2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "statem_local.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <openssl/trace.h>
26 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
29 DEFINE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
30 DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER)
32 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
33 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
35 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
36 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
37 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
41 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
47 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
49 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
50 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
51 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
52 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
59 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
65 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
67 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
70 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
71 * ciphersuite or for SRP
73 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
82 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
83 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
84 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
85 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
87 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
88 * (transition not allowed)
90 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
92 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
95 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
96 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
97 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
100 switch (st->hand_state) {
104 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
106 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
107 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
116 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
117 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
122 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
124 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
125 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
129 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
130 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
133 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
134 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
140 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
154 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
162 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
163 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
170 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
171 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
172 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
174 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
175 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
177 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
178 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
179 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
180 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
182 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
183 /* SSLfatal() already called */
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
193 /* No valid transition found */
198 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
199 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
200 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
201 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
203 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
204 * (transition not allowed)
206 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
208 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
212 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
213 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
215 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
216 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
221 switch (st->hand_state) {
225 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
226 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
231 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
232 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
233 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
239 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
241 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
242 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
245 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
246 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
251 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
253 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
258 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
263 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
264 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
266 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
267 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
268 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
269 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
271 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
272 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
273 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
274 * the server is resuming.
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
279 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
280 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
281 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
286 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
287 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
289 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
290 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
291 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
295 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
296 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
299 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
300 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
309 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
310 * |ext.status_expected| is set
312 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
313 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
318 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
319 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
320 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
321 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
322 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
323 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
331 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
332 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
333 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
341 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
342 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
343 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
348 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
349 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
354 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
360 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
361 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
362 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
367 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
368 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
369 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
375 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
376 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
383 /* No valid transition found */
384 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
388 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
389 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
392 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
393 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
394 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
395 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
398 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
399 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
400 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
405 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
406 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
409 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
411 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
414 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
415 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
416 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
418 switch (st->hand_state) {
420 /* Shouldn't happen */
421 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
422 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
423 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
424 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
426 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
427 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
429 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
433 * we already sent close_notify
435 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
436 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
438 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
439 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
440 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
443 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
445 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
446 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
447 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
449 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
450 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
453 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
454 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
458 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
465 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
466 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
467 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
468 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
471 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
472 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
473 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
474 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
476 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
481 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
482 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
483 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
485 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
493 /* Try to read from the server instead */
494 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
499 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
500 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
502 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
504 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
507 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
508 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
512 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
514 switch (st->hand_state) {
516 /* Shouldn't happen */
517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
518 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
519 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
520 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
523 if (!s->renegotiate) {
525 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
526 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
528 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
534 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
536 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
537 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
539 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
540 * actually selected a version yet.
542 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
549 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
552 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
554 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
556 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
557 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
558 * because we did early data.
560 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
561 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
562 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
565 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
567 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
568 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
570 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
574 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
575 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
576 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
579 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
583 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
585 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
587 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
588 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
591 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
592 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
593 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
594 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
596 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
601 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
604 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
606 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
608 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
610 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
611 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
613 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
616 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
617 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
619 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
620 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
622 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
625 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
627 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
628 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
629 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
630 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
633 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
635 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
636 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
638 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
641 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
643 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
644 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
646 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
647 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
650 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
652 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
655 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
656 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
657 /* SSLfatal() already called */
658 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
660 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
661 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
669 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
670 * the client to the server.
672 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
674 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
676 switch (st->hand_state) {
678 /* No pre work to be done */
681 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
683 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
684 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
685 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
686 /* SSLfatal() already called */
692 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
693 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
696 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
697 * messages unless we need to.
701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
702 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
703 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
704 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
710 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
712 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
713 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
714 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
716 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
717 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
718 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
721 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
722 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
725 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
726 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
729 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
733 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
734 * client to the server.
736 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
738 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
742 switch (st->hand_state) {
744 /* No post work to be done */
747 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
748 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
749 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
751 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
752 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
753 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
755 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
756 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
757 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
758 /* SSLfatal() already called */
762 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
763 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
767 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
768 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
773 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
775 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
776 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
778 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
779 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
782 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
783 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
784 /* SSLfatal() already called */
789 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
790 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
792 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
793 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
795 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
796 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
797 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
799 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
800 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
804 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
805 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
806 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
808 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
809 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
811 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
813 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
814 /* SSLfatal() already called */
818 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
819 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
820 /* SSLfatal() already called */
824 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
828 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
831 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
836 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
840 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
842 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
844 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
847 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
851 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
854 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
855 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
856 /* SSLfatal() already called */
859 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
860 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
861 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
862 /* SSLfatal() already called */
869 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
870 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
872 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
873 /* SSLfatal() already called */
879 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
883 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
886 * Valid return values are:
890 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
891 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
893 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
895 switch (st->hand_state) {
897 /* Shouldn't happen */
898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
899 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
900 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
903 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
905 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
907 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
908 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
911 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
912 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
913 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
916 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
917 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
918 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
921 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
927 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
928 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
931 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
932 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
933 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
936 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
937 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
938 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
941 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
942 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
943 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
944 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
947 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
948 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
949 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
952 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
953 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
954 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
962 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
963 * reading. Excludes the message header.
965 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
967 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
969 switch (st->hand_state) {
971 /* Shouldn't happen */
974 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
975 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
977 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
978 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
981 return s->max_cert_list;
983 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
984 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
986 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
987 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
989 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
990 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
992 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
994 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
995 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
996 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
998 return s->max_cert_list;
1000 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1001 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1004 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1006 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1008 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1009 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1011 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1012 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1014 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1015 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1017 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1018 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1023 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1025 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1027 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1029 switch (st->hand_state) {
1031 /* Shouldn't happen */
1032 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1033 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1034 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1035 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1037 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1038 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1040 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1041 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1043 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1044 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1046 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1047 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1049 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1050 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1052 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1053 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1055 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1056 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1058 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1059 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1061 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1062 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1064 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1065 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1067 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1068 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1070 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1071 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1073 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1074 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1076 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1077 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1082 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1085 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1087 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1089 switch (st->hand_state) {
1091 /* Shouldn't happen */
1092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1093 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1094 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1098 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1099 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1103 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1108 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1111 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1112 unsigned char *session_id;
1114 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1115 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1116 if (protverr != 0) {
1117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1123 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1124 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1125 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1126 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1127 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1131 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1133 p = s->s3.client_random;
1136 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1137 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1139 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1142 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1149 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1152 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1153 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1154 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1155 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1160 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1161 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1162 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1163 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1164 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1165 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1166 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1167 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1170 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1171 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1172 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1173 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1174 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1175 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1176 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1177 * know that is maximum server supports.
1178 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1179 * containing version 1.0.
1181 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1182 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1183 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1184 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1185 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1186 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1187 * the negotiated version.
1189 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1190 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1192 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1193 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1194 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1195 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1200 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1201 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1202 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1203 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1204 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1205 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1206 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1207 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1208 && RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1209 sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1210 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1211 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1219 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1220 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1221 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1222 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1223 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1226 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1227 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1229 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1231 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1235 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1236 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1237 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1238 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1239 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1241 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 /* Ciphers supported */
1247 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1249 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1254 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1257 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1259 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1264 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1266 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1270 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1271 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1272 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1273 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1274 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1275 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1276 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1278 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1279 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1285 /* Add the NULL method */
1286 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1288 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1292 /* TLS extensions */
1293 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1294 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1301 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1306 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1307 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1309 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1310 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1313 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1314 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1316 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1317 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1320 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1322 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1323 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1325 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1327 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1330 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1332 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1333 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1336 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1338 /* unknown cipher */
1339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1340 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1344 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1345 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1347 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1349 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1353 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1354 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1356 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1358 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1362 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1363 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1364 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1366 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1371 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1372 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1373 * set and use it for comparison.
1375 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1376 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1377 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1378 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1380 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1381 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1383 if (ssl_md(s->ctx, c->algorithm2)
1384 != ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1386 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1387 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1392 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1396 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1400 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1405 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1407 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1408 size_t session_id_len;
1409 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1411 unsigned int compression;
1412 unsigned int sversion;
1413 unsigned int context;
1414 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1419 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1421 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1425 /* load the server random */
1426 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1427 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1428 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1429 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1430 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1432 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1434 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1438 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1440 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1445 /* Get the session-id. */
1446 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1448 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1451 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1452 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1453 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1455 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1459 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1461 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1465 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1467 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1471 /* TLS extensions */
1472 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1473 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1474 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1475 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1476 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1482 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1483 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1484 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1485 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1486 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1490 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1491 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1496 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1497 if (compression != 0) {
1498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1499 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1500 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1504 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1505 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1506 session_id_len) != 0) {
1507 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1508 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1514 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1515 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1519 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1523 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1524 * are appropriate for this version.
1526 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1527 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1528 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1529 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1530 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1536 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1538 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1539 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1541 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1543 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1544 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1548 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1549 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1550 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1551 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1552 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1557 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1558 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1559 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1560 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1561 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1562 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1563 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1564 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1565 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1566 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1568 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1569 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1570 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1572 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1573 * backwards compat reasons
1575 int master_key_length;
1576 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1577 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1580 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1581 && master_key_length > 0) {
1582 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1583 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1584 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1586 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1587 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1592 if (session_id_len != 0
1593 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1594 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1595 session_id_len) == 0)
1600 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1601 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1602 /* actually a client application bug */
1603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1604 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1605 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1610 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1611 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1612 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1613 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1614 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1616 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1617 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1618 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1619 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1624 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1626 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1627 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1628 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1629 * used for resumption.
1631 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1632 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1633 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1634 if (session_id_len > 0)
1635 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1640 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1641 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1642 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1643 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1647 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1650 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1651 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1653 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1654 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1658 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1659 if (compression != 0) {
1660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1661 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1665 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1666 * using compression.
1668 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1670 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1674 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1676 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1679 if (compression == 0)
1681 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1682 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1683 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1686 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1689 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1691 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1694 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1698 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1699 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1704 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1705 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1706 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1710 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1713 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1714 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1716 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1717 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1718 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1721 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1722 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1724 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1726 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1730 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1731 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1732 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1737 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1738 * we're done with this message
1741 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1742 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1743 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1744 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1748 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1749 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1751 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1752 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1755 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1758 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1761 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1762 * should not be used.
1764 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1765 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1767 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1768 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1769 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1770 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1771 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1775 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1778 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1779 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1780 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL
1784 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1785 * ClientHello will not change
1787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1788 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1789 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1794 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1795 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1797 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1798 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1803 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1804 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1805 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1808 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1809 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1810 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1814 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1816 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1817 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1820 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1823 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1824 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1826 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1827 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1828 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1829 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1830 unsigned int context = 0;
1831 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1833 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1834 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1835 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1839 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1841 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1842 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1843 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1845 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1848 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1849 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1850 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1851 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1852 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1853 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1857 certstart = certbytes;
1858 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1861 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1864 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1866 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1867 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1871 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1872 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1875 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1877 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1881 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1882 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1883 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1884 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1885 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1886 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1887 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1888 /* SSLfatal already called */
1891 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1894 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1896 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1897 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1903 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1905 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1906 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1907 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1908 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1909 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1910 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1911 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1912 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1913 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1914 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1915 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1916 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1918 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1919 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1920 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1921 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1924 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1927 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1931 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1933 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1934 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1936 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1939 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1941 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1944 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1948 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1951 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1952 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1956 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1957 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1960 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1961 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1964 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1965 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1969 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1971 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1973 s->session->peer = x;
1974 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1977 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1979 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1980 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1981 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1982 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1986 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1990 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1994 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1997 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1999 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2001 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
2002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2003 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2008 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2009 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2010 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2013 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2014 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2015 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2016 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2020 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2021 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2022 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2023 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2024 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2032 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2033 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2038 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2041 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2043 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2044 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2045 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2046 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2048 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2052 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2054 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2055 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2057 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2058 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2060 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2061 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2063 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2064 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2070 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2071 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2075 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2076 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2077 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2082 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2087 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2090 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2091 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2094 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2098 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2099 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2100 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2102 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2106 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2109 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2110 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2111 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2115 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2116 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2117 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2119 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2120 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2121 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2127 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2128 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2130 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2134 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2135 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2141 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2143 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2147 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2154 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2161 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2162 0, EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(peer_tmp))) {
2163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2164 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2168 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2171 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2172 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2174 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2175 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2176 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2185 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2190 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2195 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2197 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2199 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2202 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2203 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2204 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2206 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2208 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2212 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2213 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2215 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2216 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2222 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2224 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2228 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2230 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2234 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2235 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2236 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2237 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2243 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2244 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2247 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2248 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2249 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2250 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2251 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2256 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2261 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2264 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2265 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2266 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2267 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2269 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2271 save_param_start = *pkt;
2273 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2274 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2275 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2278 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2279 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2280 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2285 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2286 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2287 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2288 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2289 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2292 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2293 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2294 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2297 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2298 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2299 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2304 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2308 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2311 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2317 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2318 * equals the length of the parameters.
2320 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2321 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2322 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2324 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2328 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2329 unsigned int sigalg;
2331 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2332 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2333 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2336 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2337 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2340 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2342 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2346 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2348 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2351 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2352 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2353 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
2355 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2356 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2358 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2362 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2363 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2365 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2369 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, &pctx,
2370 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md),
2371 s->ctx->propq, pkey, s->ctx->libctx) <= 0) {
2372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2376 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2377 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2378 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2379 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2381 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2385 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2386 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2388 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2392 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2393 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2397 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2400 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2403 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2404 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2405 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2406 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2407 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2411 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2414 /* still data left over */
2415 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2417 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2422 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2424 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2425 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2428 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2432 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2433 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2434 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2436 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2437 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2438 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2440 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2442 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2443 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2446 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2449 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2450 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2451 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2452 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2453 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2454 s->pha_context = NULL;
2456 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2457 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2459 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2460 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2461 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2464 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2466 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2468 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2470 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2471 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2473 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2474 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2475 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2476 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2477 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2479 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2480 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2482 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2484 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2489 /* get the certificate types */
2490 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2492 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2493 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2494 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2497 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2499 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2500 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2501 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2504 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2507 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2508 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2509 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2510 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2511 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2515 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2516 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2518 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2520 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2521 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2522 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2524 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2526 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2527 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2528 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2532 /* get the CA RDNs */
2533 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2534 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2535 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2539 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2540 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2541 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2542 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2543 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2546 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2547 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2550 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2551 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2552 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2553 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2554 * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2557 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2558 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2560 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2563 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2565 unsigned int ticklen;
2566 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2567 unsigned int sess_len;
2568 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2570 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2572 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2574 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2576 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2577 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2578 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2579 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2580 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2581 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2582 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2587 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2588 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2589 * be 0 here in that instance
2592 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2595 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2596 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2597 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2598 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2599 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2602 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2603 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2606 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2609 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2611 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2612 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2616 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2617 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2619 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2620 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2621 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2623 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2626 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2627 s->session = new_sess;
2631 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2632 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2634 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2636 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2637 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2638 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2640 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2641 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2642 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2643 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2646 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2647 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2648 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2652 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2653 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2654 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2656 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2659 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2660 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2662 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2663 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2667 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2668 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2670 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2671 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2672 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2673 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2679 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2680 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2681 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2682 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2683 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2684 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2685 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2686 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2689 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq);
2690 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2692 SSL_R_ALGORITHM_FETCH_FAILED);
2696 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2697 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2699 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2700 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2706 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2708 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2709 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2711 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2712 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2713 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2714 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
2716 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2718 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2719 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2720 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2721 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2722 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2725 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2727 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2729 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2730 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2731 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2732 s->session->master_key,
2734 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2737 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2740 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2741 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2744 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2746 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2748 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2752 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2753 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2755 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2760 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2761 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2763 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2766 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2767 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2769 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2772 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2773 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2775 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2778 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2780 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2783 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2789 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2791 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2792 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2793 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2796 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2800 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2801 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2802 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2805 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2808 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2811 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2812 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2817 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2818 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2819 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2821 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2822 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2823 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2827 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2828 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2833 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2834 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2839 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2840 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2841 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2842 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2851 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2853 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2854 /* should contain no data */
2855 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2856 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2857 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2860 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2861 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2864 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2869 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2870 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2871 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2874 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2877 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2882 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2883 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2886 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2887 size_t identitylen = 0;
2888 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2889 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2890 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2893 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2895 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2899 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2901 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2902 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2905 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2906 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2907 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2909 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2911 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2912 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2916 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2917 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2919 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2923 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2924 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2925 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2927 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2931 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2932 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2933 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2935 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2936 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2939 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2941 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2948 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2949 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2950 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2951 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2961 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2964 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2965 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2966 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2968 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2971 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2973 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2975 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2976 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2980 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2981 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2983 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2987 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2988 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2990 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2991 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2995 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2996 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2997 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2998 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3000 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3004 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3005 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3007 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3011 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pkey, s->ctx->propq);
3012 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
3013 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3014 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3018 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
3019 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3020 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3021 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3024 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3027 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3028 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3029 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3034 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3035 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3036 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3040 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3041 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3045 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3046 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3050 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3051 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3056 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3058 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3060 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
3061 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3062 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3064 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3066 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3067 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3071 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3074 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3078 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3080 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3082 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3086 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3087 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3091 /* send off the data */
3092 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
3093 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
3095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3096 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3100 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
3101 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3105 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3109 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3114 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3117 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3118 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3119 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3122 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3129 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3131 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3132 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3136 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3137 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3141 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3142 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3144 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3150 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3152 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3158 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3159 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3163 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3168 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3171 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3172 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3175 unsigned int md_len;
3176 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3177 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3178 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3179 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3182 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3183 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3186 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3188 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3189 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3191 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3195 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx,
3196 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3198 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3200 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3204 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3205 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3206 * certificate key for key exchange
3209 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3211 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3214 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3218 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3219 /* Generate session key
3220 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3222 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3224 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3228 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3231 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3232 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3233 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3234 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3235 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3236 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3237 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3238 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3240 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3243 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3245 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3246 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3251 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3253 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3256 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3262 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3263 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3264 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3266 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3270 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3271 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3272 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3276 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3277 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3278 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3282 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3288 int gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL *s)
3290 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3291 return NID_magma_ctr;
3292 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3293 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3298 int gost_ukm(const SSL *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3300 EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL;
3301 unsigned int md_len;
3302 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, s->ctx->propq);
3307 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3308 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3309 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3310 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3311 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3312 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3313 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3317 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3318 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3323 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3326 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3327 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32], tmp[255];
3328 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3330 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3333 int cipher_nid = gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3335 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3337 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3341 if (gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3347 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3349 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3352 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3356 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3358 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3362 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3363 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3364 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3366 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3370 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), s->ctx->propq);
3371 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3373 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3377 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 ) {
3378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3379 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3383 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3384 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3385 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) < 0) {
3386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3391 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3392 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) < 0) {
3393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3399 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3405 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3407 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3411 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3412 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3413 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3417 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3418 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3421 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3422 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3427 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3430 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3432 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3433 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3436 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3439 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3441 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3442 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3443 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3445 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3452 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3457 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3459 unsigned long alg_k;
3461 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3464 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3465 * no need to do so here.
3467 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3468 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3471 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3472 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3474 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3475 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3477 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3478 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3480 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3481 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3483 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3484 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3486 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3487 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3489 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3490 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3491 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3497 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3498 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3500 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3501 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3506 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3508 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3511 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3512 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3516 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3517 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3518 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3525 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3527 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3530 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3531 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3532 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3542 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3543 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3547 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3550 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3551 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3553 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3554 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3555 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3558 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3559 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3560 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3561 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3562 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3563 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3567 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3568 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3574 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3575 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3580 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3581 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3582 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3584 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3586 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3587 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3590 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3591 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3593 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3594 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3599 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3602 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3605 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3606 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3607 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3608 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3610 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3615 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3616 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3619 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3621 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3622 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3623 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3625 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3628 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3632 /* We need to get a client cert */
3633 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3635 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3636 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3638 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3640 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3643 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3644 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3645 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3647 } else if (i == 1) {
3649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3650 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3654 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3655 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3658 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3659 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3660 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3661 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3663 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3664 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3665 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3671 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3672 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3673 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3676 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3678 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3682 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3684 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3685 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3686 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3687 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3689 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3692 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3694 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3698 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3699 (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3706 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3707 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3708 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3710 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3711 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3714 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3721 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3723 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3727 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3728 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3730 /* we don't have a certificate */
3731 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3734 /* This is the passed certificate */
3735 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3737 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3738 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3739 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3740 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3741 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3746 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3747 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3749 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3750 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3755 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3757 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3758 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3763 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3765 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3774 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3776 size_t len, padding_len;
3777 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3779 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3780 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3782 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3783 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3785 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3789 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3795 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3797 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3798 /* should contain no data */
3799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3800 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3801 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3804 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3805 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3806 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3810 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3811 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3812 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3813 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3814 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3819 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3821 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3824 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3827 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3829 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3830 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3831 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3832 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3836 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3837 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3839 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3840 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3841 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3845 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3846 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3849 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3850 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3853 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3857 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3858 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3859 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3860 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3865 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3866 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3870 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3873 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3874 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3876 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3877 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3879 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3889 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3890 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3891 # error Max cipher length too short
3894 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3895 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3898 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3899 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3902 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3905 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3907 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3910 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3911 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3913 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3914 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3915 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3918 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3920 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3924 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3926 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3927 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3928 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
3931 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
3932 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3940 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3941 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3942 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3945 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3952 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3953 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3954 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3956 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3958 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3962 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3963 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3964 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3966 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3968 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3977 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3979 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3980 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3981 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3982 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3983 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3987 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;