2 * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include "../ssl_local.h"
11 #include <openssl/trace.h>
12 #include <openssl/rand.h>
13 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
14 #include "record_local.h"
15 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = {
18 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
19 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
20 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
21 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
22 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
23 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
26 static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = {
27 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
28 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
29 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
30 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
31 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
32 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
36 * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated
38 void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs)
43 for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
46 memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r));
51 void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs)
55 for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
56 OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp);
61 void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num)
63 memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE);
67 * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting
68 * for us in the buffer.
70 static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s)
76 rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
78 p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf);
82 left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf);
84 if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
87 p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf);
90 * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version
93 if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
99 if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len)
105 int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int send)
107 uint32_t max_early_data;
108 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
111 * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
112 * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
113 * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
115 if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
116 if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
117 && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) {
118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
121 sess = s->psksession;
125 max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data;
126 else if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
127 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data;
129 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data < sess->ext.max_early_data
130 ? s->recv_max_early_data : sess->ext.max_early_data;
132 if (max_early_data == 0) {
133 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
134 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
138 /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
139 max_early_data += overhead;
141 if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) {
142 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
143 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
146 s->early_data_count += length;
152 * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
153 * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
154 * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
155 * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
157 #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
159 #define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2
161 * Call this to get new input records.
162 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
163 * or non-blocking IO.
164 * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i':
165 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
167 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes
168 * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all
169 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <=
172 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
173 int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
178 SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr;
182 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
183 unsigned int version;
186 size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j;
187 PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt;
189 SSL_MAC_BUF *macbufs = NULL;
192 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
193 rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
194 is_ktls_left = (rbuf->left > 0);
195 max_recs = s->max_pipelines;
201 thisrr = &rr[num_recs];
203 /* check if we have the header */
204 if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
205 (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)
206 < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
210 rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
211 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0,
212 num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n);
214 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
215 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) || rret == 0)
216 return rret; /* error or non-blocking */
219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,
220 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
224 SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
227 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
228 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
236 RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
238 p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
239 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer),
240 RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer))) {
241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
245 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len)
246 || !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) {
247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
251 * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello.
253 if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)
254 && (sslv2len & 0x8000) != 0
255 && (type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) {
259 * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because
260 * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing
261 * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here
262 * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using
263 * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency
265 thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
266 thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION;
268 thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff;
270 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)
271 - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
272 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
273 SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
277 if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
278 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
282 /* SSLv3+ style record */
284 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
285 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type)
286 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)
287 || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) {
289 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
290 s->msg_callback_arg);
291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
295 thisrr->rec_version = version;
298 s->msg_callback(0, version, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
299 s->msg_callback_arg);
302 * Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we only check this field
303 * when encryption is occurring (see later check). For the
304 * ServerHello after an HRR we haven't actually selected TLSv1.3
305 * yet, but we still treat it as TLSv1.3, so we must check for
308 if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
309 && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_PENDING
310 && version != (unsigned int)s->version) {
311 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
312 && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
313 if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
315 * The record is using an incorrect version number,
316 * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We
317 * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a
318 * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably
319 * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just
322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
323 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
327 * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
329 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
332 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
336 if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
337 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) {
338 /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes
340 p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
341 if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 ||
342 strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 ||
343 strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 ||
344 strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) {
345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
347 } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) {
348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
349 SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
353 /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */
354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
355 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
359 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
364 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
365 if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
366 && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
367 || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
368 && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
369 || s->statem.enc_read_state
370 != ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS)) {
371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
372 SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
375 if (thisrr->rec_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) {
376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
377 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
383 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
384 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
385 SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
390 /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
393 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
394 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
396 SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
400 size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
404 * If OPENSSL_NO_COMP is defined then SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH
405 * does not include the compression overhead anyway.
407 if (s->expand == NULL)
408 len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
411 if (thisrr->length > len && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
413 SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
419 * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data.
420 * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the
423 if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
424 more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
425 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
427 more = thisrr->length;
431 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
433 rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 0, &n);
435 return rret; /* error or non-blocking io */
438 /* set state for later operations */
439 RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
442 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
443 * + thisrr->length, or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
444 * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->packet
446 if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
448 &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
451 &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
455 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'thisrr' thisrr->input
456 * points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied into
457 * thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression When
458 * the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer, thisrr->input will
459 * be pointed at the new buffer
463 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
464 * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
467 /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */
468 thisrr->data = thisrr->input;
469 thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length;
471 /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */
476 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
477 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
478 RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer);
479 } while (num_recs < max_recs
480 && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
481 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
482 && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
483 && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx))
484 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) != 0
485 && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s));
488 && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
489 && (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
490 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
492 * CCS messages must be exactly 1 byte long, containing the value 0x01
494 if (thisrr->length != 1 || thisrr->data[0] != 0x01) {
495 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
496 SSL_R_INVALID_CCS_MESSAGE);
500 * CCS messages are ignored in TLSv1.3. We treat it like an empty
503 thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
504 RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
505 if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
506 > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
507 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
508 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_CCS_MESSAGE);
512 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1);
518 * KTLS reads full records. If there is any data left,
519 * then it is from before enabling ktls
521 if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !is_ktls_left)
522 goto skip_decryption;
524 /* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */
525 if (s->read_hash != NULL) {
526 const EVP_MD *tmpmd = EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash);
529 imac_size = EVP_MD_size(tmpmd);
530 if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
531 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
534 mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
539 * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
540 * the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
542 if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
545 for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
548 if (thisrr->length < mac_size) {
549 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
552 thisrr->length -= mac_size;
553 mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length;
554 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
555 if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) {
556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,
557 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
562 * We've handled the mac now - there is no MAC inside the encrypted
569 macbufs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*macbufs) * num_recs);
570 if (macbufs == NULL) {
571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
576 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0, macbufs, mac_size);
580 * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
581 * decryption failed, or ETM decryption failed.
582 * 1: Success or MTE decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
585 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
586 /* SSLfatal() already got called */
589 if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
591 * Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt will fail here. We treat
592 * it like an empty record.
597 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length,
598 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
599 /* SSLfatal() already called */
605 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1);
606 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,
611 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
614 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
615 BIO_printf(trc_out, "dec %lu\n", (unsigned long)rr[0].length);
616 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rr[0].data, rr[0].length, 4);
617 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
619 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
621 && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
622 && (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
623 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
625 for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
626 SSL_MAC_BUF *thismb = &macbufs[j];
629 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
630 if (i == 0 || thismb == NULL || thismb->mac == NULL
631 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, thismb->mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
633 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
639 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
640 /* We already called SSLfatal() */
644 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
645 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
646 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
647 * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become
648 * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,
651 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
657 for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
660 /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */
661 if (s->expand != NULL) {
662 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
664 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
667 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) {
668 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE,
669 SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
675 && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
676 && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
679 if (thisrr->length == 0
680 || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
681 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
685 /* Strip trailing padding */
686 for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0;
690 thisrr->length = end;
691 thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end];
692 if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
693 && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
694 && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
695 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
699 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
700 &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
704 * TLSv1.3 alert and handshake records are required to be non-zero in
708 && (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
709 || thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
710 && thisrr->length == 0) {
711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
715 if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
716 && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
721 /* If received packet overflows current Max Fragment Length setting */
722 if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
723 && thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)
724 && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
725 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
731 * So at this point the following is true
732 * thisrr->type is the type of record
733 * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record
734 * thisrr->off == offset to first valid byte
735 * thisrr->data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-).
738 /* just read a 0 length packet */
739 if (thisrr->length == 0) {
740 RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
741 if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
742 > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
743 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
747 RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
751 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) {
753 if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
754 && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, 0)) {
755 /* SSLfatal already called */
760 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs);
763 if (macbufs != NULL) {
764 for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
765 if (macbufs[j].alloced)
766 OPENSSL_free(macbufs[j].mac);
768 OPENSSL_free(macbufs);
773 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr)
775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
778 if (rr->comp == NULL) {
779 rr->comp = (unsigned char *)
780 OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
782 if (rr->comp == NULL)
785 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
786 i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
787 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length);
797 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr)
799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
802 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
803 i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
804 (int)(wr->length + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD),
805 wr->input, (int)wr->length);
811 wr->input = wr->data;
817 * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Calls SSLfatal on
818 * internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to
819 * report a bad_record_mac
822 * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error
823 * 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
825 int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending,
826 SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize)
832 const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
836 * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case
841 ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
842 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
845 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
847 ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
848 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
851 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
854 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
855 memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length);
856 rec->input = rec->data;
858 int provided = (EVP_CIPHER_provider(enc) != NULL);
861 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
862 bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds);
866 if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
868 * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
869 * padding on the provider side.
873 /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */
876 * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the
879 memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i);
881 rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1);
885 if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) {
886 /* Publicly invalid */
889 /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */
892 if (EVP_CIPHER_provider(enc) != NULL) {
895 if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, rec->data, &outlen, rec->input,
898 rec->length = outlen;
900 if (!sending && mac != NULL) {
901 /* Now get a pointer to the MAC */
902 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
907 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
910 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
912 if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
913 /* Shouldn't normally happen */
914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
919 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
920 if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) {
921 /* Shouldn't happen */
922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
927 return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&rec->length,
930 (mac != NULL) ? &mac->mac : NULL,
931 (mac != NULL) ? &mac->alloced : NULL,
940 #define MAX_PADDING 256
942 * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls SSLfatal on internal
943 * error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to report
944 * a bad_record_mac - if appropriate (DTLS just drops the record).
947 * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
948 * decryption failed, or Encrypt-then-mac decryption failed.
949 * 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
951 int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending,
952 SSL_MAC_BUF *macs, size_t macsize)
955 size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
956 unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
957 int i, pad = 0, tmpr;
958 size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop;
959 unsigned char padval;
960 const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
961 int tlstree_enc = sending ? (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
962 : (s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
965 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
970 if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->write_hash)) {
971 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
972 if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
973 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
977 ds = s->enc_write_ctx;
978 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
983 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
984 /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
985 if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
986 && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
987 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
991 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
992 if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
994 * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever
997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
999 } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(s->ctx->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
1001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1008 if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash)) {
1009 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
1010 if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
1011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1015 ds = s->enc_read_ctx;
1016 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
1019 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
1022 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) {
1023 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1024 memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length);
1025 recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data;
1028 int provided = (EVP_CIPHER_provider(enc) != NULL);
1030 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds));
1033 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
1034 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0) {
1036 * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
1037 * cipher doesn't support pipelining
1039 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
1043 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1044 reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
1046 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
1047 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0) {
1050 seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
1051 : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
1053 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1054 /* DTLS does not support pipelining */
1055 unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq;
1057 s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) :
1058 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p);
1059 memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
1060 memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
1062 memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
1063 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */
1070 buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
1071 buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
1072 buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
1073 buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
1074 buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
1075 pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
1076 EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
1078 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1084 recs[ctr].length += pad;
1087 } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
1089 * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
1090 * padding on the provider side.
1092 padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
1094 /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
1096 if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
1097 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1100 /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
1101 padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
1102 for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
1103 recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
1104 reclen[ctr] += padnum;
1105 recs[ctr].length += padnum;
1109 if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) {
1110 /* Publicly invalid */
1116 unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
1118 /* Set the output buffers */
1119 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1120 data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
1122 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
1123 (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
1124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
1127 /* Set the input buffers */
1128 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1129 data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
1131 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
1132 (int)n_recs, data) <= 0
1133 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
1134 (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
1135 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
1140 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && tlstree_enc) {
1142 int decrement_seq = 0;
1145 * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
1146 * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
1147 * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
1149 if (sending && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s))
1152 seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer)
1153 : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
1154 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq, seq) <= 0) {
1155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1163 /* Provided cipher - we do not support pipelining on this path */
1165 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1169 if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, recs[0].data, &outlen, recs[0].input,
1170 (unsigned int)reclen[0]))
1172 recs[0].length = outlen;
1175 * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
1176 * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
1180 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
1181 recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1182 recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1183 } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
1184 recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1185 recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1186 } else if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
1188 recs[0].input += bs;
1189 recs[0].orig_len -= bs;
1192 /* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */
1194 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
1197 macs[0].alloced = 0;
1199 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
1200 (void **)&macs[0].mac,
1202 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1204 if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
1205 /* Shouldn't normally happen */
1206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1207 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1215 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1216 tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
1217 (unsigned int)reclen[0]);
1218 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
1219 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) != 0
1222 /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
1227 /* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */
1228 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
1229 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1230 recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1231 recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1232 recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1234 } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
1235 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1236 recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1237 recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1238 recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
1242 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1243 if (bs != 1 && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
1244 if (recs[ctr].length < bs)
1246 recs[ctr].data += bs;
1247 recs[ctr].input += bs;
1248 recs[ctr].length -= bs;
1249 recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs;
1253 * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
1254 * with a random MAC if padding is invalid
1256 if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
1259 (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL,
1260 (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].alloced
1264 (EVP_CIPHER_flags(enc)
1265 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0,
1270 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
1271 recs[ctr].length -= pad;
1281 * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function
1282 * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports.
1284 char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
1286 switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) {
1299 int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
1301 unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq;
1302 const EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
1303 unsigned char *p, rec_char;
1309 mac_sec = &(ssl->s3.write_mac_secret[0]);
1310 seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
1311 hash = ssl->write_hash;
1313 mac_sec = &(ssl->s3.read_mac_secret[0]);
1314 seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
1315 hash = ssl->read_hash;
1318 t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
1322 npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size;
1325 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
1326 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) {
1327 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
1331 * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
1332 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we
1333 * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
1337 * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
1338 * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
1340 * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
1341 * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
1344 unsigned char header[75];
1346 memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
1348 memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad);
1350 memcpy(header + j, seq, 8);
1352 header[j++] = rec->type;
1353 header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
1354 header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
1356 /* Final param == is SSLv3 */
1357 if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(hash),
1360 rec->length, rec->orig_len,
1361 mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0)
1365 unsigned int md_size_u;
1366 /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */
1367 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1372 rec_char = rec->type;
1374 s2n(rec->length, p);
1375 if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
1376 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
1377 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0
1378 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0
1379 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0
1380 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0
1381 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
1382 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1383 || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0
1384 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0
1385 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0
1386 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0
1387 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) {
1388 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1392 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1395 ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq);
1399 int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending)
1405 EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
1406 unsigned char header[13];
1407 int stream_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM)
1408 : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM);
1409 int tlstree_mac = sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE)
1410 : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE);
1414 seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
1415 hash = ssl->write_hash;
1417 seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer);
1418 hash = ssl->read_hash;
1421 t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
1422 if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
1426 /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
1430 hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1431 if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
1432 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
1438 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) && tlstree_mac && EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE, 0, seq) <= 0) {
1439 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
1443 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
1444 unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
1446 s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) :
1447 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p);
1448 memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
1450 memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
1452 memcpy(header, seq, 8);
1454 header[8] = rec->type;
1455 header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8);
1456 header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version);
1457 header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
1458 header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
1460 if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) &&
1461 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
1462 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
1463 OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params;
1465 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE,
1467 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1469 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx),
1474 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1475 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
1476 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
1477 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) {
1478 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
1482 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
1484 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
1485 BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n");
1486 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4);
1487 BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n");
1488 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4);
1489 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
1491 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) {
1492 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1498 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
1499 BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n");
1500 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4);
1501 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
1505 int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1512 size_t mac_size = 0;
1513 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1514 size_t max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1515 SSL_MAC_BUF macbuf = { NULL, 0 };
1518 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
1522 * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
1523 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
1525 rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
1528 * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
1529 * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
1530 * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
1531 * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
1535 * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
1536 * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
1539 /* check is not needed I believe */
1540 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
1541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1545 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
1546 rr->data = rr->input;
1547 rr->orig_len = rr->length;
1549 /* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */
1550 if (s->read_hash != NULL) {
1551 const EVP_MD *tmpmd = EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash);
1553 if (tmpmd != NULL) {
1554 imac_size = EVP_MD_size(tmpmd);
1555 if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
1556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1559 mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
1563 if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
1566 if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) {
1567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1570 rr->length -= mac_size;
1571 mac = rr->data + rr->length;
1572 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
1573 if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
1574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,
1575 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
1579 * We've handled the mac now - there is no MAC inside the encrypted
1586 * Set a mark around the packet decryption attempt. This is DTLS, so
1587 * bad packets are just ignored, and we don't want to leave stray
1588 * errors in the queue from processing bogus junk that we ignored.
1591 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0, &macbuf, mac_size);
1595 * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
1596 * decryption failed, or ETM decryption failed.
1597 * 1: Success or MTE decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
1601 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1602 /* SSLfatal() got called */
1605 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
1607 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1610 ERR_clear_last_mark();
1611 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
1612 BIO_printf(trc_out, "dec %zd\n", rr->length);
1613 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rr->data, rr->length, 4);
1614 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
1616 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
1619 && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
1620 && (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
1621 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
1623 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
1624 if (i == 0 || macbuf.mac == NULL
1625 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, macbuf.mac, mac_size) != 0)
1627 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
1632 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
1634 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1638 /* r->length is now just compressed */
1639 if (s->expand != NULL) {
1640 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
1641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
1642 SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1645 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) {
1646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
1651 /* use current Max Fragment Length setting if applicable */
1652 if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1653 max_plain_length = GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session);
1655 /* send overflow if the plaintext is too long now it has passed MAC */
1656 if (rr->length > max_plain_length) {
1657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1663 * So at this point the following is true
1664 * ssl->s3.rrec.type is the type of record
1665 * ssl->s3.rrec.length == number of bytes in record
1666 * ssl->s3.rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
1667 * ssl->s3.rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
1671 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
1672 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1674 /* Mark receipt of record. */
1675 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
1680 OPENSSL_free(macbuf.mac);
1685 * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed
1687 #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
1688 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
1689 &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(&s->rlayer)))
1692 * Call this to get a new input record.
1693 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
1694 * or non-blocking IO.
1695 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
1696 * ssl->s3.rrec.type - is the type of record
1697 * ssl->s3.rrec.data - data
1698 * ssl->s3.rrec.length - number of bytes
1700 /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
1701 int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
1703 int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
1707 unsigned char *p = NULL;
1708 unsigned short version;
1709 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
1710 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
1712 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
1716 * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
1717 * This is a non-blocking operation.
1719 if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) {
1720 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1724 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
1725 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
1728 /* get something from the wire */
1730 /* check if we have the header */
1731 if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
1732 (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1733 rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
1734 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1, &n);
1735 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
1737 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1738 return rret; /* error or non-blocking */
1741 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
1742 if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) !=
1743 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1744 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1748 RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
1750 p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
1752 if (s->msg_callback)
1753 s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
1754 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1756 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
1760 version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
1762 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
1765 memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6);
1772 * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact
1773 * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors)
1775 if (!s->first_packet && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1776 if (version != s->version) {
1777 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
1780 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1785 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
1786 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
1789 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1793 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
1794 /* record too long, silently discard it */
1797 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1801 /* If received packet overflows own-client Max Fragment Length setting */
1802 if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
1803 && rr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session) + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD) {
1804 /* record too long, silently discard it */
1807 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1811 /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
1814 /* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
1817 RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1818 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
1820 rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n);
1821 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
1822 if (rret <= 0 || n != more) {
1823 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1824 /* ssl3_read_n() called SSLfatal() */
1829 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1834 * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
1835 * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
1838 /* set state for later operations */
1839 RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
1841 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
1842 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
1843 if (bitmap == NULL) {
1845 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
1846 goto again; /* get another record */
1848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1849 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
1850 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1852 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */
1854 * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where
1855 * we have no integrity negotiated yet?
1857 if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
1860 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
1861 goto again; /* get another record */
1863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1867 /* just read a 0 length packet */
1868 if (rr->length == 0) {
1874 * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
1875 * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
1876 * processed at this time.
1878 if (is_next_epoch) {
1879 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) {
1880 if (dtls1_buffer_record (s,
1881 &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)),
1883 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1889 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
1893 if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
1894 if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1895 /* dtls1_process_record() called SSLfatal */
1900 RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
1901 goto again; /* get another record */
1908 int dtls_buffer_listen_record(SSL *s, size_t len, unsigned char *seq, size_t off)
1912 rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
1913 memset(rr, 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
1916 rr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1917 memcpy(rr->seq_num, seq, sizeof(rr->seq_num));
1920 s->rlayer.packet = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)->buf;
1921 s->rlayer.packet_length = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len;
1922 rr->data = s->rlayer.packet + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1924 if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds),
1925 SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) <= 0) {
1926 /* SSLfatal() already called */