2 * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include <openssl/err.h>
21 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
22 #include <openssl/params.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/sizes.h"
27 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
28 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
29 #include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
30 #include "prov/implementations.h"
31 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
32 #include "prov/der_rsa.h"
33 #include "prov/securitycheck.h"
35 #define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
37 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
38 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
39 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
40 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
41 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
42 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
43 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
44 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
45 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
46 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
47 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
48 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
49 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
50 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
51 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
52 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
53 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
54 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
55 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
56 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
57 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
58 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
59 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
61 static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
62 { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 },
63 { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 },
64 { RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE },
65 { RSA_X931_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 },
66 { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS },
71 * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
72 * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
73 * we use that here too.
83 * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
84 * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
85 * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
86 * by their Final function.
88 unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
90 /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
91 unsigned char aid_buf[128];
99 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
101 /* RSA padding mode */
103 /* message digest for MGF1 */
105 char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
106 /* PSS salt length */
108 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
116 static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
118 if (prsactx->md != NULL)
119 return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
123 static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
125 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
126 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
130 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
131 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
132 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
140 static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
142 if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
145 /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
146 max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
147 if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
149 if (prsactx->min_saltlen < 0 || prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
150 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
157 static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
159 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
160 char *propq_copy = NULL;
162 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
165 if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL
167 && (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) {
168 OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
169 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
173 prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
174 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
175 prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
179 /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
180 #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
182 static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
186 mdprops = ctx->propq;
188 if (mdname != NULL) {
190 EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
191 int sha1_allowed = (ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
192 int md_nid = digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, sha1_allowed);
193 size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
196 || md_nid == NID_undef
197 || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
198 || mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) {
200 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
201 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
202 if (md_nid == NID_undef)
203 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
204 "digest=%s", mdname);
205 if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname))
206 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
207 "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
212 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
213 EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
216 * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
217 * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
218 * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
219 * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
220 * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
223 if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
224 && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa,
226 && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
227 WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
228 ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
230 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
235 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
241 static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
248 mdprops = ctx->propq;
250 if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
251 EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
253 if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
254 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
255 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
258 /* The default for mgf1 is SHA1 - so allow SHA1 */
259 if (digest_rsa_sign_get_md_nid(md, 1) == NID_undef) {
260 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
261 "digest=%s", mdname);
266 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
267 if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) {
268 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
269 "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
276 static int rsa_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
278 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
280 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
283 if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
286 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
288 prsactx->operation = operation;
290 if (!rsa_check_key(vrsa, operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN)) {
291 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
295 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
296 prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
297 prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
299 switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
300 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
301 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
303 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
304 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
307 const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss =
308 rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
310 if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
311 int md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
312 int mgf1md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
313 int min_saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
314 const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname;
317 mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
318 mgf1mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
319 prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
321 if (mdname == NULL) {
322 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
323 "PSS restrictions lack hash algorithm");
326 if (mgf1mdname == NULL) {
327 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
328 "PSS restrictions lack MGF1 hash algorithm");
332 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname,
333 sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
334 if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mdname)) {
335 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
336 "hash algorithm name too long");
339 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
340 sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
341 if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) {
342 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
343 "MGF1 hash algorithm name too long");
346 prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
348 return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
349 && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq)
350 && rsa_check_parameters(prsactx);
356 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
363 static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
365 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
367 if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
368 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
374 static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
376 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
377 OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
380 static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
383 OPENSSL_free(ctx->tbuf);
387 static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
389 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
391 return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
394 static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
395 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
397 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
399 size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
400 size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
402 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
410 if (sigsize < rsasize) {
411 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_SIZE,
412 "is %zu, should be at least %zu", sigsize, rsasize);
417 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
418 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
423 if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
426 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
427 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
428 "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
431 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
435 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
442 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
443 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
444 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
445 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL,
446 "RSA key size = %d, expected minimum = %d",
447 RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), tbslen + 1);
450 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
451 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
454 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
455 prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
456 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
457 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
461 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
465 ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
468 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
475 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
476 /* Check PSS restrictions */
477 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
478 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
479 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
480 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
481 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
482 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
483 "minimum salt length set to %d, "
484 "but the digest only gives %d",
485 prsactx->min_saltlen,
486 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
491 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
492 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
493 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
494 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
495 "minimum salt length set to %d, but the"
496 "actual salt length is only set to %d",
497 prsactx->min_saltlen,
504 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
506 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
508 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
510 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
513 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
514 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
519 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
520 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
524 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
532 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
540 static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
542 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
544 return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
547 static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
551 const unsigned char *sig,
554 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
557 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
561 *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
565 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
566 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
567 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
568 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
570 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
573 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
577 if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
578 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
581 if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
582 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
583 "Should be %d, but got %d",
584 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
589 if (rout != prsactx->tbuf) {
590 if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
591 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
592 "buffer size is %d, should be %d",
596 memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
600 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
604 ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
605 sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
607 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
615 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
616 "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
620 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
623 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
631 static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
633 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
635 return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
638 static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
639 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
641 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
644 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
646 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
647 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
648 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
649 if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
651 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
655 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
656 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
658 if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, prsactx->tbuf, &rslen, 0,
662 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
668 * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
671 mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
672 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
673 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
674 "Should be %d, but got %d",
679 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
681 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
682 prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
684 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
687 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
688 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
692 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
698 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
699 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
703 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
705 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
708 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
713 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
719 static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
720 void *vrsa, int operation)
722 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
724 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
728 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
729 if (!rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
730 || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */
733 prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
734 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) {
735 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
739 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
745 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
746 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
747 prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
752 static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx,
753 const unsigned char *data,
756 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
758 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
761 return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
764 static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
767 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
769 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
773 static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig,
774 size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize)
776 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
777 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
778 unsigned int dlen = 0;
780 if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || prsactx == NULL)
782 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
783 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
786 * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
787 * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
791 * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
792 * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
794 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
798 return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
801 static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
804 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
806 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
810 int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
813 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
814 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
815 unsigned int dlen = 0;
817 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
822 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
823 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
827 * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
828 * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
830 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
833 return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
836 static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
838 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
843 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
844 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
845 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
846 OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq);
848 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
850 OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(*prsactx));
853 static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
855 PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
856 PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
858 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
861 dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
862 if (dstctx == NULL) {
863 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
870 dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
873 if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
875 dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
877 if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
879 dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
881 if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
883 dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
885 if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
886 dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
887 if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
888 || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
898 static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
900 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
903 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
906 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
908 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
911 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
913 switch (p->data_type) {
914 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
915 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
918 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
921 const char *word = NULL;
923 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
924 if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
925 word = padding_item[i].ptr;
931 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
934 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
942 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
943 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
946 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
947 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
950 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
952 if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
953 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
955 } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
956 const char *value = NULL;
958 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
959 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
960 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST;
962 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
963 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX;
965 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
966 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO;
970 int len = BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d",
975 p->return_size = len;
980 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, value))
988 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
989 OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
990 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
991 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
992 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
993 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
997 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx)
999 return known_gettable_ctx_params;
1002 static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1004 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1005 const OSSL_PARAM *p;
1007 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
1010 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
1011 /* Not allowed during certain operations */
1012 if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
1015 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
1016 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
1017 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
1018 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
1019 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
1021 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1026 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
1027 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
1030 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1031 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
1032 if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
1034 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1038 /* non-PSS code follows */
1039 if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
1043 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
1046 const char *err_extra_text = NULL;
1048 switch (p->data_type) {
1049 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1050 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
1053 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1057 if (p->data == NULL)
1060 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
1061 if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
1062 pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
1073 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
1075 * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
1076 * with signature use.
1078 err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying";
1080 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
1081 if ((prsactx->operation
1082 & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) {
1084 "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations";
1087 if (prsactx->md == NULL
1088 && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME, NULL)) {
1092 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
1093 err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1095 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
1096 err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1098 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
1099 err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1101 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
1102 err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1104 if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
1105 RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
1110 if (err_extra_text == NULL)
1111 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1112 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
1114 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1115 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
1119 if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
1121 prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
1124 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
1128 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1129 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
1130 "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
1131 "PSS padding has been specified first");
1135 switch (p->data_type) {
1136 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1137 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
1140 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1141 if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST) == 0)
1142 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
1143 else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX) == 0)
1144 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
1145 else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO) == 0)
1146 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
1148 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
1155 * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
1156 * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
1157 * lowest saltlen number possible.
1159 if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
1160 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1164 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1166 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
1167 if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
1168 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1172 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
1173 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
1174 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1175 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1176 "Should be more than %d, but would be "
1177 "set to match digest size (%d)",
1178 prsactx->min_saltlen,
1179 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
1184 if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
1185 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1186 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1187 "Should be more than %d, "
1188 "but would be set to %d",
1189 prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen);
1195 prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
1198 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
1200 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
1201 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
1202 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
1203 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
1204 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
1206 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1211 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
1212 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
1215 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1216 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
1220 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1221 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */
1222 if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
1223 || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
1225 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1229 /* non-PSS code follows */
1230 if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
1237 static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
1238 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1239 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1240 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1241 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1242 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1243 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1247 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void *provctx)
1250 * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
1251 * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
1252 * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
1253 * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
1255 return known_settable_ctx_params;
1258 static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
1260 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1262 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1265 return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1268 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1270 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1272 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1275 return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1278 static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1280 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1282 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1285 return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1288 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1290 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1292 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1295 return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1298 const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
1299 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
1300 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
1301 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
1302 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init },
1303 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
1304 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT,
1305 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init },
1306 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER,
1307 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
1308 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
1309 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init },
1310 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
1311 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1312 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
1313 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
1314 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
1315 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init },
1316 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
1317 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1318 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
1319 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
1320 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
1321 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
1322 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
1323 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1324 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
1325 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
1326 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1327 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
1328 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1329 (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
1330 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1331 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
1332 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1333 (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
1334 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1335 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },