3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
6 /* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
59 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
119 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
121 #include <openssl/rand.h>
122 #include <openssl/objects.h>
123 #include <openssl/evp.h>
124 #include <openssl/x509.h>
126 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(msg_len) (((msg_len) + 7) / 8)
128 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(bitmask, start, end) { \
129 if ((end) - (start) <= 8) { \
131 for (ii = (start); ii < (end); ii++) bitmask[((ii) >> 3)] |= (1 << ((ii) & 7)); \
134 bitmask[((start) >> 3)] |= bitmask_start_values[((start) & 7)]; \
135 for (ii = (((start) >> 3) + 1); ii < ((((end) - 1)) >> 3); ii++) bitmask[ii] = 0xff; \
136 bitmask[(((end) - 1) >> 3)] |= bitmask_end_values[((end) & 7)]; \
139 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(bitmask, msg_len, is_complete) { \
141 OPENSSL_assert((msg_len) > 0); \
143 if (bitmask[(((msg_len) - 1) >> 3)] != bitmask_end_values[((msg_len) & 7)]) is_complete = 0; \
144 if (is_complete) for (ii = (((msg_len) - 1) >> 3) - 1; ii >= 0 ; ii--) \
145 if (bitmask[ii] != 0xff) { is_complete = 0; break; } }
148 #define RSMBLY_BITMASK_PRINT(bitmask, msg_len) { \
150 printf("bitmask: "); for (ii = 0; ii < (msg_len); ii++) \
151 printf("%d ", (bitmask[ii >> 3] & (1 << (ii & 7))) >> (ii & 7)); \
155 static unsigned char bitmask_start_values[] = {0xff, 0xfe, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xc0, 0x80};
156 static unsigned char bitmask_end_values[] = {0xff, 0x01, 0x03, 0x07, 0x0f, 0x1f, 0x3f, 0x7f};
158 /* XDTLS: figure out the right values */
159 static const unsigned int g_probable_mtu[] = {1500, 512, 256};
161 static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
162 unsigned long frag_len);
163 static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s,
165 static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
166 unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
167 unsigned long frag_len);
168 static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn,
172 dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, int reassembly)
174 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
175 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
176 unsigned char *bitmask = NULL;
178 frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment));
184 buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len);
192 /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */
193 frag->fragment = buf;
195 /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */
198 bitmask = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
201 if (buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buf);
205 memset(bitmask, 0, RSMBLY_BITMASK_SIZE(frag_len));
208 frag->reassembly = bitmask;
213 void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
216 if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
218 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
219 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
221 if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
222 if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
226 static int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s)
230 s->d1->mtu = s->d1->link_mtu-BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
234 /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */
235 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
237 if(!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
240 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL);
242 /* I've seen the kernel return bogus numbers when it doesn't know
243 * (initial write), so just make sure we have a reasonable number */
244 if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu(s))
247 s->d1->mtu = dtls1_min_mtu(s);
248 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU,
258 /* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */
259 int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
263 unsigned int len, frag_off, mac_size, blocksize;
265 if(!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
270 fprintf(stderr, "using MTU = %d\n", mtu);
272 mtu -= (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
274 curr_mtu = mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s));
278 else if ( ( ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s))) <= 0)
281 if ( BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) + s->init_num >= mtu)
283 ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
286 mtu = s->d1->mtu - (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
290 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu(s)); /* should have something reasonable now */
292 if ( s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
293 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num ==
294 (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
298 if (s->enc_write_ctx && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
301 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
306 if (s->enc_write_ctx &&
307 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
308 blocksize = 2 * EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
315 curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) -
316 DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - mac_size - blocksize;
318 if ( curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
320 /* grr.. we could get an error if MTU picked was wrong */
321 ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
324 curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH -
325 mac_size - blocksize;
328 if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
334 /* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */
335 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
337 if ( s->init_off != 0)
339 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
340 s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
341 s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
343 if ( s->init_num > curr_mtu)
349 if ( len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH )
352 * len is so small that we really can't do anything sensible
357 dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off,
358 len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
360 dtls1_write_message_header(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]);
363 ret=dtls1_write_bytes(s,type,&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
367 /* might need to update MTU here, but we don't know
368 * which previous packet caused the failure -- so can't
369 * really retransmit anything. continue as if everything
370 * is fine and wait for an alert to handle the
373 if ( BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
374 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED, 0, NULL) > 0 )
376 if(!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU))
378 if(!dtls1_query_mtu(s))
392 /* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake
393 * message got sent. but why would this happen? */
394 OPENSSL_assert(len == (unsigned int)ret);
396 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && ! s->d1->retransmitting)
398 /* should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case
399 * we'll ignore the result anyway */
400 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off];
401 const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
404 if (frag_off == 0 && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
406 /* reconstruct message header is if it
407 * is being sent in single fragment */
408 *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
409 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
410 s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
412 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len,p);
413 p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
418 p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
419 xlen = ret - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
422 ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, xlen);
425 if (ret == s->init_num)
428 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
429 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
430 s->msg_callback_arg);
432 s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */
439 frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH);
446 /* Obtain handshake message of message type 'mt' (any if mt == -1),
447 * maximum acceptable body length 'max'.
448 * Read an entire handshake message. Handshake messages arrive in
451 long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok)
454 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr;
456 unsigned long msg_len;
458 /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused
459 * by the absence of an optional handshake message */
460 if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message)
462 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=0;
463 if ((mt >= 0) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type != mt))
465 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
466 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
470 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
471 s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size;
475 msg_hdr = &s->d1->r_msg_hdr;
476 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
479 i = dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, max, ok);
480 if ( i == DTLS1_HM_BAD_FRAGMENT ||
481 i == DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY) /* bad fragment received */
483 else if ( i <= 0 && !*ok)
486 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
487 msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
489 /* reconstruct message header */
490 *(p++) = msg_hdr->type;
492 s2n (msg_hdr->seq,p);
495 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
496 p -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
497 msg_len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
500 ssl3_finish_mac(s, p, msg_len);
502 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
504 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
506 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
508 /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
510 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
512 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
516 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
522 static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
524 size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
526 msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
527 frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
528 frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
530 /* sanity checking */
531 if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
533 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
534 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
537 if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
539 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
540 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
543 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
545 /* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
546 * against max above */
547 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
549 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
550 return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
553 s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
554 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
555 s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
556 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
557 s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
559 else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
561 /* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
562 * upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
563 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
564 return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
567 return 0; /* no error */
572 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
574 /* (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
576 * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
577 * (2) update s->init_num
584 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages);
588 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
590 /* Don't return if reassembly still in progress */
591 if (frag->reassembly != NULL)
594 if ( s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq)
596 unsigned long frag_len = frag->msg_header.frag_len;
597 pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages);
599 al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&frag->msg_header,max);
601 if (al==0) /* no alert */
603 unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
604 memcpy(&p[frag->msg_header.frag_off],
605 frag->fragment,frag->msg_header.frag_len);
608 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
617 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
626 /* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
627 * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
628 * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
629 static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
631 unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
632 if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
633 return s->max_cert_list;
638 dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
640 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
642 int i = -1, is_complete;
643 unsigned char seq64be[8];
644 unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
646 if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
647 msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
651 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
653 /* Try to find item in queue */
654 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
655 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
656 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
657 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
661 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, 1);
664 memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
665 frag->msg_header.frag_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len;
666 frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
670 frag = (hm_fragment*) item->data;
671 if (frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
680 /* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
681 * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
682 * does not need to be freed.
684 if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
686 unsigned char devnull [256];
690 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
692 frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
696 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
699 /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
700 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
701 frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
702 if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
707 RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
708 (long)(msg_hdr->frag_off + frag_len));
710 RSMBLY_BITMASK_IS_COMPLETE(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->msg_len,
715 OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
716 frag->reassembly = NULL;
721 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
728 item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
729 /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
730 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
731 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
732 * would never have reached this branch. */
733 OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
736 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
739 if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
746 dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
749 hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
751 unsigned char seq64be[8];
752 unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
754 if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
757 /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
758 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
759 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
760 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
761 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
763 /* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
764 * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
766 if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
769 /* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
770 * too far in the future, already in the queue or if we received
771 * a FINISHED before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale
774 if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
775 msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
776 (s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
778 unsigned char devnull [256];
782 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
784 frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
791 if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
792 return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
794 if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
797 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
801 memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
805 /* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
806 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
807 frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
808 if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
814 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
818 item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
819 /* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
820 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
821 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
822 * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
823 * to NULL and it will have been processed with
824 * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
826 OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
829 return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
832 if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
839 dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok)
841 unsigned char wire[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
842 unsigned long len, frag_off, frag_len;
844 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
847 /* see if we have the required fragment already */
848 if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok)
850 if (*ok) s->init_num = frag_len;
854 /* read handshake message header */
855 i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,wire,
856 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0);
857 if (i <= 0) /* nbio, or an error */
859 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
863 /* Handshake fails if message header is incomplete */
864 if (i != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
866 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
871 /* parse the message fragment header */
872 dtls1_get_message_header(wire, &msg_hdr);
875 * if this is a future (or stale) message it gets buffered
876 * (or dropped)--no further processing at this time
877 * While listening, we accept seq 1 (ClientHello with cookie)
878 * although we're still expecting seq 0 (ClientHello)
880 if (msg_hdr.seq != s->d1->handshake_read_seq && !(s->d1->listen && msg_hdr.seq == 1))
881 return dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
883 len = msg_hdr.msg_len;
884 frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
885 frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len;
887 if (frag_len && frag_len < len)
888 return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, &msg_hdr, ok);
890 if (!s->server && s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0 &&
891 wire[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
893 /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
894 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them
895 * if their format is correct. Does not count for
897 if (wire[1] == 0 && wire[2] == 0 && wire[3] == 0)
900 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
901 wire, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
902 s->msg_callback_arg);
907 else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */
909 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
910 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
915 if ((al=dtls1_preprocess_fragment(s,&msg_hdr,max)))
918 /* XDTLS: ressurect this when restart is in place */
923 unsigned char *p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
925 i=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
926 &p[frag_off],frag_len,0);
927 /* XDTLS: fix this--message fragments cannot span multiple packets */
930 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
938 /* XDTLS: an incorrectly formatted fragment should cause the
939 * handshake to fail */
940 if (i != (int)frag_len)
942 al=SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT,SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
949 /* Note that s->init_num is *not* used as current offset in
950 * s->init_buf->data, but as a counter summing up fragments'
951 * lengths: as soon as they sum up to handshake packet
952 * length, we assume we have got all the fragments. */
953 s->init_num = frag_len;
957 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
964 /* for these 2 messages, we need to
965 * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init
966 * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero
967 * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init
968 * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign
969 * ssl->session->read_compression assign
970 * ssl->session->read_hash assign
972 int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b)
978 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
980 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
981 s->init_num=DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
983 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
984 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
985 s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,p);
991 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
992 s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
994 /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */
995 dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
1000 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
1001 return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC));
1004 int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code)
1008 fprintf( stderr, "invalid state reached %s:%d", __FILE__, __LINE__);
1012 if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s))
1014 /* not a timeout, none of our business,
1015 let higher layers handle this. in fact it's probably an error */
1019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1020 if (!SSL_in_init(s) && !s->tlsext_hb_pending) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
1022 if (!SSL_in_init(s)) /* done, no need to send a retransmit */
1025 BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ);
1029 #if 0 /* for now, each alert contains only one record number */
1030 item = pqueue_peek(state->rcvd_records);
1033 /* send an alert immediately for all the missing records */
1038 #if 0 /* no more alert sending, just retransmit the last set of messages */
1039 if ( state->timeout.read_timeouts >= DTLS1_TMO_READ_COUNT)
1040 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1041 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1044 return dtls1_handle_timeout(s);
1048 dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
1050 /* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence number,
1051 * since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. However, the
1052 * ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using only the sequence
1053 * will result in the CCS and Finished having the same index. To prevent this,
1054 * the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted.
1055 * This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also maintains the order of the
1056 * index (important for priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
1058 return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
1062 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
1064 pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
1070 iter = pqueue_iterator(sent);
1072 for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter))
1074 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
1075 if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1076 (unsigned short)dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs),
1077 0, &found) <= 0 && found)
1079 fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
1088 dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs)
1092 unsigned char seq64be[8];
1094 /* this function is called immediately after a message has
1095 * been serialized */
1096 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
1098 frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0);
1102 memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num);
1106 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
1107 DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
1111 OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
1112 DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
1115 frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
1116 frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq;
1117 frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type;
1118 frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0;
1119 frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
1120 frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
1122 /* save current state*/
1123 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
1124 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
1125 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
1126 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
1127 frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1129 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
1130 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
1131 frag->msg_header.is_ccs)>>8);
1132 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
1133 frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
1135 item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
1138 dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
1143 fprintf( stderr, "buffered messge: \ttype = %xx\n", msg_buf->type);
1144 fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tlen = %d\n", msg_buf->len);
1145 fprintf( stderr, "\t\t\t\t\tseq_num = %d\n", msg_buf->seq_num);
1148 pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item);
1153 dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
1157 /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */
1160 unsigned long header_length;
1161 unsigned char seq64be[8];
1162 struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
1163 unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
1166 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
1167 OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
1170 /* XDTLS: the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
1171 memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
1172 seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(seq>>8);
1173 seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)seq;
1175 item = pqueue_find(s->d1->sent_messages, seq64be);
1178 fprintf(stderr, "retransmit: message %d non-existant\n", seq);
1184 frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
1186 if ( frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
1187 header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1189 header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1191 memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment,
1192 frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length);
1193 s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length;
1195 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, frag->msg_header.type,
1196 frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
1197 frag->msg_header.frag_len);
1199 /* save current state */
1200 saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
1201 saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
1202 saved_state.compress = s->compress;
1203 saved_state.session = s->session;
1204 saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1205 saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
1207 s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
1209 /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
1210 s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
1211 s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
1212 s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
1213 s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
1214 s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
1216 if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
1218 memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1219 memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1222 ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
1223 SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
1225 /* restore current state */
1226 s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
1227 s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
1228 s->compress = saved_state.compress;
1229 s->session = saved_state.session;
1230 s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
1232 if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
1234 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1235 memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1238 s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
1240 (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1244 /* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */
1246 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s)
1250 for(item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages);
1251 item != NULL; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages))
1253 dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data);
1260 dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char mt,
1261 unsigned long len, unsigned long frag_off, unsigned long frag_len)
1263 /* Don't change sequence numbers while listening */
1264 if (frag_off == 0 && !s->d1->listen)
1266 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
1267 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq++;
1270 dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, mt, len, s->d1->handshake_write_seq,
1271 frag_off, frag_len);
1273 return p += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1277 /* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */
1279 dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
1280 unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
1281 unsigned long frag_len)
1283 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1286 msg_hdr->msg_len = len;
1287 msg_hdr->seq = seq_num;
1288 msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
1289 msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
1293 dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off,
1294 unsigned long frag_len)
1296 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1298 msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off;
1299 msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len;
1302 static unsigned char *
1303 dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
1305 struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr;
1307 *p++ = msg_hdr->type;
1308 l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p);
1310 s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p);
1311 l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p);
1312 l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p);
1318 dtls1_link_min_mtu(void)
1320 return (g_probable_mtu[(sizeof(g_probable_mtu) /
1321 sizeof(g_probable_mtu[0])) - 1]);
1325 dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s)
1327 return dtls1_link_min_mtu()-BIO_dgram_get_mtu_overhead(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1332 dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr)
1334 memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st));
1335 msg_hdr->type = *(data++);
1336 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len);
1338 n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq);
1339 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off);
1340 n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len);
1344 dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr)
1346 memset(ccs_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct ccs_header_st));
1348 ccs_hdr->type = *(data++);
1351 int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s)
1354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1355 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1356 !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN))
1358 ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
1359 if (ret < 0) return -1;
1362 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 1, NULL);
1365 ret = ssl3_shutdown(s);
1366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1367 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN, 0, NULL);
1372 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1374 dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1376 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
1377 unsigned short hbtype;
1378 unsigned int payload;
1379 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1381 if (s->msg_callback)
1382 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1383 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
1384 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1386 /* Read type and payload length first */
1387 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
1388 return 0; /* silently discard */
1389 if (s->s3->rrec.length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1390 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
1394 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
1395 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
1398 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
1400 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
1401 unsigned int write_length = 1 /* heartbeat type */ +
1402 2 /* heartbeat length */ +
1406 if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1409 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte
1410 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
1411 * payload, plus padding
1413 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
1416 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
1417 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
1419 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
1421 /* Random padding */
1422 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
1424 r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
1426 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
1427 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1428 buffer, write_length,
1429 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1431 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
1436 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
1440 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
1441 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
1442 * sequence number */
1445 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
1447 dtls1_stop_timer(s);
1449 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
1457 dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
1459 unsigned char *buf, *p;
1461 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
1462 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
1464 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
1465 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
1466 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
1472 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
1473 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
1479 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
1480 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1486 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
1487 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
1489 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
1491 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
1492 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
1493 * some random stuff.
1494 * - Message Type, 1 byte
1495 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
1496 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
1497 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
1500 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
1503 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
1504 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
1506 /* Sequence number */
1507 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
1508 /* 16 random bytes */
1509 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
1511 /* Random padding */
1512 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
1514 ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
1517 if (s->msg_callback)
1518 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
1519 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
1520 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1522 dtls1_start_timer(s);
1523 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;