2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include "record_locl.h"
21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
22 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
39 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
48 rl->packet_length = 0;
50 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
51 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
52 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
53 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
59 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
60 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
62 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
64 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
65 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
68 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
71 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
73 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
74 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
75 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
76 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
77 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
80 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
81 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
83 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
86 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
87 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
89 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
90 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
92 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
95 return curr_rec < num_recs;
98 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
100 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
101 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
104 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
106 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
109 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
111 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
114 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
118 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
121 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
122 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
123 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
125 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
131 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
133 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
136 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
138 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
141 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
143 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
144 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
145 return "read header";
146 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
148 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
155 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
157 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
158 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
160 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
162 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
170 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
172 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
176 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
177 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
178 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
179 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
180 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
181 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
182 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
184 size_t len, left, align = 0;
191 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
193 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
197 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
198 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
199 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
203 /* start with empty packet ... */
206 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
208 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
211 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
212 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
213 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
215 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
216 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
217 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
218 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
219 * overrun can be triggered.
221 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
225 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
226 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
227 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
230 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
231 pkt = rb->buf + align;
233 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
234 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
236 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
237 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
238 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
239 rb->offset = len + align;
243 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
244 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
247 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
248 if (left == 0 && extend)
250 if (left > 0 && n > left)
254 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
256 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
263 /* else we need to read more data */
265 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
270 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
271 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
272 /* ignore max parameter */
277 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
278 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
286 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
287 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
292 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
293 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
294 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
295 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
299 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
305 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
307 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
312 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
313 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
314 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
316 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
318 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
322 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
325 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
326 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
332 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
333 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
335 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
338 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
340 size_t n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
341 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
342 size_t max_send_fragment, nw;
344 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
348 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
349 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
351 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
352 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
353 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
354 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
355 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
356 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
357 * report the error in a way the user will notice
359 if (len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
364 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
365 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, NULL))
370 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
371 i = s->handshake_func(s);
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
381 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
382 * will happen with non blocking IO
385 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
388 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
389 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
392 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
394 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
396 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
397 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
398 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
399 * compromise is considered worthy.
401 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
402 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
403 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
404 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
405 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
406 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
407 unsigned char aad[13];
408 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
412 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
413 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
414 max_send_fragment -= 512;
416 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
417 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
419 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
420 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
421 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
423 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
428 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
432 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
433 /* free jumbo buffer */
434 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
441 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
442 /* free jumbo buffer */
443 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
447 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
448 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
450 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
455 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
456 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
458 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
460 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
462 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
463 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
470 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
471 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
472 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
473 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
474 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
475 /* free jumbo buffer */
476 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
480 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
481 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
484 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
485 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
486 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
489 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
490 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
492 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
498 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
499 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
500 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
501 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
503 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
505 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
506 /* free jumbo buffer */
507 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
509 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
513 /* free jumbo buffer */
514 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
515 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
523 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
524 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
525 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
533 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
535 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
536 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
537 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
540 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
541 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
543 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
550 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
551 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
552 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
553 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
555 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
556 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
558 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
559 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
566 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
572 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
573 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
576 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
578 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
581 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
582 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
585 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
586 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
587 remain = n % numpipes;
588 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
589 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
595 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
598 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
599 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
604 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
605 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
607 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
608 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
610 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
612 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
614 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
616 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
625 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
626 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
627 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
629 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
630 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
633 unsigned char *recordstart;
634 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
635 size_t prefix_len = 0;
640 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
643 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
644 totlen += pipelens[j];
646 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
647 * will happen with non blocking IO
649 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
650 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
652 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
653 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
654 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
657 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
660 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
661 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
664 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
669 if ((sess == NULL) ||
670 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
671 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
674 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
675 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
681 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
683 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
685 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
686 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
689 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
691 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
692 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
693 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
696 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
699 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
704 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
705 /* insufficient space */
706 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
711 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
714 if (create_empty_fragment) {
715 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
716 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
718 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
719 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
720 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
722 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
723 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
725 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
726 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
727 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
728 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
729 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
733 } else if (prefix_len) {
734 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
735 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
736 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
737 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
738 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
739 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
740 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
745 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
748 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
749 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
750 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
751 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
753 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
754 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
755 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
756 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
757 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
764 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
765 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
766 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
767 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
768 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
769 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
772 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
773 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
774 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
775 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
776 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
781 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
782 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
783 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
784 unsigned int version = SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_VERSION : s->version;
785 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
787 unsigned int rectype;
792 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type);
794 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
797 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
798 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
802 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
803 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
805 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
806 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
807 version = TLS1_VERSION;
809 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
810 if (s->compress != NULL)
811 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
813 /* write the header */
814 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
815 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
816 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
818 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
820 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
826 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
827 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
828 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
829 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
830 totlen += pipelens[j];
833 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
837 /* first we compress */
838 if (s->compress != NULL) {
840 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
842 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
843 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
844 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
848 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
849 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
852 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
855 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
856 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
860 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
862 * TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
863 * For now, use no padding
868 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
869 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
873 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
876 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
877 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
884 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
885 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
886 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
888 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
891 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
894 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
899 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
900 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
902 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
903 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
904 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
907 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
908 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY) {
910 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
911 * send early data - so we need to use the the tls13enc function.
913 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
916 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
920 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
926 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
927 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
928 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
929 || origlen > thiswr->length
930 || (thiswr->length > origlen
931 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
932 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
936 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
939 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
940 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
944 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
947 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
948 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
953 if (s->msg_callback) {
954 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
955 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
956 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
957 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
958 s->msg_callback_arg);
961 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
967 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
968 * is thiswr->length long
970 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
972 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
974 if (create_empty_fragment) {
976 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
980 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
984 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
988 /* now let's set up wb */
989 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
990 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
994 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
997 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
998 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
999 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1000 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
1002 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1003 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
1005 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
1006 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1010 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1012 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1014 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1018 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1022 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1023 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
1024 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1025 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1031 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1032 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1033 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1038 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1039 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1040 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1041 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1042 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1043 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1044 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1051 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1052 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1053 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1054 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1056 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1057 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1059 } else if (i <= 0) {
1060 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1062 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1063 * using a datagram service
1065 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1069 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1070 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1075 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1076 * 'type' is one of the following:
1078 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1079 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1080 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1082 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1083 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1085 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1086 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1087 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1088 * argument is non NULL.
1089 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1090 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1091 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1092 * Change cipher spec protocol
1093 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1095 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1096 * Handshake protocol
1097 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1098 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1099 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1100 * Application data protocol
1101 * none of our business
1103 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1104 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1107 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1110 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1112 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1114 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1115 /* Not initialized yet */
1116 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1120 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1121 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1123 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1128 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1129 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1131 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1132 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1137 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1140 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1143 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1144 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1145 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1147 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1148 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1155 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1158 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1159 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1160 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1169 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1172 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1173 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1174 * rr[i].data, - data
1175 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1176 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1178 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1179 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1182 /* get new records if necessary */
1183 if (num_recs == 0) {
1184 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1187 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1188 if (num_recs == 0) {
1189 /* Shouldn't happen */
1190 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1195 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1197 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1199 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1200 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1204 } while (num_recs == 0);
1208 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1209 * record that isn't an alert.
1211 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1212 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1213 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1215 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1217 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1218 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1219 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1220 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1226 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1229 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1230 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1231 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1235 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1236 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1237 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1238 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1240 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1241 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1242 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1245 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1246 * doing a handshake for the first time
1248 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1249 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1250 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1255 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1256 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1257 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1258 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1263 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1264 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1271 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1272 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1274 n = len - totalbytes;
1276 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1279 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1280 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1281 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1283 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1284 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1285 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1286 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1287 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1288 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1291 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1292 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1297 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1298 && totalbytes < len);
1299 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1300 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1303 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1304 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1305 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1306 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1307 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1312 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1313 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1314 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1318 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1320 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1322 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1323 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1324 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1325 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1327 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1332 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1333 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1335 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1336 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1337 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1338 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1340 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1341 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1347 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1348 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1351 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1352 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1353 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1355 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1356 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1357 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1358 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1359 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1360 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1361 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1362 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1365 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1366 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1367 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1368 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1370 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1371 memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
1372 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
1373 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1374 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -n);
1376 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1377 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1379 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1380 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1385 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1386 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1387 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1391 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1392 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1393 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1396 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1397 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1398 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1400 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1401 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1402 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1403 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1404 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1405 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1406 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1409 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1410 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1411 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1413 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1415 if (s->msg_callback)
1416 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1417 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1418 s->msg_callback_arg);
1420 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1421 cb = s->info_callback;
1422 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1423 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1426 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1427 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1430 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1431 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1432 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1434 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1435 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1436 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1441 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1442 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1446 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1447 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1448 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1449 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1450 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1451 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1453 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1454 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1458 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1461 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1462 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1464 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1465 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1466 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1467 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1468 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1471 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1479 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1481 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1482 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1483 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1487 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1488 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1494 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1495 * protocol violation)
1497 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1498 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1499 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1500 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1502 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1510 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1511 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1512 /* no read-ahead left? */
1515 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1516 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1517 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1518 * problems in the blocking world
1520 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1521 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1522 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1523 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1530 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1533 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1534 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1535 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1536 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1537 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1539 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1542 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1544 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1546 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1547 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1548 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1550 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1553 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1555 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1556 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1557 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1558 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1559 * started), we will indulge it.
1561 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1562 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1564 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1566 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1567 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1568 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1569 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1570 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1571 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1574 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1575 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, &al))
1577 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1580 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1588 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1592 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1596 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1604 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1605 * format and false otherwise.
1607 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1609 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1613 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1615 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1617 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);