1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
155 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
156 #include <openssl/rand.h>
157 #include <openssl/objects.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
160 #include <openssl/x509.h>
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
162 # include <openssl/dh.h>
164 #include <openssl/bn.h>
165 #include <openssl/md5.h>
167 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
168 PACKET *cipher_suites,
169 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
170 int sslv2format, int *al);
173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
174 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
176 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
178 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
180 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
181 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
182 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
184 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
188 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
190 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
197 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
200 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
201 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
203 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
205 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
209 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
210 cb = s->info_callback;
211 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
212 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
214 /* init things to blank */
216 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
221 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
223 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
224 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
227 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
228 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
237 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
239 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
243 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
244 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
248 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
250 if ((s->version >> 8 != 3) && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
252 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
256 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
261 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
263 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
264 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
266 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
269 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
272 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
278 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
280 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
285 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
287 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
289 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
291 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
293 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
294 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
296 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
298 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
302 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
303 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
304 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
305 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
307 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
309 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
310 * support secure renegotiation.
312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
313 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
314 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
316 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
320 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
323 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
324 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
328 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
329 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
332 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
335 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
336 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
339 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
342 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
343 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
346 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
347 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
348 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
350 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
354 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
355 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
358 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
360 * callback indicates firther work to be done
362 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
365 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
366 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
368 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
369 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
371 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
374 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
381 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
385 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
386 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
387 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
392 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
393 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
395 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
397 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
403 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
404 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
405 /* normal PSK or SRP */
406 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
407 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
408 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
412 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
413 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
415 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
418 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
424 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
425 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
428 * clear this, it may get reset by
429 * send_server_key_exchange
431 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
434 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
435 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
436 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
437 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
438 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
443 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
447 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
448 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
449 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
450 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
453 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
454 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
456 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
457 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
458 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
459 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
460 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
461 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
462 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
463 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
468 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
474 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
478 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
479 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
480 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
481 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
483 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
484 * during re-negotiation:
486 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
487 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
489 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
490 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
493 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
495 * ... except when the application insists on
496 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
499 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
500 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
501 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
503 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
506 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
507 /* no cert request */
509 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
510 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
511 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
512 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
516 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
517 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
520 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
526 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
527 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
530 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
531 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
535 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
538 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
539 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
540 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
541 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
542 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
546 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
547 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
551 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
553 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
556 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
557 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
558 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
559 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
564 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
567 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
568 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
569 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
574 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
575 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
576 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
577 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
579 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
581 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
582 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
584 if (!s->session->peer)
586 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
588 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
592 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
593 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
595 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
596 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
603 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
607 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
608 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
609 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
612 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
613 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
616 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
617 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
620 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
629 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
631 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
640 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
641 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
642 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
646 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
650 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
651 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
652 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
653 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
657 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
662 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A:
663 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B:
664 ret = ssl3_get_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A,
665 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B);
669 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
670 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
672 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
673 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
675 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
680 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
681 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
682 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
683 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
687 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
688 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
689 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
691 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
695 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
696 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
697 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
700 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
704 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
705 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
706 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
709 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
713 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
714 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
716 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
717 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
719 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
723 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
725 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
729 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
732 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
733 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
736 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
742 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
743 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
744 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
745 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
746 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
748 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
750 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
753 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
755 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
757 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
762 /* clean a few things up */
763 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
765 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
768 /* remove buffering on output */
769 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
773 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
778 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
780 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
782 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
785 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
794 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
800 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
802 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
806 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
807 new_state = s->state;
809 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
810 s->state = new_state;
816 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
820 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
824 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
827 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
828 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
832 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
835 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
836 return ssl_do_write(s);
839 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
841 int i, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
842 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
847 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
849 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
851 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
852 PACKET pkt, session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
855 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
859 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
860 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
861 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
862 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
864 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
865 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
868 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
869 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
870 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
871 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
872 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
877 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
879 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
883 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
885 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
886 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
888 unsigned int version;
891 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
892 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
893 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
894 * the rest right through. Its format is:
896 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
897 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
899 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
900 * 7-8 session_id_length
901 * 9-10 challenge_length
905 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &mt)
906 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
908 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
909 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
916 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)) {
917 /* No protocol version supplied! */
918 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
921 if (version == 0x0002) {
922 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
925 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
927 s->client_version = version;
929 /* No idea what protocol this is */
930 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
935 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
936 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
938 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
939 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
945 /* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
946 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
947 if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
948 if (s->client_version >= s->version) {
951 } else if (s->client_version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
952 switch(s->client_version) {
955 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
956 s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
957 s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
961 /* Deliberately fall through */
963 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
964 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
965 s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
969 /* Deliberately fall through */
971 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
972 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
973 s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
977 /* Deliberately fall through */
979 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
980 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
981 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
982 s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
991 } else if (s->client_version <= s->version
992 || s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
994 * For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
995 * negotiation comes later.
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1002 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1004 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1007 s->version = s->client_version;
1009 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1013 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1016 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1017 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1018 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1020 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1023 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &cipher_len)
1024 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &session_id_len)
1025 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1027 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1031 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1032 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1033 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1034 /* No extensions. */
1035 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
1036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1037 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1041 /* Load the client random */
1042 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1044 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1045 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1046 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1047 challenge_len, challenge_len)) {
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1049 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1053 PACKET_null_init(&compression);
1054 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1056 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1057 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1058 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &session_id)) {
1059 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1064 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1065 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &cookie)) {
1066 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1067 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1071 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1072 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1073 * So check cookie length...
1075 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1076 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1081 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &cipher_suites)
1082 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &compression)) {
1083 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1087 /* Could be empty. */
1094 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1095 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1097 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1098 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1099 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1100 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1101 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1102 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1103 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1104 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1105 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1106 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1111 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1112 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1115 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1117 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1119 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1120 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1121 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1122 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1123 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1125 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1126 /* previous session */
1128 } else if (i == -1) {
1132 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1137 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1138 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1139 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1140 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1141 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1142 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
1143 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1145 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1147 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1149 /* default verification */
1150 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1151 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1152 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1156 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1159 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1160 /* Select version to use */
1161 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1162 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1163 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1164 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1165 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1167 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1168 s->version = s->client_version;
1169 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1171 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1172 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1173 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1174 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1177 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1178 s->version = s->client_version;
1179 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1182 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1186 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1187 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1191 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1194 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1197 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1198 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1200 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1201 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1203 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1204 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1213 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1216 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1218 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1223 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1224 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1225 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1231 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1236 /* TLS extensions */
1237 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1238 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1245 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1246 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1247 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1248 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1252 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1253 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1258 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1259 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1261 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1262 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1263 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1265 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1267 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1268 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1272 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1274 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1279 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1280 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1285 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1286 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1287 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1288 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1289 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1294 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1295 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1296 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1298 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1300 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1301 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1302 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1304 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1305 /* Can't disable compression */
1306 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1308 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1311 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1312 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1313 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1314 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1315 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1319 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1321 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1324 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1325 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1326 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1330 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1332 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1337 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1338 /* See if we have a match */
1339 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1342 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1343 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1344 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1346 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1347 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1356 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1362 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1363 * using compression.
1365 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1372 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1376 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1377 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1379 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1381 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1382 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1383 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1384 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1385 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1389 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1393 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1395 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1396 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1398 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1403 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1406 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1408 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1411 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1415 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1416 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1417 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1418 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1419 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1421 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1422 /* do not send a session ticket */
1423 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1425 /* Session-id reuse */
1426 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1429 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1430 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
1435 * we now have the following setup.
1437 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1438 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1439 * compression - basically ignored right now
1440 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1441 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1442 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1443 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1446 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1447 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1448 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1458 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1460 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1463 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1464 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1467 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1470 unsigned char *p, *d;
1475 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1476 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1478 /* Do the message type and length last */
1479 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1481 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1482 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1485 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1486 * ssl3_get_client_hello()
1488 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1489 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1492 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1493 * back in the server hello:
1494 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1495 * we send back the old session ID.
1496 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1497 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1498 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1499 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1501 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1502 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1503 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1504 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1507 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1508 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1510 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1512 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1513 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1515 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1519 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1522 /* put the cipher */
1523 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1526 /* put the compression method */
1527 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1530 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1533 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1536 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1538 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1542 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1544 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1546 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1552 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1556 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1559 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1560 return ssl_do_write(s);
1563 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1566 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1567 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1571 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1574 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1575 return ssl_do_write(s);
1578 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1584 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1588 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1591 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1592 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1595 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1598 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1599 unsigned char *p, *d;
1609 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1610 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1611 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1616 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1619 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1621 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1624 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
1625 n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1627 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1628 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1630 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1632 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1633 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1634 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1635 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1636 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1638 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1641 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1643 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1647 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1650 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1652 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1657 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1661 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1662 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1663 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1665 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1667 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1672 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1673 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1674 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1676 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1679 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1681 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1684 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1685 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1686 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1688 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1691 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1693 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1697 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1699 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1705 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1706 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1707 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1708 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1713 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1714 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1715 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1726 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1727 const EC_GROUP *group;
1729 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1730 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1731 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1732 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1733 if (nid != NID_undef)
1734 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1735 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1736 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1737 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1739 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1740 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1742 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1743 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1745 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1749 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1751 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1755 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1756 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1760 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1762 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1767 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1768 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1769 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1770 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1771 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1778 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1779 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1780 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1785 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1786 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1788 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1793 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1794 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1798 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1801 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1806 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1807 * allocate memory accordingly.
1809 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1810 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1811 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1814 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1815 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1816 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1817 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1819 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1823 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1824 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1825 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1826 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1828 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1833 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1837 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1838 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1839 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1842 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1845 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1846 * can set these to NULLs
1853 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1855 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1856 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1857 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1858 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1859 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1860 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1863 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1864 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1865 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1866 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1870 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1872 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1875 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1876 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1878 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1885 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1886 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1887 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1889 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1892 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1898 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1902 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1905 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1906 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1907 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
1908 s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p);
1909 strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1910 strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint));
1911 p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1918 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1920 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1931 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1933 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1934 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1935 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1936 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1938 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1946 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1947 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1948 encodedPoint = NULL;
1956 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1957 * points to the space at the end.
1959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1960 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1963 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1964 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1965 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1966 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1967 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1968 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1970 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1972 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1973 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
1977 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1978 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
1987 /* send signature algorithm */
1988 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1989 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1990 /* Should never happen */
1991 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1993 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1999 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2001 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2002 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2004 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2006 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
2007 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2008 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
2009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2014 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2017 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2018 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2020 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2025 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2026 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2032 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2033 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2034 return ssl_do_write(s);
2036 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2039 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2040 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2042 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2043 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2047 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2049 unsigned char *p, *d;
2050 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2051 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2055 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2058 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2060 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2062 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2067 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2068 const unsigned char *psigs;
2069 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2070 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2071 /* Skip over length for now */
2073 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2074 /* Now fill in length */
2084 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2087 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2088 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2089 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2090 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2091 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2096 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2098 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2103 /* else no CA names */
2104 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2107 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2112 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2115 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2116 return ssl_do_write(s);
2118 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2122 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2127 unsigned long alg_k;
2128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2130 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2134 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2137 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2138 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2139 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2140 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2142 PACKET pkt, enc_premaster;
2143 unsigned char *data, *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2145 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2146 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2147 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2148 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2152 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
2153 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2158 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2160 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2161 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2162 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2163 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2165 PACKET psk_identity;
2167 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2168 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2172 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2173 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2175 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2178 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2179 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2181 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2185 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2187 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2191 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2194 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2195 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2198 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2200 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2203 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2204 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2208 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2209 s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
2210 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2212 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2213 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2218 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2220 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2221 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2222 if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2223 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2227 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2228 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2229 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2235 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2236 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2237 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2239 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2242 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2243 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2244 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2245 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2247 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2250 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2252 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2257 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2258 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2259 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2260 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2262 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2265 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2268 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2269 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2270 enc_premaster = pkt;
2273 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &enc_premaster)
2274 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2275 /* Try SSLv3 behaviour for TLS. */
2276 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG) {
2277 enc_premaster = orig;
2279 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2287 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2288 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2289 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2290 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2292 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2293 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2295 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2299 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2300 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2301 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2307 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2308 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2309 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2310 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2311 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2314 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2315 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2319 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2320 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2321 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2325 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2326 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2329 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2332 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2333 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2334 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2335 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2336 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2337 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2340 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0],
2341 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2343 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2344 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2347 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2348 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2349 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2350 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2351 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2352 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2355 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2356 unsigned char workaround_good;
2358 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2360 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2361 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2362 version_good |= workaround_good;
2366 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2367 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2369 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2372 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2373 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2374 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2375 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2377 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2379 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j],
2380 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2383 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
2384 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2385 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2389 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2393 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2394 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2396 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2397 PACKET bookmark = pkt;
2398 unsigned char shared[(OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8];
2400 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)) {
2401 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2402 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2404 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2409 if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != i) {
2410 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2412 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2416 i = PACKET_remaining(&pkt);
2419 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2420 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2421 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2422 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2424 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2425 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2426 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2427 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2429 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2432 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2433 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2434 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2436 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2439 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2442 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2443 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2445 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2446 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2448 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2449 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2451 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2454 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2455 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2457 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
2458 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2459 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2461 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2464 pub = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2471 i = DH_compute_key(shared, pub, dh_srvr);
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2479 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2480 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2486 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 0)) {
2487 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2497 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2501 const EC_GROUP *group;
2502 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2503 unsigned char *shared;
2505 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2506 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2511 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2512 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2513 /* use the certificate */
2514 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2517 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2518 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2520 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2523 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2524 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2526 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2527 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2532 /* Let's get client's public key */
2533 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2539 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2541 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2542 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2544 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2547 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2548 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2550 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2551 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2552 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2553 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2554 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2555 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2557 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2559 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2563 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2564 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2569 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2572 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2573 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2575 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2577 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2581 /* Get encoded point length */
2582 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &i)) {
2583 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2585 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2588 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)
2589 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2593 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, data, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2599 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2600 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2601 if (field_size <= 0) {
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2605 shared = OPENSSL_malloc((field_size + 7) / 8);
2606 if (shared == NULL) {
2607 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2610 i = ECDH_compute_key(shared, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint,
2613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2614 OPENSSL_free(shared);
2618 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2619 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2620 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2621 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2622 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2623 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2625 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 1)) {
2626 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2634 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2635 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)
2636 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
2637 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2641 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2645 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2646 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2647 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2649 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2652 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2653 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2654 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2659 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2664 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2665 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2667 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2668 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2669 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2670 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2671 unsigned long alg_a;
2675 /* Get our certificate private key */
2676 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2677 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2678 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2680 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2681 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2683 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2684 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2685 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2686 * client certificate for authorization only.
2688 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2689 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2690 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2693 /* Decrypt session key */
2694 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, n)) {
2695 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2700 ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2701 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2702 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2704 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2709 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2710 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2712 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2715 /* Generate master secret */
2716 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2717 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2718 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2722 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2723 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2724 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2729 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2730 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2735 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2742 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2743 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2747 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2748 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2749 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2750 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2751 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2754 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2755 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2757 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2761 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2763 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2764 unsigned char *sig, *data;
2765 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2770 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2773 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2776 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2777 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2778 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2779 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2780 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2781 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2783 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2788 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2789 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2790 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2791 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2792 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2797 peer = s->session->peer;
2798 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2799 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2801 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2803 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2804 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2808 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2809 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2811 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2814 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2816 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2819 if (n == 64 && pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2822 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2825 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2826 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2829 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2831 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2833 } else if (rv == 0) {
2834 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2838 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2841 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &len)) {
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2843 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2847 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2848 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2850 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2853 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, len)) {
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2855 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2859 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2862 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2863 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2865 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2869 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
2872 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
2873 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2875 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2879 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2880 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2886 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
2887 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2888 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len,
2891 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2896 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2903 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
2904 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2905 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2906 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.dsa);
2909 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2916 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2917 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2918 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2919 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.ec);
2922 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2928 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2929 unsigned char signature[64];
2931 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2932 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2934 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", len);
2936 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
2937 signature[63 - idx] = data[idx];
2939 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2941 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2943 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2949 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2956 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2957 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2960 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2961 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2962 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
2963 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2967 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2969 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
2971 unsigned long l, llen, n;
2972 const unsigned char *certstart;
2973 unsigned char *certbytes;
2974 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2977 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2980 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
2985 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
2986 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2987 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2989 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2990 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2994 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
2996 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2998 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2999 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3002 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3006 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3007 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3012 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
3013 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3018 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3023 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &llen)
3024 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &spkt, llen)
3025 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
3026 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3031 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
3032 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3033 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3034 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3036 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3040 certstart = certbytes;
3041 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3046 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3047 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3049 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3052 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3059 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3060 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3061 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3062 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3064 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3067 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3068 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3069 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3071 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3072 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3075 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3076 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3077 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3082 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3084 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3086 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3091 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3094 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3096 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3098 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3101 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3104 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3105 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3106 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3108 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3109 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3111 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3112 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3119 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3121 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3123 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3127 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3131 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3132 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3135 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3139 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3141 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3144 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3147 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3148 return ssl_do_write(s);
3151 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3152 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3154 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3158 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3159 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3160 const unsigned char *const_p;
3161 int len, slen_full, slen;
3164 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3165 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3166 unsigned char key_name[16];
3168 /* get session encoding length */
3169 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3171 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3174 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3175 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3178 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3180 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3184 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3185 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3188 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3192 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3195 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3198 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3200 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3201 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3202 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3206 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3207 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3210 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3213 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3214 * follows handshake_header_length +
3215 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3216 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3217 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3218 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3220 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3221 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3222 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3225 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3227 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3228 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3230 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3231 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3235 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3237 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3238 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3240 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3241 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3243 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3247 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3248 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3249 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3251 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3253 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3255 /* Output key name */
3257 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3260 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3261 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3262 /* Encrypt session data */
3263 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3266 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3270 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3272 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3275 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3276 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3279 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3281 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3282 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3283 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3285 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3287 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3291 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3292 return ssl_do_write(s);
3295 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3296 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3297 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3301 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3303 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3306 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3307 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3308 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3311 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3312 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3316 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3319 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3320 /* message length */
3321 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3323 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3324 /* length of OCSP response */
3325 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3326 /* actual response */
3327 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3328 /* number of bytes to write */
3329 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3330 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3334 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3335 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3340 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3341 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3343 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3347 PACKET pkt, next_proto, padding;
3348 size_t next_proto_len;
3351 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3352 * extension in their ClientHello
3354 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3356 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3357 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3361 /* See the payload format below */
3362 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3363 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3364 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3365 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3371 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3372 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3373 * ssl3_get_finished).
3375 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3377 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3382 goto err; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3385 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
3386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3391 * The payload looks like:
3393 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3394 * uint8 padding_len;
3395 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3397 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &next_proto)
3398 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&pkt, &padding)
3399 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
3400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3404 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
3406 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3410 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3414 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3419 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3421 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3422 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3423 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3424 int sslv2format, int *al
3427 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3428 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3430 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3431 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3433 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3435 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3437 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3439 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3443 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3445 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3446 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3450 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3451 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3454 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3459 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3462 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3463 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3464 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3468 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3470 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3471 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3472 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3474 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3477 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3478 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3479 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3480 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3481 if (s->renegotiate) {
3482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3483 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3484 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3487 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3488 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3489 fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
3494 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3495 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3496 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3498 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3499 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3502 if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
3503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3504 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3505 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3511 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3512 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3514 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3516 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3521 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3522 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3531 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3532 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);