2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include <openssl/evp.h>
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include "record_locl.h"
20 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
21 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
24 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
25 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
26 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
27 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
29 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
30 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
33 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
36 RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
37 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
40 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
44 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
47 * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
48 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
53 rl->packet_length = 0;
55 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
56 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
57 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
58 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
64 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
65 for (pipes = 0; pipes < rl->numwpipes; pipes++)
66 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->wbuf[pipes]);
69 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
71 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
72 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
75 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
78 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
80 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
81 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
82 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
83 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
84 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
87 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
89 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
92 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
94 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
95 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
98 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf,
101 rl->packet_length = len;
103 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
104 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
105 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
109 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
110 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
115 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
117 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
120 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
122 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
125 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
129 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
132 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
133 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
134 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
136 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
142 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
144 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
147 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
149 SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
152 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
154 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
155 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
156 return "read header";
157 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
159 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
166 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
168 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
169 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
171 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
173 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
181 * Return values are as per SSL_read()
183 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
187 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
188 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
189 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
190 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
191 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
192 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
193 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
195 size_t len, left, align = 0;
202 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
204 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
208 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
209 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
210 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
214 /* start with empty packet ... */
217 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
219 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
222 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
223 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
224 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
226 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
227 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
228 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
229 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
230 * overrun can be triggered.
232 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
236 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
237 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
238 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
241 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
242 pkt = rb->buf + align;
244 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
245 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
247 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
248 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
249 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
250 rb->offset = len + align;
254 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
255 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
259 if (left == 0 && extend)
261 if (left > 0 && n > left)
265 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
267 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
274 /* else we need to read more data */
276 if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) { /* does not happen */
277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
281 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
282 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
283 /* ignore max parameter */
288 if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
289 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
297 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
298 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
303 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
304 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
305 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
306 ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
316 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
318 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
323 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
324 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
325 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
327 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
329 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
333 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
336 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
337 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
343 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
344 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
346 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
349 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
351 size_t n, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
352 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
353 size_t max_send_fragment, nw;
355 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
359 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
360 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
362 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
363 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
364 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
365 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
366 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
367 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
368 * report the error in a way the user will notice
370 if (len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
377 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
378 i = s->handshake_func(s);
382 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
388 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
389 * will happen with non blocking IO
392 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
395 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
396 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
399 tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
401 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
403 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
404 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
405 * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
406 * compromise is considered worthy.
408 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
409 len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
410 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
411 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
412 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
413 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
414 unsigned char aad[13];
415 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
419 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
420 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
421 max_send_fragment -= 512;
423 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
424 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
426 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
427 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
428 (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
430 if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
435 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
439 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
440 /* free jumbo buffer */
441 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
448 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
449 /* free jumbo buffer */
450 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
454 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
455 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
457 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
462 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
463 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
465 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
467 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
469 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
470 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
477 packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
478 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
479 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
480 packlen = (size_t)packleni;
481 if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
482 /* free jumbo buffer */
483 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
487 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
488 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
491 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
492 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
493 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
496 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
497 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
499 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
505 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
506 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
507 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
508 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
510 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
512 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
513 /* free jumbo buffer */
514 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
516 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
520 /* free jumbo buffer */
521 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
522 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
530 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
531 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
532 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
540 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
542 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
543 * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
544 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
547 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
548 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
550 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
557 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
558 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
559 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
560 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
562 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
563 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
565 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
566 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
573 size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
579 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
580 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
583 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
585 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
588 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
589 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
592 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
593 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
594 remain = n % numpipes;
595 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
596 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
602 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
605 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
606 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
611 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
612 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
614 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
615 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
617 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
619 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
621 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
623 *written = tot + tmpwrit;
632 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
633 size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
634 int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
636 unsigned char *outbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], *plen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
637 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
638 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
639 size_t prefix_len = 0;
647 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
648 totlen += pipelens[j];
650 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
651 * will happen with non blocking IO
653 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
654 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
656 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
657 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
658 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
661 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
664 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
665 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0))
668 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
673 if ((sess == NULL) ||
674 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
675 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
678 /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
679 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
685 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
687 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
689 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
690 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
693 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
695 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
696 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
697 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
700 size_t tmppipelen = 0;
703 ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
708 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
709 /* insufficient space */
710 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
715 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
718 if (create_empty_fragment) {
719 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
720 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
722 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
723 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
724 * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
726 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
727 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
729 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
730 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
731 } else if (prefix_len) {
732 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
733 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
736 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
737 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
738 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
739 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
740 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
742 outbuf[j] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
743 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
747 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
748 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
749 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
750 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
751 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
752 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
756 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
757 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
758 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
759 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
760 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
767 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
768 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
769 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
770 /* write the header */
771 *(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff;
772 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type);
774 *(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8);
776 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
777 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
779 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
780 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
781 *(outbuf[j]++) = 0x1;
783 *(outbuf[j]++) = s->version & 0xff;
785 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
789 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
790 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j] + eivlen);
791 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], pipelens[j]);
792 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
793 totlen += pipelens[j];
796 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
799 /* first we compress */
800 if (s->compress != NULL) {
801 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])) {
802 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
806 memcpy(wr[j].data, wr[j].input, wr[j].length);
807 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
811 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
812 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
816 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
817 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
818 &(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]),
821 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
824 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]);
825 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
829 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
831 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], eivlen);
835 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
838 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
839 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
840 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
841 outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1))
843 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
846 /* record length after mac and block padding */
847 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]), plen[j]);
850 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen[j] - 5, 5, s,
851 s->msg_callback_arg);
854 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
857 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for
859 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
861 if (create_empty_fragment) {
863 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
867 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
871 *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
875 /* now let's set up wb */
876 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
877 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]));
881 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
884 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
885 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
886 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
887 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
889 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
890 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
895 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
897 * Return values are as per SSL_write()
899 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
903 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
907 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
908 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
909 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
910 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
916 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
917 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
918 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
923 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
924 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
925 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
926 i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
927 &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
928 [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
929 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
936 if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
937 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
938 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
939 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
941 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
942 *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
945 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
947 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
948 * using a datagram service
950 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
954 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
955 SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
960 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
961 * 'type' is one of the following:
963 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
964 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
965 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
967 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
968 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
970 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
971 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
972 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
973 * argument is non NULL.
974 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
975 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
976 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
977 * Change cipher spec protocol
978 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
980 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
982 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
983 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
984 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
985 * Application data protocol
986 * none of our business
988 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
989 size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
992 size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
995 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
997 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
999 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1000 /* Not initialized yet */
1001 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1005 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1006 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1008 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1013 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1014 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1016 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1017 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1022 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1025 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1028 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1029 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1030 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1032 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1033 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1040 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1043 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1044 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1045 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1054 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1057 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1058 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1059 * rr[i].data, - data
1060 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1061 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1063 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1064 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1067 /* get new records if necessary */
1068 if (num_recs == 0) {
1069 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1072 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1073 if (num_recs == 0) {
1074 /* Shouldn't happen */
1075 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1080 /* Skip over any records we have already read */
1082 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
1084 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1085 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1089 } while (num_recs == 0);
1093 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
1094 * record that isn't an alert.
1096 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
1097 && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
1098 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
1100 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1102 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1103 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1104 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1105 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1111 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1114 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1115 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1116 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1120 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1121 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1122 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
1124 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1125 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1126 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1129 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1130 * doing a handshake for the first time
1132 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1133 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1134 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1139 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1140 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1141 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1142 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1147 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1148 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1155 if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1156 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1158 n = len - totalbytes;
1160 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1163 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
1164 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
1165 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1167 SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
1168 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1169 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1170 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1171 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1172 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1175 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1176 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1181 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1182 && totalbytes < len);
1183 if (totalbytes == 0) {
1184 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
1187 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1188 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1189 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1190 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1191 *readbytes = totalbytes;
1196 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1197 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1198 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1202 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1204 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1206 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1207 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1208 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1209 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1211 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1217 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1219 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1220 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1221 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1222 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1224 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1225 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1231 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1232 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1235 size_t dest_maxlen = 0;
1236 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1237 size_t *dest_len = NULL;
1239 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1240 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1241 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1242 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1243 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1244 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1245 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1246 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1249 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1250 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1251 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1252 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1254 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1256 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1257 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1258 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1259 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1262 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) {
1263 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1264 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1270 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1271 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1272 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1275 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1277 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1278 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1279 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1280 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1282 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1283 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1284 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1285 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1290 if (s->msg_callback)
1291 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1292 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1293 s->msg_callback_arg);
1295 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1296 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1297 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1298 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1299 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1300 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1308 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1309 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1310 /* no read-ahead left? */
1313 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1314 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1315 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1316 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1318 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1319 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1320 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1321 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1328 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1329 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1334 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1335 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1336 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1339 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1340 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1341 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1342 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1343 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1344 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1345 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1346 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1347 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1348 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1351 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1352 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1353 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1355 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1357 if (s->msg_callback)
1358 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1359 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1360 s->msg_callback_arg);
1362 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1363 cb = s->info_callback;
1364 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1365 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1368 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1369 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1372 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1373 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1374 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1376 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
1377 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
1378 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
1383 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1384 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1388 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1389 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1390 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
1391 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1392 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1393 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1395 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1396 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1400 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1401 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1404 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1407 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1408 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1410 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1411 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1412 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1413 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1414 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1417 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1425 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1427 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1428 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1429 SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
1433 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1434 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1440 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1442 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1443 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1444 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1445 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1446 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1450 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1458 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1459 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1460 /* no read-ahead left? */
1463 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1464 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1465 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1466 * problems in the blocking world
1468 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1469 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1470 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1471 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1478 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1481 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1482 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1483 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1484 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1485 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1487 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1490 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1492 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1494 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1495 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1496 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1498 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1501 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1503 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1504 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1505 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1506 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1507 * started), we will indulge it.
1509 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1510 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1513 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1521 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1525 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1529 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1537 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1538 * format and false otherwise.
1540 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1542 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1546 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1548 size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1550 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);