2 * Copyright 2022-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/evp.h>
11 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
12 #include <openssl/rand.h>
13 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
14 #include "internal/ssl3_cbc.h"
15 #include "../../ssl_local.h"
16 #include "../record_local.h"
17 #include "recmethod_local.h"
19 static int tls1_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
20 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
21 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
22 unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
23 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
29 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx;
31 int enc = (rl->direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) ? 1 : 0;
33 if (level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION)
34 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
36 if ((rl->enc_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
37 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
38 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
41 ciph_ctx = rl->enc_ctx;
43 rl->md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
44 if (rl->md_ctx == NULL) {
45 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
46 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
48 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
50 rl->compctx = COMP_CTX_new(comp);
51 if (rl->compctx == NULL) {
52 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
53 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
59 * If we have an AEAD Cipher, then there is no separate MAC, so we can skip
60 * setting up the MAC key.
62 if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0) {
63 if (mactype == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) {
64 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(rl->libctx, "HMAC",
69 * If its not HMAC then the only other types of MAC we support are
70 * the GOST MACs, so we need to use the old style way of creating
73 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mactype, NULL, mackey,
77 || EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(rl->md_ctx, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(md),
78 rl->libctx, rl->propq, mac_key,
80 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
81 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
82 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
84 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
87 if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
88 if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, NULL, enc)
89 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
90 (int)ivlen, iv) <= 0) {
91 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
92 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
94 } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
95 if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, enc)
96 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12,
98 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
99 (int)taglen, NULL) <= 0
100 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
102 || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, enc)) {
103 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
104 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
107 if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, key, iv, enc)) {
108 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
109 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
112 /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
113 if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0
115 && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
116 (int)mackeylen, mackey) <= 0) {
117 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
118 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
122 * The cipher we actually ended up using in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX may be
123 * different to that in ciph if we have an ENGINE in use
125 if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ciph_ctx)) != NULL
126 && !ossl_set_tls_provider_parameters(rl, ciph_ctx, ciph, md)) {
127 /* ERR_raise already called */
128 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
131 /* Calculate the explicit IV length */
132 if (RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) {
133 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(ciph_ctx);
136 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
137 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(ciph_ctx);
139 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
140 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
144 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
145 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
146 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
147 } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
148 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
150 rl->eivlen = (size_t)eivlen;
153 return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS;
156 #define MAX_PADDING 256
158 * tls1_cipher encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Calls RLAYERfatal on
159 * internal error, but not otherwise. It is the responsibility of the caller to
160 * report a bad_record_mac - if appropriate (DTLS just drops the record).
163 * 0: if the record is publicly invalid, or an internal error, or AEAD
164 * decryption failed, or Encrypt-then-mac decryption failed.
165 * 1: Success or Mac-then-encrypt decryption failed (MAC will be randomised)
167 static int tls1_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, TLS_RL_RECORD *recs,
168 size_t n_recs, int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *macs,
172 size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
173 unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN];
174 unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
175 int pad = 0, tmpr, provided;
176 size_t bs, ctr, padnum, loop;
177 unsigned char padval;
178 const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
181 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
185 if (EVP_MD_CTX_get0_md(rl->md_ctx)) {
186 int n = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(rl->md_ctx);
188 if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) {
189 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
194 if (!ossl_assert(rl->enc_ctx != NULL)) {
195 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
199 enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(rl->enc_ctx);
204 /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
205 if (RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)
206 && EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
207 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(enc);
211 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
212 if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) {
213 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 } else if (RAND_bytes_ex(rl->libctx, recs[ctr].input,
217 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
223 if (!ossl_assert(enc != NULL)) {
224 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
228 provided = (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(enc) != NULL);
230 bs = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds));
233 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
238 if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
239 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) == 0) {
241 * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the
242 * cipher doesn't support pipelining
244 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
248 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
249 reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length;
251 if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
252 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0) {
258 unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
261 memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
262 memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8);
264 memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8);
265 if (!tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl)) {
266 /* RLAYERfatal already called */
271 buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type;
272 buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8);
273 buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version);
274 buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8);
275 buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff);
276 pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
277 EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]);
279 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
285 recs[ctr].length += pad;
287 } else if ((bs != 1) && sending && !provided) {
289 * We only do this for legacy ciphers. Provided ciphers add the
290 * padding on the provider side.
292 padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs);
294 /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */
296 if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) {
297 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
300 /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */
301 padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1);
302 for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++)
303 recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval;
304 reclen[ctr] += padnum;
305 recs[ctr].length += padnum;
309 if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) {
310 /* Publicly invalid */
316 /* Set the output buffers */
317 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++)
318 data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data;
320 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS,
321 (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) {
322 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
325 /* Set the input buffers */
326 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++)
327 data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input;
329 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS,
330 (int)n_recs, data) <= 0
331 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS,
332 (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) {
333 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE);
338 if (!rl->isdtls && rl->tlstree) {
339 int decrement_seq = 0;
342 * When sending, seq is incremented after MAC calculation.
343 * So if we are in ETM mode, we use seq 'as is' in the ctrl-function.
344 * Otherwise we have to decrease it in the implementation
346 if (sending && !rl->use_etm)
349 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_TLSTREE, decrement_seq,
350 rl->sequence) <= 0) {
352 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
360 /* Provided cipher - we do not support pipelining on this path */
362 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
366 if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ds, recs[0].data, &outlen, recs[0].input,
367 (unsigned int)reclen[0]))
369 recs[0].length = outlen;
372 * The length returned from EVP_CipherUpdate above is the actual
373 * payload length. We need to adjust the data/input ptr to skip over
377 if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
378 recs[0].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
379 recs[0].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
380 } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
381 recs[0].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
382 recs[0].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
383 } else if (bs != 1 && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) {
386 recs[0].orig_len -= bs;
389 /* Now get a pointer to the MAC (if applicable) */
391 OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
396 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC,
397 (void **)&macs[0].mac,
399 *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
401 if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_params(ds, params)) {
402 /* Shouldn't normally happen */
403 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
404 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
412 tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input,
413 (unsigned int)reclen[0]);
414 if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(ds))
415 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) != 0
418 /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
423 for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) {
424 /* Adjust the record to remove the explicit IV/MAC/Tag */
425 if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
426 recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
427 recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
428 recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
429 } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
430 recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
431 recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
432 recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
433 } else if (bs != 1 && RLAYER_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(rl)) {
434 if (recs[ctr].length < bs)
436 recs[ctr].data += bs;
437 recs[ctr].input += bs;
438 recs[ctr].length -= bs;
439 recs[ctr].orig_len -= bs;
443 * If using Mac-then-encrypt, then this will succeed but
444 * with a random MAC if padding is invalid
446 if (!tls1_cbc_remove_padding_and_mac(&recs[ctr].length,
449 (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].mac : NULL,
450 (macs != NULL) ? &macs[ctr].alloced
453 pad ? (size_t)pad : macsize,
454 (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(enc)
455 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) != 0,
464 static int tls1_mac(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, TLS_RL_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md,
467 unsigned char *seq = rl->sequence;
470 EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx;
471 unsigned char header[13];
477 t = EVP_MD_CTX_get_size(hash);
478 if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0))
482 if (rl->stream_mac) {
485 hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
486 if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) {
494 && EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mac_ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_TLSTREE, 0, seq) <= 0)
498 unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq;
501 memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6);
503 memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
505 memcpy(header, seq, 8);
508 header[8] = rec->type;
509 header[9] = (unsigned char)(rl->version >> 8);
510 header[10] = (unsigned char)(rl->version);
511 header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8);
512 header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff);
514 if (!sending && !rl->use_etm
515 && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_mode(rl->enc_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE
516 && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) {
517 OSSL_PARAM tls_hmac_params[2], *p = tls_hmac_params;
519 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_TLS_DATA_SIZE,
521 *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
523 if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(EVP_MD_CTX_get_pkey_ctx(mac_ctx),
528 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0
529 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0
530 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0)
533 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
534 BIO_printf(trc_out, "seq:\n");
535 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, seq, 8, 4);
536 BIO_printf(trc_out, "rec:\n");
537 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, rec->data, rec->length, 4);
538 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
540 if (!rl->isdtls && !tls_increment_sequence_ctr(rl)) {
541 /* RLAYERfatal already called */
545 OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) {
546 BIO_printf(trc_out, "md:\n");
547 BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, md, md_size, 4);
548 } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS);
551 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac);
555 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
556 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
557 # define MAX_PREFIX_LEN ((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1) \
558 + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
559 + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH \
560 + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD)
562 # define MAX_PREFIX_LEN ((SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1) \
563 + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
564 + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
565 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
567 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
568 # define MAX_PREFIX_LEN (SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
569 + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH \
570 + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD)
572 # define MAX_PREFIX_LEN (SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD \
573 + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
574 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
577 /* This function is also used by the SSLv3 implementation */
578 int tls1_allocate_write_buffers(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
579 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *templates,
580 size_t numtempl, size_t *prefix)
582 /* Do we need to add an empty record prefix? */
583 *prefix = rl->need_empty_fragments
584 && templates[0].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
587 * In the prefix case we can allocate a much smaller buffer. Otherwise we
588 * just allocate the default buffer size
590 if (!tls_setup_write_buffer(rl, numtempl + *prefix,
591 *prefix ? MAX_PREFIX_LEN : 0, 0)) {
592 /* RLAYERfatal() already called */
599 /* This function is also used by the SSLv3 implementation */
600 int tls1_initialise_write_packets(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl,
601 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *templates,
603 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE *prefixtempl,
612 /* Do we need to add an empty record prefix? */
613 prefix = rl->need_empty_fragments
614 && templates[0].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
618 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
619 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
621 prefixtempl->buf = NULL;
622 prefixtempl->version = templates[0].version;
623 prefixtempl->buflen = 0;
624 prefixtempl->type = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
628 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
629 align = (size_t)TLS_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
630 align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1
631 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
633 TLS_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
635 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], TLS_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
636 TLS_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)) {
637 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
641 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
642 RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
647 return tls_initialise_write_packets_default(rl, templates, numtempl,
649 pkt + prefix, bufs + prefix,
653 /* TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.2 all use the same funcs */
654 struct record_functions_st tls_1_funcs = {
655 tls1_set_crypto_state,
658 tls_default_set_protocol_version,
660 tls_get_more_records,
661 tls_default_validate_record_header,
662 tls_default_post_process_record,
663 tls_get_max_records_multiblock,
664 tls_write_records_multiblock, /* Defined in tls_multib.c */
665 tls1_allocate_write_buffers,
666 tls1_initialise_write_packets,
668 tls_prepare_record_header_default,
670 tls_prepare_for_encryption_default,
671 tls_post_encryption_processing_default,
675 struct record_functions_st dtls_1_funcs = {
676 tls1_set_crypto_state,
679 tls_default_set_protocol_version,
681 dtls_get_more_records,
685 tls_write_records_default,
687 * Don't use tls1_allocate_write_buffers since that handles empty fragment
688 * records which aren't needed in DTLS. We just use the default allocation
691 tls_allocate_write_buffers_default,
692 /* Don't use tls1_initialise_write_packets for same reason as above */
693 tls_initialise_write_packets_default,
695 dtls_prepare_record_header,
697 tls_prepare_for_encryption_default,
698 dtls_post_encryption_processing,