2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
163 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
164 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
165 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
167 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
168 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
170 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
171 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
172 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
173 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
175 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
176 /* SSLfatal() already called */
179 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
186 /* No valid transition found */
191 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
192 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
193 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
194 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
196 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
197 * (transition not allowed)
199 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
201 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
205 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
206 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
208 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
209 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
214 switch (st->hand_state) {
218 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
219 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
220 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
224 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
225 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
226 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
232 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
234 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
235 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
238 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
239 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
244 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
246 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
247 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
248 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
251 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
252 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
256 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
257 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
259 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
260 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
261 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
262 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
264 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
265 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
266 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
267 * the server is resuming.
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
272 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
273 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
274 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
275 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
279 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
280 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
282 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
283 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
284 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
285 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
288 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
289 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
292 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
293 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
302 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
303 * |ext.status_expected| is set
305 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
306 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
311 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
312 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
313 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
314 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
315 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
316 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
317 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
324 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
325 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
326 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
327 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
334 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
335 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
336 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
341 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
342 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
347 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
348 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
353 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
354 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
360 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
361 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
362 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
368 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
369 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
376 /* No valid transition found */
377 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
378 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
379 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
384 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
385 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
388 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
390 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
393 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
394 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
395 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
397 switch (st->hand_state) {
398 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
399 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
400 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
401 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 /* Shouldn't happen */
407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
408 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
409 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
410 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
412 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
413 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
414 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
415 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
416 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
417 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
420 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
421 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
422 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
425 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
426 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
432 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
433 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
434 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
438 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
439 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
440 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
448 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
455 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
456 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
461 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
466 /* Try to read from the server instead */
467 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
472 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
473 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
475 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
477 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
480 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
481 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
485 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
487 switch (st->hand_state) {
489 /* Shouldn't happen */
490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
491 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
492 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
493 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
496 if (!s->renegotiate) {
498 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
499 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
501 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
509 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
510 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
512 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
513 * actually selected a version yet.
515 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
522 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
525 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
527 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
529 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
530 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
531 * because we did early data.
533 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
534 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
538 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
540 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
541 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
543 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
544 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
545 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
547 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
548 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
549 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
551 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
552 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
560 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
561 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
564 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
565 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
566 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
567 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
569 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
574 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
575 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
577 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
584 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
585 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
586 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
589 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
592 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
593 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
601 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
603 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
606 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
609 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
611 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
614 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
616 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
617 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
619 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
623 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
625 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
628 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
629 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
630 /* SSLfatal() already called */
631 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
633 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
634 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
636 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
637 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
642 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
643 * the client to the server.
645 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
647 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
649 switch (st->hand_state) {
651 /* No pre work to be done */
654 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
656 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
657 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
658 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
659 /* SSLfatal() already called */
665 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
666 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
669 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
670 * messages unless we need to.
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
675 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
676 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
677 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
683 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
685 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
686 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
687 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
689 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
690 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
691 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
694 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
695 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
698 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
699 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
702 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
706 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
707 * client to the server.
709 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
711 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
715 switch (st->hand_state) {
717 /* No post work to be done */
720 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
721 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
722 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
724 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
725 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
726 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
728 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
729 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
730 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
731 /* SSLfatal() already called */
735 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
736 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
740 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
741 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
746 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
748 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
749 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
751 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
752 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
755 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
756 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
757 /* SSLfatal() already called */
762 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
763 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
765 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
766 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
768 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
769 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
770 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
772 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
773 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
777 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
778 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
779 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
781 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
782 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
784 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
786 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
787 /* SSLfatal() already called */
791 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
792 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
793 /* SSLfatal() already called */
797 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
798 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
801 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
804 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
809 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
813 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
815 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
817 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
820 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
824 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
827 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
828 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
829 /* SSLfatal() already called */
832 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
833 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
834 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
835 /* SSLfatal() already called */
842 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
843 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
845 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
846 /* SSLfatal() already called */
852 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
856 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
859 * Valid return values are:
863 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
864 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
866 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
868 switch (st->hand_state) {
870 /* Shouldn't happen */
871 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
872 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
873 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
876 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
878 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
880 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
881 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
884 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
885 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
886 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
889 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
890 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
891 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
894 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
900 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
901 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
904 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
905 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
906 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
909 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
910 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
911 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
914 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
915 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
916 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
917 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
920 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
921 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
922 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
925 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
926 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
927 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
935 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
936 * reading. Excludes the message header.
938 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
940 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
942 switch (st->hand_state) {
944 /* Shouldn't happen */
947 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
948 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
950 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
951 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
954 return s->max_cert_list;
956 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
957 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
959 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
960 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
962 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
963 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
965 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
967 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
968 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
969 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
971 return s->max_cert_list;
973 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
974 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
976 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
977 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
979 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
981 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
982 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
984 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
985 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
987 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
988 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
990 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
991 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
996 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
998 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1000 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1002 switch (st->hand_state) {
1004 /* Shouldn't happen */
1005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1006 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1007 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1008 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1010 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1011 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1013 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1014 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1016 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1017 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1019 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1020 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1022 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1023 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1025 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1026 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1028 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1029 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1031 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1032 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1034 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1035 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1037 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1038 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1040 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1041 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1043 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1044 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1046 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1047 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1049 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1050 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1055 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1058 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1060 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1062 switch (st->hand_state) {
1064 /* Shouldn't happen */
1065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1066 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1067 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1070 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1071 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1075 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1083 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1084 unsigned char *session_id;
1086 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1087 /* Should not happen */
1088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1089 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1093 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1094 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1095 if (protverr != 0) {
1096 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1102 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1103 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1104 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1105 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1106 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1110 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1112 p = s->s3->client_random;
1115 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1116 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1118 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1121 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1128 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1131 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1132 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1134 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1139 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1140 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1141 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1142 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1143 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1144 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1145 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1146 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1149 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1150 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1151 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1152 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1153 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1154 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1155 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1156 * know that is maximum server supports.
1157 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1158 * containing version 1.0.
1160 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1161 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1162 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1163 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1164 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1165 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1166 * the negotiated version.
1168 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1169 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1171 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1172 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1174 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1179 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1180 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1181 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1182 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1183 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1184 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1185 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1186 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1187 && ssl_randbytes(s, s->tmp_session_id,
1188 sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1190 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1199 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1200 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1201 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1204 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1205 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1206 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1208 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1209 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1214 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1215 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1216 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1217 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1218 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1220 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1225 /* Ciphers supported */
1226 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1227 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1228 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1232 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1233 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1236 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1237 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1238 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1245 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1249 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1250 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1251 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1252 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1253 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1254 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1255 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1257 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1258 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1264 /* Add the NULL method */
1265 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1271 /* TLS extensions */
1272 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1273 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1280 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1285 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1286 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1288 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1289 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1292 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1293 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1295 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1296 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1299 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1301 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1302 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1304 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1306 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1309 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1311 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1312 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1315 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1317 /* unknown cipher */
1318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1319 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1323 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1324 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1326 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1328 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1332 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1333 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1335 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1337 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1341 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1342 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1343 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1344 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1345 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1350 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1351 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1352 * set and use it for comparison.
1354 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1355 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1356 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1357 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1359 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1360 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1362 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1363 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1365 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1366 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1371 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1374 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1375 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1379 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1384 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1386 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1387 size_t session_id_len;
1388 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1390 unsigned int compression;
1391 unsigned int sversion;
1392 unsigned int context;
1394 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1399 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1401 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1405 /* load the server random */
1406 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1407 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1408 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1409 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1410 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1412 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1414 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1418 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1420 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1425 /* Get the session-id. */
1426 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1428 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1431 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1432 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1433 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1435 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1439 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1441 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1445 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1447 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1451 /* TLS extensions */
1452 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1453 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1454 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1455 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1462 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1463 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1464 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1465 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1466 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1470 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1471 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1476 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1477 if (compression != 0) {
1478 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1479 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1480 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1484 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1485 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1486 session_id_len) != 0) {
1487 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1488 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1494 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1495 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1499 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1503 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1504 * are appropriate for this version.
1506 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1507 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1508 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1510 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1516 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1518 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1519 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1521 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1523 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1524 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1528 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1529 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1530 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1531 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1532 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1537 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1538 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1539 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1540 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1541 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1542 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1543 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1544 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1545 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1546 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1548 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1549 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1550 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1552 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1553 * backwards compat reasons
1555 int master_key_length;
1556 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1557 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1560 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1561 && master_key_length > 0) {
1562 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1563 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1564 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1567 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1572 if (session_id_len != 0
1573 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1574 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1575 session_id_len) == 0)
1580 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1581 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1582 /* actually a client application bug */
1583 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1584 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1585 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1590 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1591 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1592 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1593 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1594 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1596 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1598 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1599 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1600 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
1601 s->session_ctx->lock);
1602 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1603 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1608 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1610 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1611 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1612 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1613 * used for resumption.
1615 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1616 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1617 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1618 if (session_id_len > 0)
1619 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1624 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1625 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1627 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1631 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1634 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1635 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1637 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1638 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1642 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1643 if (compression != 0) {
1644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1645 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1649 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1650 * using compression.
1652 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1653 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1654 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1658 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1660 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1663 if (compression == 0)
1665 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1667 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1670 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1673 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1674 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1675 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1678 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1682 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1683 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1688 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1689 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1690 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1693 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1696 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1697 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1699 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1700 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1702 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1704 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1708 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1709 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1710 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1715 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1716 * we're done with this message
1719 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1720 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1721 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1722 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1726 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1727 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1729 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1730 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1733 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1736 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1739 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1740 * should not be used.
1742 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1743 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1745 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1746 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1747 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1748 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1749 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1753 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1756 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1757 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1758 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1762 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1763 * ClientHello will not change
1765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1766 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1767 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1772 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1773 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1775 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1776 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1781 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1782 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1783 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1786 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1787 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1788 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1792 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1794 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1795 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1798 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1801 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1802 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1804 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1805 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1806 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1807 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1808 unsigned int context = 0;
1809 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1811 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1813 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1817 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1819 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1820 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1821 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1823 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1826 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1827 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1828 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1829 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1830 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1831 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1835 certstart = certbytes;
1836 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1839 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1842 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1844 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1845 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1849 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1850 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1853 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1855 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1859 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1860 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1861 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1862 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1863 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1864 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1865 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1866 /* SSLfatal already called */
1869 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1872 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1874 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1875 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1881 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1883 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1884 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1885 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1886 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1887 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1888 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1889 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1890 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1891 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1892 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1893 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1894 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1896 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1897 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
1898 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1899 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1902 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1905 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1909 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1911 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1912 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1914 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1917 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1919 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1922 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1926 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1929 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1930 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1934 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1935 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1938 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1939 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1941 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1942 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1943 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1947 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1949 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1951 s->session->peer = x;
1952 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1955 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1957 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1958 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1959 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1960 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1964 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1968 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1972 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1975 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1977 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1979 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1980 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1981 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1986 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1987 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1988 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1991 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1993 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1994 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1998 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1999 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2000 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2001 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2002 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2003 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2004 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2010 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2016 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2019 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2021 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2022 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2023 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2024 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2026 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2030 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2032 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2033 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2035 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2036 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2038 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2039 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2041 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2042 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2048 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2049 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2053 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2054 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2055 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2060 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2065 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2068 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2069 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2072 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2076 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2077 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2078 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2080 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2084 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2087 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2089 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2093 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2094 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2095 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2097 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2098 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2099 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2105 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2106 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2108 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2112 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2113 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2119 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2120 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2121 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2125 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2132 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2134 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2138 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2144 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2147 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2148 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2150 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2151 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2152 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2161 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2166 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2171 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2175 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2178 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2179 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2180 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2182 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2184 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2188 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2189 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2191 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) {
2192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2197 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2199 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2203 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2205 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2209 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2210 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2211 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2212 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2218 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2219 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2222 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2223 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2224 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2225 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2226 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2231 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2236 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2239 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2240 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2241 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2242 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2244 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2246 save_param_start = *pkt;
2248 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2249 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2250 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2253 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2254 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2255 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2260 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2261 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2262 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2263 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2264 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2267 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2268 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2269 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2272 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2273 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2278 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2279 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2283 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2287 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2293 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2294 * equals the length of the parameters.
2296 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2297 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2298 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2300 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2304 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2305 unsigned int sigalg;
2307 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2309 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2312 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2313 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2316 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2318 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2322 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2324 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2328 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2329 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2332 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2333 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2335 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2338 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2341 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2346 * Check signature length
2348 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2349 /* wrong packet length */
2350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2351 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2355 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2356 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2358 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2362 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2367 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2368 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2369 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2370 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2372 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2376 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2377 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2379 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2383 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2384 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2387 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2388 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2391 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2394 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2395 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2396 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2397 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2398 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2402 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2405 /* still data left over */
2406 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2408 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2413 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2415 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2416 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2419 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2423 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2424 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2425 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2427 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2428 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2429 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2431 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2432 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2433 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2434 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2435 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2436 s->pha_context = NULL;
2438 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2439 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2441 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2442 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2443 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2446 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2448 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2450 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2452 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2453 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2455 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2456 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2457 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2458 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2459 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2461 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2462 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2464 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2466 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2471 /* get the certificate types */
2472 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2474 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2475 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2476 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2479 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2481 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2482 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2483 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2486 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2489 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2491 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2492 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2493 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2497 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2498 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2500 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2502 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2503 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2504 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2506 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2507 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2508 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2509 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2510 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2514 /* get the CA RDNs */
2515 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2516 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2517 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2521 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2523 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2524 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2525 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2528 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2529 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2531 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2534 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2536 unsigned int ticklen;
2537 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2538 unsigned int sess_len;
2539 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2542 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2544 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2545 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2546 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2547 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2548 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2549 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2551 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2553 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2558 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2559 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2560 * be 0 here in that instance
2563 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2566 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2567 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2568 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2569 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2570 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2573 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2574 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2575 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2577 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2580 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2582 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2583 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2587 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2589 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2591 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2594 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2595 s->session = new_sess;
2599 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2600 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2602 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2604 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2605 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2606 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2608 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2609 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2611 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2614 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2615 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2616 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2620 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2621 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2622 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2624 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2627 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2628 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2629 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2630 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2632 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2633 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2634 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2635 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2641 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2642 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2643 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2644 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2645 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2646 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2647 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2648 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2649 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2652 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2653 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2655 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2656 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2657 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2658 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2662 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2664 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2665 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2667 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2668 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2671 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2674 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2678 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2679 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2681 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2686 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2687 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2689 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2692 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2693 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2694 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2695 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2698 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2699 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2700 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2701 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2704 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2706 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2709 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2715 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2717 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2718 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2719 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2722 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2726 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2727 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2728 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2731 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2734 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2737 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2738 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2743 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2744 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2745 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2747 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2748 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2749 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2753 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2754 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2758 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2759 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2760 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2765 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2766 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2767 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2768 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2777 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2779 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2780 /* should contain no data */
2781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2782 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2783 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2786 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2787 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2790 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2795 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2796 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2797 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2800 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2803 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2808 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2809 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2812 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2813 size_t identitylen = 0;
2814 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2815 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2816 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2819 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2821 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2825 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2827 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2828 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2831 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2833 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2835 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2837 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2838 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2842 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2843 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2845 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2849 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2850 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2851 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2853 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2857 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2858 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2859 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2861 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2862 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2865 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2866 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2867 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2874 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2875 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2876 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2877 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2881 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2882 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2887 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2890 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2891 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2892 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2894 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2897 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2899 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2901 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2902 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2906 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2907 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2909 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2913 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2914 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2917 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2921 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2922 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2923 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2924 if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2926 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2930 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2931 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2933 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2936 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2937 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2938 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2943 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2944 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2946 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2949 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2952 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2953 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2955 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2959 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2960 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2961 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2965 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2966 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2970 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2971 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2975 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2976 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2981 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2985 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2986 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2987 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2989 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2991 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2992 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2996 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2999 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3003 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3005 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3007 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3011 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3012 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3016 /* send off the data */
3017 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
3018 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
3020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3021 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3025 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
3026 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3030 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3034 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3039 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3041 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3042 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3043 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3044 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3047 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3049 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3050 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3054 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3056 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3057 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3061 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3062 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3066 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3067 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3069 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3070 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3075 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3077 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3083 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3084 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3088 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3093 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3096 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3097 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3100 unsigned int md_len;
3101 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3102 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3103 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3104 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3107 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3108 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3111 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3113 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3116 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3120 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3121 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3123 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3127 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3128 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3129 * certificate key for key exchange
3132 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3134 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3136 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3137 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3141 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3142 /* Generate session key
3143 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3145 || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3147 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3151 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3154 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3155 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3156 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3157 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3158 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3159 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3160 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3161 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3163 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3166 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3168 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3169 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3170 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3174 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3176 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3179 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3185 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3186 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3187 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3189 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3193 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3194 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3195 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3199 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3200 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3201 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3210 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3213 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3215 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3216 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3219 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3222 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3224 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3225 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3226 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3227 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3228 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3235 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3240 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3242 unsigned long alg_k;
3244 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3247 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3248 * no need to do so here.
3250 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3251 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3254 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3255 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3257 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3258 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3260 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3261 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3263 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3264 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3266 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3267 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3269 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3270 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3271 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3277 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3278 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3280 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3281 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3286 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3288 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3291 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3292 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3296 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3297 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3298 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3305 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3307 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3310 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3311 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3312 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3321 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3322 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3323 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3326 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3329 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3330 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3332 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3333 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3334 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3336 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3337 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3341 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3342 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3348 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3349 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3354 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3355 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3356 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3358 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3360 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3361 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3364 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3365 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3367 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3368 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3374 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3377 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3380 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3381 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3382 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3383 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3385 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3390 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3391 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3394 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3396 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3397 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3398 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3400 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3403 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3407 /* We need to get a client cert */
3408 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3410 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3411 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3413 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3415 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3418 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3419 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3420 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3422 } else if (i == 1) {
3424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3425 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3429 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3430 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3433 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3434 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3435 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3436 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3438 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3439 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3440 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3446 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3447 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3448 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3451 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3453 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3457 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3459 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3460 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3461 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3462 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3464 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3467 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3469 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3473 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3474 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3476 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3481 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3482 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3483 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3485 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3486 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3489 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3496 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3498 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3502 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3503 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3505 /* we don't have a certificate */
3506 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3509 /* This is the passed certificate */
3510 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3512 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3513 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3515 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3516 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3521 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3522 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3525 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3529 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3530 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3532 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3533 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3538 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3540 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3549 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3551 size_t len, padding_len;
3552 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3554 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3555 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3557 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3558 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3559 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3560 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3564 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3570 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3572 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3573 /* should contain no data */
3574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3575 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3576 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3579 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3580 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3581 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3585 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3586 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3587 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3588 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3589 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3594 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3596 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3599 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3602 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3604 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3605 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3607 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3611 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3612 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3614 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3615 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3616 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3620 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3621 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3624 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3625 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3628 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3632 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3633 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3634 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3635 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3640 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3641 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3645 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3648 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3649 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3650 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3651 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3655 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3659 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3660 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3661 # error Max cipher length too short
3664 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3665 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3668 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3669 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3672 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3675 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3677 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3680 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3681 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3683 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3684 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3685 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3688 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3689 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3690 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3694 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3696 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3697 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3698 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3701 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3702 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3710 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3712 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3715 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3722 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3723 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3724 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3726 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3728 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3732 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3733 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3734 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3736 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3737 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3738 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3747 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3749 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3750 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3751 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3752 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3753 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3757 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;