2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
169 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
173 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
175 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
176 return (SSLv3_client_method());
181 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
182 ssl_undefined_function,
183 ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
185 int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
188 unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
189 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
191 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
193 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
197 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
198 cb = s->info_callback;
199 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
200 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
203 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
210 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
211 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
214 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
215 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
224 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
226 s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
227 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
231 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
232 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
236 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
238 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
244 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
249 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
250 s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
252 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
253 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
257 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
265 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
270 /* setup buffing BIO */
271 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
276 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
278 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
280 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
281 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
283 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
285 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
287 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
290 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
291 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
294 ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
297 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
300 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
301 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
302 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
306 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
307 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
308 ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
313 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
315 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
316 /* receive renewed session ticket */
317 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
321 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
325 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
328 /* Noop (ret = 0) for everything but EAP-FAST. */
329 ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
334 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
339 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
343 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
344 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
345 ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
349 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
350 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
352 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
355 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
361 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
366 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
367 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
368 ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
371 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
375 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
378 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
384 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
385 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
386 ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
389 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
393 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
394 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
395 ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
398 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
399 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
400 if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
402 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
407 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
408 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
410 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
415 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
416 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
417 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
418 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
419 ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
422 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
426 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
427 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
428 ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
432 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
435 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
436 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
439 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
440 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
441 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
442 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
444 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
445 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
447 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
449 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
450 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
456 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
457 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
458 ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
461 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
465 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
466 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
467 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
469 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
473 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
474 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
476 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
477 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
479 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
483 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
484 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
485 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
487 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
488 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
490 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
492 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
497 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
498 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
506 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
507 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
508 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
509 ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
512 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
516 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
517 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
518 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
519 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
520 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
522 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
524 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
527 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
530 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
532 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
533 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
534 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
535 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
536 s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
541 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
543 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
544 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
548 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
554 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
555 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
556 ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
559 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
563 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
564 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
565 ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
568 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
573 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
574 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
575 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
576 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
577 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
578 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
583 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
585 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
589 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
590 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
591 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
595 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
596 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
600 /* clean a few things up */
601 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
602 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
606 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
609 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
610 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
611 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
617 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
619 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
623 s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
624 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
627 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
639 /* did we do anything */
640 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
642 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
646 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
647 new_state = s->state;
649 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
650 s->state = new_state;
659 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
663 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
666 unsigned char *p, *d;
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
675 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
676 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
677 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
678 if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
679 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
680 !sess->session_id_length ||
683 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
684 * "ticket" without a session ID.
686 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
688 (sess->not_resumable)) {
689 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
692 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
693 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
694 int options = s->options;
695 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
696 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
697 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
699 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
703 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
705 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
710 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
712 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
713 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
716 * We only support one version: update method
718 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
719 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
720 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
722 s->client_version = s->version;
724 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
726 p = s->s3->client_random;
729 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
730 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
732 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
735 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
744 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
745 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
748 /* Do the message type and length last */
749 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
752 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
753 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
754 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
755 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
756 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
757 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
758 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
759 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
762 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
763 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
764 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
765 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
766 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
767 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
768 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
769 * know that is maximum server supports.
770 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
771 * containing version 1.0.
773 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
774 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
775 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
776 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
777 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
778 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
779 * the negotiated version.
781 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
782 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
785 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
786 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
792 i = s->session->session_id_length;
795 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
796 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
799 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
803 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
804 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
805 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
806 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
809 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
810 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
811 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
814 /* Ciphers supported */
815 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
820 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
822 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
823 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
826 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
827 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
828 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
834 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
838 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
841 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
843 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
844 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
848 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
852 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
857 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
859 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
866 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
867 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
871 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
874 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
875 return ssl_do_write(s);
880 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
882 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
885 unsigned char *p, *d;
886 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
893 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
894 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
899 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
900 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
901 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
906 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
908 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
909 if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
910 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
912 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
914 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
921 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
922 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
927 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
928 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
929 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
930 int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
931 int options = s->options;
932 if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
933 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
934 else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
936 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
937 s->version = hversion;
938 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
940 } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
941 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
944 s->version = hversion;
945 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
948 s->version = s->method->version;
951 if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
953 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
954 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
959 /* load the server hello data */
960 /* load the server random */
961 memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
962 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
966 /* get the session-id */
969 if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
970 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
976 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
977 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
978 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
979 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
980 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
981 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
982 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
983 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
984 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
985 * server wants to resume.
987 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
988 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
989 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
990 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
991 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
992 &s->session->master_key_length,
994 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
995 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
996 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
999 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1003 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
1005 if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
1006 && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
1007 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1008 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1009 /* actually a client application bug */
1010 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1012 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1018 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1019 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1020 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1021 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1022 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1024 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1025 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1029 s->session->session_id_length = j;
1030 memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
1033 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
1035 /* unknown cipher */
1036 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1040 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1041 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1042 ct->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1046 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1049 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1050 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1054 p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
1056 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1057 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1059 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1060 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1066 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1067 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1068 * set and use it for comparison.
1070 if (s->session->cipher)
1071 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1072 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1073 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1074 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1075 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1078 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1080 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1083 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1085 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1087 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1089 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1091 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1095 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1096 * using compression.
1098 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1104 if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
1105 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1107 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1112 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1113 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1117 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
1119 if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
1120 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1122 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1125 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1130 /* TLS extensions */
1131 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1138 /* wrong packet length */
1139 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1146 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1151 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
1153 int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
1154 unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
1156 const unsigned char *q, *p;
1158 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1160 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1161 int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1164 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1167 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1172 if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
1173 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
1174 (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
1175 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1179 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
1180 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
1184 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1186 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1192 if (llen + 3 != n) {
1193 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1197 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
1199 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
1200 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1202 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1207 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
1209 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1214 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1216 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1219 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1228 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1229 if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
1230 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1231 && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1232 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1233 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1235 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1237 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1240 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1243 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1247 sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1251 ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
1252 s->session->sess_cert = sc;
1254 sc->cert_chain = sk;
1256 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1257 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1259 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1262 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1265 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
1267 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1268 need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1269 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1273 fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
1274 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
1275 fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1276 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
1277 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
1278 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
1279 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1281 if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1285 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1289 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1290 if (need_cert && i < 0) {
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1294 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1299 int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1300 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
1302 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1304 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1307 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1308 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1310 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1313 X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
1314 sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
1315 sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
1317 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1318 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1319 s->session->peer = x;
1321 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1322 sc->peer_key = NULL;
1324 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1325 s->session->peer = NULL;
1327 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1334 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1336 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1338 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1342 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1345 unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
1348 unsigned char *param, *p;
1350 long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
1351 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1352 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1360 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
1361 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1362 EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1364 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
1367 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1370 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1371 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1373 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1374 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1375 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1376 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1380 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1382 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
1384 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1387 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
1388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1389 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1394 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1395 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1398 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1399 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1400 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1401 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1404 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1408 param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1409 if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
1410 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1411 RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
1412 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1415 DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
1416 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1419 EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
1420 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
1423 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1426 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1429 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1431 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1434 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1435 char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
1438 if (param_len > n) {
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1445 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1446 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1447 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1450 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1451 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1455 if (i > n - param_len) {
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1457 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
1463 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1464 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1465 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1467 memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
1468 memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
1469 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1470 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
1471 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
1472 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1480 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1482 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1484 if (param_len > n) {
1485 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1490 if (i > n - param_len) {
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
1496 if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1502 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1510 if (i > n - param_len) {
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
1516 if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1522 if (1 > n - param_len) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1528 i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
1531 if (i > n - param_len) {
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
1537 if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1543 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1551 if (i > n - param_len) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
1557 if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1564 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1569 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1570 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1571 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1573 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1574 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1578 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1579 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1581 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1582 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1586 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1588 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
1589 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1590 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1591 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1595 if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1601 if (param_len > n) {
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1607 if (i > n - param_len) {
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
1613 if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
1614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1619 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1627 if (i > n - param_len) {
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
1633 if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1640 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1641 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1643 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1644 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1649 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
1652 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1656 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
1657 if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1663 if (param_len > n) {
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1669 if (i > n - param_len) {
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
1675 if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1681 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1689 if (i > n - param_len) {
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
1695 if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1701 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1709 if (i > n - param_len) {
1710 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
1715 if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1722 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1723 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1727 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1728 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1730 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1731 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1735 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1736 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1738 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1739 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1742 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1744 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
1747 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1750 else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
1752 const EC_GROUP *group;
1754 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1760 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1761 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1762 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1766 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1767 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1768 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1771 if (param_len > n) {
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1776 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1777 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1779 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) {
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1784 if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) {
1785 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1787 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1791 ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
1792 if (ngroup == NULL) {
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1796 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1800 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
1802 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
1804 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1805 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1806 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1808 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1814 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1815 if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
1816 ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1821 encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
1824 if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
1825 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
1826 p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
1827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1830 param_len += encoded_pt_len;
1833 p += encoded_pt_len;
1836 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1837 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1841 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1842 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1844 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1845 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1847 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1848 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1850 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1851 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
1853 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1854 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
1855 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
1857 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1859 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1860 srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1862 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1866 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1868 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1870 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1872 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1878 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
1885 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1898 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1901 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1903 if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
1904 /* wrong packet length */
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1909 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1915 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1916 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1917 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1918 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1919 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1921 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1923 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1924 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
1928 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
1930 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1931 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
1936 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1943 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1944 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1946 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1948 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1949 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
1951 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1957 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1958 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
1959 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1960 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1961 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1965 /* still data left over */
1967 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1971 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1972 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1975 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1977 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1985 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1986 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1989 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1993 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1996 unsigned long n, nc, l;
1997 unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
1998 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1999 const unsigned char *p, *q;
2001 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2003 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2004 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
2005 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
2006 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
2011 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2013 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
2014 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2016 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2017 * wont be doing client auth.
2019 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2020 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
2026 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
2027 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2032 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2033 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2034 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
2035 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2036 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2037 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
2042 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2044 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2049 /* get the certificate types */
2051 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2052 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2053 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2054 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2055 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2056 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2060 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
2061 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
2062 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2064 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2065 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
2067 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2070 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2073 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
2074 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2076 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2079 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2080 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2081 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2082 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2084 if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
2085 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2087 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2090 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2091 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2098 /* get the CA RDNs */
2101 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
2102 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2107 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
2109 if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
2110 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
2117 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
2118 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2124 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2126 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2129 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2138 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2139 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2140 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2141 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2142 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2147 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2151 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2153 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2157 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2159 int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
2161 const unsigned char *p;
2164 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2165 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
2166 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
2167 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
2173 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2174 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2179 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2180 n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
2182 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2183 if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
2184 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2188 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2189 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2190 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2191 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2195 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
2196 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2198 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2199 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2200 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2201 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2202 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2203 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2204 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2205 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2206 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2208 EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
2209 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2210 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2214 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2219 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
2222 unsigned long resplen, n;
2223 const unsigned char *p;
2225 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2226 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
2227 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
2228 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
2233 /* need at least status type + length */
2234 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2238 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2239 if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2240 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2245 if (resplen + 4 != n) {
2246 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2250 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2251 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
2252 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2253 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2257 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2258 if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2260 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2262 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2267 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2274 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2279 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
2284 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2285 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2286 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
2287 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
2288 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
2293 /* should contain no data */
2294 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2302 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2306 unsigned long alg_k;
2307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2309 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2313 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2315 EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
2316 const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
2317 EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
2318 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2319 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2320 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2322 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2325 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
2326 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2328 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2330 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2334 else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2336 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2337 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2341 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2343 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2346 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2350 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
2351 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
2354 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2355 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
2357 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2358 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2360 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2363 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2364 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2367 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2368 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2369 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2373 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2374 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2376 n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2378 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2380 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2385 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2389 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2390 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2397 else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2398 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2399 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2400 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2401 krb5_data *enc_ticket;
2402 krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
2403 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2404 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2405 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2406 unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2407 unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2408 int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
2410 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2413 fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2415 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2418 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2420 authp = &authenticator;
2421 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2423 krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
2424 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2429 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
2430 if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
2431 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2434 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2437 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2443 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2444 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2446 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2447 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2448 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2449 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2450 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2452 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2453 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2454 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2455 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2457 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2458 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2459 * optional authenticator omitted.
2462 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2463 s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
2464 memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
2465 p += enc_ticket->length;
2466 n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
2468 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2469 if (authp && authp->length) {
2470 s2n(authp->length, p);
2471 memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
2473 n += authp->length + 2;
2479 s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
2483 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2484 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2488 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2489 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2490 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2494 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2495 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2496 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2497 * kssl_ctx->length);
2498 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2501 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2502 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
2503 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, pms, pmslen);
2504 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
2506 if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2508 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2511 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2513 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2515 memcpy(p, epms, outl);
2518 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
2521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2522 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2523 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
2524 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
2526 if (scert == NULL) {
2527 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2529 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2533 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
2534 dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp;
2536 /* we get them from the cert */
2537 int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
2538 EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
2541 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
2543 dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
2544 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
2546 if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2548 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2552 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
2553 /* Use client certificate key */
2554 EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2557 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2558 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2560 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2564 /* generate a new random key */
2565 if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
2566 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2569 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2576 pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
2577 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2582 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2583 * clear it out afterwards
2586 n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
2587 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2597 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
2600 /* send off the data */
2601 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2603 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2609 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2614 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2615 const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
2617 int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
2620 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2621 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2623 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2628 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2629 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2630 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2632 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
2634 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2635 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2636 * To add such support, one needs to add
2637 * code that checks for appropriate
2638 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2639 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2640 * key on the same curve as the server's
2641 * and the key should be authorized for
2644 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2645 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2648 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2649 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2650 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2651 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2655 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
2656 tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
2658 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2660 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2661 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
2662 if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
2663 || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2664 || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2666 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2670 tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
2673 srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2674 srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
2676 if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2678 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2682 if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2684 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2688 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2692 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2694 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2695 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2697 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2698 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2699 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2700 if (priv_key == NULL) {
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2702 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2705 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2710 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2711 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2719 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2720 * clear it out afterwards
2723 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
2724 if (field_size <= 0) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2728 pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
2729 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2732 n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
2733 if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2738 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2739 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2743 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2747 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2748 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2749 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2752 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
2753 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
2754 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
2755 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2757 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2761 /* Encode the public key */
2762 n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2763 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2764 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2765 encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
2767 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2768 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2770 /* copy the point */
2771 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
2772 /* increment n to account for length field */
2776 /* Free allocated memory */
2777 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2778 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2779 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2780 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2782 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2783 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2784 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2785 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2788 unsigned int md_len;
2790 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2791 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2795 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2800 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2804 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
2808 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2811 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2815 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
2816 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2818 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2820 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2821 * certificate key for key exchange
2824 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2826 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2827 /* Generate session key */
2828 if (RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2829 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2831 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2835 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2837 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2838 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2839 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2841 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2848 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2851 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2852 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2853 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
2854 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2856 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2858 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
2859 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2860 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2861 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2867 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2869 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2871 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2873 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) {
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2878 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2880 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2883 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2886 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2887 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2888 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2889 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2890 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2891 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2893 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2894 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
2897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2898 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2899 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2900 /* send off the data */
2901 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2903 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2907 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2910 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2911 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2912 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2914 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2920 else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2922 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2923 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2926 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
2927 size_t identity_len;
2928 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2929 unsigned int psk_len = 0;
2933 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2935 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2939 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2940 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2941 pmslen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4;
2942 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2946 psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
2947 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2949 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2951 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2953 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2955 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2958 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2959 pmslen = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2960 identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
2961 identity_len = strlen(identity);
2962 if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2964 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2967 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2969 memmove(pms + psk_len + 4, pms, psk_len);
2971 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2975 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2976 s->session->psk_identity_hint =
2977 BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2978 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
2979 && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2981 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2985 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2986 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
2987 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2989 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2993 s2n(identity_len, p);
2994 memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
2995 n = 2 + identity_len;
2998 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
3000 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3006 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3011 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
3012 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3017 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
3020 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3021 n = ssl_do_write(s);
3022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3024 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3026 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
3027 * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
3030 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
3031 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
3032 s->session->master_key)) <
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3035 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3041 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
3044 s->cert->pmslen = pmslen;
3046 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
3049 pmslen = s->cert->pmslen;
3052 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3056 s->session->master_key_length =
3057 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3059 session->master_key,
3061 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3062 s->cert->pms = NULL;
3063 if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
3064 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3071 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3072 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3074 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3075 s->cert->pms = NULL;
3076 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3077 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3078 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3079 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
3080 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
3085 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
3088 unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
3090 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3096 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3098 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
3099 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3100 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3101 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3102 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3103 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
3104 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3105 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3106 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3109 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
3114 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3115 * digest and cached handshake records.
3117 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3120 const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
3121 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3122 if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3128 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3131 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3132 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
3133 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3140 * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
3143 if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
3144 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3145 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3146 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3147 } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3151 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3152 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
3153 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
3154 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
3155 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
3163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3164 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3165 if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3166 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3167 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3168 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
3176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3177 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3178 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3179 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3180 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3181 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
3189 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3190 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3191 unsigned char signbuf[64];
3193 size_t sigsize = 64;
3194 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3195 NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
3196 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3200 for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
3201 p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
3206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3209 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3213 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
3215 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3216 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3217 return ssl_do_write(s);
3219 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3220 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3225 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3226 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3227 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3229 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3231 unsigned long alg_k;
3232 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
3234 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3235 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
3238 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3239 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3241 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3242 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3244 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3245 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3246 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3247 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
3248 int i = scert->peer_cert_type;
3249 EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
3250 clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3251 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3252 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
3255 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
3257 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3258 i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
3259 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
3263 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
3268 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3271 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3274 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
3275 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3276 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3277 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3279 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3283 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3286 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3288 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3289 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3291 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3294 /* We need to get a client cert */
3295 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
3297 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3298 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3301 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3303 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3306 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3307 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3308 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3309 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3311 } else if (i == 1) {
3313 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3314 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3318 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3319 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3322 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3323 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3324 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3327 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3331 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3332 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3335 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
3336 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
3337 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
3338 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
3339 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
3340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3341 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3345 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3346 return ssl_do_write(s);
3349 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3351 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3355 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3364 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3365 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3367 /* we don't have a certificate */
3368 if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3371 sc = s->session->sess_cert;
3373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3377 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
3379 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3380 dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
3383 /* This is the passed certificate */
3385 idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
3386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3387 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3388 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
3390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3395 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3397 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3399 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
3400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
3404 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
3405 i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
3406 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3408 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3409 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3411 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3415 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3417 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3422 if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
3423 !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) {
3424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3425 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3430 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) &&
3431 !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) {
3432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
3434 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3435 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
3436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3437 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
3440 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3441 else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3442 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
3443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3444 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
3450 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PKT_EXP)) {
3451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3452 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3454 || RSA_size(rsa) * 8 >
3455 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3456 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3457 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3463 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3465 || DH_size(dh) * 8 >
3466 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3468 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3475 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
3481 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3488 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session from
3489 * the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on the next server
3490 * message after the ServerHello to determine if the server is resuming.
3491 * Therefore, we allow EAP-FAST to peek ahead.
3492 * ssl3_check_finished returns 1 if we are resuming from an external
3493 * pre-shared secret, we have a "ticket" and the next server handshake message
3494 * is Finished; and 0 otherwise. It returns -1 upon an error.
3496 static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
3500 if (s->version < TLS1_VERSION || !s->tls_session_secret_cb ||
3501 !s->session->tlsext_tick)
3504 /* Need to permit this temporarily, in case the next message is Finished. */
3505 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3507 * This function is called when we might get a Certificate message instead,
3508 * so permit appropriate message length.
3509 * We ignore the return value as we're only interested in the message type
3510 * and not its length.
3512 s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3515 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3516 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
3521 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3523 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
3526 /* If we're not done, then the CCS arrived early and we should bail. */
3527 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_FINISHED, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
3529 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3536 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3537 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
3539 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3542 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
3543 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3544 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3545 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3547 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3548 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3549 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3550 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3551 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3552 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
3553 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3557 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3562 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3566 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3567 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3568 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3569 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3574 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3575 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);