2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include "record_locl.h"
21 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
22 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
23 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
24 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
26 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
27 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
30 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
33 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
34 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
37 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
39 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
42 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
43 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
48 rl->packet_length = 0;
50 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
51 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
52 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
53 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
59 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
60 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
62 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
64 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
65 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
68 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
71 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
73 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
74 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
75 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
76 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
77 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
80 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
82 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
85 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
87 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
88 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
91 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf,
94 rl->packet_length = len;
96 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
97 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
98 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
102 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
103 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
108 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
110 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
113 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
115 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
118 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
122 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
125 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
126 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
127 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
129 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
135 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
137 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
140 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
142 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
145 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
147 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
148 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
149 return "read header";
150 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
152 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
159 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
161 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
162 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
164 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
166 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
174 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
176 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
180 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
181 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
182 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
183 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
184 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
185 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
186 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
188 size_t len, left, align = 0;
195 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
197 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
201 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
202 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
203 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
207 /* start with empty packet ... */
210 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
212 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
215 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
216 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
217 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
219 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
220 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
221 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
222 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
223 * overrun can be triggered.
225 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
229 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
230 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
231 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
234 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
235 pkt = rb->buf + align;
237 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
238 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
240 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
241 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
242 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
243 rb->offset = len + align;
247 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
248 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
251 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
252 if (left == 0 && extend)
254 if (left > 0 && n > left)
258 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
260 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
267 /* else we need to read more data */
269 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
274 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
275 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
276 /* ignore max parameter */
281 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
282 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
290 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
291 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
296 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
297 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
298 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
299 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
309 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
311 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
316 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
317 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
318 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
320 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
322 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
326 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
329 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
330 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
336 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
337 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
339 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
342 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
344 size_t n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
345 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
346 size_t max_send_fragment, nw;
348 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
352 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
353 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
355 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
356 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
357 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
358 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
359 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
360 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
361 * report the error in a way the user will notice
363 if (len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
370 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
371 i = s->handshake_func(s);
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
381 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
382 * will happen with non blocking IO
385 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
388 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
389 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
392 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
394 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
396 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
397 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
398 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
399 * compromise is considered worthy.
401 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
402 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
403 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
404 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
405 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
406 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
407 unsigned char aad[13];
408 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
412 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
413 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
414 max_send_fragment -= 512;
416 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
417 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
419 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
420 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
421 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
423 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
428 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
432 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
433 /* free jumbo buffer */
434 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
441 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
442 /* free jumbo buffer */
443 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
447 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
448 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
450 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
455 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
456 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
458 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
460 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
462 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
463 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
470 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
471 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
472 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
473 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
474 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
475 /* free jumbo buffer */
476 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
480 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
481 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
484 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
485 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
486 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
489 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
490 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
492 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
498 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
499 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
500 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
501 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
503 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
505 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
506 /* free jumbo buffer */
507 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
509 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
513 /* free jumbo buffer */
514 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
515 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
523 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
524 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
525 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
533 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
535 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
536 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
537 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
540 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
541 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
543 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
550 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
551 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
552 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
553 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
555 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
556 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
558 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
559 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
566 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
572 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
573 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
576 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
578 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
581 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
582 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
585 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
586 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
587 remain = n % numpipes;
588 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
589 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
595 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
598 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
599 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
604 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
605 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
607 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
608 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
610 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
612 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
614 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
616 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
625 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
626 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
627 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
629 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
630 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
633 unsigned char *recordstart;
634 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
635 size_t prefix_len = 0;
640 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
643 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
644 totlen += pipelens[j];
646 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
647 * will happen with non blocking IO
649 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
650 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
652 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
653 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
654 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
657 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
660 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
661 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
664 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
669 if ((sess == NULL) ||
670 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
671 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
674 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
675 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
681 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
683 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
685 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
686 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
689 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
691 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
692 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
693 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
696 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
699 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
704 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
705 /* insufficient space */
706 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
711 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
714 if (create_empty_fragment) {
715 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
716 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
718 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
719 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
720 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
722 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
723 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
725 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
726 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
727 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
728 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
729 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
733 } else if (prefix_len) {
734 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
735 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
736 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
737 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
738 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
739 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
740 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
745 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
748 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
749 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
750 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
751 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
753 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
754 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
755 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
756 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
757 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
764 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
765 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
766 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
767 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
768 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
769 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
772 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
773 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
774 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
775 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
776 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
781 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
782 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
783 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
784 unsigned int version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_VERSION : s->version;
785 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
787 unsigned int rectype;
792 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type);
794 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
797 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
798 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
802 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
803 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
805 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
806 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
807 version = TLS1_VERSION;
809 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
810 if (s->compress != NULL)
811 pipelens[j] += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
813 /* write the header */
814 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
815 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
816 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
818 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
820 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
826 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
827 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
828 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
829 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
830 totlen += pipelens[j];
833 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
837 /* first we compress */
838 if (s->compress != NULL) {
840 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make sure we prevent compression!!!
842 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
843 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
844 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
848 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
849 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
852 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
855 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
856 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
857 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
860 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
862 * TODO(TLS1.3): Padding goes here. Do we need an API to add this?
863 * For now, use no padding
868 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
869 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
873 if (!SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
876 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
877 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
884 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
885 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
886 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
888 if(!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
891 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
894 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
895 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
899 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
900 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
902 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
903 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
904 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
907 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
910 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
916 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
917 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
918 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
919 || origlen > thiswr->length
920 || (thiswr->length > origlen
921 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
922 thiswr->length - origlen, NULL))) {
923 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
926 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
929 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
930 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
931 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
934 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
937 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
938 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
943 if (s->msg_callback) {
944 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
945 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
946 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
947 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
948 s->msg_callback_arg);
951 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
957 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
958 * is thiswr->length long
960 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
962 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
964 if (create_empty_fragment) {
966 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
970 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
974 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
978 /* now let's set up wb */
979 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
980 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
984 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
987 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
988 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
989 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
990 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
992 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
993 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
995 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
996 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1000 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1002 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1004 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1008 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1012 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1013 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
1014 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1015 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1021 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1022 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1023 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1028 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1029 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1030 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1031 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1032 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1033 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1034 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1041 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1042 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1043 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1044 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1046 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1047 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1049 } else if (i <= 0) {
1050 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1052 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1053 * using a datagram service
1055 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1059 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1060 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1065 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1066 * 'type' is one of the following:
1068 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1069 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1070 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1072 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1073 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1075 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1076 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1077 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1078 * argument is non NULL.
1079 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1080 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1081 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1082 * Change cipher spec protocol
1083 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1085 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1086 * Handshake protocol
1087 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1088 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1089 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1090 * Application data protocol
1091 * none of our business
1093 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1094 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1097 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1100 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1102 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1104 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1105 /* Not initialized yet */
1106 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1110 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1111 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1113 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1118 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1119 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1121 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1122 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1127 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1130 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1133 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1134 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1135 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1137 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1138 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1145 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1148 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1149 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1150 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1159 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1162 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1163 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1164 * rr[i].data, - data
1165 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1166 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1168 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1169 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1172 /* get new records if necessary */
1173 if (num_recs == 0) {
1174 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1177 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1178 if (num_recs == 0) {
1179 /* Shouldn't happen */
1180 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1187 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1189 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1190 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1194 } while (num_recs == 0);
1198 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1199 * record that isn't an alert.
1201 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1202 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1203 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1205 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1207 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1208 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1209 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1210 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1216 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1219 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1220 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1221 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1225 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1226 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1227 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1228 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1230 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1231 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1232 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1235 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1236 * doing a handshake for the first time
1238 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1239 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1240 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1245 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1246 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1247 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1248 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1253 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1254 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1261 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1262 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1264 n = len - totalbytes;
1266 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1269 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1270 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1271 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1273 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1274 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1275 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1276 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1277 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1278 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1281 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1282 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1287 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1288 && totalbytes < len);
1289 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1290 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1293 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1294 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1295 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1296 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1297 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1302 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1303 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1304 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1308 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1310 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1312 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1313 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1314 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1315 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1317 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1323 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1325 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1326 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1327 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1328 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1330 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1331 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1337 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1338 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1341 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1342 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1343 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1345 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1346 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1347 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1348 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1349 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1350 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1351 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1352 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1355 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1356 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1357 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1358 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1360 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1362 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1363 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1364 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1365 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1368 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
1369 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1370 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1376 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1377 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1378 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1382 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1383 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1384 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1387 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1388 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1389 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1391 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1392 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1393 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1394 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1395 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1396 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1397 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1400 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1401 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1402 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1404 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1406 if (s->msg_callback)
1407 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1408 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1409 s->msg_callback_arg);
1411 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1412 cb = s->info_callback;
1413 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1414 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1417 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1418 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1421 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1422 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1423 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1425 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1426 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1427 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1432 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1433 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1437 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1438 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1439 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1440 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1441 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1442 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1444 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1445 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1449 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1450 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1453 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1456 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1457 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1459 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1460 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1461 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1462 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1463 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1466 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1474 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1476 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1477 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1478 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1482 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1483 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1489 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1490 * protocol violation)
1492 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1493 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1495 * To get here we must be trying to read app data but found handshake
1496 * data. But if we're trying to read app data, and we're not in init
1497 * (which is tested for at the top of this function) then init must be
1500 assert(SSL_is_init_finished(s));
1501 if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s)) {
1502 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1507 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1508 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1510 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1518 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1519 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1520 /* no read-ahead left? */
1523 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1524 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1525 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1526 * problems in the blocking world
1528 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1529 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1530 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1531 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1538 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1541 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1542 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1543 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1544 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1545 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1547 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1550 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1552 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1554 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1555 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1556 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1558 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1561 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1563 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1564 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1565 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1566 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1567 * started), we will indulge it.
1569 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1570 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1573 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1581 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1585 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1589 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1597 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1598 * format and false otherwise.
1600 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1602 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1606 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1608 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1610 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);