1 /* ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120 #include "record_locl.h"
122 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
123 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
126 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
127 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
128 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
129 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
130 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
132 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
133 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
136 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
139 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->rrec);
140 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->wrec);
143 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
145 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
147 /* Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
148 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
153 rl->packet_length = 0;
155 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
156 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
157 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
158 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
162 rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
164 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
165 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->wbuf);
166 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->rrec);
167 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->wrec);
169 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
170 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
173 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
176 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
178 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
179 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
180 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->wbuf))
181 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
182 SSL3_RECORD_release(&rl->rrec);
185 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
187 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
190 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
192 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf) != 0;
195 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
197 rl->packet_length = len;
199 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
200 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
201 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
205 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
206 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
211 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
213 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
216 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
218 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
221 int RECORD_LAYER_setup_comp_buffer(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
223 return SSL3_RECORD_setup(&(rl)->rrec);
226 int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
228 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
231 return (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
232 ? SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec) : 0;
235 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
239 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
240 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
243 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
246 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
256 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
260 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
261 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
264 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
267 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
277 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
280 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
281 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
282 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
283 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
284 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
294 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
296 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
300 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
301 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
302 align = (0-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
306 /* start with empty packet ... */
309 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
311 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
314 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
315 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
316 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
318 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
319 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
320 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
321 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
322 * overrun can be triggered.
324 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
328 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
329 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
330 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
334 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
335 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
338 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
339 if (left == 0 && extend)
341 if (left > 0 && n > left)
345 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
347 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
353 /* else we need to read more data */
355 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
356 pkt = rb->buf + align;
358 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
359 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
361 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
362 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
363 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
364 rb->offset = len + align;
367 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
372 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
373 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
374 /* ignore max parameter */
379 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
380 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
385 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
386 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
391 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
392 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
393 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
401 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
403 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
408 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
409 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
410 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
412 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
414 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
418 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
421 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
422 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
428 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
429 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
431 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
433 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
436 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
437 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
438 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
440 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
444 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
448 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
449 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
451 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
452 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
453 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
454 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
455 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
456 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
457 * report the error in a way the user will notice
459 if ((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
467 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
468 i = s->handshake_func(s);
472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
478 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
479 * will happen with non blocking IO
482 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot);
484 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
485 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
488 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
490 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
492 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
493 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
494 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
495 * compromise is considered worthy.
497 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
498 u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
499 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
500 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
501 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
502 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
503 unsigned char aad[13];
504 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
507 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
508 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
509 max_send_fragment -= 512;
511 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
512 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
514 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
515 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
516 max_send_fragment, NULL);
518 if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
523 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
524 if (wb->buf == NULL) {
525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
529 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
530 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
537 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
538 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
543 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
544 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
546 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
551 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
552 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
554 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
556 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
558 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
559 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
566 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
567 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
568 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
570 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
571 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
576 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
577 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
580 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
581 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
582 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
585 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
586 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
588 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
594 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
595 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
596 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
597 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
599 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
601 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
602 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
605 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
609 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
618 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
619 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
620 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
627 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
628 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
632 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
634 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
635 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
640 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
641 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
643 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
644 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
646 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
648 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
650 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
660 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
661 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
663 unsigned char *p, *plen;
664 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
669 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
673 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
674 * will happen with non blocking IO
676 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb) != 0)
677 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
679 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
680 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
681 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
684 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
687 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(wb))
688 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
691 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
694 wr = &s->rlayer.wrec;
697 if ((sess == NULL) ||
698 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
699 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
700 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
703 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
709 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
711 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
713 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
714 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
717 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
719 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
720 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
721 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
724 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
729 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
731 /* insufficient space */
732 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
737 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
740 if (create_empty_fragment) {
741 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
743 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
744 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
745 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
747 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
748 align = (0-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
750 p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
751 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
752 } else if (prefix_len) {
753 p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb) + prefix_len;
755 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
756 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
757 align = (0-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
759 p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
760 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
763 /* write the header */
765 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
766 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(wr, type);
768 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
770 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
771 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
773 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
774 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
777 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
779 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
782 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
783 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
784 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
785 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
786 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
790 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
791 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
792 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
793 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
794 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
800 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
801 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(wr, p + eivlen);
802 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(wr, (int)len);
803 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(wr, (unsigned char *)buf);
807 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
810 /* first we compress */
811 if (s->compress != NULL) {
812 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
813 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
817 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
818 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(wr);
822 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
823 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
827 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
828 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
830 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, mac_size);
833 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(wr, p);
834 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(wr);
838 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
840 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, eivlen);
843 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
846 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
847 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, p + wr->length, 1) < 0)
849 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, mac_size);
852 /* record length after mac and block padding */
853 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr), plen);
856 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s,
857 s->msg_callback_arg);
860 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
863 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(wr, type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
864 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(wr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
866 if (create_empty_fragment) {
868 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
871 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
874 /* now let's set up wb */
875 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr));
878 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
881 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len;
882 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
883 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
884 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
886 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
887 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
892 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
893 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
897 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
900 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > (int)len)
901 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
902 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
903 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
910 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
911 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
912 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
913 (char *)&(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb)[SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)]),
914 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb));
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
919 if (i == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(wb)) {
920 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, 0);
921 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(wb, i);
922 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
923 return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret);
925 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
927 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
928 * using a datagram service
930 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(wb, 0);
934 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(wb, i);
935 SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(wb, -i);
940 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
941 * 'type' is one of the following:
943 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
944 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
945 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
947 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
948 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
950 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
951 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
952 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
953 * argument is non NULL.
954 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
955 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
956 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
957 * Change cipher spec protocol
958 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
960 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
962 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
963 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
964 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
965 * Application data protocol
966 * none of our business
968 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
974 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
976 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
977 /* Not initialized yet */
978 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
982 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
983 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
985 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
990 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
991 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
993 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
994 unsigned char *dst = buf;
999 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1002 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1005 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1006 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1007 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1009 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1010 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1016 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1019 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1020 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1021 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1030 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1033 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1034 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1035 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1036 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1038 rr = &s->rlayer.rrec;
1040 /* get new packet if necessary */
1041 if ((SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1042 || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
1043 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1048 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1050 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1051 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1052 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1053 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1059 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1062 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1063 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1064 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1068 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1069 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1070 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
1072 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1073 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1074 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1077 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1078 * doing a handshake for the first time
1080 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1081 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1082 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1087 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1088 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1089 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1090 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1095 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1096 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1101 if ((unsigned int)len > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1102 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1104 n = (unsigned int)len;
1106 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1108 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -n);
1109 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1110 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1111 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1112 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1113 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1114 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0)
1115 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1122 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1123 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1124 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1127 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1128 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1134 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1136 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1138 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1139 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1140 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1141 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1143 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 if(s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1149 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1151 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1152 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1153 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1154 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1156 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1157 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1163 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1164 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1167 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1168 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1169 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1171 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1172 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1173 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1174 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1175 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1176 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1177 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1178 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1181 else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)== TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1182 /* We can ignore 0 return values */
1183 if (tls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr),
1184 SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr)) < 0) {
1188 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1189 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1190 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1191 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1192 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1197 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1198 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1199 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1200 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1202 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1204 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1205 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1206 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1207 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1210 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1211 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1216 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1217 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1218 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1221 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1223 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1224 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1225 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1226 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1228 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1229 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1230 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1231 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1236 if (s->msg_callback)
1237 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1238 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1239 s->msg_callback_arg);
1241 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1242 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1243 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1244 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1245 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1246 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1251 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1255 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1256 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
1257 /* no read-ahead left? */
1260 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1261 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1262 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1263 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1265 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1266 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1267 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1268 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1275 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1276 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1281 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1282 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1283 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1286 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1287 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1288 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1289 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1290 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1291 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1292 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1293 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1294 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1297 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1298 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1299 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1301 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1303 if (s->msg_callback)
1304 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1305 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1306 s->msg_callback_arg);
1308 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1309 cb = s->info_callback;
1310 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1311 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1314 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1315 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1318 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1319 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1320 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1321 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1325 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1326 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1327 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1328 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1329 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1330 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1332 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1333 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1337 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1338 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1341 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1344 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1345 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1347 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1348 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1349 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1350 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1353 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1361 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1363 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1364 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1368 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1369 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1375 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1377 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1378 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1379 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1380 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1381 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1385 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1393 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1394 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
1395 /* no read-ahead left? */
1398 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1399 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1400 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1401 * problems in the blocking world
1403 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1404 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1405 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1406 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1413 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1416 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1417 * an unexpected message alert.
1419 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1420 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1423 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1424 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1426 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1428 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1430 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1431 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1432 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1434 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1437 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1439 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1440 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1441 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1442 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1443 * started), we will indulge it.
1445 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1446 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1449 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1457 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1461 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1465 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1473 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1474 * format and false otherwise.
1476 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1478 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec);
1482 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1484 unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1486 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec);