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2424 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2427 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2428 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2429 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2431 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2434 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2435 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2436 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2442 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2443 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2444 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2445 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2446 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
2447 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2449 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
2450 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2451 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2453 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2458 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2461 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2464 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2467 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2469 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2473 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2476 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2478 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2479 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2480 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2482 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2486 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2487 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2488 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2490 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2495 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2496 const uint16_t *psigs;
2497 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2499 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2500 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2501 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2502 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2504 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2509 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2510 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2515 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2517 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2518 unsigned char *namebytes;
2519 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2523 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2524 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2526 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2528 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2533 /* else no CA names */
2534 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2539 * TODO(TLS1.3) implement configurable certificate_extensions
2540 * For now just send zero length extensions.
2542 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2547 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2551 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2555 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2558 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2560 PACKET psk_identity;
2562 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2563 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2567 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2568 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2572 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2573 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2578 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2579 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2584 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2587 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2588 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2591 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2593 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2595 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2597 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2601 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2602 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2603 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2605 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2606 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2611 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2615 /* Should never happen */
2616 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2622 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2625 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2627 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2628 size_t j, padding_len;
2629 PACKET enc_premaster;
2631 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2634 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2636 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2641 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2642 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2643 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2645 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2646 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2647 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2654 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2655 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2656 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2657 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2659 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2660 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2665 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2666 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2667 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2673 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2674 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2675 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2676 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2677 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2680 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2684 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2685 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2687 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2688 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2689 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2690 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2691 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2694 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2697 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2698 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2699 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2701 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2702 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2707 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2708 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2709 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2710 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2711 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2713 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2716 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2717 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2718 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2719 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2720 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2721 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2724 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2725 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2727 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2728 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2731 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2732 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2733 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2734 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2735 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2736 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2739 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2740 unsigned char workaround_good;
2741 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2742 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2744 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2745 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2746 version_good |= workaround_good;
2750 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2751 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2753 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2756 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2757 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2758 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2759 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2761 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2762 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2763 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2764 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2765 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2768 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2769 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2770 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2777 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2780 /* Should never happen */
2781 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2787 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2790 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2794 const unsigned char *data;
2795 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2798 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2799 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2801 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2804 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2806 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2811 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2812 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2816 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2817 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2818 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2822 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2823 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2827 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2828 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2830 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2832 if (pub_key != NULL)
2837 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2838 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2844 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2845 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2847 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2850 /* Should never happen */
2851 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2857 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2860 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2861 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2864 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2865 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2866 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2871 const unsigned char *data;
2874 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2875 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2878 /* Get encoded point length */
2879 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2880 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2881 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2885 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2886 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2890 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2891 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2897 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2898 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2904 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2905 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2907 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2911 /* Should never happen */
2912 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2918 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2922 const unsigned char *data;
2924 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2925 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2926 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2930 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2934 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2935 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2939 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2940 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2941 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2946 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2953 /* Should never happen */
2954 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2960 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2963 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2964 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2965 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2966 const unsigned char *start;
2967 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2968 unsigned long alg_a;
2971 size_t sess_key_len;
2972 const unsigned char *data;
2975 /* Get our certificate private key */
2976 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2977 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2979 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2981 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2983 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2986 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2988 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2989 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2992 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2993 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2994 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2998 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2999 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3004 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3005 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3006 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3007 * client certificate for authorization only.
3009 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3010 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3011 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3014 /* Decrypt session key */
3015 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3016 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
3017 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3021 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3022 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
3023 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3024 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
3025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3031 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
3032 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3033 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3037 /* Generate master secret */
3038 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3039 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3040 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3044 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3045 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
3046 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3047 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3051 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3054 /* Should never happen */
3055 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3061 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3064 unsigned long alg_k;
3066 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3068 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3069 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3072 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3073 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3074 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3075 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3077 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3080 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3081 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3082 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3086 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3087 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3089 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3090 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3092 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3093 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3095 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3096 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3098 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3099 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3102 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3104 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3108 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3111 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3112 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3113 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3114 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3116 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3117 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3120 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3123 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3124 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3125 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3126 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3128 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3131 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3132 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3134 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3135 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3136 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3138 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3142 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3143 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3148 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
3150 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
3151 /* Are we renegotiating? */
3153 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
3154 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
3155 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
3156 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
3157 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
3158 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
3159 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
3160 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
3163 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
3167 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3169 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3170 * the handshake_buffer
3172 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3173 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3176 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3178 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3180 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3181 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3185 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3186 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3188 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3189 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3194 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3197 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3199 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3201 unsigned long l, llen;
3202 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3203 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3204 PACKET spkt, context;
3207 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3212 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3213 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3214 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3215 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3216 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3217 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3222 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3223 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3224 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3225 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3227 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3231 certstart = certbytes;
3232 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3237 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3238 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3240 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3244 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3245 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3248 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3249 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3253 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3254 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
3255 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3256 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
3257 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3260 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3263 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3270 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3271 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3272 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3273 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3275 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3278 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3279 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3280 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3282 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3283 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3286 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3287 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3292 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3294 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3296 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3301 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3304 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3306 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3308 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3313 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3314 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3315 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3317 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3318 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3321 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3324 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3325 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3326 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3331 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3332 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3336 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3338 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3339 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3340 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3341 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3346 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3350 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3351 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3354 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3358 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3360 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3361 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3369 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3370 * for the server Certificate message
3372 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3373 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
3374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3375 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3382 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3384 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3385 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3386 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3387 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3388 const unsigned char *const_p;
3389 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3392 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3393 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3394 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3395 int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3396 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3398 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3402 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3403 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
3405 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3406 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3407 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3408 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3409 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3410 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3411 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3412 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3413 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3416 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3418 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3421 /* get session encoding length */
3422 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3424 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3427 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3431 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3437 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3438 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3439 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3445 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3449 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3452 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3455 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3457 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3458 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3459 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3463 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3464 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3467 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3470 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3471 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3473 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3474 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3475 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3480 /* Put timeout and length */
3481 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3482 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3483 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3484 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3488 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3489 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3494 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3496 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3498 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3499 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3501 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3502 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
3504 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3505 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3506 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3508 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3509 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3513 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3514 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3515 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3518 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3519 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3520 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3522 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add))
3523 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3524 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3525 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3526 /* Output key name */
3527 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3529 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3530 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3532 /* Encrypt session data */
3533 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3534 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3535 || encdata1 != encdata2
3536 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3537 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3538 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3539 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3540 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3541 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3542 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3543 macendoffset - macoffset)
3544 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3545 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3546 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3547 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3548 || macdata1 != macdata2
3549 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
3551 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3552 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3557 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3558 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3563 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3565 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3566 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3567 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3572 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3573 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3575 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3577 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3578 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3579 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3587 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3589 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3590 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3599 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3600 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3602 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3604 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3605 size_t next_proto_len;
3608 * The payload looks like:
3610 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3611 * uint8 padding_len;
3612 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3614 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3615 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3616 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3621 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3626 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3628 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3630 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3631 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3635 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3639 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3641 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3643 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3650 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3652 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3655 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3656 * (should be s->version)
3658 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
3659 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
3661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3662 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3666 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3667 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);