2 * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include <openssl/err.h>
21 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
22 #include <openssl/params.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/sizes.h"
27 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
28 #include "prov/providercommon.h"
29 #include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
30 #include "prov/implementations.h"
31 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
32 #include "prov/der_rsa.h"
33 #include "prov/provider_util.h"
35 #define RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1
37 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
38 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
39 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
40 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
41 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
42 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
43 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
44 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
45 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
46 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
47 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
48 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
49 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
50 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
51 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
52 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
53 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
54 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
55 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
56 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
57 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
58 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
59 static OSSL_FUNC_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
61 static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
62 { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 },
63 { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 },
64 { RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE },
65 { RSA_X931_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 },
66 { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS },
71 * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
72 * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
73 * we use that here too.
83 * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
84 * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
85 * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
86 * by their Final function.
88 unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
90 /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */
91 unsigned char aid_buf[128];
99 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
101 /* RSA padding mode */
103 /* message digest for MGF1 */
105 char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
106 /* PSS salt length */
108 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
116 static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
118 if (prsactx->md != NULL)
119 return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
123 static int rsa_get_md_nid_check(const PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md,
126 int mdnid = NID_undef;
129 static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
130 { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
131 { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
132 { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
133 { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
134 { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
135 { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
142 mdnid = ossl_prov_digest_get_approved_nid(md, sha1_allowed);
145 if (mdnid == NID_undef)
146 mdnid = ossl_prov_digest_md_to_nid(md, name_to_nid,
147 OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid));
153 static int rsa_get_md_nid(const PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
155 return rsa_get_md_nid_check(ctx, md, ctx->operation != EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
158 static int rsa_get_md_mgf1_nid(const PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
160 /* The default for mgf1 is SHA1 - so allow this */
161 return rsa_get_md_nid_check(ctx, md, 1);
164 static int rsa_check_key_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
167 int sz = RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa);
169 return (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN) ? (sz >= 2048) : (sz >= 1024);
175 static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
177 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
178 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
182 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
183 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
184 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
192 static int rsa_check_parameters(PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
194 if (prsactx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
197 /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
198 max_saltlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) - EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
199 if ((RSA_bits(prsactx->rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
201 if (prsactx->min_saltlen < 0 || prsactx->min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
202 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
209 static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
211 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = NULL;
212 char *propq_copy = NULL;
214 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
217 if ((prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX))) == NULL
219 && (propq_copy = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL)) {
220 OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
221 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
225 prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
226 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
227 prsactx->propq = propq_copy;
231 /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
232 #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
234 static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
238 mdprops = ctx->propq;
240 if (mdname != NULL) {
242 EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
243 int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(ctx, md);
244 size_t mdname_len = strlen(mdname);
247 || md_nid == NID_undef
248 || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)
249 || mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname)) {
251 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
252 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
253 if (md_nid == NID_undef)
254 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
255 "digest=%s", mdname);
256 if (mdname_len >= sizeof(ctx->mdname))
257 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
258 "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
263 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
264 EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
267 * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
268 * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
269 * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
270 * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
271 * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
274 if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
275 && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_MDWithRSAEncryption(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa,
277 && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
278 WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
279 ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
281 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
286 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
292 static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
299 mdprops = ctx->propq;
301 if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
302 EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
304 if ((md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL) {
305 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
306 "%s could not be fetched", mdname);
309 if (rsa_get_md_mgf1_nid(ctx, md) == NID_undef) {
310 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED,
311 "digest=%s", mdname);
316 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
317 if (len >= sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname)) {
318 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
319 "%s exceeds name buffer length", mdname);
326 static int rsa_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
328 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
330 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
333 if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
336 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
338 prsactx->operation = operation;
340 if (!rsa_check_key_size(prsactx)) {
341 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
345 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
346 prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
347 prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
349 switch (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa, RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK)) {
350 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA:
351 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
353 case RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSASSAPSS:
354 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
357 const RSA_PSS_PARAMS_30 *pss =
358 rsa_get0_pss_params_30(prsactx->rsa);
360 if (!rsa_pss_params_30_is_unrestricted(pss)) {
361 int md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_hashalg(pss);
362 int mgf1md_nid = rsa_pss_params_30_maskgenhashalg(pss);
363 int min_saltlen = rsa_pss_params_30_saltlen(pss);
364 const char *mdname, *mgf1mdname;
367 mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(md_nid);
368 mgf1mdname = rsa_oaeppss_nid2name(mgf1md_nid);
369 prsactx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
371 if (mdname == NULL) {
372 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
373 "PSS restrictions lack hash algorithm");
376 if (mgf1mdname == NULL) {
377 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
378 "PSS restrictions lack MGF1 hash algorithm");
382 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mdname, mdname,
383 sizeof(prsactx->mdname));
384 if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mdname)) {
385 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
386 "hash algorithm name too long");
389 len = OPENSSL_strlcpy(prsactx->mgf1_mdname, mgf1mdname,
390 sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname));
391 if (len >= sizeof(prsactx->mgf1_mdname)) {
392 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
393 "MGF1 hash algorithm name too long");
396 prsactx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
398 return rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, prsactx->propq)
399 && rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mgf1mdname, prsactx->propq)
400 && rsa_check_parameters(prsactx);
406 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
413 static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
415 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
417 if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
418 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
424 static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
426 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
427 OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
430 static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
433 OPENSSL_free(ctx->tbuf);
437 static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
439 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
441 return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
444 static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
445 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
447 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
449 size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
450 size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
452 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
460 if (sigsize < rsasize) {
461 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_SIZE,
462 "is %zu, should be at least %zu", sigsize, rsasize);
467 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
468 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
473 if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
476 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
477 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
478 "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
481 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
485 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
492 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
493 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
494 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
495 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL,
496 "RSA key size = %d, expected minimum = %d",
497 RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), tbslen + 1);
500 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
501 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
504 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
505 prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
506 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
507 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
511 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
515 ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
518 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
525 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
526 /* Check PSS restrictions */
527 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
528 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
529 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
530 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
531 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
532 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
533 "minimum salt length set to %d, "
534 "but the digest only gives %d",
535 prsactx->min_saltlen,
536 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
541 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
542 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
543 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
544 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
545 "minimum salt length set to %d, but the"
546 "actual salt length is only set to %d",
547 prsactx->min_saltlen,
554 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
556 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
558 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
560 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
563 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
564 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
569 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
570 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
574 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
582 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
590 static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
592 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
594 return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
597 static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
601 const unsigned char *sig,
604 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
607 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
611 *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
615 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
616 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
617 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
618 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
620 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
623 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
627 if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
628 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
631 if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
632 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
633 "Should be %d, but got %d",
634 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
639 if (rout != prsactx->tbuf) {
640 if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
641 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL,
642 "buffer size is %d, should be %d",
646 memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
650 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
654 ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
655 sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
657 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
665 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
666 "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
670 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
673 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
681 static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
683 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
685 return rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
688 static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
689 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
691 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
694 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
696 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
697 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
698 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
699 if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
701 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
705 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
706 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
708 if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, prsactx->tbuf, &rslen, 0,
712 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
718 * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
721 mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
722 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
723 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
724 "Should be %d, but got %d",
729 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
731 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
732 prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
734 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
737 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
738 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
742 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
748 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
749 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
753 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
755 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
758 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
763 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
769 static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
770 void *vrsa, int operation)
772 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
774 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
778 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
779 if (!rsa_signverify_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
780 || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL)) /* TODO RL */
783 prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
784 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL) {
785 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
789 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
795 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
796 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
797 prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
802 static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx,
803 const unsigned char *data,
806 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
808 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
811 return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
814 static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
817 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
819 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
823 static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig,
824 size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize)
826 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
827 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
828 unsigned int dlen = 0;
830 if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || prsactx == NULL)
832 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
833 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
836 * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
837 * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
841 * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
842 * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
844 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
848 return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
851 static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
854 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
856 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, vrsa,
860 int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
863 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
864 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
865 unsigned int dlen = 0;
867 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
872 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
873 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
877 * The digests used here are all known (see rsa_get_md_nid()), so they
878 * should not exceed the internal buffer size of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE.
880 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
883 return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
886 static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
888 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
893 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
894 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
895 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
896 OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq);
898 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
900 OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(*prsactx));
903 static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
905 PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
906 PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
908 if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
911 dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
912 if (dstctx == NULL) {
913 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
920 dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
923 if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
925 dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
927 if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
929 dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
931 if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
933 dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
935 if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
936 dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
937 if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
938 || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
948 static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
950 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
953 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
956 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
958 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
961 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
963 switch (p->data_type) {
964 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
965 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
968 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
971 const char *word = NULL;
973 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
974 if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
975 word = padding_item[i].ptr;
981 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
984 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
992 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
993 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
996 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
997 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
1000 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
1002 if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
1003 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
1005 } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
1006 const char *value = NULL;
1008 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
1009 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
1010 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST;
1012 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
1013 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX;
1015 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
1016 value = OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO;
1020 int len = BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d",
1025 p->return_size = len;
1030 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, value))
1038 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
1039 OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
1040 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1041 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1042 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1043 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1047 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *vctx)
1049 return known_gettable_ctx_params;
1052 static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1054 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1055 const OSSL_PARAM *p;
1057 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
1060 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
1061 /* Not allowed during certain operations */
1062 if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
1065 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
1066 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
1067 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
1068 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
1069 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
1071 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1076 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
1077 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
1080 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1081 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
1082 if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
1084 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1088 /* non-PSS code follows */
1089 if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
1093 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
1096 const char *err_extra_text = NULL;
1098 switch (p->data_type) {
1099 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1100 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
1103 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1107 if (p->data == NULL)
1110 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
1111 if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
1112 pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
1123 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
1125 * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
1126 * with signature use.
1128 err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying";
1130 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
1131 if ((prsactx->operation
1132 & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) {
1134 "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations";
1137 if (prsactx->md == NULL
1138 && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, RSA_DEFAULT_DIGEST_NAME, NULL)) {
1142 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
1143 err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1145 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
1146 err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1148 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
1149 err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1151 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
1152 err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
1154 if (RSA_test_flags(prsactx->rsa,
1155 RSA_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == RSA_FLAG_TYPE_RSA)
1160 if (err_extra_text == NULL)
1161 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1162 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
1164 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1165 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
1169 if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
1171 prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
1174 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
1178 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1179 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
1180 "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
1181 "PSS padding has been specified first");
1185 switch (p->data_type) {
1186 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1187 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
1190 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1191 if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_DIGEST) == 0)
1192 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
1193 else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_MAX) == 0)
1194 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
1195 else if (strcmp(p->data, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SALT_LEN_AUTO) == 0)
1196 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
1198 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
1205 * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
1206 * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
1207 * lowest saltlen number possible.
1209 if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
1210 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1214 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1216 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
1217 if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
1218 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1222 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
1223 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
1224 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1225 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1226 "Should be more than %d, but would be "
1227 "set to match digest size (%d)",
1228 prsactx->min_saltlen,
1229 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
1234 if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
1235 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1236 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1237 "Should be more than %d, "
1238 "but would be set to %d",
1239 prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen);
1245 prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
1248 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
1250 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
1251 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
1252 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
1253 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
1254 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
1256 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1261 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
1262 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
1265 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1266 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
1270 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1271 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */
1272 if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
1273 || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
1275 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1279 /* non-PSS code follows */
1280 if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
1287 static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
1288 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1289 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1290 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1291 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1292 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1293 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1297 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void *provctx)
1300 * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
1301 * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
1302 * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
1303 * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
1305 return known_settable_ctx_params;
1308 static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
1310 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1312 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1315 return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1318 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1320 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1322 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1325 return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1328 static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1330 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1332 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1335 return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1338 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1340 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1342 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1345 return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1348 const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
1349 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
1350 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
1351 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
1352 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init },
1353 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
1354 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT,
1355 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init },
1356 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER,
1357 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
1358 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
1359 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init },
1360 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
1361 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1362 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
1363 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
1364 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
1365 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init },
1366 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
1367 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1368 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
1369 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
1370 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
1371 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
1372 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
1373 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1374 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
1375 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
1376 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1377 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
1378 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1379 (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
1380 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1381 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
1382 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1383 (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
1384 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1385 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },