2 * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
13 #include "../ssl_local.h"
14 #include <openssl/evp.h>
15 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
16 #include <openssl/rand.h>
17 #include "record_local.h"
18 #include "internal/packet.h"
20 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
21 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
22 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
23 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
25 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
26 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
29 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
32 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
33 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
36 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
38 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
41 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
42 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
47 rl->packet_length = 0;
49 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
50 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
56 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
57 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
59 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
61 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
62 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
65 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
68 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
70 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
71 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
72 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
73 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
74 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
77 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
78 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
80 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
83 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
84 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
86 size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
87 const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
89 while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
92 return curr_rec < num_recs;
95 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
97 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
98 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
101 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
103 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
106 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
108 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
111 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
115 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
118 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
119 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
120 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
122 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
128 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
130 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
133 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
135 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
138 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
140 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
141 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
142 return "read header";
143 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
145 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
154 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
167 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
169 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
173 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
174 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
175 * s->s3.rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
176 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
177 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
178 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
179 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
181 size_t len, left, align = 0;
188 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
190 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
196 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
197 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
198 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
202 /* start with empty packet ... */
205 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
207 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
210 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
211 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
212 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
214 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
215 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
216 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
217 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
218 * overrun can be triggered.
220 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
224 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
225 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
226 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
229 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
230 pkt = rb->buf + align;
232 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
233 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
235 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
236 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
237 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
238 rb->offset = len + align;
242 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
243 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
246 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
247 if (left == 0 && extend)
249 if (left > 0 && n > left)
253 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
255 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
262 /* else we need to read more data */
264 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) {
265 /* does not happen */
266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
272 * Ktls always reads full records.
273 * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS.
275 if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !s->rlayer.read_ahead
276 && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
277 /* ignore max parameter */
282 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
283 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
291 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3.rbuf.buf and
292 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
297 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
298 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
299 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
300 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
304 && !BIO_should_retry(s->rbio)
305 && BIO_eof(s->rbio)) {
306 if (s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) {
307 SSL_set_shutdown(s, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
308 s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
310 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
311 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING);
315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
316 SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
322 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
324 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
329 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
330 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
331 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
333 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
335 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
339 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
342 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
343 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
349 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
350 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
352 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
355 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
357 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
358 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
361 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
365 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
366 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
368 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
369 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
370 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
371 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
372 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
373 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
374 * report the error in a way the user will notice
376 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
377 || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
383 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
384 && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
385 /* SSLfatal() already called */
392 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
393 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
396 if (wb->left == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
397 || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0))
398 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
401 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
402 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
405 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
406 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
407 i = s->handshake_func(s);
408 /* SSLfatal() already called */
417 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
418 * will happen with non blocking IO
421 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
422 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
425 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
426 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
429 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
431 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
433 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
434 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
435 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
436 * compromise is considered worthy.
438 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
439 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) &&
440 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
441 !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
442 (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) == 0) &&
443 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
444 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
445 unsigned char aad[13];
446 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
450 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
451 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
452 max_send_fragment -= 512;
454 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
455 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
457 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
458 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
459 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
461 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
466 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
467 /* SSLfatal() already called */
470 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
471 /* free jumbo buffer */
472 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
479 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
480 /* free jumbo buffer */
481 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
485 if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) {
486 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
488 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
489 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
494 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
495 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
497 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
499 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
501 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
502 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
509 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
510 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
511 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
512 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
513 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
514 /* free jumbo buffer */
515 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
519 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
520 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
523 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
524 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
525 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
528 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
529 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
531 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
537 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
538 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
539 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
540 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
542 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
544 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
545 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
546 /* free jumbo buffer */
547 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
549 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
553 /* free jumbo buffer */
554 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
555 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
562 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
563 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
564 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
565 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
573 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
574 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
576 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
577 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
578 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
581 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
582 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
584 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
588 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
592 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
593 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
594 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
595 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
597 if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0
598 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
600 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
601 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
604 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
609 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
615 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
616 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
619 if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) {
621 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
624 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
625 pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment;
628 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
629 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
630 remain = n % numpipes;
631 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
632 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
638 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
641 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
642 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
643 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
648 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
649 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
651 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
652 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
654 s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 0;
657 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0
659 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
661 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
670 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
671 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
672 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
674 WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
675 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
678 unsigned char *recordstart;
679 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
680 size_t prefix_len = 0;
685 size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
688 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
689 totlen += pipelens[j];
691 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
692 * will happen with non blocking IO
694 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
695 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
696 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
699 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
700 if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) {
701 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
703 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
706 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
709 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) {
710 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) {
711 /* SSLfatal() already called */
716 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
721 if ((sess == NULL) ||
722 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
723 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
726 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
727 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
736 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
738 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3.empty_fragment_done) {
740 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
741 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
744 if (s->s3.need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
746 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
747 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
748 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
751 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
754 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
756 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
761 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
762 /* insufficient space */
763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
764 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
769 s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 1;
772 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
774 * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to
775 * discard the const qualifier.
776 * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when
779 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], (unsigned char *)buf);
780 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 0);
781 SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 1);
782 goto wpacket_init_complete;
785 if (create_empty_fragment) {
786 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
787 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
789 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
790 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
791 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
793 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
794 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
796 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
797 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
798 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
799 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
801 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
805 } else if (prefix_len) {
806 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
807 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
808 SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
809 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
810 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
811 + prefix_len, NULL)) {
812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
813 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
818 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
821 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
822 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
823 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
824 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
826 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
827 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
828 SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
829 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
831 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
838 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
839 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
840 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
841 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
842 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
843 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
846 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
847 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
848 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
849 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
850 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
854 wpacket_init_complete:
857 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
858 memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr));
859 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
860 unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
862 unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
864 unsigned int rectype;
870 * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
873 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
874 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
875 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
876 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT))
877 rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
880 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype);
883 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
884 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
886 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
888 && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION
889 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
890 version = TLS1_VERSION;
891 SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version);
893 maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
894 if (s->compress != NULL)
895 maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
898 * When using offload kernel will write the header.
899 * Otherwise write the header now
901 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
902 && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
903 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
904 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
906 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
908 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
911 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
915 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
916 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
917 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
918 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
919 totlen += pipelens[j];
922 * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
926 /* first we compress */
927 if (s->compress != NULL) {
928 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
929 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
931 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
935 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
936 SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr[j]);
938 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
940 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
943 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
947 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
948 && !BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
949 && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
950 && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
951 || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
952 size_t rlen, max_send_fragment;
954 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
959 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
961 /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
962 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
963 rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
964 if (rlen < max_send_fragment) {
966 size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen;
967 if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
968 padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
969 } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
970 size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
973 /* optimize for power of 2 */
974 if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
975 remainder = rlen & mask;
977 remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
978 /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
982 padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
985 /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
986 if (padding > max_padding)
987 padding = max_padding;
988 if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
990 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
993 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
999 * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
1000 * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
1004 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1007 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
1008 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
1009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1010 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1016 * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
1017 * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
1018 * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
1020 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
1021 if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt,
1022 SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
1025 * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
1028 || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
1029 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1034 /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
1035 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
1036 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
1037 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
1038 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
1042 if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) {
1044 * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
1045 * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
1047 if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1, NULL, mac_size) < 1) {
1048 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1049 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1050 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1055 if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
1056 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1, NULL,
1058 if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
1059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1060 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1067 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
1073 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio))
1076 /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
1077 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
1078 /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
1079 || origlen > thiswr->length
1080 || (thiswr->length > origlen
1081 && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
1082 thiswr->length - origlen,
1084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1088 if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
1091 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
1092 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
1093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1094 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
1100 if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
1101 || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
1102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1103 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1107 if (s->msg_callback) {
1108 recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
1109 - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1110 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
1111 SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1112 s->msg_callback_arg);
1114 if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
1115 unsigned char ctype = type;
1117 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
1118 &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1122 if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
1123 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1124 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1128 /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */
1129 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
1131 if (create_empty_fragment) {
1133 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
1137 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
1138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
1139 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
1148 * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
1149 * is thiswr->length long
1151 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
1154 /* now let's set up wb */
1155 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
1156 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
1160 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
1163 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
1164 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
1165 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
1166 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
1168 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1169 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
1171 for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
1172 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
1176 /* if s->s3.wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
1178 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
1180 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
1184 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
1188 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
1189 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
1190 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
1191 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
1193 SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1198 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1199 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1200 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1205 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1206 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1209 * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages,
1210 * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO
1212 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1213 i = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1218 if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
1219 && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
1220 BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s->wbio, type);
1222 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1223 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
1224 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
1225 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1226 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
1234 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1235 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1236 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1237 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1239 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1240 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
1242 } else if (i <= 0) {
1243 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1245 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1246 * using a datagram service
1248 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1252 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1253 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
1258 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1259 * 'type' is one of the following:
1261 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1262 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1263 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1265 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1266 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1268 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1269 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1270 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1271 * argument is non NULL.
1272 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1273 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1274 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1275 * Change cipher spec protocol
1276 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1278 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1279 * Handshake protocol
1280 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1281 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1282 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1283 * Application data protocol
1284 * none of our business
1286 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1287 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
1290 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
1293 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1294 int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s);
1296 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1298 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1299 /* Not initialized yet */
1300 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
1301 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1306 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1307 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1309 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1310 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1311 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1315 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1316 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1318 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1319 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1324 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1327 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1330 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1331 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1332 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1334 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1335 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1342 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1345 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1346 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1347 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1348 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1355 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1358 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1359 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1360 * rr[i].data, - data
1361 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1362 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1364 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1365 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1368 /* get new records if necessary */
1369 if (num_recs == 0) {
1370 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1372 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1375 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1376 if (num_recs == 0) {
1377 /* Shouldn't happen */
1378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1379 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1383 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1385 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1387 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1388 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1392 } while (num_recs == 0);
1395 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0
1396 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1397 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1399 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
1404 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1405 * record that isn't an alert.
1407 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1408 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1409 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1411 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1413 if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1414 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1415 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1417 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1422 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1425 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1426 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1427 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1431 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1432 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1433 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
1436 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1437 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1438 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1441 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1442 * doing a handshake for the first time
1444 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1445 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1447 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1451 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1452 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1453 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1455 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1459 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1460 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1464 * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
1465 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
1466 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
1468 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1469 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1475 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1476 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1478 n = len - totalbytes;
1480 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1483 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1484 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1485 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1487 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT)
1488 OPENSSL_cleanse(&(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1489 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1490 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1491 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1492 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1493 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1494 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1497 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1498 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1503 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1504 && totalbytes < len);
1505 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1506 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1509 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1510 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1511 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1512 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1513 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1518 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1519 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1520 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1524 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1526 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1528 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1529 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1530 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1531 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1534 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1538 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1539 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1541 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1542 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
1543 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
1544 * if we are a server.
1546 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1547 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1548 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1553 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1554 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1557 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1558 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
1559 unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
1560 + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
1563 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1564 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
1565 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
1566 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
1567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1568 SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
1572 if (s->msg_callback)
1573 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
1574 s->msg_callback_arg);
1576 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1577 cb = s->info_callback;
1578 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1579 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1582 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1583 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1586 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING
1587 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
1588 s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr;
1589 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1591 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1592 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1594 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1600 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
1601 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
1603 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
1605 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
1606 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
1607 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1609 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
1612 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1613 s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1615 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1616 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1617 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1618 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1619 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1620 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1622 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1624 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1625 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1626 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1627 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1628 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1629 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1632 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1634 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1635 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
1639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1640 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1644 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
1645 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1649 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
1650 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
1651 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
1652 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
1653 * sent close_notify.
1655 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1656 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1657 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1659 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
1662 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1663 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1664 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
1665 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
1670 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
1671 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
1672 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
1674 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
1676 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1677 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1679 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
1685 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
1686 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
1687 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
1688 * that we're just going to discard.
1690 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1691 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
1692 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1693 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1695 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1696 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1697 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1699 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1700 memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
1701 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
1702 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1703 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1705 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1706 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1708 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1709 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1712 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1714 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1719 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
1720 * protocol violation)
1722 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1723 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1724 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
1726 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
1727 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1729 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1730 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
1738 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
1739 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
1740 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
1745 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1746 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1747 /* no read-ahead left? */
1750 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1751 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1752 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1753 * problems in the blocking world
1755 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1756 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1757 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1758 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1765 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1768 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1769 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1770 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1771 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1772 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1775 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1777 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1779 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1781 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1782 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1783 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1785 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1786 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1788 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1790 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1791 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1792 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1793 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1794 * started), we will indulge it.
1796 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1797 s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2;
1799 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1801 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1802 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1803 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1804 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1805 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1806 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1809 if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1810 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
1811 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1814 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1818 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1824 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1828 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1836 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1837 * format and false otherwise.
1839 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1841 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1845 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1847 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1849 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);