2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
194 switch (st->hand_state) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
205 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
206 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
210 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
211 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
217 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
219 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
220 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
223 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
224 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
233 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
235 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
237 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
240 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
246 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
248 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
249 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
250 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
251 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
253 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
254 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
255 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
256 * the server is resuming.
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
261 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
262 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
268 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
269 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
271 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
272 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
277 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
278 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
281 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
291 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
292 * |ext.status_expected| is set
294 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
300 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
301 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
303 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
304 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
306 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
314 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
315 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
323 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
324 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
330 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
331 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
332 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
333 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
336 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
349 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
365 /* No valid transition found */
366 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
367 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
368 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
373 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
374 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
377 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
379 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
382 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
383 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
384 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
386 switch (st->hand_state) {
388 /* Shouldn't happen */
389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
390 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
391 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
392 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
394 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
395 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
396 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
397 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
398 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
399 && !s->hello_retry_request)
400 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
402 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
403 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
407 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
408 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
409 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
413 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
414 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
415 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
416 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
421 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
422 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
426 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
429 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
430 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
436 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
437 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
438 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 /* Try to read from the server instead */
449 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
454 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
455 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
457 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
459 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
462 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
463 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
467 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
469 switch (st->hand_state) {
471 /* Shouldn't happen */
472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
473 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
474 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
475 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
478 if (!s->renegotiate) {
480 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
481 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
483 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
488 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
491 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
492 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
494 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
495 * actually selected a version yet.
497 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
498 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
500 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
501 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
504 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
507 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
509 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
510 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
513 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
514 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
516 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
517 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
520 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
521 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
524 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
528 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
529 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
531 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
533 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
534 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
537 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
538 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
539 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
540 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
542 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
547 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
550 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
552 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
553 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
556 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
557 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
560 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
561 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
563 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
571 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
572 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
585 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
594 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
596 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
599 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
600 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
601 /* SSLfatal() already called */
602 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
608 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
614 * the client to the server.
616 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
618 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
620 switch (st->hand_state) {
622 /* No pre work to be done */
625 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
627 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
628 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
629 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
630 /* SSLfatal() already called */
636 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
637 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
640 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
641 * messages unless we need to.
645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
646 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
647 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
648 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
654 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
656 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
657 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
658 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
660 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
661 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
662 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
665 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
667 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
668 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
671 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
675 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
676 * client to the server.
678 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
680 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
684 switch (st->hand_state) {
686 /* No post work to be done */
689 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
690 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
693 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
694 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
698 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
699 && s->max_early_data > 0
700 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
702 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
703 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
704 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
706 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
707 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
708 /* SSLfatal() already called */
714 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
716 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
717 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
719 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
720 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
723 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
724 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
725 /* SSLfatal() already called */
730 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
733 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
734 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
736 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
737 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
738 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
740 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
741 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
745 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
746 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
747 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
749 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
750 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
752 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
754 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
755 /* SSLfatal() already called */
759 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
760 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
761 /* SSLfatal() already called */
765 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
769 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
772 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
777 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
781 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
782 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
783 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
785 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
788 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
792 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
795 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
796 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
797 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
798 /* SSLfatal() already called */
804 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
805 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
807 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
808 /* SSLfatal() already called */
814 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
818 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
821 * Valid return values are:
825 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
826 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
828 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
830 switch (st->hand_state) {
832 /* Shouldn't happen */
833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
834 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
835 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
838 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
840 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
842 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
843 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
846 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
847 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
848 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
851 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
852 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
853 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
856 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
862 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
863 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
866 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
867 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
868 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
871 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
872 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
873 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
876 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
877 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
878 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
879 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
882 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
883 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
884 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
887 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
888 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
889 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
897 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
898 * reading. Excludes the message header.
900 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
902 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
904 switch (st->hand_state) {
906 /* Shouldn't happen */
909 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
910 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
912 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
913 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
915 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
916 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
919 return s->max_cert_list;
921 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
922 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
924 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
925 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
927 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
928 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
930 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
932 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
933 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
934 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
936 return s->max_cert_list;
938 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
939 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
941 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
942 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
944 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
946 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
947 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
949 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
950 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
952 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
953 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
955 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
956 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
961 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
963 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
965 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
967 switch (st->hand_state) {
969 /* Shouldn't happen */
970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
971 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
972 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
973 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
975 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
976 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
978 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
979 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
981 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
982 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
985 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
987 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
988 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
990 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
991 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
993 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
994 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
996 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
997 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
999 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1000 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1002 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1003 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1005 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1006 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1008 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1009 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1011 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1012 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1014 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1015 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1017 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1018 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1023 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1026 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1028 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1030 switch (st->hand_state) {
1032 /* Shouldn't happen */
1033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1034 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1035 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1038 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1039 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1043 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1051 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1052 unsigned char *session_id;
1054 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1055 /* Should not happen */
1056 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1057 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1061 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1062 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1063 if (protverr != 0) {
1064 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1070 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1071 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1072 if (!s->hello_retry_request && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1073 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1077 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1079 p = s->s3->client_random;
1082 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1083 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1085 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1088 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1095 i = s->hello_retry_request == 0;
1098 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1099 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1101 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1106 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1107 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1108 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1109 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1110 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1111 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1112 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1113 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1116 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1117 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1118 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1119 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1120 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1121 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1122 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1123 * know that is maximum server supports.
1124 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1125 * containing version 1.0.
1127 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1128 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1129 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1130 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1131 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1132 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1133 * the negotiated version.
1135 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1136 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1138 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1139 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1141 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1147 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1148 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1149 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1150 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1151 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1152 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1153 if (!s->hello_retry_request
1154 && ssl_randbytes(s, s->tmp_session_id,
1155 sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1157 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1158 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1166 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1167 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1168 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1171 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1172 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1173 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1175 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1182 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1183 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1184 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1185 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1187 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1192 /* Ciphers supported */
1193 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1194 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1195 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1200 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1203 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1216 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1217 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1218 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1219 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1220 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1221 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1222 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1224 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1225 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1231 /* Add the NULL method */
1232 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1238 /* TLS extensions */
1239 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1240 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1247 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1252 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1253 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1255 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1256 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1259 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1260 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1261 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1262 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1263 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1266 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1268 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1269 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1271 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1273 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1276 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1278 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1279 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1282 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1284 /* unknown cipher */
1285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1286 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1290 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1291 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1293 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1295 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1299 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1300 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1302 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1304 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1308 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1309 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1310 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1312 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1317 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1318 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1319 * set and use it for comparison.
1321 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1322 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1323 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1324 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1326 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1327 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1329 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1330 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1332 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1333 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1338 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1342 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1346 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1351 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1353 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1354 size_t session_id_len;
1355 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1356 unsigned int compression;
1357 unsigned int sversion;
1358 unsigned int context;
1360 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1361 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1365 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1367 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1371 /* load the server random */
1372 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1374 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1378 /* Get the session-id. */
1379 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1381 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1384 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1385 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1386 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1387 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1388 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1392 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1394 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1398 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1400 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1404 /* TLS extensions */
1405 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1406 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1407 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1408 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1409 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1414 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1415 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1416 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1417 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1418 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1422 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1423 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1428 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1429 * are appropriate for this version.
1431 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1432 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1433 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1434 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1435 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1441 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1443 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1444 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1446 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1448 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1449 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1453 if (compression != 0) {
1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1455 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1456 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1460 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1461 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1462 session_id_len) != 0) {
1463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1464 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1468 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1469 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1470 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1471 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1472 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1477 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1478 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1479 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1480 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1481 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1482 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1483 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1484 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1485 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1486 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1488 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1489 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1490 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1492 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1493 * backwards compat reasons
1495 int master_key_length;
1496 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1497 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1500 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1501 && master_key_length > 0) {
1502 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1503 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1504 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1507 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1512 if (session_id_len != 0
1513 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1514 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1515 session_id_len) == 0)
1520 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1521 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1522 /* actually a client application bug */
1523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1524 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1525 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1530 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1531 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1532 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1533 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1534 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1536 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1538 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1539 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1540 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
1541 s->session_ctx->lock);
1542 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1543 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1548 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1550 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1551 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1552 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1553 * used for resumption.
1555 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1556 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1557 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1558 if (session_id_len > 0)
1559 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1564 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1565 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1567 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1571 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1574 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1575 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1577 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1578 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1582 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1583 if (compression != 0) {
1584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1585 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1589 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1590 * using compression.
1592 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1594 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1598 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1600 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1603 if (compression == 0)
1605 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1607 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1610 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1613 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1615 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1618 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1622 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1623 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1628 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1629 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1630 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1633 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1636 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1637 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1639 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1640 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1642 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1644 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1648 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1649 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1650 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1655 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1656 * we're done with this message
1659 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1660 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1661 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1662 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1666 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1667 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1669 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1670 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1673 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1675 unsigned int sversion;
1676 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1677 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1680 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1681 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1682 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1686 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT clause before release */
1687 if (sversion != TLS1_3_VERSION && sversion != TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) {
1688 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1689 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1690 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1694 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1697 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1698 * should not be used.
1700 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1701 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1703 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1705 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1709 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1710 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1714 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1715 /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
1716 || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt) == 0
1717 /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
1718 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1724 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1725 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1726 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1727 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1728 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1732 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1735 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1736 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1737 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1741 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1742 * ClientHello will not change
1744 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1745 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1746 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1751 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1752 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1754 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1755 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1760 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1761 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1762 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1765 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1766 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1767 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1771 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1773 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1774 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1777 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1780 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1781 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1783 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1784 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1785 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1786 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1787 unsigned int context = 0;
1788 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1790 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1792 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1796 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1798 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1799 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1800 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1801 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1802 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1805 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1806 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1807 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1809 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1810 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1814 certstart = certbytes;
1815 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1818 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1821 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1823 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1824 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1828 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1829 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1832 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1834 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1838 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1839 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1840 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1841 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1842 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1843 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1844 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1845 /* SSLfatal already called */
1848 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1851 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1853 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1854 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1860 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1862 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1863 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1864 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1865 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1866 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1867 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1868 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1869 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1870 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1871 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1872 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1873 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1875 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1876 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
1877 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1878 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1881 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1884 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1888 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1890 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1891 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1893 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1896 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1898 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1901 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1905 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1907 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1908 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1909 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1913 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1914 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1917 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1918 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1921 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1922 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1926 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1928 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1930 s->session->peer = x;
1931 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1934 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1936 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1937 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1938 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1939 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1943 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1947 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1951 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1954 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1956 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1958 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1960 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1965 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1966 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1967 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1970 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1971 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1972 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1973 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1977 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1978 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1979 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1980 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1981 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1983 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1990 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1995 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
1997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1998 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2000 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2001 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2002 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2003 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2005 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2009 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2011 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2012 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2014 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2015 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2017 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2018 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2020 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2021 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2027 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2028 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2032 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2033 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2034 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2039 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2044 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2047 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2048 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2051 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2055 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2056 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2057 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2059 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2063 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2066 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2068 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2072 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2073 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2074 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2076 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2077 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2078 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2084 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2085 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2086 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2087 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2091 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2098 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2099 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2100 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2104 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2105 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2111 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2112 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2113 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2117 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2123 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2126 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2127 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2129 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2130 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2131 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2140 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2144 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2145 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2150 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2154 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2157 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2158 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2159 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2161 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2163 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2167 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2168 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2170 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) {
2171 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2176 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2178 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2182 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2184 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2188 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2189 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2190 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2197 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2198 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2201 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2202 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2203 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2204 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2205 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2209 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2215 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2218 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2219 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2220 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2221 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2223 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2225 save_param_start = *pkt;
2227 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2228 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2229 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2232 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2233 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2234 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2239 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2240 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2241 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2242 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2243 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2246 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2247 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2248 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2251 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2252 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2253 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2258 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2262 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2266 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2272 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2273 * equals the length of the parameters.
2275 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2276 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2277 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2278 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2279 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2283 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2284 unsigned int sigalg;
2286 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2288 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2291 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2292 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2296 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2298 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2300 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2304 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2306 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2310 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2311 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2313 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2316 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2319 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2324 * Check signature length
2326 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2327 /* wrong packet length */
2328 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2329 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2333 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2334 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2336 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2340 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2345 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2346 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2347 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2348 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2349 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2350 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2354 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2355 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2357 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2361 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2362 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2366 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2369 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2372 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2373 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2374 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2375 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2376 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2380 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2383 /* still data left over */
2384 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2385 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2386 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2391 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2393 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2394 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2397 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2401 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2402 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2403 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2405 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2406 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2407 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2409 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2410 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2411 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2412 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2414 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2415 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2417 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2418 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2419 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2422 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2424 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2426 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2428 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2429 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2431 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2432 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2433 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2434 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2435 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2437 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2438 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2440 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2442 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2447 /* get the certificate types */
2448 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2450 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2451 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2452 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2455 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2457 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2458 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2459 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2462 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2465 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2467 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2468 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2469 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2472 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2474 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2475 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2476 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2478 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2480 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2481 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2482 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2486 /* get the CA RDNs */
2487 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2488 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2489 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2493 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2495 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2496 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2497 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2500 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2501 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2503 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2506 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2508 unsigned int ticklen;
2509 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2510 unsigned int sess_len;
2511 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2514 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2516 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2517 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2518 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2519 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2520 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2521 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2523 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2525 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2530 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2531 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2532 * be 0 here in that instance
2535 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2538 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2539 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2540 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2541 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2542 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2545 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2546 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2547 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2549 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2552 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2554 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2555 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2559 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2561 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2563 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2566 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2567 s->session = new_sess;
2571 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2572 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2574 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2576 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2577 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2578 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2580 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2581 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2582 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2583 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2586 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2588 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2592 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2593 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2594 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2596 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2599 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2600 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2601 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2602 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2604 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2605 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2606 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2607 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2613 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2614 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2615 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2616 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2617 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2618 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2619 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2620 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2621 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2624 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2625 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2627 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2628 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2629 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2634 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2636 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2637 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2639 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2640 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2643 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2646 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2650 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2651 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2653 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2658 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2659 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2661 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2664 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2665 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2666 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2667 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2670 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2671 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2673 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2676 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2678 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2681 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2687 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2689 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2690 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2691 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2694 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2698 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2699 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2700 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2703 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2706 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2709 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2710 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2715 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2716 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2717 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2719 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2720 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2721 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2725 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2726 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2730 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2731 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2732 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2737 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2738 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2739 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2749 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2751 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2752 /* should contain no data */
2753 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2754 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2755 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2758 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2759 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2762 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2767 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2768 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2769 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2772 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2775 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2780 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2781 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2784 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2785 size_t identitylen = 0;
2786 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2787 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2788 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2791 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2793 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2797 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2799 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2800 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2803 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2805 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2807 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2808 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2809 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2810 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2814 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2815 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2817 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2821 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2822 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2823 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2825 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2829 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2830 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2831 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2833 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2834 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2837 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2839 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2846 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2847 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2848 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2849 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2854 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2859 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2862 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2863 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2864 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2866 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2869 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2871 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2874 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2878 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2879 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2881 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2885 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2886 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2889 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2893 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2894 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2895 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2896 if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2898 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2902 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2903 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2904 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2905 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2908 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2909 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2910 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2911 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2915 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2916 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2918 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2921 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2924 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2925 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2926 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2927 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2931 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2932 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2933 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2937 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2938 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2942 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2943 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2948 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2953 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2957 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2958 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2959 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2961 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2964 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2968 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2970 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2971 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2975 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2977 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2979 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2983 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2984 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2988 /* send off the data */
2989 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2990 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
2992 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2993 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2997 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2998 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3002 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3005 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3006 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3011 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3014 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3015 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3016 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3019 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3021 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3022 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3026 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3029 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3033 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3034 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3038 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3039 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3041 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3047 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3048 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3049 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3055 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3056 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3060 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3065 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3068 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3069 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3072 unsigned int md_len;
3073 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3074 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3075 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3076 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3079 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3080 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3083 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3085 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3088 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3092 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3093 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3094 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3095 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3099 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3100 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3101 * certificate key for key exchange
3104 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3106 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3109 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3113 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3114 /* Generate session key
3115 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3117 || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3119 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3123 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3126 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3127 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3128 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3129 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3130 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3131 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3132 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3133 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3134 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3135 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3138 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3140 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3141 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3146 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3148 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3151 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3157 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3158 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3159 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3160 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3161 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3165 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3166 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3167 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3171 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3172 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3173 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3182 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3184 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3185 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3187 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3188 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3194 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3196 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3197 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3198 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3200 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3207 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3212 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3214 unsigned long alg_k;
3216 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3219 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3220 * no need to do so here.
3222 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3223 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3226 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3227 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3229 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3230 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3232 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3233 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3235 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3236 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3238 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3239 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3241 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3243 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3249 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3250 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3252 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3253 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3258 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3260 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3263 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3264 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3268 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3269 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3270 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3277 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3278 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3279 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3282 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3283 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3284 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3292 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3293 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3294 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3295 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3298 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3301 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3302 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3304 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3305 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3306 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3308 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3309 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3313 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3314 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3320 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3321 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3326 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3327 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3328 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3330 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3332 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3333 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3336 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3337 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3339 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3340 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3345 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3348 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3351 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3352 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3353 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3354 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3356 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3361 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3362 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3365 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3367 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3368 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3370 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3374 /* We need to get a client cert */
3375 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3377 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3378 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3380 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3382 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3385 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3386 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3387 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3389 } else if (i == 1) {
3391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3392 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3396 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3397 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3400 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3401 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3402 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3403 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3405 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3406 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3407 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3413 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3416 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3422 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3425 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3428 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3430 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3433 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3434 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3436 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3441 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3442 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3443 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3445 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3446 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3448 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3449 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3456 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3458 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3462 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3463 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3465 /* we don't have a certificate */
3466 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3469 /* This is the passed certificate */
3470 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3472 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3473 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3475 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3476 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3481 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3482 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3485 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3490 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3492 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3493 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3497 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3498 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3500 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3508 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3509 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3511 size_t len, padding_len;
3512 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3514 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3515 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3517 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3518 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3519 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3520 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3524 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3530 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3532 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3533 /* should contain no data */
3534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3535 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3536 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3539 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3540 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3541 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3545 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3546 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3547 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3548 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3549 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3554 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3556 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3559 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3562 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3564 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3565 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3566 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3567 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3571 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3572 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3574 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3575 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3576 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3580 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3581 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3584 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3585 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3588 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3592 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3593 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3594 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3595 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3600 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3601 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3605 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3608 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3609 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3610 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3611 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3615 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3619 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3620 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3621 # error Max cipher length too short
3624 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3625 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3628 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3629 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3632 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3635 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3637 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3640 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3641 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3643 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3644 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3645 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3648 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3649 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3650 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3654 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3656 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3657 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3658 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3661 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3662 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3670 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3671 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3672 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3675 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3682 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3683 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3684 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3686 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3688 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3692 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3693 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3694 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3696 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3698 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3707 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3709 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3710 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3712 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3713 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3717 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;