2 * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
17 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
18 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
21 const unsigned char *data;
23 /* Parse the length byte */
24 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
25 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
26 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
27 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
31 /* Check that the extension matches */
32 if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
33 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
34 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
38 if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
39 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
40 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
41 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
45 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
51 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
53 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
54 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
55 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
56 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
57 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
58 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
59 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
60 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
61 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
62 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
63 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
64 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
65 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
66 * the value of the Host: field.
67 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
68 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
69 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
71 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
73 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
74 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
76 unsigned int servname_type;
79 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
80 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
81 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
82 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
88 * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
89 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
90 * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
91 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
92 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
93 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
95 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
96 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
98 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
99 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
100 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
102 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
107 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
109 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
110 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
114 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
116 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
117 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
121 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
122 s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
123 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) {
124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
129 s->servername_done = 1;
132 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
133 * fall back to a full handshake.
135 s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname
136 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
137 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
139 if (!s->servername_done && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
140 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
146 int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
147 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
151 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
153 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
157 /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
158 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
159 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
160 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
161 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
166 * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
167 * including session resumptions.
168 * We should receive the same code as in resumed session !
170 if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) {
171 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
172 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
173 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
178 * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
179 * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
181 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
186 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
191 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
192 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
194 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
195 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
200 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
201 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
203 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
204 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
213 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
214 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
215 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
217 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
219 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
220 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS,
222 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
227 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
228 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
229 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
231 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
240 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
241 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
243 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
244 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
245 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
246 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
248 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
255 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
258 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
260 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
261 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
263 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
267 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs)) {
268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
269 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
277 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
278 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
280 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
282 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
286 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
288 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
292 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
294 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
296 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
300 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
302 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
307 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
308 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
310 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
311 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
312 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
313 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
315 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
319 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
322 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
325 const unsigned char *id_data;
327 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
328 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
330 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
334 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
335 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
336 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
337 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
340 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
344 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
345 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
347 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
352 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
353 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
355 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
361 /* Read in request_extensions */
362 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
364 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
368 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
369 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
371 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
372 X509_EXTENSION_free);
374 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
375 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
377 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
387 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
391 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
394 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
402 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
403 * extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert
404 * value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
406 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
409 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
411 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
414 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
415 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
417 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
421 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
423 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
424 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
425 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
427 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
430 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
432 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
433 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
434 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
435 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
436 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
438 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
446 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
449 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
450 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
454 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
455 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
458 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
459 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
460 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
462 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
466 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
467 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
468 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
469 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
471 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
472 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
474 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
479 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
481 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
484 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
485 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
486 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
488 if (sprof->id == id) {
489 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
496 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
497 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
498 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
499 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
503 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
504 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
506 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
514 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
517 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
524 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
525 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
526 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
528 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
529 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
531 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
532 PACKET psk_kex_modes;
535 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
536 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
537 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES,
538 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
542 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
543 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
544 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
545 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
546 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
547 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
555 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
556 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
557 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
559 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
563 unsigned int group_id;
564 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
565 const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups;
566 size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups;
569 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
573 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
575 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
579 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
580 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
581 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
585 /* Get our list of supported groups */
586 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups);
587 /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
588 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
589 if (clnt_num_groups == 0) {
591 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
592 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
596 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
600 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
601 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
602 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
603 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
605 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
610 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
611 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
616 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
617 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) {
618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
619 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
623 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
624 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) {
625 /* Share not suitable */
629 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(group_id)) == NULL) {
630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
631 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
635 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
637 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
638 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
639 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
641 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
653 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
654 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
656 PACKET supported_groups_list;
658 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
659 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
660 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
661 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
663 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
667 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
668 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
669 s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
670 s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
671 if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
672 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
673 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
674 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
675 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
676 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
685 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
688 /* The extension must always be empty */
689 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
690 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
691 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
695 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
701 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
702 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
704 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
706 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
710 if (s->hello_retry_request) {
711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
712 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
719 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
722 PACKET identities, binders, binder;
723 size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
724 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
725 unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
726 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
729 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
730 * ignore this extension
732 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
733 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
736 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
737 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
738 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
742 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
744 unsigned long ticket_agel;
746 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
747 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
749 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
753 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
754 && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
755 PACKET_remaining(&identity),
757 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
758 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
764 SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
766 if (sesstmp == NULL) {
767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
768 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
771 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
775 * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
776 * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
778 memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
779 sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
782 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
784 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
785 int ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
786 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
789 if (ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
790 || ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
792 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
795 if (ret == TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
798 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
799 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
800 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
801 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
802 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
805 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the
806 * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age
807 * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be
808 * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency).
809 * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for
813 && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
814 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
815 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
816 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
818 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
821 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
825 md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
826 if (md != ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) {
827 /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
828 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
830 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
839 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
840 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
842 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
844 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
848 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
849 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
850 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
851 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
856 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize
857 || tls_psk_do_binder(s, md,
858 (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
859 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL,
860 sess, 0, ext) != 1) {
861 /* SSLfatal() already called */
865 sess->ext.tick_identity = id;
867 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
871 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
876 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
878 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
879 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
882 if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
883 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
885 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
886 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
887 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
888 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
889 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
890 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
891 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
892 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
893 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
894 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
895 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
896 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
897 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
900 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
903 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
904 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
907 if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
908 || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL)
909 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
911 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
912 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
914 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
915 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
918 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
921 /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
922 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
923 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
926 if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
927 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
930 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
931 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
933 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
934 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
935 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
936 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
938 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
939 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
942 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
946 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
947 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
950 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
951 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
952 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
953 && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
954 const unsigned char *plist;
958 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
960 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
961 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
962 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
963 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
964 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
965 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
966 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
967 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
970 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
975 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
976 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
979 const uint16_t *groups;
980 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
982 /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
983 if (s->s3->group_id == 0)
984 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
986 /* Get our list of supported groups */
987 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups);
988 if (numgroups == 0) {
989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
990 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
991 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
994 /* Copy group ID if supported */
995 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) {
996 uint16_t group = groups[i];
998 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1001 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
1002 * so we don't need to add this extension
1004 if (s->s3->group_id == group)
1005 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1007 /* Add extension header */
1008 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1009 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1010 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1011 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1012 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1013 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1014 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1015 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1020 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) {
1021 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1022 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1023 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1024 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1029 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1030 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1031 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1032 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1033 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1036 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1040 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1041 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1044 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1045 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1046 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1049 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1050 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1051 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1052 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1053 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1056 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1060 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1061 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1064 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
1065 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1067 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
1068 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1070 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1071 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1073 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1074 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1078 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
1079 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
1082 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
1083 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1084 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1086 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1087 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1088 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1089 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1092 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1097 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1098 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1101 const unsigned char *npa;
1102 unsigned int npalen;
1104 int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen;
1106 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
1107 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
1108 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1110 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1111 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
1112 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1113 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1114 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1116 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
1117 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1118 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1120 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1123 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1127 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1128 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1130 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
1131 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1133 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1134 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1135 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1136 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1137 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1138 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1139 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1140 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1141 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1142 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1143 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1146 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1150 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1151 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1154 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1155 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1157 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1158 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1159 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1160 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1161 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1162 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1164 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1168 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1172 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1173 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1175 if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1176 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1179 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1180 * for other cases too.
1182 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1183 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1184 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1185 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
1187 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1190 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1191 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM,
1193 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1194 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1197 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1200 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1201 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1203 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1204 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1206 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1207 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS,
1209 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1213 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1216 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1217 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1221 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1222 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1223 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1226 /* No key_share received from client */
1227 if (s->hello_retry_request) {
1228 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1229 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1230 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
1231 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1233 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1234 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1235 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1238 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1241 /* Must be resuming. */
1242 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1244 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1245 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1247 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1250 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1251 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1252 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1254 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1258 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1261 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1262 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1265 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1266 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1267 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1270 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1271 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1274 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1275 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1277 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1278 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1279 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1280 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1282 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1284 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1285 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1286 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1287 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1288 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1292 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1295 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1296 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1299 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1300 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1301 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1302 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1303 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1304 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1305 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1308 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1309 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1310 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1311 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1313 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1315 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1316 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1319 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1322 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1323 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1326 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1327 if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1328 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1330 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1331 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1332 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1333 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1335 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1336 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1339 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1342 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1343 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1345 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1346 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1347 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1349 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1350 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1353 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1356 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1357 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1360 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1362 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1363 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1364 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity)
1365 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1367 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1368 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1371 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;