2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
194 switch (st->hand_state) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
205 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
206 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
210 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
211 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
217 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
219 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
220 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
223 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
224 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
233 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
235 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
237 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
240 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
246 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
248 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
249 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
250 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
251 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
253 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
254 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
255 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
256 * the server is resuming.
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
261 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
262 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
268 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
269 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
271 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
272 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
277 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
278 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
281 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
291 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
292 * |ext.status_expected| is set
294 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
300 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
301 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
303 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
304 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
306 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
314 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
315 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
323 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
324 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
330 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
331 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
332 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
333 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
336 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
349 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
365 /* No valid transition found */
366 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
372 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
373 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
376 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
378 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
381 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
382 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
383 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
385 switch (st->hand_state) {
387 /* Shouldn't happen */
388 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
390 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
391 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
395 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
396 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
397 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
399 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
400 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
401 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
403 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
404 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
405 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
406 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
411 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
412 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
413 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
416 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
417 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
418 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
419 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
421 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
426 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
427 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
428 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
433 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
434 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
444 /* Try to read from the server instead */
445 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
450 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
451 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
453 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
455 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
458 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
459 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
463 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
465 switch (st->hand_state) {
467 /* Shouldn't happen */
468 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
471 if (!s->renegotiate) {
473 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
474 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
476 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
481 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
485 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
487 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
488 * actually selected a version yet.
490 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
491 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
497 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
499 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
500 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
501 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
503 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
506 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
510 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
511 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
521 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
523 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
524 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
527 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
528 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
529 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
530 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
532 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
537 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
542 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
544 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
546 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
547 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
549 hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
551 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
559 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
572 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
583 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
586 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
587 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
588 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
589 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
601 * the client to the server.
603 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
605 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
607 switch (st->hand_state) {
609 /* No pre work to be done */
612 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
614 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
615 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
616 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
617 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
623 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
624 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
627 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
628 * messages unless we need to.
632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
633 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
634 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
639 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
641 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
642 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
643 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
645 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
646 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
647 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
650 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
652 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
655 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
659 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
660 * client to the server.
662 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
664 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
668 switch (st->hand_state) {
670 /* No post work to be done */
673 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
674 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
677 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
678 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
682 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
683 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
685 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
686 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
687 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
689 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
690 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
695 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
697 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
698 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
700 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
701 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
704 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
705 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
709 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
710 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
711 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
712 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
714 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
715 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
717 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
719 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
722 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
723 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
726 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
730 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
733 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
738 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
742 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
744 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
746 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
749 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
753 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
756 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
757 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
758 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
763 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
764 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
766 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
771 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
775 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
778 * Valid return values are:
782 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
783 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
785 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
787 switch (st->hand_state) {
789 /* Shouldn't happen */
792 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
794 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
796 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
797 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
800 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
801 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
802 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
805 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
806 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
807 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
810 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
816 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
817 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
820 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
821 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
822 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
825 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
826 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
827 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
830 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
831 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
832 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
833 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
836 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
837 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
838 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
841 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
842 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
843 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
851 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
852 * reading. Excludes the message header.
854 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
856 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
858 switch (st->hand_state) {
860 /* Shouldn't happen */
863 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
864 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
866 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
867 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
869 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
870 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
873 return s->max_cert_list;
875 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
876 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
878 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
879 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
881 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
882 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
884 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
886 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
887 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
888 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
890 return s->max_cert_list;
892 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
893 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
895 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
896 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
898 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
900 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
901 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
903 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
904 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
906 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
907 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
909 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
910 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
915 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
917 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
919 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
921 switch (st->hand_state) {
923 /* Shouldn't happen */
924 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
926 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
927 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
929 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
930 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
932 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
933 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
936 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
938 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
939 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
941 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
942 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
944 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
945 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
947 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
948 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
950 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
951 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
953 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
954 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
956 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
957 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
959 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
960 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
962 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
963 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
965 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
966 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
968 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
969 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
974 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
977 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
979 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
981 switch (st->hand_state) {
983 /* Shouldn't happen */
986 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
987 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
991 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
996 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1000 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1002 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1003 /* Should not happen */
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1008 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1009 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1010 if (protverr != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1016 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1017 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1018 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1021 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1023 p = s->s3->client_random;
1026 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1027 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1029 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1032 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1039 i = s->hello_retry_request == 0;
1042 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1043 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0)
1047 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1048 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1049 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1050 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1051 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1052 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1053 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1054 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1057 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1058 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1059 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1060 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1061 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1062 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1063 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1064 * know that is maximum server supports.
1065 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1066 * containing version 1.0.
1068 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1069 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1070 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1071 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1072 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1073 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1074 * the negotiated version.
1076 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1077 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1079 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1080 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1086 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1089 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1090 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1091 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1092 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1094 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1099 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1100 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1101 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1102 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1103 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1109 /* Ciphers supported */
1110 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1114 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1115 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1117 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1128 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1129 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1130 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1131 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1132 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1133 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1134 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1141 /* Add the NULL method */
1142 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 /* TLS extensions */
1148 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1162 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1163 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1164 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1169 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1170 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1171 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1176 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1177 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1181 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1183 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1185 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1186 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1187 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1190 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1192 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1193 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1196 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1198 /* unknown cipher */
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1203 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1204 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1206 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1211 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1212 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1214 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1219 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1220 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1221 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1227 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1228 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1229 * set and use it for comparison.
1231 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1232 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1233 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1234 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1236 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1237 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1239 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1240 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1242 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1247 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1251 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1255 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1260 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1262 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1263 size_t session_id_len;
1264 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1265 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1266 unsigned int compression;
1267 unsigned int sversion;
1268 unsigned int context;
1270 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1275 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1276 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1281 /* load the server random */
1282 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1283 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1289 * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
1290 * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
1291 * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
1293 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 1, &al);
1294 if (protverr != 0) {
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1300 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1301 * message must be on a record boundary.
1303 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1304 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1305 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1309 /* Get the session-id. */
1310 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1311 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1312 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1316 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1317 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1318 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1319 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1321 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1325 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1329 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1331 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1335 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1336 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1338 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1345 /* TLS extensions */
1346 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1347 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1348 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1349 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1350 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1355 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1356 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1357 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL, 1))
1362 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1363 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1364 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1365 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1366 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1370 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1371 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1372 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1373 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1374 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1375 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1376 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1377 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1378 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1379 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1381 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1382 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1383 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1385 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1386 * backwards compat reasons
1388 int master_key_length;
1389 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1390 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1393 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1394 && master_key_length > 0) {
1395 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1396 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1397 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1405 if (session_id_len != 0
1406 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1407 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1408 session_id_len) == 0)
1413 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1414 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1415 /* actually a client application bug */
1416 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1418 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1423 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1424 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1425 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1426 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1427 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1429 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1431 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1432 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1433 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1434 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1439 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1440 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1441 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1442 if (session_id_len > 0)
1443 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1447 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1448 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1449 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1452 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1456 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1459 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1460 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1462 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1463 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1467 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1468 if (compression != 0) {
1469 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1471 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1475 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1476 * using compression.
1478 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1483 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1484 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1486 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1489 if (compression == 0)
1491 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1492 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1496 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1499 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1500 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1502 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1505 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1509 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
1512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1513 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1514 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1515 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1518 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1521 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1522 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1524 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1525 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1527 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1530 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1531 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1532 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1537 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1538 * we're done with this message
1541 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1542 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1543 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1544 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1549 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1550 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1552 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1553 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1554 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1555 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1558 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1560 unsigned int sversion;
1561 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1562 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1566 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1567 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1572 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1575 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1576 * should not be used.
1578 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1579 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1581 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1583 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1587 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1588 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1592 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1593 /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
1594 || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt) == 0
1595 /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
1596 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1597 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1602 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1603 &extensions, &al, NULL, 1)
1604 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1605 extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
1608 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1611 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1612 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1613 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1617 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1618 * ClientHello will not change
1620 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1622 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1627 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1628 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1630 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1631 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1636 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1637 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1638 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1641 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1642 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1643 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1648 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1650 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1651 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1652 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1653 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1656 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1659 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1660 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1662 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1663 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1664 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1665 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1666 unsigned int context = 0;
1667 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1669 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1674 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1676 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1677 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1678 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1679 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1683 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1684 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1685 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1686 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1688 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1692 certstart = certbytes;
1693 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1695 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1699 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1700 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1702 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1706 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1707 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1710 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1711 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1715 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1716 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1717 &al, NULL, chainidx == 0)
1718 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1719 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al,
1720 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1721 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1724 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1727 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1734 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1736 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1737 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1738 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1739 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1740 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1741 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1742 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1743 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1744 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1745 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1746 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1747 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1749 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1750 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1752 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1755 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1758 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1762 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1764 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1765 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1767 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1770 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1772 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1774 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1776 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1780 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1784 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1788 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1789 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1792 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1793 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1795 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1797 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1801 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1803 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1805 s->session->peer = x;
1806 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1809 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1811 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1812 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1813 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1814 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1819 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1823 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1825 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1828 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1832 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1835 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1837 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1839 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1840 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1846 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1847 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1848 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1851 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1852 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1857 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1858 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1859 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1860 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1861 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1862 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1869 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1874 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1877 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1879 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1880 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1881 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1882 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1883 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1888 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1890 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1891 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1893 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1894 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1896 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1897 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1899 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1900 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1901 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1906 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1911 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1912 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1913 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1918 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1923 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1925 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1926 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1927 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1930 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1934 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1935 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1936 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1937 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1942 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1945 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1946 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1951 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1952 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1953 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1955 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1956 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1957 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1958 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1963 /* test non-zero pubkey */
1964 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1965 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1970 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1971 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1977 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1978 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1983 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1984 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1990 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1991 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1996 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1997 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2002 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2005 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2006 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2008 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2009 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2010 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2019 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2024 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2029 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
2031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2033 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2036 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2037 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2038 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2040 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2041 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2046 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2047 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2049 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) {
2050 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2055 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2056 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2058 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2062 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2063 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2068 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2069 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2070 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2071 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2077 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2078 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2081 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2082 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2083 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2084 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2085 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2090 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2095 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2099 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2100 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2101 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2102 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2104 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2106 save_param_start = *pkt;
2108 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2109 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2110 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2113 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2114 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2118 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2119 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2120 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2121 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2123 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2124 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2126 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2127 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2130 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2135 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2139 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2145 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2146 * equals the length of the parameters.
2148 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2149 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2150 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2151 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2156 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2157 unsigned int sigalg;
2159 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2160 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2164 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2166 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2168 } else if (rv == 0) {
2169 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2173 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2175 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2176 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2180 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2181 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2185 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2186 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2187 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2191 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2193 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2199 * Check signature length
2201 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2202 /* wrong packet length */
2203 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2205 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2209 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2210 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2211 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2216 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2217 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2221 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2222 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2223 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2224 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2225 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2230 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2231 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2233 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2238 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2239 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2242 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2246 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2249 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2250 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2251 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2252 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2253 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2254 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2255 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2258 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2262 /* still data left over */
2263 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2264 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2270 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2273 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2274 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2275 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2276 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2279 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2281 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2282 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2285 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2286 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2287 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2289 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2290 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2291 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2293 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2294 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2295 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2296 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2298 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2299 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2301 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2305 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2309 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2310 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2311 &rawexts, &al, NULL, 1)
2312 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2313 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
2314 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2317 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2318 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2319 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2326 /* get the certificate types */
2327 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2329 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2333 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2334 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2339 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2342 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2344 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2348 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2350 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2353 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2354 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2356 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2361 /* get the CA RDNs */
2362 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt, &al))
2366 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2371 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2372 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2374 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2377 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2378 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2383 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2385 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2386 unsigned int ticklen;
2387 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2388 unsigned int sess_len;
2389 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2392 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2394 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2395 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2396 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2397 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2398 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2399 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2401 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2407 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2408 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2409 * be 0 here in that instance
2412 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2415 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2416 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2417 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2418 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2419 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2422 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2423 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2424 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2426 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2429 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2430 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2431 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2435 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2437 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2439 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2442 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2443 s->session = new_sess;
2447 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2448 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2450 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2452 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2453 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2454 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2456 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2457 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2461 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2462 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2467 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2468 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2469 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2471 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2474 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2475 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2476 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2477 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2478 &exts, &al, NULL, 1)
2479 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2480 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2481 exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2488 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2489 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2490 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2491 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2492 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2493 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2494 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2495 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2496 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2499 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2500 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2502 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2503 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2504 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2508 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2510 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2511 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2513 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2514 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2517 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2519 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2521 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2523 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2527 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2528 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2529 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2531 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2536 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2537 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2538 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2540 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2543 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2544 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2545 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2549 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2550 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2551 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2555 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2556 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2560 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2566 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2570 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2571 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2572 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2573 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2576 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2580 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2581 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2582 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2585 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2588 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2591 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2592 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2597 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2598 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2599 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2601 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2602 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2603 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2606 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2608 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2612 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2614 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2619 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2620 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2621 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2622 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2631 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2633 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2635 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2636 /* should contain no data */
2637 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2641 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2642 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2643 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2651 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2653 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2656 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2659 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2660 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2661 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2664 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2669 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2670 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2673 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2674 size_t identitylen = 0;
2675 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2676 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2677 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2680 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2682 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2686 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2688 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2689 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2692 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2694 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2696 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2698 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2699 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2703 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2704 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2705 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2706 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2710 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2711 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2712 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2714 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2718 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2719 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2720 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2722 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2723 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2726 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2728 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2735 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2736 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2737 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2738 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2743 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2748 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2751 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2752 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2753 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2755 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2758 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2760 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2766 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2767 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2772 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2773 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2776 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2780 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2781 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2782 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2783 if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2787 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2788 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2792 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2793 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2794 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2798 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2799 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2803 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2806 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2807 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2812 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2813 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2816 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2817 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2821 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2822 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2826 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2827 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2832 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2836 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2837 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2838 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2840 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2844 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2848 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2850 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2853 /* send off the data */
2854 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2855 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2858 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2859 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2863 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2866 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2870 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2873 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2874 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2875 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2878 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2884 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2890 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2895 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2896 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2898 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2903 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2910 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2911 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2915 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2920 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2923 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2924 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2927 unsigned int md_len;
2928 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2929 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2930 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2931 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2934 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2935 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2938 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2940 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2942 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2944 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2948 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2949 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2950 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2955 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2956 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2957 * certificate key for key exchange
2960 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2962 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2964 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2969 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2970 /* Generate session key
2971 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2973 || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2974 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2979 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2982 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2983 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2984 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2985 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2986 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2987 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2988 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2989 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2990 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2994 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2996 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2997 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2998 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3002 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3004 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3007 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3008 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3013 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3014 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3015 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3016 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3021 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3022 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3023 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3027 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3028 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3029 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3033 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3038 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3041 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3043 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3044 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3049 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3051 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3052 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3053 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3061 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3066 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3068 unsigned long alg_k;
3071 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3073 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3074 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3077 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3078 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3080 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3081 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3083 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3084 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3086 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3087 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3089 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3090 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3092 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3093 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3101 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3102 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3103 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3105 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3106 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3111 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3113 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3116 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3117 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3119 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3121 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3122 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3124 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3131 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3132 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3136 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3137 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3139 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3148 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3149 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3150 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3153 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3156 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3157 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3159 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3160 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3161 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3164 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3165 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3171 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3172 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3177 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3178 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3179 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3181 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3183 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3184 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3187 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3188 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3190 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3191 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3196 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3199 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3202 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3203 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3204 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3205 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3207 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3211 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3212 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3215 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3217 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3218 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3220 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3224 /* We need to get a client cert */
3225 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3227 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3228 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3230 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3232 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3235 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3236 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3237 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3239 } else if (i == 1) {
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3242 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3246 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3247 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3250 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3251 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3252 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3253 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3255 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3256 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3257 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3258 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3264 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3267 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3271 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3273 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3276 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3279 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3280 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3281 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3289 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3290 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3291 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3293 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3295 * This is a fatal error, which leaves
3296 * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state
3297 * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3304 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3308 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3310 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3313 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3315 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3316 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3318 /* we don't have a certificate */
3319 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3322 /* This is the passed certificate */
3323 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3325 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3326 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3332 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3333 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3340 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3342 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3347 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3348 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3356 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3361 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3363 size_t len, padding_len;
3364 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3366 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3367 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3369 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3370 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3375 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3379 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3384 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3386 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3387 /* should contain no data */
3388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3389 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3390 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3391 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3394 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3395 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3396 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3400 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3401 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3402 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3403 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3404 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3409 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3411 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3414 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3416 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3418 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3420 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3421 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3422 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3423 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3427 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3428 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3430 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3431 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
3434 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3435 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3438 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3439 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3440 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3441 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3444 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3448 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3449 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3450 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3451 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3456 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3457 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3461 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3464 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3465 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3466 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3467 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3472 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3473 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3474 # error Max cipher length too short
3477 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3478 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3481 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3482 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3485 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3488 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3490 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3493 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3494 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3496 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3497 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3498 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3501 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3502 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3506 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3508 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3509 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3510 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3513 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3514 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3522 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3526 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3533 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3534 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3535 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3537 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3542 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3543 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3544 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3546 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3556 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3558 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3559 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3561 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3565 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;