2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
194 switch (st->hand_state) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
205 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
206 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
210 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
211 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
217 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
219 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
220 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
223 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
224 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
233 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
235 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
237 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
240 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
246 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
248 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
249 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
250 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
251 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
253 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
254 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
255 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
256 * the server is resuming.
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
261 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
262 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
268 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
269 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
271 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
272 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
277 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
278 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
281 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
291 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
292 * |ext.status_expected| is set
294 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
300 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
301 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
303 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
304 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
306 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
314 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
315 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
323 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
324 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
330 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
331 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
332 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
333 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
336 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
349 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
365 /* No valid transition found */
366 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
367 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
372 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
373 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
376 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
378 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
381 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
382 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
383 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
385 switch (st->hand_state) {
387 /* Shouldn't happen */
388 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
390 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
391 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
395 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
396 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
397 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
399 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
400 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
401 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
403 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
404 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
405 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
406 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
411 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
412 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
413 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
416 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
417 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
418 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
419 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
421 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
426 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
427 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
428 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
433 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
434 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
444 /* Try to read from the server instead */
445 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
450 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
451 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
453 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
455 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
458 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
459 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
463 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
465 switch (st->hand_state) {
467 /* Shouldn't happen */
468 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
471 if (!s->renegotiate) {
473 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
474 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
476 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
481 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
485 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
487 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
488 * actually selected a version yet.
490 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
491 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
497 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
499 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
500 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
501 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
503 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
506 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
510 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
511 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
521 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
523 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
524 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
527 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
528 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
529 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
530 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
532 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
533 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
537 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
542 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
544 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
546 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
547 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
549 hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
551 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
559 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
572 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
583 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
586 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
587 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
588 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
589 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
595 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
601 * the client to the server.
603 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
605 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
607 switch (st->hand_state) {
609 /* No pre work to be done */
612 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
614 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
615 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
616 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
617 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
623 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
624 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
627 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
628 * messages unless we need to.
632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
633 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
634 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
639 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
641 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
642 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
643 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
645 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
646 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
647 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
650 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
652 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
655 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
659 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
660 * client to the server.
662 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
664 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
668 switch (st->hand_state) {
670 /* No post work to be done */
673 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
674 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
677 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
678 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
682 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
683 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
685 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
686 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
687 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
689 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
690 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
695 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
697 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
698 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
700 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
701 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
704 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
705 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
709 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
710 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
711 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
712 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
714 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
715 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
717 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
719 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
722 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
723 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
726 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
730 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
733 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
738 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
742 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
744 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
746 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
749 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
753 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
756 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
757 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
758 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
763 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
764 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
766 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
771 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
775 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
778 * Valid return values are:
782 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
783 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
785 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
787 switch (st->hand_state) {
789 /* Shouldn't happen */
792 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
794 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
796 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
797 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
800 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
801 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
802 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
805 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
806 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
807 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
810 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
816 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
817 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
820 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
821 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
822 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
825 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
826 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
827 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
830 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
831 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
832 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
833 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
836 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
837 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
838 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
841 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
842 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
843 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
851 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
852 * reading. Excludes the message header.
854 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
856 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
858 switch (st->hand_state) {
860 /* Shouldn't happen */
863 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
864 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
866 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
867 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
869 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
870 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
873 return s->max_cert_list;
875 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
876 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
878 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
879 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
881 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
882 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
884 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
886 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
887 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
888 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
890 return s->max_cert_list;
892 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
893 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
895 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
896 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
898 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
900 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
901 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
903 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
904 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
906 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
907 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
909 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
910 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
915 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
917 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
919 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
921 switch (st->hand_state) {
923 /* Shouldn't happen */
924 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
926 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
927 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
929 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
930 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
932 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
933 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
936 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
938 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
939 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
941 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
942 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
944 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
945 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
947 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
948 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
950 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
951 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
953 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
954 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
956 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
957 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
959 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
960 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
962 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
963 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
965 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
966 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
968 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
969 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
974 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
977 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
979 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
981 switch (st->hand_state) {
983 /* Shouldn't happen */
986 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
987 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
991 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
996 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1000 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1002 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1003 /* Should not happen */
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1008 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1009 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1010 if (protverr != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1016 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1017 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1018 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1021 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1023 p = s->s3->client_random;
1026 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1027 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1029 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1032 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1039 i = s->hello_retry_request == 0;
1042 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1043 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0)
1047 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1048 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1049 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1050 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1051 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1052 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1053 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1054 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1057 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1058 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1059 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1060 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1061 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1062 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1063 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1064 * know that is maximum server supports.
1065 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1066 * containing version 1.0.
1068 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1069 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1070 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1071 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1072 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1073 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1074 * the negotiated version.
1076 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1077 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1079 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1080 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1086 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1089 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1090 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1091 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1092 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1094 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1099 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1100 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1101 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1102 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1103 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1109 /* Ciphers supported */
1110 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1114 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1115 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1117 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1128 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1129 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1130 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1131 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1132 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1133 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1134 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1141 /* Add the NULL method */
1142 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 /* TLS extensions */
1148 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1149 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1162 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1163 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1164 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1169 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1170 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1171 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1176 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1177 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1181 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1183 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1185 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1186 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1187 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1190 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1192 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1193 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1196 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1198 /* unknown cipher */
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1203 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1204 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1206 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1211 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1212 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1214 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1219 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1220 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1221 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1227 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1228 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1229 * set and use it for comparison.
1231 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1232 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1233 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1234 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1236 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1237 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1239 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1240 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1242 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1247 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1251 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1255 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1260 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1262 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1263 size_t session_id_len;
1264 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1265 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1266 unsigned int compression;
1267 unsigned int sversion;
1268 unsigned int context;
1270 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1275 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1276 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1281 /* load the server random */
1282 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1283 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1289 * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
1290 * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
1291 * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
1293 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 1, &al);
1294 if (protverr != 0) {
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1300 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1301 * message must be on a record boundary.
1303 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1304 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1305 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1309 /* Get the session-id. */
1310 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1311 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1312 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1316 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1317 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1318 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1319 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1321 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1325 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1329 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1331 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1335 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1336 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1338 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1345 /* TLS extensions */
1346 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1347 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1348 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1349 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1350 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1355 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1356 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1357 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL, 1))
1362 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1363 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1364 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1365 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1366 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1370 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1371 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1372 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1373 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1374 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1375 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1376 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1377 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1378 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1379 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1381 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1382 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1383 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1385 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1386 * backwards compat reasons
1388 int master_key_length;
1389 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1390 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1393 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1394 && master_key_length > 0) {
1395 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1396 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1397 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1405 if (session_id_len != 0
1406 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1407 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1408 session_id_len) == 0)
1413 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1414 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1415 /* actually a client application bug */
1416 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1418 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1423 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1424 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1425 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1426 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1427 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1429 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1431 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1432 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1433 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1434 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1439 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1440 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1441 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1442 if (session_id_len > 0)
1443 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1447 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1448 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1449 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1452 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1456 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1459 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1460 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1462 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1463 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1467 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1468 if (compression != 0) {
1469 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1471 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1475 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1476 * using compression.
1478 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1483 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1484 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1486 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1489 if (compression == 0)
1491 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1492 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1496 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1499 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1500 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1502 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1505 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1509 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
1512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1513 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1514 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1515 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1518 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1521 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1522 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1524 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1525 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1527 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1530 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1531 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1532 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1537 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1538 * we're done with this message
1541 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1542 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1543 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1544 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1549 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1550 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1552 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1553 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1554 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1555 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1558 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1560 unsigned int sversion;
1561 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1562 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1566 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1567 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1572 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT clause before release */
1573 if (sversion != TLS1_3_VERSION && sversion != TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) {
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1575 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1579 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1582 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1583 * should not be used.
1585 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1586 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1588 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1590 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1594 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1595 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1599 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1600 /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
1601 || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt) == 0
1602 /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
1603 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1604 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1609 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1610 &extensions, &al, NULL, 1)
1611 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1612 extensions, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
1615 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1618 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1619 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1620 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1624 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1625 * ClientHello will not change
1627 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1629 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1634 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1635 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1637 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1638 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1643 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1644 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1645 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1648 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1649 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1650 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1655 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1657 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1658 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1659 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1660 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1663 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1666 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1667 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1669 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1670 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1671 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1672 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1673 unsigned int context = 0;
1674 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1676 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1681 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1683 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1684 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1685 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1686 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1690 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1691 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1692 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1693 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1695 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1699 certstart = certbytes;
1700 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1702 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1706 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1707 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1709 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1713 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1714 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1717 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1718 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1722 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1723 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1724 &al, NULL, chainidx == 0)
1725 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1726 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al,
1727 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1728 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1731 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1734 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1741 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1743 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1744 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1745 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1746 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1747 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1748 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1749 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1750 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1751 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1752 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1753 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1754 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1756 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1757 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1759 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1762 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1765 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1769 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1771 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1772 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1774 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1777 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1779 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1781 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1782 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1783 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1787 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1790 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1791 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1795 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1796 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1799 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1800 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1802 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1804 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1808 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1810 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1812 s->session->peer = x;
1813 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1816 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1818 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1819 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1820 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1821 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1826 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1830 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1832 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1835 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1839 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1842 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1844 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1846 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1847 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1853 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1854 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1855 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1858 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1859 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1864 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1865 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1866 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1867 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1868 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1869 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1876 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1881 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1884 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1886 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1887 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1888 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1889 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1890 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1895 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1897 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1898 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1900 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1901 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1903 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1904 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1906 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1907 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1908 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1909 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1913 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1918 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1919 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1920 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1925 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1930 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1932 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1933 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1934 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1937 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1941 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1942 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1943 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1944 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1949 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1952 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1953 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1958 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1959 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1960 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1962 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1963 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1964 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1965 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1970 /* test non-zero pubkey */
1971 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1972 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1977 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1978 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1984 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1985 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1990 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1991 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1997 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1998 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2003 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2004 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2009 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2012 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2013 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2015 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2016 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2017 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2026 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2031 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2036 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
2038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2040 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2043 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2044 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2045 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2047 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2048 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2053 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2054 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2056 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) {
2057 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2062 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2063 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2065 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2069 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2070 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2075 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2076 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2077 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2078 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2084 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2085 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2088 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2089 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2090 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2091 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2092 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2097 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2102 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2106 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2107 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2108 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2109 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2111 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2113 save_param_start = *pkt;
2115 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2116 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2117 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2120 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2121 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2125 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2126 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2127 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2128 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2130 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2131 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2133 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2134 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2137 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2142 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2146 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2152 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2153 * equals the length of the parameters.
2155 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2156 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2157 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2158 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2163 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2164 unsigned int sigalg;
2166 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2167 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2171 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2173 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2175 } else if (rv == 0) {
2176 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2180 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2182 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2183 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2187 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2188 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2192 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2193 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2194 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2198 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2200 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2206 * Check signature length
2208 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2209 /* wrong packet length */
2210 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2212 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2216 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2217 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2218 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2223 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2224 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2228 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2229 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2230 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2231 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2232 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2233 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2237 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2238 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2240 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2245 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2246 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2249 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2253 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2256 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2257 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2258 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2259 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2260 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2261 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2262 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2265 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2269 /* still data left over */
2270 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2271 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2277 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2280 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2281 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2282 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2283 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2286 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2288 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2289 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2292 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2293 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2294 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2296 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2297 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2298 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2300 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2301 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2302 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2303 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2305 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2306 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2308 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2312 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2313 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2316 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2317 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2318 &rawexts, &al, NULL, 1)
2319 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2320 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
2321 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2324 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2325 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2326 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2333 /* get the certificate types */
2334 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2336 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2340 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2341 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2346 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2349 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2351 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2355 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2357 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2360 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2361 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2363 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2368 /* get the CA RDNs */
2369 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt, &al))
2373 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2378 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2379 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2381 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2384 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2385 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2390 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2392 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2393 unsigned int ticklen;
2394 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2395 unsigned int sess_len;
2396 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2399 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2401 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2402 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2403 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2404 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2405 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2406 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2408 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2414 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2415 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2416 * be 0 here in that instance
2419 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2422 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2423 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2424 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2425 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2426 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2429 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2430 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2431 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2433 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2436 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2437 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2442 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2444 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2446 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2449 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2450 s->session = new_sess;
2454 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2455 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2457 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2459 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2460 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2461 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2463 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2464 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2468 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2469 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2474 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2475 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2476 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2478 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2481 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2482 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2483 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2484 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2485 &exts, &al, NULL, 1)
2486 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2487 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2488 exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2495 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2496 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2497 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2498 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2499 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2500 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2501 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2502 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2503 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2506 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2507 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2509 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2510 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2511 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2515 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2517 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2518 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2520 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2521 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2524 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2526 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2528 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2530 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2534 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2535 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2536 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2538 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2543 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2544 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2545 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2547 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2550 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2551 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2552 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2556 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2557 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2558 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2562 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2563 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2567 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2573 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2577 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2578 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2579 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2580 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2583 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2587 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2588 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2589 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2592 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2595 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2598 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2599 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2604 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2605 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2606 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2608 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2609 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2610 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2613 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2614 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2615 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2619 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2621 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2626 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2627 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2628 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2629 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2638 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2640 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2642 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2643 /* should contain no data */
2644 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2649 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2650 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2658 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2660 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2663 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2666 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2667 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2668 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2671 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2676 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2677 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2680 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2681 size_t identitylen = 0;
2682 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2683 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2684 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2687 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2689 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2693 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2695 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2696 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2699 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2701 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2703 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2705 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2706 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2710 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2711 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2713 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2717 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2718 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2719 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2721 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2725 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2726 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2727 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2729 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2730 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2733 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2735 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2742 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2743 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2744 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2745 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2750 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2755 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2758 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2759 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2760 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2762 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2765 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2767 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2773 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2774 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2779 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2780 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2783 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2787 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2788 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2789 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2790 if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2794 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2795 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2799 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2800 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2801 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2805 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2806 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2810 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2813 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2814 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2819 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2820 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2823 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2824 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2828 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2829 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2833 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2834 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2839 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2843 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2844 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2845 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2847 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2851 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2855 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2857 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2860 /* send off the data */
2861 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2862 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2865 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2866 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2870 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2873 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2877 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2879 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2880 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2881 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2882 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2885 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2891 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2897 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2902 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2903 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2905 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2910 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2917 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2918 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2922 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2927 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2930 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2931 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2934 unsigned int md_len;
2935 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2936 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2937 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2938 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2941 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2942 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2945 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2947 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2949 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2951 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2955 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2956 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2957 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2958 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2962 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2963 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2964 * certificate key for key exchange
2967 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2969 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2971 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2976 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2977 /* Generate session key
2978 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2980 || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2981 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2986 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2989 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2990 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2991 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2992 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2993 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2994 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2995 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2996 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2997 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3001 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3003 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3004 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3005 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3009 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3011 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3014 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3015 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3020 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3021 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3022 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3023 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3028 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3029 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3030 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3034 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3035 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3036 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3040 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3045 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3048 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3050 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3051 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3056 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3058 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3059 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3060 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3068 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3073 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3075 unsigned long alg_k;
3078 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3080 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3081 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3084 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3085 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3087 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3088 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3090 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3091 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3093 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3094 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3096 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3097 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3099 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3100 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3108 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3109 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3110 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3112 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3113 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3118 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3120 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3123 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3124 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3128 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3129 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3131 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3138 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3139 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3143 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3144 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3146 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3155 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3156 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3157 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3160 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3163 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3164 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3166 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3167 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3168 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3171 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3172 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3178 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3179 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3184 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3185 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3186 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3188 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3190 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3191 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3194 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3195 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3197 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3198 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3203 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3206 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3209 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3210 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3211 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3212 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3214 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3218 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3219 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3222 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3224 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3225 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3227 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3231 /* We need to get a client cert */
3232 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3234 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3235 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3237 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3239 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3242 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3243 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3244 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3246 } else if (i == 1) {
3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3249 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3253 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3254 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3257 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3258 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3259 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3260 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3262 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3263 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3264 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3265 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3271 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3274 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3278 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3280 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3283 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3286 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3287 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3288 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3296 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3297 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3298 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3300 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3302 * This is a fatal error, which leaves
3303 * enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent state
3304 * and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3311 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3315 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3317 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3320 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3322 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3323 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3325 /* we don't have a certificate */
3326 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3329 /* This is the passed certificate */
3330 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3332 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3333 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3339 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3340 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3347 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3349 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3354 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3355 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3363 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3368 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3370 size_t len, padding_len;
3371 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3373 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3374 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3376 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3377 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3382 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3386 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3391 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3393 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3394 /* should contain no data */
3395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3396 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3397 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3398 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3401 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3402 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3403 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3407 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3408 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3409 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3410 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3411 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3416 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3418 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3421 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3423 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3425 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3427 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3428 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3429 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3434 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3435 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3437 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3438 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al, 1))
3441 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3442 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3445 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3446 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3447 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3448 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3451 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3455 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3456 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3457 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3458 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3463 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3464 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3468 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3471 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3472 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3473 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3474 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3479 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3480 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3481 # error Max cipher length too short
3484 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3485 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3488 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3489 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3492 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3495 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3497 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3500 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3501 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3503 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3504 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3505 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3508 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3513 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3515 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3516 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3517 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3520 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3521 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3529 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3533 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3540 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3541 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3542 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3544 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3549 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3550 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3551 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3553 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3563 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3565 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3566 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3567 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3568 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3572 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;