2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
123 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
137 if (n <= 0) return n;
141 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
145 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
146 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
147 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
152 /* start with empty packet ... */
155 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
157 /* check if next packet length is large
158 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
159 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
160 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
161 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
163 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
164 * and its length field is insane, we can
165 * only be led to wrong decision about
166 * whether memmove will occur or not.
167 * Header values has no effect on memmove
168 * arguments and therefore no buffer
169 * overrun can be triggered. */
170 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
174 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
175 s->packet_length = 0;
176 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
179 /* extend reads should not span multiple packets for DTLS */
180 if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION &&
183 if ( left > 0 && n > left)
187 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
196 /* else we need to read more data */
198 len = s->packet_length;
200 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
201 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
202 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
203 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
205 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
207 rb->offset = len + align;
210 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
211 if (n > max) /* does not happen */
213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
222 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
223 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
224 * len+max if possible) */
229 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
230 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RELEASE_BUFFERS
243 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS))
244 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
251 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
254 s->packet_length += n;
255 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
259 /* Call this to get a new input record.
260 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
261 * or non-blocking IO.
262 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
263 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
264 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
265 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
267 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
268 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
270 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
271 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
275 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
277 unsigned int mac_size;
280 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
281 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
286 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
287 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
290 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
292 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
293 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
294 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
299 /* check if we have the header */
300 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
301 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
303 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
304 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
305 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
309 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
313 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
316 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
319 /* Lets check version */
320 if (!s->first_packet)
322 if (version != s->version)
324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
325 /* Send back error using their
326 * version number :-) */
328 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
333 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
339 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
341 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
346 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
349 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
351 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
353 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
355 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
356 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
357 /* now n == rr->length,
358 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
361 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
363 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
364 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
366 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
368 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
369 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
370 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
371 * the decryption or by the decompression
372 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
373 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
375 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
376 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
378 /* check is not needed I believe */
379 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
381 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
386 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
389 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
393 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
396 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
397 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
398 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
399 * the MAC computation anyway. */
400 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
404 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
405 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
409 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
410 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
411 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
412 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
417 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
419 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
421 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
422 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
426 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
429 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
430 if (rr->length >= mac_size)
432 rr->length -= mac_size;
433 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
437 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
438 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
439 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
443 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
447 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
448 if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
450 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
454 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
456 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
457 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
458 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
459 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
460 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
461 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
466 /* r->length is now just compressed */
467 if (s->expand != NULL)
469 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
471 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
475 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
477 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
483 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
485 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
491 /* So at this point the following is true
492 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
493 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
494 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
495 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
499 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
502 /* just read a 0 length packet */
503 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
506 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
512 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
517 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
523 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
524 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
525 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
535 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
541 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
542 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
543 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
544 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
555 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
556 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
558 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
560 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
561 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
564 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
568 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
570 i=s->handshake_func(s);
571 if (i < 0) return(i);
574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
582 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
583 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
587 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
595 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
596 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
598 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
599 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
600 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
610 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
611 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
613 unsigned char *p,*plen;
614 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
618 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
622 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
625 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
626 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
628 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
630 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
631 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
633 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
636 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
639 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
645 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
646 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
647 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
653 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
655 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
656 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
658 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
659 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
661 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
663 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
664 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
665 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
666 * together with the actual payload) */
667 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
672 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
674 /* insufficient space */
675 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
680 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
683 if (create_empty_fragment)
685 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
686 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
687 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
688 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
689 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
690 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
691 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
698 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
702 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
703 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
704 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
710 /* write the header */
715 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
716 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
718 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
722 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
725 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
727 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
730 /* first we compress */
731 if (s->compress != NULL)
733 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
735 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
741 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
745 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
746 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
747 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
751 s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1);
752 wr->length+=mac_size;
757 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
758 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
760 /* record length after mac and block padding */
761 s2n(wr->length,plen);
763 /* we should now have
764 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
766 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
767 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
769 if (create_empty_fragment)
771 /* we are in a recursive call;
772 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
777 /* now let's set up wb */
778 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
780 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
781 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
782 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
783 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
784 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
786 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
787 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
792 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
793 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
797 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
800 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
801 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
802 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
803 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
814 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
816 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
817 (unsigned int)wb->left);
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RELEASE_BUFFERS
829 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
830 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
832 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
833 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
842 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
843 * 'type' is one of the following:
845 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
846 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
847 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
849 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
850 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
852 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
853 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
854 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
855 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
856 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
857 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
858 * Change cipher spec protocol
859 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
861 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
863 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
864 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
865 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
866 * Application data protocol
867 * none of our business
869 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
874 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
876 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
877 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
880 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
881 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
887 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
888 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
890 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
891 unsigned char *dst = buf;
896 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
899 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
902 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
903 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
904 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
908 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
910 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
912 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
913 i=s->handshake_func(s);
914 if (i < 0) return(i);
917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
922 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
924 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
925 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
926 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
927 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
930 /* get new packet if necessary */
931 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
933 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
934 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
937 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
939 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
940 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
941 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
943 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
948 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
949 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
950 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
953 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
958 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
960 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
961 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
962 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
963 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
965 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
970 if (len <= 0) return(len);
972 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
975 n = (unsigned int)len;
977 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
984 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RELEASE_BUFFERS
987 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS))
988 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
996 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
997 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
999 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1000 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1003 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1004 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1005 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1007 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1009 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1010 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1011 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1013 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1015 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1016 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1017 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1020 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1022 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1024 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1026 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1029 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1033 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1034 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1038 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1039 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1040 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1042 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1044 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1045 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1046 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1048 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1050 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1051 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1052 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1054 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1059 if (s->msg_callback)
1060 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1062 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1063 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1064 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1066 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1067 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1069 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1070 if (i < 0) return(i);
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1077 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1079 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1082 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1083 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1084 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1085 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1086 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1087 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1088 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1089 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1095 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1096 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1100 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1102 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1103 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1105 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1107 if (s->msg_callback)
1108 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1110 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1111 cb=s->info_callback;
1112 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1113 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1117 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1118 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1121 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1123 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1124 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1126 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1130 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1134 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1135 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1137 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1138 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1139 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1140 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1145 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1153 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1155 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1160 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1162 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1163 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1164 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1165 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1167 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1172 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1173 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1175 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1182 if (s->msg_callback)
1183 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1185 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1186 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1192 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1193 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1195 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1196 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1198 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1199 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1200 * protocol violations): */
1201 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1205 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1209 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1210 if (i < 0) return(i);
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1217 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1219 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1222 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1223 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1224 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1225 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1226 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1227 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1228 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1229 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1240 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1241 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1247 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1250 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1252 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1253 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1254 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1255 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1256 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1259 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1260 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1261 * but have application data. If the library was
1262 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1263 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1264 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1265 * we will indulge it.
1267 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1268 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1270 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1271 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1272 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1274 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1275 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1276 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1280 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1285 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1293 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1298 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1304 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1305 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1307 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1309 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1311 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1312 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1315 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1318 /* we have to record the message digest at
1319 * this point so we can get it before we read
1320 * the finished message */
1321 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1323 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1324 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1328 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1329 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1332 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1333 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1338 void ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1340 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1341 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1342 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1343 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1344 if (desc < 0) return;
1345 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1346 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1347 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1349 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1350 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1351 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1352 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1353 s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1354 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1355 * some time in the future */
1358 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1361 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1363 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1364 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1367 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1371 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1372 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1373 * we will not worry too much. */
1374 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1375 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1377 if (s->msg_callback)
1378 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1380 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1381 cb=s->info_callback;
1382 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1383 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1387 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1388 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);