2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
34 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
38 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
40 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
41 * ignore the result anyway
43 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
44 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
48 if (ret == s->init_num) {
50 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
51 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
60 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
64 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
65 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
67 || !WPACKET_finish(pkt))
69 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
75 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen)
80 if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)
81 || !ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) {
82 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
86 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
88 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
90 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
94 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
96 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i)) {
97 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
102 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
105 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
106 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
107 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
109 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
110 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
111 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
114 if (!ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) {
115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
121 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
122 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
123 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
129 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
132 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
137 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
138 * the appropriate error.
140 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
143 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
144 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
146 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
147 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
150 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
153 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
157 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
162 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
164 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
165 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
166 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
168 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
169 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
170 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
171 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
172 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
173 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
175 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
180 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
181 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
182 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
187 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
188 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
189 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
194 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
195 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
196 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
201 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
202 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
204 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
205 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
209 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
210 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
213 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
217 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
219 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
220 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
221 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
224 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
228 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
229 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
230 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
234 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
236 i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
238 if ((unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
239 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
240 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
244 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) {
245 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
251 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
254 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
255 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
256 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
258 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
259 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
260 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
263 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
265 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
266 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
267 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
270 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
274 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
282 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
286 if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)) {
287 /* Should not happen */
288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
292 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header2(s, &pkt, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
293 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&pkt)) {
294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
298 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, &pkt, cpk))
301 if (!WPACKET_close(&pkt) || !ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
307 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
311 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
313 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
316 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
318 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
319 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
324 /* clean a few things up */
325 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
327 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
329 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
330 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
332 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
336 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
340 if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
341 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
346 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
348 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
349 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
351 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
353 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
355 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
356 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
359 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
360 cb = s->info_callback;
361 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
362 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
365 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
367 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
368 /* done with handshaking */
369 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
370 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
371 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
372 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
376 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
379 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
381 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
382 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
386 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
389 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
390 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
392 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
395 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
398 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
400 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
401 * in the middle of a handshake message.
403 if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
404 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
405 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
406 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
409 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
411 s->s3->tmp.message_size = i;
413 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
414 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
415 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
423 if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
425 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
426 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
427 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
430 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
435 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
436 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
437 s->msg_callback_arg);
439 } while (skip_message);
440 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
443 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
445 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
447 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
450 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
451 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
453 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
454 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
455 if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, (int)l)) {
456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
459 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
461 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
462 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
465 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
466 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
467 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
471 if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
472 (int)l + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
473 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
476 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
478 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
484 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
489 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len)
495 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
496 /* We've already read everything in */
497 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
502 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
504 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
505 &p[s->init_num], n, 0);
507 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
517 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
518 * Finished verification.
520 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
524 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
525 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
526 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
529 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
534 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
535 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
537 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
538 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
539 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
540 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
545 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
546 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
547 s->msg_callback_arg);
551 * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared
554 if (s->init_num < 0) {
555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
556 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
560 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
564 int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
566 if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
569 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
573 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
575 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
581 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
582 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
583 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
584 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
585 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
586 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
591 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
596 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
597 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
598 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
599 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
601 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
602 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
603 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
604 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
605 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
606 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
607 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
608 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
609 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
610 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
611 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
612 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
613 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
614 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
615 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
616 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
617 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
618 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
619 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
621 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
622 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
623 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
625 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
626 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
627 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
629 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
630 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
632 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
633 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
634 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
635 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
636 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
638 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
639 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
640 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
641 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
642 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
643 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
644 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
645 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
647 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
648 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
650 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
651 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
654 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
660 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
662 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
664 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
667 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
669 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
674 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
675 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
680 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
681 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
684 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
685 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
688 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
689 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
690 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
692 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
695 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
697 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
700 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
702 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
705 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
707 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
712 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
713 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
716 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
718 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
720 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
722 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
723 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
724 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
726 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
727 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
733 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
735 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
736 * @method: the intended method.
738 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
740 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
742 int version = method->version;
744 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
745 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
746 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
747 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
749 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
750 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
751 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
753 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
754 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
755 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
756 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
757 else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
758 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE;
764 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
767 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
768 * @version: Protocol version to test against
770 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
772 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
774 const version_info *vent;
775 const version_info *table;
777 switch (s->method->version) {
779 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
780 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
781 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
782 table = tls_version_table;
784 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
785 table = dtls_version_table;
790 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
792 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
793 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
794 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
802 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
803 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
804 * supported protocol version.
806 * @s server SSL handle.
808 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
810 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
812 const version_info *vent;
813 const version_info *table;
816 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
817 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
820 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
824 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
825 * highest protocol version).
827 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
828 table = tls_version_table;
829 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
830 table = dtls_version_table;
832 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
836 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
837 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
838 return s->version == vent->version;
844 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
845 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
846 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
847 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
849 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
850 * @version: the intended limit.
851 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
853 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
855 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
863 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
864 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
865 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
867 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
868 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
869 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
870 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
871 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
873 switch (method_version) {
876 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
877 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
878 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
879 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
884 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
885 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
889 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
890 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
891 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
901 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
902 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
903 * the version specific method.
905 * @s: server SSL handle.
907 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
909 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s)
912 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
914 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
915 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
917 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
920 int server_version = s->method->version;
921 int client_version = s->client_version;
922 const version_info *vent;
923 const version_info *table;
926 switch (server_version) {
928 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
929 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
931 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
932 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
933 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
934 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
935 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
938 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
939 table = tls_version_table;
941 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
942 table = dtls_version_table;
946 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
947 const SSL_METHOD *method;
949 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
950 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
952 method = vent->smeth();
953 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
954 s->version = vent->version;
960 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
964 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
965 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
966 * the version specific method.
968 * @s: client SSL handle.
969 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
971 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
973 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
975 const version_info *vent;
976 const version_info *table;
978 switch (s->method->version) {
980 if (version != s->version)
981 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
983 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
984 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
985 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
986 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
987 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
990 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
991 table = tls_version_table;
993 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
994 table = dtls_version_table;
998 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
999 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1002 if (version != vent->version)
1004 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1006 method = vent->cmeth();
1007 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1011 s->version = version;
1015 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1019 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1020 * @s: The SSL connection
1021 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1022 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1024 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1025 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1026 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1027 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1028 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1030 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1031 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1032 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1034 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1035 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1037 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
1042 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1043 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1044 const version_info *table;
1045 const version_info *vent;
1047 switch (s->method->version) {
1050 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1051 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1052 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1053 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1054 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1056 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1058 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1059 table = tls_version_table;
1061 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1062 table = dtls_version_table;
1067 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1068 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1069 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1070 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1072 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1073 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1074 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1076 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1077 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1078 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1080 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1081 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1082 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1083 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1084 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1085 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1087 *min_version = version = 0;
1089 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1091 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1092 * "version capability" vector.
1094 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1098 method = vent->cmeth();
1099 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1103 *min_version = method->version;
1105 version = (single = method)->version;
1106 *min_version = version;
1111 *max_version = version;
1113 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1115 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1121 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1122 * the initial ClientHello.
1124 * @s: client SSL handle.
1126 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1128 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1130 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1132 ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1137 s->client_version = s->version = ver_max;