2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include "record_locl.h"
20 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
21 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
24 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
25 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
26 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
27 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
29 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
30 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
33 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
36 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
37 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
40 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
44 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
47 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
48 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
53 rl->packet_length = 0;
55 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
56 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
57 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
58 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
64 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
65 for (pipes = 0; pipes < rl->numwpipes; pipes++)
66 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->wbuf[pipes]);
69 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
71 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
72 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
75 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
78 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
80 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
81 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
82 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
83 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
84 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
87 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
89 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
92 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
94 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
95 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
98 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
100 rl->packet_length = len;
102 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
103 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
104 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
108 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
109 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
114 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
116 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
119 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
121 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
124 int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
129 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
132 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
133 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
134 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
136 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
142 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
144 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
147 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
149 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
154 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
156 return "read header";
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
166 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
168 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
169 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
171 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
173 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
181 * Return values are as per SSL_read(), i.e.
182 * >0 The number of read bytes
183 * 0 Failure (not retryable)
184 * <0 Failure (may be retryable)
186 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold)
189 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
190 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
191 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
192 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
193 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
194 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
195 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
205 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
207 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
211 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
212 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
213 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
217 /* start with empty packet ... */
220 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
222 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
225 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
226 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
227 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
229 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
230 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
231 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
232 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
233 * overrun can be triggered.
235 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
239 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
240 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
241 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
245 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
246 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
249 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
250 if (left == 0 && extend)
252 if (left > 0 && n > left)
256 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
258 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
264 /* else we need to read more data */
266 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
267 pkt = rb->buf + align;
269 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
270 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
272 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { /* len > 0 */
273 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
274 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
275 rb->offset = len + align;
278 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
283 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
284 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
285 /* ignore max parameter */
290 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
291 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
296 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
297 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
302 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
303 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
304 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
306 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
312 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
314 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
319 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
320 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
321 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
323 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
325 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
329 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
332 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
333 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
338 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
339 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
341 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
343 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
345 unsigned int n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
346 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
347 unsigned int max_send_fragment, nw;
348 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
350 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
358 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
359 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
361 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
362 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
363 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
364 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
365 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
366 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
367 * report the error in a way the user will notice
369 if ((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
376 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
377 i = s->handshake_func(s);
381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
387 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
388 * will happen with non blocking IO
391 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot);
393 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
394 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
397 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
399 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
401 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
402 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
403 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
404 * compromise is considered worthy.
406 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
407 u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
408 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
409 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
410 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
411 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
412 unsigned char aad[13];
413 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
416 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
417 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
418 max_send_fragment -= 512;
420 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
421 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
423 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
424 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
425 max_send_fragment, NULL);
427 if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
432 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
436 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
437 /* free jumbo buffer */
438 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
444 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
445 /* free jumbo buffer */
446 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
450 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
451 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
453 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
458 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
459 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
461 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
463 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
465 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
466 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
473 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
474 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
475 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
477 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
478 /* free jumbo buffer */
479 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
483 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
484 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
487 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
488 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
489 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
492 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
493 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
495 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
501 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
502 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
503 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
504 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
506 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
508 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
509 /* free jumbo buffer */
510 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
512 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
516 /* free jumbo buffer */
517 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
525 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
526 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
527 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
534 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
536 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
537 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
538 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
541 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
542 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
544 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
547 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
551 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
552 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
553 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
554 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
556 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
557 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
559 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
560 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
562 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
567 unsigned int pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
568 unsigned int numpipes, j;
573 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
574 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
577 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
579 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
582 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
583 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
586 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
587 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
588 remain = n % numpipes;
589 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
590 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
596 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0);
598 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
599 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
604 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
605 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
607 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
608 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
610 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
612 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
614 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
624 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
625 unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes,
626 int create_empty_fragment)
628 unsigned char *outbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], *plen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
629 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
630 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
636 unsigned int totlen = 0;
639 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
640 totlen += pipelens[j];
642 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
643 * will happen with non blocking IO
645 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
646 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen));
648 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
649 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
650 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
653 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
656 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
657 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
660 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
665 if ((sess == NULL) ||
666 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
667 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
670 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
676 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
678 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
680 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
681 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
684 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
686 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
687 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
688 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
691 unsigned int tmppipelen = 0;
693 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1);
698 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
699 /* insufficient space */
700 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
705 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
708 if (create_empty_fragment) {
709 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
710 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
712 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
713 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
714 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
716 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
717 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
719 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
720 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
721 } else if (prefix_len) {
722 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
723 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
726 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
727 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
728 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
729 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
730 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
732 outbuf[j] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
733 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
737 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
738 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
739 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
740 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
741 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
745 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
746 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
747 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
748 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
749 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
756 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
757 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
758 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
759 /* write the header */
760 *(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff;
761 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type);
763 *(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8);
765 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
766 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
768 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
769 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
770 *(outbuf[j]++) = 0x1;
772 *(outbuf[j]++) = s->version & 0xff;
774 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
778 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
779 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j] + eivlen);
780 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], (int)pipelens[j]);
781 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
782 totlen += pipelens[j];
785 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
788 /* first we compress */
789 if (s->compress != NULL) {
790 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])) {
791 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
795 memcpy(wr[j].data, wr[j].input, wr[j].length);
796 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
800 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
801 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
805 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
806 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
807 &(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]),
810 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
813 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]);
814 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
818 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
820 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], eivlen);
824 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
827 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
828 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
829 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
830 outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1) < 0)
832 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
835 /* record length after mac and block padding */
836 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]), plen[j]);
839 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen[j] - 5, 5, s,
840 s->msg_callback_arg);
843 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
846 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for
848 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
850 if (create_empty_fragment) {
852 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
856 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
860 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
863 /* now let's set up wb */
864 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
865 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]));
869 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
872 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
873 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
874 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
875 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
877 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
878 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen);
883 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
885 * Return values are as per SSL_read(), i.e.
886 * >0 The number of read bytes
887 * 0 Failure (not retryable)
888 * <0 Failure (may be retryable)
890 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
894 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
895 unsigned int currbuf = 0;
898 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > (int)len)
899 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
900 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
901 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
902 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
907 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
908 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
909 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
914 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
915 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
916 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
917 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
918 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
919 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
924 if (i == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
925 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
926 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
927 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
929 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
930 return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret);
932 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
934 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
935 * using a datagram service
937 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
941 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
942 SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(&wb[currbuf], -i);
947 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
948 * 'type' is one of the following:
950 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
951 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
952 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
954 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
955 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
957 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
958 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
959 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
960 * argument is non NULL.
961 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
962 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
963 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
964 * Change cipher spec protocol
965 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
967 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
969 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
970 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
971 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
972 * Application data protocol
973 * none of our business
975 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
979 unsigned int n, curr_rec, num_recs, read_bytes;
982 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
984 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
986 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
987 /* Not initialized yet */
988 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
992 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
993 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
995 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1001 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1003 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1004 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1009 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1012 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1015 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1016 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1017 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1019 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1020 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1026 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1029 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1030 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1031 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1040 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1043 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1044 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1045 * rr[i].data, - data
1046 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1047 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1049 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1050 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1053 /* get new records if necessary */
1054 if (num_recs == 0) {
1055 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1058 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1059 if (num_recs == 0) {
1060 /* Shouldn't happen */
1061 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1068 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1070 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1071 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1075 } while (num_recs == 0);
1079 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1080 * record that isn't an alert.
1082 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1083 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1084 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1086 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1088 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1089 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1090 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1091 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1097 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1100 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1101 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1102 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1106 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1107 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1108 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
1110 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1111 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1112 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1115 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1116 * doing a handshake for the first time
1118 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1119 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1120 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1125 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1126 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1127 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1128 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1133 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1134 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1141 if ((unsigned int)len - read_bytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1142 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1144 n = (unsigned int)len - read_bytes;
1146 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1149 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1150 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1151 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1153 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1154 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1155 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1156 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1157 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1158 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1161 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1162 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1167 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1168 && read_bytes < (unsigned int)len);
1169 if (read_bytes == 0) {
1170 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1173 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1174 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1175 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1176 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1181 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1182 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1183 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1187 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1189 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1191 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1192 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1193 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1194 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1196 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1201 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1202 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1204 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1205 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1206 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1207 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1209 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1210 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1216 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1217 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1220 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1221 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1222 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1224 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1225 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1226 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1227 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1228 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1229 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1230 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1231 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1234 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1235 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1236 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1237 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1239 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1241 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1242 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1243 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1244 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1247 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
1248 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1249 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1255 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1256 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1257 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1260 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1262 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1263 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1264 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1265 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1267 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1268 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1269 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1270 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1275 if (s->msg_callback)
1276 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1277 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1278 s->msg_callback_arg);
1280 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1281 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1282 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1283 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1284 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1285 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1293 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1294 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1295 /* no read-ahead left? */
1298 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1299 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1300 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1301 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1303 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1304 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1305 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1306 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1313 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1314 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1319 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1320 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1321 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1324 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1325 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1326 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1327 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1328 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1329 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1330 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1331 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1332 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1333 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1336 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1337 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1338 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1340 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1342 if (s->msg_callback)
1343 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1344 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1345 s->msg_callback_arg);
1347 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1348 cb = s->info_callback;
1349 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1350 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1353 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1354 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1357 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1358 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1359 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1361 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1362 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1363 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1368 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1369 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1373 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1374 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1375 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1376 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1377 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1378 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1380 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1381 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1385 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1386 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1389 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1392 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1393 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1395 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1396 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1397 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1398 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1399 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1402 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1410 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1412 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1413 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1414 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1418 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1419 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1425 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1427 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1428 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1429 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1430 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1431 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1435 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1443 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1444 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1445 /* no read-ahead left? */
1448 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1449 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1450 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1451 * problems in the blocking world
1453 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1454 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1455 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1456 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1463 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1466 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1467 * an unexpected message alert.
1469 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1470 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1471 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1474 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1477 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1479 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1481 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1482 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1483 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1485 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1488 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1490 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1491 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1492 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1493 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1494 * started), we will indulge it.
1496 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1497 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1500 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1508 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1512 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1516 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1524 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1525 * format and false otherwise.
1527 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1529 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1533 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1535 unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1537 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);