2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 /* We need to use some engine deprecated APIs */
13 #define OPENSSL_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATED
18 #include "../ssl_local.h"
19 #include "statem_local.h"
20 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
21 #include <openssl/rand.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/md5.h>
25 #include <openssl/dh.h>
26 #include <openssl/bn.h>
27 #include <openssl/engine.h>
28 #include <openssl/trace.h>
29 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
32 DEFINE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
33 DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(SSL_CIPHER)
35 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
36 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
38 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
39 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
40 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
44 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
50 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
52 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
53 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
54 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
55 || (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
62 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
68 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
70 long alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
73 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
74 * ciphersuite or for SRP
76 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
85 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
86 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
87 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
88 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
90 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
91 * (transition not allowed)
93 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
95 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
98 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
99 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
100 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
103 switch (st->hand_state) {
107 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
109 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
110 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
112 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
113 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
118 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
125 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
127 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
128 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
132 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
133 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
143 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
144 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
145 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
151 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
152 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
157 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
158 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
159 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
169 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
170 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
174 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
175 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
177 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
178 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
180 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
181 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
182 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
183 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
185 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
186 /* SSLfatal() already called */
189 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
196 /* No valid transition found */
201 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
202 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
203 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
204 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
206 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
207 * (transition not allowed)
209 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
211 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
215 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
216 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
218 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
219 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
224 switch (st->hand_state) {
228 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
229 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
230 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
234 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
235 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
236 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
242 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
244 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
245 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
254 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
256 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
257 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
261 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
262 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
266 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
267 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
269 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
270 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
271 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
272 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
274 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
275 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
276 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
277 * the server is resuming.
280 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
282 } else if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
283 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
284 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
285 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
289 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
290 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
292 || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
293 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
294 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
298 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
299 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
300 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
302 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
303 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
312 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
313 * |ext.status_expected| is set
315 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
321 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
322 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
323 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
324 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
325 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
326 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
327 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
334 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
335 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
336 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
344 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
345 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
351 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
352 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
353 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
354 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
357 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
363 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
364 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
365 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
370 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
371 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
372 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
378 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
379 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
386 /* No valid transition found */
387 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
391 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
392 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
395 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
396 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
397 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
398 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
401 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
402 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
403 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
408 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
409 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
412 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
414 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
417 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
418 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
419 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
421 switch (st->hand_state) {
423 /* Shouldn't happen */
424 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
425 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
426 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
427 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
429 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
430 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
435 * We should only get here if we received a CertificateRequest after
436 * we already sent close_notify
438 if (!ossl_assert((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0)) {
439 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
441 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
442 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
443 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
449 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
450 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
452 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
453 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
456 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
457 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
461 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
468 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
469 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
470 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
475 st->hand_state = (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
476 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
483 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
484 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
485 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
486 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
491 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
496 /* Try to read from the server instead */
497 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
502 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
503 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
505 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
507 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
510 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
511 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
515 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
517 switch (st->hand_state) {
519 /* Shouldn't happen */
520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
521 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
522 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
523 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
526 if (!s->renegotiate) {
528 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
529 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
531 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
536 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
537 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
539 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
540 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
542 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
543 * actually selected a version yet.
545 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
546 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
549 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
552 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
555 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
557 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
559 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
560 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
561 * because we did early data.
563 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
564 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
567 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
570 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
571 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
573 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
578 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req)
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
585 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
586 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
588 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
590 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
591 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
594 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
595 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
596 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
597 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
599 if (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) {
600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
602 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
604 if (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
607 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
609 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
611 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
614 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
616 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
617 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
619 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
620 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
622 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.npn_seen)
623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
625 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
628 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
630 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
631 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
632 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
633 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
636 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
638 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
639 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
641 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
644 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
646 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
647 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
649 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
650 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
653 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
655 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
658 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
659 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
660 /* SSLfatal() already called */
661 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
663 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
664 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
666 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
667 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
672 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
673 * the client to the server.
675 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
677 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
679 switch (st->hand_state) {
681 /* No pre work to be done */
684 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
686 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
687 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
688 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
689 /* SSLfatal() already called */
695 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
696 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
699 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
700 * messages unless we need to.
704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
705 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
706 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
707 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
713 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
715 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
716 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
717 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
719 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
720 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
721 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
724 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
725 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
728 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
729 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
732 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
736 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
737 * client to the server.
739 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
741 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
745 switch (st->hand_state) {
747 /* No post work to be done */
750 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
751 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
752 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
754 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
755 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
756 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
758 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
759 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
760 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
761 /* SSLfatal() already called */
765 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
766 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
770 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
771 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
776 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
778 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
779 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
781 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
782 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
785 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
786 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
787 /* SSLfatal() already called */
792 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
793 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
795 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
796 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
798 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
799 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
800 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
802 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
803 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
807 s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher;
808 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
809 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
811 if (s->s3.tmp.new_compression == NULL)
812 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
814 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3.tmp.new_compression->id;
816 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
817 /* SSLfatal() already called */
821 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
822 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
823 /* SSLfatal() already called */
827 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
831 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
834 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
839 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
843 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
845 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
847 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
850 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
854 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
857 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
858 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
859 /* SSLfatal() already called */
862 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
863 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
864 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
865 /* SSLfatal() already called */
872 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
873 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
875 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
876 /* SSLfatal() already called */
882 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
886 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
889 * Valid return values are:
893 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
894 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
896 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
898 switch (st->hand_state) {
900 /* Shouldn't happen */
901 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
902 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
903 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
906 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
908 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
910 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
911 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
914 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
915 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
916 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
919 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
920 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
921 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
924 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
934 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
935 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
936 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
939 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
940 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
944 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
945 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
946 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
947 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
950 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
951 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
952 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
955 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
956 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
957 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
965 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
966 * reading. Excludes the message header.
968 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
970 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
972 switch (st->hand_state) {
974 /* Shouldn't happen */
977 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
978 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
980 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
981 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
984 return s->max_cert_list;
986 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
987 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
989 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
990 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
992 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
993 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
995 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
997 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
998 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
999 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
1001 return s->max_cert_list;
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1004 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
1006 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1007 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1009 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1011 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1012 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1014 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1015 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1017 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1018 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1020 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1021 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1026 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1028 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1030 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1032 switch (st->hand_state) {
1034 /* Shouldn't happen */
1035 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1036 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1037 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1038 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1040 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1041 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1043 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1044 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1046 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1047 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1049 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1050 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1052 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1053 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1055 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1056 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1058 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1059 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1061 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1062 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1064 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1065 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1067 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1068 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1070 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1071 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1073 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1074 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1076 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1077 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1079 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1080 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1085 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1088 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1090 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1092 switch (st->hand_state) {
1094 /* Shouldn't happen */
1095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1096 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1097 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1100 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1101 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1102 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1106 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1114 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1115 unsigned char *session_id;
1117 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1118 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1119 if (protverr != 0) {
1120 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1126 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1127 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1128 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1129 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1130 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1134 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1136 p = s->s3.client_random;
1139 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1140 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1142 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1145 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3.client_random); idx++) {
1152 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1155 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3.client_random),
1156 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1158 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1163 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1164 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1165 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1166 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1167 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1168 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1169 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1170 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1173 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1174 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1175 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1176 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1177 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1178 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1179 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1180 * know that is maximum server supports.
1181 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1182 * containing version 1.0.
1184 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1185 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1186 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1187 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1188 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1189 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1190 * the negotiated version.
1192 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1193 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1195 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1196 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1198 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1203 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1204 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1205 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1206 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1207 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1208 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1209 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1210 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1211 && RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, s->tmp_session_id,
1212 sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1214 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1215 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1222 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1223 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1224 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1225 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1226 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1229 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1230 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1232 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1238 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1239 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1240 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1241 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1242 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1244 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1249 /* Ciphers supported */
1250 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1252 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1256 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1257 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1260 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1261 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1262 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1267 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1269 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1273 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1274 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1275 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3.tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1276 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1277 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1278 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1279 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1281 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1282 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1288 /* Add the NULL method */
1289 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1290 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1291 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1295 /* TLS extensions */
1296 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1297 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1304 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1309 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1310 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1311 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1312 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1313 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1316 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1317 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1319 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1320 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1323 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1325 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1326 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1328 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1330 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1333 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1335 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1336 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1339 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1341 /* unknown cipher */
1342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1343 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1347 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1348 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1350 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1351 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1352 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1356 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1357 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1359 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1361 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1365 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1366 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1367 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1369 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1374 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1375 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1376 * set and use it for comparison.
1378 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1379 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1380 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1381 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1383 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1384 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1386 if (ssl_md(s->ctx, c->algorithm2)
1387 != ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1389 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1390 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1395 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1399 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1403 s->s3.tmp.new_cipher = c;
1408 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1410 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1411 size_t session_id_len;
1412 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1414 unsigned int compression;
1415 unsigned int sversion;
1416 unsigned int context;
1417 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1422 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1424 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1428 /* load the server random */
1429 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1430 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1431 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1432 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1433 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1435 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1437 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1441 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1442 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1443 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1448 /* Get the session-id. */
1449 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1451 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1454 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1455 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1456 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1458 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1462 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1464 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1468 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1470 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1474 /* TLS extensions */
1475 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1476 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1477 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1478 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1485 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1486 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1487 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1488 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1489 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1493 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1494 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1499 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1500 if (compression != 0) {
1501 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1502 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1503 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1507 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1508 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1509 session_id_len) != 0) {
1510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1511 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1517 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1518 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1522 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1526 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1527 * are appropriate for this version.
1529 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1530 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1531 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1533 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1539 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1541 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1542 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1544 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1546 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1547 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1551 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1552 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1553 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1554 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1555 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1560 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1561 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1562 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1563 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1564 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1565 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1566 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1567 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1568 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1569 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1571 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1572 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1573 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1575 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1576 * backwards compat reasons
1578 int master_key_length;
1579 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1580 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1583 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1584 && master_key_length > 0) {
1585 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1586 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1587 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1590 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1595 if (session_id_len != 0
1596 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1597 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1598 session_id_len) == 0)
1603 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1604 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1605 /* actually a client application bug */
1606 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1607 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1608 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1613 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1614 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1615 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1616 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1617 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1619 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1620 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss);
1621 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1622 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1627 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1629 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1630 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1631 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1632 * used for resumption.
1634 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1635 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1636 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1637 if (session_id_len > 0)
1638 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1643 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1644 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1646 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1650 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1653 s->s3.tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1654 s->s3.tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1656 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1657 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1661 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1662 if (compression != 0) {
1663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1664 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1668 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1669 * using compression.
1671 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1673 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1677 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1679 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1682 if (compression == 0)
1684 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1686 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1689 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1692 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1694 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1697 s->s3.tmp.new_compression = comp;
1701 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1702 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1707 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1708 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1709 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1713 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1716 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1717 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1719 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
1720 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
1721 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
1724 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1725 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1727 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1733 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1734 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1735 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1740 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1741 * we're done with this message
1744 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1745 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1746 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1747 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1751 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1752 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1754 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1755 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1758 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1761 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1764 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1765 * should not be used.
1767 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1768 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1770 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1771 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1772 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1773 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1774 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1778 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1781 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1782 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1783 && s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL
1787 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1788 * ClientHello will not change
1790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1791 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1792 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1797 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1798 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1800 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1801 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1806 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1807 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1808 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1811 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1812 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1813 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1817 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1819 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1820 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1823 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1826 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1827 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1829 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1830 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1831 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1832 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1833 unsigned int context = 0;
1834 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1836 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1838 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1842 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1844 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1845 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1846 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1848 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1851 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1852 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1853 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1854 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1855 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1856 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1860 certstart = certbytes;
1861 x = X509_new_with_libctx(s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq);
1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1864 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1865 SSLerr(0, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1868 if (d2i_X509(&x, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes,
1869 cert_len) == NULL) {
1870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1871 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1875 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1876 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1877 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1878 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1882 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1883 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1886 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1888 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1892 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1893 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1894 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1895 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1896 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1897 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1898 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1899 /* SSLfatal already called */
1902 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1905 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1906 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1907 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1908 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1914 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1916 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1917 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1918 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1919 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1920 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1921 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1922 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1923 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1924 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1925 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1926 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1927 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1929 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1930 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1931 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1932 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1935 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1938 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1942 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1944 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1945 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1947 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1950 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1952 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1955 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1959 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1962 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1963 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1967 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1968 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1971 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1972 if ((clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1975 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1976 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1980 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1982 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1984 s->session->peer = x;
1985 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1988 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1990 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1991 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1992 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1993 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1997 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2001 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2005 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2008 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
2010 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
2012 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
2013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2014 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2019 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2020 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2021 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2024 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2026 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2027 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2031 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2032 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2033 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2034 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2035 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2036 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2037 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2044 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2049 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2052 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2054 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2055 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2056 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2057 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2058 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2059 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2063 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2065 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2066 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2068 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2069 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2071 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2072 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2074 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2075 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2081 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2082 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2086 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2087 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2088 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2098 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2101 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2102 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2105 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2109 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2110 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2111 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2112 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2113 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2117 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2120 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2121 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2122 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2126 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2127 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2128 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2130 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2131 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2132 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2138 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2139 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2141 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2145 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2152 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2154 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2158 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2165 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2172 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(peer_tmp),
2173 0, EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(peer_tmp))) {
2174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2175 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2179 s->s3.peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2182 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2183 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2185 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2186 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2187 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2196 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2200 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2201 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2206 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2210 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2213 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2214 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2215 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2217 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2219 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2223 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2224 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2226 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2227 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2233 if ((s->s3.peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(s, curve_id)) == NULL) {
2234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2235 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2239 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2241 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2245 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3.peer_tmp,
2246 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2247 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2254 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2255 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2258 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2259 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2260 else if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2261 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2262 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2272 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2275 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2276 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2277 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2278 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2280 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2282 save_param_start = *pkt;
2284 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2285 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.peer_tmp);
2286 s->s3.peer_tmp = NULL;
2289 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2290 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2296 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2297 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2298 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2299 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2300 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2303 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2304 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2305 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2308 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2309 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2310 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2315 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2319 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2322 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2328 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2329 * equals the length of the parameters.
2331 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2332 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2333 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2335 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2339 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2340 unsigned int sigalg;
2342 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2344 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2347 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2348 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2351 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2353 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2357 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->ctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2359 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
2362 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2363 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
2364 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
2366 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2367 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2369 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2373 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2374 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2376 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2380 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_with_libctx(md_ctx, &pctx,
2381 md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_name(md),
2382 s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq,
2384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2388 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2389 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2390 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2391 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2393 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2397 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2398 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2400 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2404 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2405 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2409 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2412 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2415 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2416 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2417 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2418 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2419 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2420 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2423 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2426 /* still data left over */
2427 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2429 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2434 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2436 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2437 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2440 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2444 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2445 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2446 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2448 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2449 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2450 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2452 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
2454 * We already sent close_notify. This can only happen in TLSv1.3
2455 * post-handshake messages. We can't reasonably respond to this, so
2458 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2461 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2462 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.ctype);
2463 s->s3.tmp.ctype = NULL;
2464 s->s3.tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2465 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2466 s->pha_context = NULL;
2468 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2469 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2471 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2472 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2473 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2476 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2478 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2480 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2482 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2483 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2485 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2486 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2487 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2488 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2489 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2491 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2492 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2494 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2496 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2501 /* get the certificate types */
2502 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2503 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2504 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2505 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2506 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2509 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3.tmp.ctype, &s->s3.tmp.ctype_len)) {
2510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2511 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2512 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2513 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2516 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2519 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2520 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2521 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2522 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2523 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2527 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2528 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2530 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2532 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2533 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2534 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2536 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2538 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2539 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2540 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2544 /* get the CA RDNs */
2545 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2546 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2547 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2551 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2553 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2554 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2555 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2558 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2559 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 1;
2562 * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
2563 * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
2564 * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
2565 * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
2566 * SSL_get1_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
2569 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
2570 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2572 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2575 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2577 unsigned int ticklen;
2578 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2579 unsigned int sess_len;
2580 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2582 EVP_MD *sha256 = NULL;
2584 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2586 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2588 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2589 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2590 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2591 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2592 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2594 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2599 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2600 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2601 * be 0 here in that instance
2604 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2607 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2608 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2609 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2610 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2611 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2614 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2615 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2618 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2621 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2623 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2624 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2628 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2629 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2631 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2632 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2633 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2635 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2638 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2639 s->session = new_sess;
2643 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2644 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2646 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2648 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2649 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2650 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2652 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2653 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2654 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2655 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2658 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2659 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2660 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2664 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2665 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2666 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2668 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2671 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2672 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2673 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2674 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2675 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2679 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2680 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2682 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2683 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2684 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2685 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2691 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2692 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2693 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2694 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2695 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2696 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2697 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2698 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 hash of the
2701 sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "SHA2-256", s->ctx->propq);
2702 if (sha256 == NULL) {
2703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2704 SSL_R_ALGORITHM_FETCH_FAILED);
2708 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2709 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2711 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2712 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2718 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2720 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2721 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2723 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2724 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2725 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2726 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
2728 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2730 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2731 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2732 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2733 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2734 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2737 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2739 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2741 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2742 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2743 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2744 s->session->master_key,
2746 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2749 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2752 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2753 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2756 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2758 EVP_MD_free(sha256);
2760 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2764 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2765 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2767 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2772 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2773 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2775 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2778 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2779 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2781 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2784 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2785 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2786 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2787 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2790 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2792 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2795 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2801 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2803 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2804 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2805 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2808 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2812 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2813 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2814 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2817 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2820 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2823 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2824 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2829 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2830 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2831 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2833 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2834 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2835 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2839 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2840 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2845 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2846 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2851 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2852 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2853 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2854 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2863 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2865 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2866 /* should contain no data */
2867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2868 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2869 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2872 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2873 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2876 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2881 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2882 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2883 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2886 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2889 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2894 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2895 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2898 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2899 size_t identitylen = 0;
2900 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2901 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2902 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2905 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2906 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2907 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2911 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2913 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2914 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2917 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2918 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2919 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2921 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2923 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2924 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2928 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2929 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2931 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2935 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2936 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2937 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2939 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2943 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.tmp.psk);
2944 s->s3.tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2945 s->s3.tmp.psklen = psklen;
2947 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2948 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2951 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2952 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2953 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2960 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2961 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2962 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2963 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2968 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2973 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2975 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2976 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2977 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2978 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2980 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2983 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2985 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2988 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2992 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2993 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2995 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2999 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
3000 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3003 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3007 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
3008 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
3009 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3010 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
3011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3012 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3016 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3017 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
3018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3019 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3023 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, pkey, s->ctx->propq);
3024 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
3025 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3030 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
3031 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3032 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3033 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3036 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3039 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3040 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3041 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3042 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3046 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3047 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3048 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3052 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3053 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3057 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3058 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3062 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3063 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3068 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3072 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3073 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3076 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3078 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3079 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3083 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3086 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3090 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3092 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3094 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3098 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3099 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3103 /* send off the data */
3104 prime_len = BN_num_bytes(DH_get0_p(dh_clnt));
3106 * For interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
3107 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
3108 * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here.
3110 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, prime_len, &keybytes)
3111 || BN_bn2binpad(DH_get0_pub_key(dh_clnt), keybytes, prime_len) < 0) {
3112 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3113 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3117 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3121 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3130 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3133 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3134 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3135 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3138 skey = s->s3.peer_tmp;
3140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3141 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3145 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(s, skey);
3147 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3148 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3152 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3153 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3157 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3158 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3160 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3166 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3168 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3174 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3175 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3184 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3187 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3188 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3191 unsigned int md_len;
3192 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3193 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3194 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3195 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3198 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3199 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3202 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3204 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3205 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3207 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3211 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx,
3212 X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert),
3214 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3216 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3220 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3221 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3222 * certificate key for key exchange
3225 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3227 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3229 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3230 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3234 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3235 /* Generate session key
3236 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3238 || RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3240 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3244 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3247 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3248 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3249 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3250 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.client_random,
3251 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3252 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3.server_random,
3253 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3254 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3255 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3256 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3259 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3261 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3262 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3267 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3269 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3272 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3278 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3279 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3280 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3281 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3282 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3286 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3287 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3288 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3292 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3293 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3294 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3298 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3304 int gost18_cke_cipher_nid(const SSL *s)
3306 if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_MAGMA) != 0)
3307 return NID_magma_ctr;
3308 else if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc & SSL_KUZNYECHIK) != 0)
3309 return NID_kuznyechik_ctr;
3314 int gost_ukm(const SSL *s, unsigned char *dgst_buf)
3316 EVP_MD_CTX * hash = NULL;
3317 unsigned int md_len;
3318 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_evp_md_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, s->ctx->propq);
3323 if ((hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
3324 || EVP_DigestInit(hash, md) <= 0
3325 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3326 || EVP_DigestUpdate(hash, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3327 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(hash, dgst_buf, &md_len) <= 0) {
3328 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3329 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3333 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hash);
3334 ssl_evp_md_free(md);
3339 static int tls_construct_cke_gost18(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3342 /* GOST 2018 key exchange message creation */
3343 unsigned char rnd_dgst[32], tmp[255];
3344 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3346 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3349 int cipher_nid = gost18_cke_cipher_nid(s);
3351 if (cipher_nid == NID_undef) {
3352 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3353 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3357 if (gost_ukm(s, rnd_dgst) <= 0) {
3358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3359 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3363 /* Pre-master secret - random bytes */
3365 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3368 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3372 if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3374 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3378 /* Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it */
3379 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3380 if (peer_cert == NULL) {
3381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3382 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3386 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(s->ctx->libctx, X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), s->ctx->propq);
3387 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3389 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3393 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0 ) {
3394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3395 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3399 /* Reuse EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, make choice in engine code */
3400 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3401 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 32, rnd_dgst) < 0) {
3402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3407 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3408 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER, cipher_nid, NULL) < 0) {
3409 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3415 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3421 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3423 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3427 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3428 s->s3.tmp.pms = pms;
3429 s->s3.tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3433 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3434 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST18,
3438 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3443 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3446 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3448 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3449 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3452 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3455 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3457 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3458 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3459 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3461 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3468 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3473 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3475 unsigned long alg_k;
3477 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3480 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3481 * no need to do so here.
3483 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3484 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3487 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3488 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3490 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3491 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3493 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3494 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3496 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3497 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3499 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST18) {
3500 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost18(s, pkt))
3502 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3503 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3505 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3507 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3513 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.pms, s->s3.tmp.pmslen);
3514 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3515 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3516 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3.tmp.psk, s->s3.tmp.psklen);
3517 s->s3.tmp.psk = NULL;
3522 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3524 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3527 pms = s->s3.tmp.pms;
3528 pmslen = s->s3.tmp.pmslen;
3530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3532 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3533 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3534 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3541 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3543 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3546 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3547 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3548 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3557 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3558 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3559 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3563 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3566 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3567 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3569 /* Don't include the terminating zero. */
3570 labellen = sizeof(labelbuffer) - 1;
3571 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG)
3574 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3575 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3576 labellen, NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3577 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3578 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3579 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3583 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3584 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3590 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3591 s->s3.tmp.pms = NULL;
3596 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3597 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3598 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3600 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3602 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3603 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3606 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3607 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3609 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3610 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3615 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3618 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3621 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3622 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3623 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3624 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3626 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3631 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3632 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3635 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3637 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3638 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3639 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3641 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3644 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3648 /* We need to get a client cert */
3649 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3651 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3652 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3654 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3656 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3659 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3660 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3661 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3663 } else if (i == 1) {
3665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3666 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3670 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3671 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3674 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3675 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
3676 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3677 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3679 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 2;
3680 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3681 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3687 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3688 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3689 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3692 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3694 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3698 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3700 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3701 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3702 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3703 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3705 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3708 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3709 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3710 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3714 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3715 (s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3717 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3722 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3723 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3724 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3726 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3727 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3730 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3737 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3739 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3743 alg_k = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3744 alg_a = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3746 /* we don't have a certificate */
3747 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3750 /* This is the passed certificate */
3751 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3753 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3754 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3756 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3757 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3762 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3763 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3766 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3771 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3773 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3774 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3779 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3.peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3780 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3781 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3790 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3792 size_t len, padding_len;
3793 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3795 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3796 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3798 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3799 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3801 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3805 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3811 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3813 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3814 /* should contain no data */
3815 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3816 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3817 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3820 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3821 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3822 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3826 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3827 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3828 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3829 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3830 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3835 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3837 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3840 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3843 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3845 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3846 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3848 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3852 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3853 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3855 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3856 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3857 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3861 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3862 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3865 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3866 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3869 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3873 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3874 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3875 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3876 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3881 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3882 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3886 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3889 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3890 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3892 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3893 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3895 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3901 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3905 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3906 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3907 # error Max cipher length too short
3910 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3911 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3914 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3915 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3918 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3921 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3923 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3926 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3927 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3929 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3930 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3931 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3934 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3935 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3936 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3940 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3942 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3943 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3944 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver))
3947 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3.tmp.max_ver
3948 && c->min_tls <= s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
3956 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3957 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3958 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3961 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3968 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3969 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3970 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3972 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3974 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3978 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3979 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3980 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3982 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3984 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3993 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3995 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3996 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3998 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3999 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
4003 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;