2 * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include <openssl/err.h>
21 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
22 #include <openssl/params.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/sizes.h"
27 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
28 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
29 #include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
30 #include "prov/implementations.h"
31 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
32 #include "prov/der_rsa.h"
33 #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
35 #define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
37 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
38 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
39 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
40 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
41 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
42 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
43 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
44 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
45 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
46 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
47 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
48 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
49 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
50 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
51 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
52 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
53 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
54 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
55 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
56 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
57 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
58 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
59 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
61 static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
62 { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 },
63 { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 },
64 { RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE },
65 { RSA_X931_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 },
66 { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS },
71 * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
72 * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
73 * we use that here too.
83 * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
84 * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
85 * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
86 * by their Final function.
88 unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
90 /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
91 unsigned char aid_buf[128];
99 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
101 /* RSA padding mode */
103 /* message digest for MGF1 */
105 char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
106 /* PSS salt length */
108 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
116 static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
118 if (prsactx->md != NULL)
119 return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
123 static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
125 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
126 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
130 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
131 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
132 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
140 static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
142 if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
145 /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
146 max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
147 if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
149 if (prsactx->min_saltlen < 0 || prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
150 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
157 static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
159 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
160 char *propq_copy = NULL;
162 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
165 if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL
167 && (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) {
168 OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
169 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
173 prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(provctx);
174 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
175 prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
179 /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
180 #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
182 static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
186 mdprops = ctx->propq;
188 if (mdname != NULL) {
190 EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
191 int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
192 int md_nid = digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, sha1_allowed);
193 size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
196 || md_nid == NID_undef
197 || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
198 || mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) {
200 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
201 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
202 if (md_nid == NID_undef)
203 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
204 "digest=%s", mdname);
205 if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname))
206 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
207 "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
212 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
213 EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
216 * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
217 * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
218 * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
219 * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
220 * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
223 if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
224 && ossl_DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1,
227 && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
228 WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
229 ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
231 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
236 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
242 static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
249 mdprops = ctx->propq;
251 if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
252 EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
254 if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
255 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
256 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
259 /* The default for mgf1 is SHA1 - so allow SHA1 */
260 if (digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, 1) == NID_undef) {
261 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
262 "digest=%s", mdname);
267 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
268 if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) {
269 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
270 "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
277 static int rsa_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
279 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
281 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
284 if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
287 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
289 prsactx->operation = operation;
291 if (!ossl_rsa_check_key(vrsa, operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN)) {
292 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
296 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
297 prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
298 prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
300 switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
301 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
302 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
304 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
305 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
308 const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss =
309 ossl_rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
311 if (!ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
312 int md_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
313 int mgf1md_nid = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
314 int min_saltlen = ossl_rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
315 const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname;
318 mdname = ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
319 mgf1mdname = ossl_rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
320 prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
322 if (mdname == NULL) {
323 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
324 "PSS restrictions lack hash algorithm");
327 if (mgf1mdname == NULL) {
328 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
329 "PSS restrictions lack MGF1 hash algorithm");
333 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname,
334 sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
335 if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mdname)) {
336 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
337 "hash algorithm name too long");
340 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
341 sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
342 if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) {
343 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
344 "MGF1 hash algorithm name too long");
347 prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
349 return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
350 && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq)
351 && rsa_check_parameters(prsactx);
357 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
364 static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
366 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
368 if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
369 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
375 static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
377 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
378 OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
381 static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
384 OPENSSL_free(ctx->tbuf);
388 static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
390 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
392 return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
395 static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
396 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
398 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
400 size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
401 size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
403 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
411 if (sigsize < rsasize) {
412 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_SIZE,
413 "is %zu, should be at least %zu", sigsize, rsasize);
418 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
419 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
424 if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
427 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
428 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
429 "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
432 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
436 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
443 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
444 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
445 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
446 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL,
447 "RSA key size = %d, expected minimum = %d",
448 RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), tbslen + 1);
451 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
452 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
455 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
456 prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
457 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
458 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
462 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
466 ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
469 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
476 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
477 /* Check PSS restrictions */
478 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
479 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
480 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
481 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
482 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
483 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
484 "minimum salt length set to %d, "
485 "but the digest only gives %d",
486 prsactx->min_saltlen,
487 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
492 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
493 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
494 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
495 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
496 "minimum salt length set to %d, but the"
497 "actual salt length is only set to %d",
498 prsactx->min_saltlen,
505 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
507 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
509 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
511 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
514 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
515 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
520 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
521 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
525 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
533 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
541 static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
543 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
545 return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
548 static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
552 const unsigned char *sig,
555 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
558 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
562 *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
566 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
567 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
568 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
569 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
571 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
574 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
578 if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
579 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
582 if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
583 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
584 "Should be %d, but got %d",
585 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
590 if (rout != prsactx->tbuf) {
591 if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
592 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
593 "buffer size is %d, should be %d",
597 memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
601 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
605 ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
606 sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
608 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
616 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
617 "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
621 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
624 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
632 static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
634 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
636 return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
639 static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
640 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
642 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
645 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
647 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
648 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
649 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
650 if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
652 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
656 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
657 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
659 if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, prsactx->tbuf, &rslen, 0,
663 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
669 * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
672 mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
673 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
674 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
675 "Should be %d, but got %d",
680 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
682 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
683 prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
685 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
688 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
689 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
693 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
699 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
700 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
704 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
706 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
709 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
714 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
720 static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
721 void *vrsa, int operation)
723 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
725 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
729 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
730 if (!rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
731 || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */
734 prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
735 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) {
736 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
740 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
746 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
747 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
748 prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
753 static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx,
754 const unsigned char *data,
757 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
759 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
762 return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
765 static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
768 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
770 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
774 static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig,
775 size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize)
777 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
778 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
779 unsigned int dlen = 0;
781 if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || prsactx == NULL)
783 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
784 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
787 * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
788 * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
792 * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
793 * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
795 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
799 return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
802 static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
805 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
807 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
811 int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
814 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
815 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
816 unsigned int dlen = 0;
818 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
823 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
824 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
828 * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
829 * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
831 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
834 return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
837 static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
839 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
844 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
845 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
846 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
847 OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq);
849 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
851 OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(*prsactx));
854 static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
856 PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
857 PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
859 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
862 dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
863 if (dstctx == NULL) {
864 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
871 dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
873 dstctx->propq = NULL;
875 if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
877 dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
879 if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
881 dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
883 if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
885 dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
887 if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
888 dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
889 if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
890 || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
894 if (srcctx->propq != NULL) {
895 dstctx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(srcctx->propq);
896 if (dstctx->propq == NULL)
906 static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
908 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
911 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
914 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
916 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
919 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
921 switch (p->data_type) {
922 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
923 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
926 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
929 const char *word = NULL;
931 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
932 if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
933 word = padding_item[i].ptr;
939 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
942 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
950 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
951 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
954 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
955 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
958 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
960 if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
961 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
963 } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
964 const char *value = NULL;
966 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
967 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
968 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST;
970 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
971 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX;
973 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
974 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO;
978 int len = BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d",
983 p->return_size = len;
988 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, value))
996 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
997 OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
998 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
999 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1000 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1001 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1005 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx)
1007 return known_gettable_ctx_params;
1010 static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1012 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1013 const OSSL_PARAM *p;
1015 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
1018 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
1019 /* Not allowed during certain operations */
1020 if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
1023 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
1024 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
1025 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
1026 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
1027 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
1029 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1034 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
1035 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
1038 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1039 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
1040 if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
1042 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1046 /* non-PSS code follows */
1047 if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
1051 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
1054 const char *err_extra_text = NULL;
1056 switch (p->data_type) {
1057 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1058 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
1061 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1065 if (p->data == NULL)
1068 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
1069 if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
1070 pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
1081 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
1083 * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
1084 * with signature use.
1086 err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying";
1088 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
1089 if ((prsactx->operation
1090 & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) {
1092 "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations";
1095 if (prsactx->md == NULL
1096 && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME, NULL)) {
1100 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
1101 err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1103 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
1104 err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1106 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
1107 err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1109 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
1110 err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1112 if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
1113 RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
1118 if (err_extra_text == NULL)
1119 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1120 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
1122 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1123 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
1127 if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
1129 prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
1132 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
1136 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1137 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
1138 "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
1139 "PSS padding has been specified first");
1143 switch (p->data_type) {
1144 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1145 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
1148 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1149 if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST) == 0)
1150 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
1151 else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX) == 0)
1152 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
1153 else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO) == 0)
1154 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
1156 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
1163 * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
1164 * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
1165 * lowest saltlen number possible.
1167 if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
1168 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1172 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1174 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
1175 if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
1176 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1180 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
1181 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
1182 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1183 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1184 "Should be more than %d, but would be "
1185 "set to match digest size (%d)",
1186 prsactx->min_saltlen,
1187 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
1192 if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
1193 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1194 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1195 "Should be more than %d, "
1196 "but would be set to %d",
1197 prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen);
1203 prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
1206 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
1208 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
1209 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
1210 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
1211 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
1212 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
1214 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1219 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
1220 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
1223 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1224 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
1228 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1229 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */
1230 if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
1231 || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
1233 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1237 /* non-PSS code follows */
1238 if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
1245 static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
1246 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1247 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1248 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1249 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1250 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1251 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1255 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *provctx)
1258 * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
1259 * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
1260 * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
1261 * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
1263 return known_settable_ctx_params;
1266 static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
1268 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1270 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1273 return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1276 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1278 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1280 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1283 return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1286 static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1288 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1290 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1293 return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1296 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1298 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1300 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1303 return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1306 const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_rsa_signature_functions[] = {
1307 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
1308 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
1309 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
1310 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init },
1311 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
1312 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT,
1313 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init },
1314 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER,
1315 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
1316 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
1317 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init },
1318 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
1319 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1320 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
1321 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
1322 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
1323 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init },
1324 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
1325 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1326 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
1327 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
1328 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
1329 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
1330 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
1331 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1332 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
1333 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
1334 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1335 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
1336 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1337 (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
1338 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1339 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
1340 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1341 (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
1342 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1343 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },