2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
84 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
99 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
124 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
127 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
128 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
132 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
133 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
134 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
137 switch (st->hand_state) {
141 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
143 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
144 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
146 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
147 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
152 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
159 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
170 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
171 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
177 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
178 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
179 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
185 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
191 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
192 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
193 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
203 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
210 /* No valid transition found */
215 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
216 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
217 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
218 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
220 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
221 * (transition not allowed)
223 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
225 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
229 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
230 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
232 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
233 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
238 switch (st->hand_state) {
242 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
243 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
248 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
249 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
250 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
261 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
263 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
268 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
269 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
273 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
274 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
276 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
277 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
278 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
279 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
281 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
282 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
283 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
284 * the server is resuming.
287 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
289 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
290 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
291 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
296 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
297 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
299 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
300 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
301 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
302 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
305 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
306 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
309 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
310 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
319 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
320 * |ext.status_expected| is set
322 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
323 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
328 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
329 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
330 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
331 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
332 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
333 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
341 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
342 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
343 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
351 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
352 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
353 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
358 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
359 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
360 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
364 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
365 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
370 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
371 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
372 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
377 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
378 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
379 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
385 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
386 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
393 /* No valid transition found */
394 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
395 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
400 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
401 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
404 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
406 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
409 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
410 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
411 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
413 switch (st->hand_state) {
415 /* Shouldn't happen */
416 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
418 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
419 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
420 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
422 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
423 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
427 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
428 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
433 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
434 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
442 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
443 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
444 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
446 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
447 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
450 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
452 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455 /* Try to read from the server instead */
456 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
461 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
462 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
464 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
466 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
469 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
470 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
474 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
476 switch (st->hand_state) {
478 /* Shouldn't happen */
479 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
482 if (!s->renegotiate) {
484 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
485 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
487 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
489 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
496 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
499 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
501 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
502 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
503 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
505 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
506 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
509 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
513 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
514 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
516 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
518 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
519 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
522 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
523 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
524 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
525 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
527 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
528 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
530 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
532 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
537 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
539 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
541 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
542 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
545 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
546 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
550 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
552 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
553 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
555 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
561 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
562 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
567 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
569 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
570 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
573 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
579 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
582 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
583 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
584 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
585 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
591 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
597 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
598 * the client to the server.
600 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
602 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
604 switch (st->hand_state) {
606 /* No pre work to be done */
609 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
611 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
612 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
613 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
614 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
620 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
621 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
624 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
625 * messages unless we need to.
629 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
630 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
631 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
637 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
640 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
644 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
645 * client to the server.
646 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
647 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
649 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
651 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
655 switch (st->hand_state) {
657 /* No post work to be done */
660 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
661 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
664 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
665 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
670 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
671 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
675 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
676 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
677 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
678 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
680 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
681 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
683 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
685 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
688 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
689 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
692 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
696 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
699 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
704 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
708 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
710 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
712 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
715 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
719 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
722 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
723 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
724 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
729 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
730 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
735 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
739 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
742 * Valid return values are:
746 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
747 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
749 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
751 switch (st->hand_state) {
753 /* Shouldn't happen */
756 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
758 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
760 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
761 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
764 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
765 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
766 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
770 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
771 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
774 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
775 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
776 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
779 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
780 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
781 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
784 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
785 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
786 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
787 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
790 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
791 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
792 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
795 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
796 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
797 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
805 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
806 * reading. Excludes the message header.
808 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
810 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
812 switch (st->hand_state) {
814 /* Shouldn't happen */
817 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
818 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
820 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
821 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
823 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
824 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
827 return s->max_cert_list;
829 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
830 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
832 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
833 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
835 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
836 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
838 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
840 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
841 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
842 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
844 return s->max_cert_list;
846 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
847 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
849 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
850 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
852 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
854 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
855 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
857 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
858 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
860 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
861 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
863 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
864 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
869 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
871 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
873 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
875 switch (st->hand_state) {
877 /* Shouldn't happen */
878 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
880 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
881 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
883 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
884 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
886 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
887 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
890 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
892 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
893 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
895 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
896 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
898 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
899 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
901 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
902 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
904 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
905 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
907 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
908 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
910 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
911 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
913 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
914 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
916 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
917 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
919 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
920 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
922 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
923 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
928 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
931 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
933 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
935 switch (st->hand_state) {
937 /* Shouldn't happen */
940 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
941 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
944 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
945 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
946 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
947 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
948 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
949 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
950 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
951 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
954 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
955 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
960 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
965 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
969 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
971 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
972 /* Should not happen */
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
977 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
978 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
984 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
986 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
987 * "ticket" without a session ID.
989 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
990 (sess->not_resumable)) {
991 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
994 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
996 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
997 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
999 p = s->s3->client_random;
1002 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1003 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1005 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1008 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1017 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
1021 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1022 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1023 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1024 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1025 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1026 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1027 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1028 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1031 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1032 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1033 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1034 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1035 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1036 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1037 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1038 * know that is maximum server supports.
1039 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1040 * containing version 1.0.
1042 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1043 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1044 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1045 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1046 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1047 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1048 * the negotiated version.
1050 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1051 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1053 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1054 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1060 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1063 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1064 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1065 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1066 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1068 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1073 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1074 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1075 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1076 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1077 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1083 /* Ciphers supported */
1084 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1088 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1089 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1091 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1101 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1102 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1103 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1104 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1105 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1106 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1113 /* Add the NULL method */
1114 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1119 /* TLS extensions */
1120 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1121 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1129 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1135 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1136 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1137 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1142 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1143 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1144 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1149 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1150 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1154 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1156 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1158 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1159 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1160 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1163 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1165 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1166 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1167 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1168 size_t session_id_len;
1169 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1170 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1171 unsigned int compression;
1172 unsigned int sversion;
1173 unsigned int context;
1175 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1180 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1181 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1186 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1187 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1188 if (protverr != 0) {
1189 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1194 /* load the server hello data */
1195 /* load the server random */
1196 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1197 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1202 /* Get the session-id. */
1203 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1204 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1205 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1209 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1210 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1211 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1212 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1214 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1218 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1222 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1224 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1228 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1229 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1231 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1238 /* TLS extensions */
1239 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1240 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1241 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1242 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1247 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1248 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1249 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al))
1254 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1255 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1256 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1257 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1258 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1262 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1263 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1264 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1265 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1266 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1267 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1268 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1269 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1270 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1271 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1273 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1274 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1275 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1277 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1278 * backwards compat reasons
1280 int master_key_length;
1281 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1282 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1285 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1286 && master_key_length > 0) {
1287 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1288 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1289 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1292 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1297 if (session_id_len != 0
1298 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1299 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1300 session_id_len) == 0)
1305 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1306 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1307 /* actually a client application bug */
1308 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1310 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1315 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1316 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1317 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1318 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1319 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1321 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1323 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1324 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1325 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1326 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1331 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1332 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1333 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1334 if (session_id_len > 0)
1335 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1339 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1340 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1341 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1344 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1348 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1350 /* unknown cipher */
1351 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1356 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1359 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1360 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1362 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1363 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1365 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1366 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1371 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1372 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1374 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1375 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1381 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1382 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1383 * set and use it for comparison.
1385 if (s->session->cipher)
1386 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1387 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1388 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1390 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1393 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1395 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1396 if (compression != 0) {
1397 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1399 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1403 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1404 * using compression.
1406 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1411 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1412 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1414 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1417 if (compression == 0)
1419 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1420 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1424 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1427 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1428 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1430 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1433 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1437 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1441 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1442 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1443 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1446 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1449 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1450 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1452 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1453 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1455 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1458 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1459 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1460 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1465 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1466 * we're done with this message
1469 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1470 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1471 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1472 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1473 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1474 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1479 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1480 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1482 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1483 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1484 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1485 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1488 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1490 unsigned int sversion;
1492 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1496 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1497 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1502 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1504 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1505 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1506 if (errorcode != 0) {
1507 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1512 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1513 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1518 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1520 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1521 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1524 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1526 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1528 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1529 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1530 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1531 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1534 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1536 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1537 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1539 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1540 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1541 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1543 unsigned int context = 0;
1545 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1550 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1552 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1553 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1554 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1558 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1559 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1560 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1561 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1563 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1567 certstart = certbytes;
1568 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1570 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1574 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1575 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1577 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1581 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1582 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1585 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1586 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1590 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1592 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1593 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1594 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1597 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1600 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1607 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1609 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1610 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1611 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1612 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1613 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1614 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1615 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1616 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1617 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1618 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1619 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1620 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1622 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1623 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1625 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1628 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1631 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1635 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1637 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1638 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1640 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1643 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1646 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1648 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1652 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1656 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1661 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1665 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1666 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1669 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1670 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1671 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1672 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1673 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1674 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1676 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1678 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1682 s->session->peer_type = i;
1684 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1686 s->session->peer = x;
1687 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1690 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1692 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1693 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1694 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1695 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1700 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1704 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1706 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1709 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1713 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1716 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1718 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1720 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1721 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1727 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1728 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1729 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1732 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1733 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1738 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1739 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1740 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1741 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1742 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1743 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1750 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1755 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1758 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1760 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1761 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1762 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1763 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1764 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1769 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1771 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1772 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1774 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1775 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1777 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1778 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1780 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1781 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1782 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1787 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1788 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1793 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1794 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1795 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1800 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1805 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1808 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1809 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1812 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1816 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1817 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1818 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1819 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1824 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1827 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1828 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1833 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1834 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1835 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1837 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1838 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1839 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1840 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1845 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1846 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1847 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1852 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1853 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1859 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1860 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1865 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1866 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1872 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1873 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1878 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1879 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1884 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1887 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1888 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1890 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1891 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1892 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1901 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1906 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1911 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1915 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1917 unsigned int curve_flags;
1918 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1921 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1922 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1923 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1925 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1926 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1931 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1932 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1934 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1935 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1940 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1942 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1943 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1945 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1949 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1950 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1952 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1953 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1958 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1960 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1961 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1963 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1964 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1965 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1966 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1968 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1971 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1975 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1976 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1981 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1982 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1983 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1984 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1990 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1991 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1994 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
1995 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1996 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
1997 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1998 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2003 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2008 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2012 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2013 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2014 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2015 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2017 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2019 save_param_start = *pkt;
2021 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2022 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2023 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2026 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2027 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2031 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2032 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2033 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2034 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2036 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2037 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2039 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2040 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2043 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2048 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2052 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2055 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2056 * equals the length of the parameters.
2058 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2059 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2060 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2061 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2066 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2067 unsigned int sigalg;
2070 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2071 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2075 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2077 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2079 } else if (rv == 0) {
2080 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2084 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2086 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2087 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2091 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2093 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2094 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2095 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2099 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2101 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2107 * Check signature length
2109 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2110 /* wrong packet length */
2111 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2113 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2117 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2118 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2119 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2124 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2125 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2129 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2130 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2131 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2132 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2133 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2138 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2139 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2140 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2141 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2142 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2143 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2144 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2148 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2149 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2151 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2155 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2158 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2159 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2160 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2161 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2162 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2163 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2164 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2167 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 /* still data left over */
2172 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2173 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2179 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2182 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2183 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2184 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2185 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2188 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2190 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2191 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
2192 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2193 const unsigned char *data;
2194 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2195 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2197 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2202 /* get the certificate types */
2203 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
2204 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
2205 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2209 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2210 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2211 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2212 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2213 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2214 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2218 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
2219 s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
2220 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2222 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2223 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
2225 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2228 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2229 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2231 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2235 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2236 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2237 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2238 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2240 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2241 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2243 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2246 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2247 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2252 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2255 /* get the CA RDNs */
2256 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2257 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2258 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2263 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2264 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2265 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2266 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2268 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2272 namestart = namebytes;
2274 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2275 name_len)) == NULL) {
2276 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2281 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2282 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2284 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2287 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2294 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2295 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2296 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2297 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2298 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2301 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2304 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2307 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2311 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2313 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2316 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2318 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2319 unsigned int ticklen;
2320 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2321 unsigned int sess_len;
2322 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2324 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2325 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2326 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2327 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2329 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2335 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2336 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2337 * be 0 here in that instance
2340 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2342 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2343 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2344 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2345 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2347 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2350 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2352 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2354 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2357 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2358 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2363 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2364 s->session = new_sess;
2368 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2369 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2371 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2373 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2374 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2375 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2377 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2378 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2382 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2383 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2388 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2389 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2390 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2392 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2395 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2396 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2397 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2399 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2400 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2407 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2408 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2409 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2410 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2411 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2412 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2413 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2414 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2415 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2418 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2419 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2421 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2422 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2423 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2427 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2429 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2430 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2432 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2433 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2436 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2438 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2440 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2442 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2446 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2447 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2448 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2450 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2455 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2456 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2457 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2459 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2462 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2463 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2464 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2468 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2469 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2470 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2474 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2475 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2479 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2485 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2489 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2490 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2491 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2492 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2495 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2499 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2500 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2501 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2504 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2507 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2510 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2511 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2516 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2517 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2518 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2520 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2521 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2522 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2525 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2527 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2531 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2533 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2538 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2539 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2540 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2541 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2550 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2552 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2554 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2555 /* should contain no data */
2556 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2561 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2562 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2563 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2570 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2572 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2576 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2577 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2578 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2579 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2582 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2585 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2586 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2587 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2590 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2592 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2595 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2596 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2599 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2600 size_t identitylen = 0;
2601 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2602 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2603 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2606 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2608 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2612 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2614 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2615 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2618 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2620 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2622 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2624 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2625 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2629 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2630 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2632 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2636 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2637 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2638 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2640 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2644 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2645 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2646 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2648 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2649 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2652 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2653 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2654 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2661 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2662 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2663 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2664 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2669 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2674 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2676 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2677 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2678 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2679 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2681 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2684 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2686 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2692 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2693 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2698 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2699 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2702 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2706 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2707 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2708 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2709 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2713 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2714 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2718 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2719 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2720 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2724 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2725 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2729 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2732 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2734 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2738 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2739 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2744 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2745 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2747 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2748 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2753 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2754 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2759 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2764 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2768 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2769 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2770 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2772 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2776 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2780 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2782 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2785 /* send off the data */
2786 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2787 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2790 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2791 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2795 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2798 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2802 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2805 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2806 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2807 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2810 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2816 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2822 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2827 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2828 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2830 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2835 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2842 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2843 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2847 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2852 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2855 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2856 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2859 unsigned int md_len;
2860 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2861 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2862 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2863 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2866 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2867 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2870 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2872 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2874 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2876 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2880 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2881 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2882 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2887 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2888 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2889 * certificate key for key exchange
2892 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2894 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2896 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2901 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2902 /* Generate session key
2903 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2905 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2906 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2911 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2914 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2915 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2916 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2917 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2918 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2919 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2920 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2921 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2922 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2926 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2928 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2929 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2930 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2934 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2936 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2939 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2940 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2945 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2946 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2947 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2948 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2953 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2954 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2955 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2959 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2960 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2961 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2965 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2970 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2973 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2975 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2976 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2981 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2983 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2984 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2985 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2993 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2998 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3000 unsigned long alg_k;
3003 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3005 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3006 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3009 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3010 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3012 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3013 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3015 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3016 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3018 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3019 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3021 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3022 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3024 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3025 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3033 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3034 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3035 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3037 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3038 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3043 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3045 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3048 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3049 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3053 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3054 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3056 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3063 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3064 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3068 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3069 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3071 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3079 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3080 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3081 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3082 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3085 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3088 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3089 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3091 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3092 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3093 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3096 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3097 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3103 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3104 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3109 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3110 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3111 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3113 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3115 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3116 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3119 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3120 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3122 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3123 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3128 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3131 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3134 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3135 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3136 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3137 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3139 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3143 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3144 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3147 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3149 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3150 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3152 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3156 /* We need to get a client cert */
3157 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3159 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3160 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3162 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3164 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3167 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3168 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3169 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3171 } else if (i == 1) {
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3174 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3178 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3179 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3182 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3183 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3184 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3185 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3187 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3188 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3189 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3190 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3196 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3199 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3203 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3205 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3208 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3211 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3212 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3213 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3216 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3217 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3224 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3226 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3233 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3234 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3236 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3237 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3239 /* we don't have a certificate */
3240 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3243 /* This is the passed certificate */
3245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3246 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3247 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3248 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3255 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3257 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3261 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3262 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3264 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3265 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3267 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3271 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3273 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3278 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3279 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3281 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3286 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3287 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3295 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3300 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3302 size_t len, padding_len;
3303 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3305 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3306 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3308 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3309 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3314 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3318 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3323 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3325 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3326 /* should contain no data */
3327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3328 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3329 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3330 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3334 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3335 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3336 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3337 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3338 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3343 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3345 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3348 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3350 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3352 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3354 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3355 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3360 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3362 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3363 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3366 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3367 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3370 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3371 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3372 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3373 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3376 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3380 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3381 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3382 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3383 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3388 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3389 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3393 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3396 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3397 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3398 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3399 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3404 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3405 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3406 # error Max cipher length too short
3409 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3410 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3413 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3414 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3417 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3420 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3422 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3425 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3426 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3428 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3429 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3430 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3433 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3447 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3448 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3449 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3451 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3456 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3457 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3458 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3460 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);