2 * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
14 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include <openssl/err.h>
21 #include <openssl/rsa.h>
22 #include <openssl/params.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
25 #include "internal/nelem.h"
26 #include "internal/sizes.h"
27 #include "crypto/rsa.h"
28 #include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
29 #include "prov/implementations.h"
30 #include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
31 #include "prov/der_rsa.h"
33 static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn rsa_newctx;
34 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn rsa_sign_init;
35 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn rsa_verify_init;
36 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_init_fn rsa_verify_recover_init;
37 static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn rsa_sign;
38 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn rsa_verify;
39 static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_recover_fn rsa_verify_recover;
40 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn rsa_digest_sign_init;
41 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
42 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn rsa_digest_sign_final;
43 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn rsa_digest_verify_init;
44 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn rsa_digest_signverify_update;
45 static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn rsa_digest_verify_final;
46 static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn rsa_freectx;
47 static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn rsa_dupctx;
48 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_params;
49 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_params;
50 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_params;
51 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_params;
52 static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_get_ctx_md_params;
53 static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params;
54 static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_set_ctx_md_params;
55 static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn rsa_settable_ctx_md_params;
57 static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
58 { RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
59 { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
60 { RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
61 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" }, /* Correct spelling first */
62 { RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
63 { RSA_X931_PADDING, "x931" },
64 { RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, "pss" },
69 * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
70 * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes RSA structures, so
71 * we use that here too.
81 * Flag to determine if the hash function can be changed (1) or not (0)
82 * Because it's dangerous to change during a DigestSign or DigestVerify
83 * operation, this flag is cleared by their Init function, and set again
84 * by their Final function.
86 unsigned int flag_allow_md : 1;
88 /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */
89 unsigned char aid_buf[128];
97 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
99 /* RSA padding mode */
101 /* message digest for MGF1 */
103 char mgf1_mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; /* Purely informational */
104 /* PSS salt length */
106 /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
114 static size_t rsa_get_md_size(const PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx)
116 if (prsactx->md != NULL)
117 return EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md);
121 static int rsa_get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md)
124 * Because the RSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate.
125 * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID
128 static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = {
129 { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 },
130 { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 },
131 { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 },
132 { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 },
133 { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 },
134 { NID_sha512_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_224 },
135 { NID_sha512_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512_256 },
136 { NID_md5, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5 },
137 { NID_md5_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD5_SHA1 },
138 { NID_md2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD2 },
139 { NID_md4, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MD4 },
140 { NID_mdc2, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2 },
141 { NID_ripemd160, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_RIPEMD160 },
142 { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 },
143 { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 },
144 { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 },
145 { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 },
148 int mdnid = NID_undef;
153 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) {
154 if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) {
155 mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id;
160 if (mdnid == NID_undef)
161 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
167 static int rsa_check_padding(int mdnid, int padding)
169 if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) {
170 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE);
174 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
175 if (RSA_X931_hash_id(mdnid) == -1) {
176 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST);
184 static void *rsa_newctx(void *provctx, const char *propq)
186 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_RSA_CTX));
191 prsactx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx);
192 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
193 if (propq != NULL && (prsactx->propq = OPENSSL_strdup(propq)) == NULL) {
194 OPENSSL_free(prsactx);
196 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
201 /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
202 #define rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx) (prsactx->min_saltlen != -1)
204 static int rsa_signature_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa, int operation)
206 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
208 if (prsactx == NULL || vrsa == NULL || !RSA_up_ref(vrsa))
211 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
213 prsactx->operation = operation;
214 if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) != NULL)
215 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
217 prsactx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
218 /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
219 prsactx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
220 prsactx->min_saltlen = -1;
225 static int rsa_setup_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
229 mdprops = ctx->propq;
231 if (mdname != NULL) {
232 EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops);
233 int md_nid = rsa_get_md_nid(md);
237 || md_nid == NID_undef
238 || !rsa_check_padding(md_nid, ctx->pad_mode)) {
243 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
244 EVP_MD_free(ctx->md);
247 * TODO(3.0) Should we care about DER writing errors?
248 * All it really means is that for some reason, there's no
249 * AlgorithmIdentifier to be had (consider RSA with MD5-SHA1),
250 * but the operation itself is still valid, just as long as it's
251 * not used to construct anything that needs an AlgorithmIdentifier.
254 if (WPACKET_init_der(&pkt, ctx->aid_buf, sizeof(ctx->aid_buf))
255 && DER_w_algorithmIdentifier_RSA_with(&pkt, -1, ctx->rsa, md_nid)
256 && WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
257 WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &ctx->aid_len);
258 ctx->aid = WPACKET_get_curr(&pkt);
260 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
265 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname));
271 static int rsa_setup_mgf1_md(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx, const char *mdname,
275 mdprops = ctx->propq;
277 if (ctx->mgf1_mdname[0] != '\0')
278 EVP_MD_free(ctx->mgf1_md);
280 if ((ctx->mgf1_md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, mdprops)) == NULL)
282 OPENSSL_strlcpy(ctx->mgf1_mdname, mdname, sizeof(ctx->mgf1_mdname));
287 static int setup_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
289 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
291 if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(ctx->rsa))) == NULL) {
292 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
298 static void clean_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
300 if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
301 OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
304 static void free_tbuf(PROV_RSA_CTX *ctx)
306 OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->tbuf, RSA_size(ctx->rsa));
310 static int rsa_sign_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
312 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN);
315 static int rsa_sign(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
316 size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
318 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
320 size_t rsasize = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
321 size_t mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
328 if (sigsize < (size_t)rsasize)
332 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
333 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH);
338 if (EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_MDC2)) {
341 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) {
342 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
343 "only PKCS#1 padding supported with MDC2");
346 ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
350 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
357 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
358 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
359 if ((size_t)RSA_size(prsactx->rsa) < tbslen + 1) {
360 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
363 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx)) {
364 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
367 memcpy(prsactx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen);
368 prsactx->tbuf[tbslen] = RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid);
369 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, prsactx->tbuf,
370 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING);
374 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
378 ret = RSA_sign(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp,
381 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
388 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
389 /* Check PSS restrictions */
390 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
391 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
392 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
393 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
394 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
399 if (prsactx->saltlen >= 0
400 && prsactx->saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
401 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
407 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
409 if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa,
411 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
413 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
416 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(prsactx->rsa), prsactx->tbuf,
417 sig, prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
422 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
423 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
427 ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, prsactx->rsa,
435 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
443 static int rsa_verify_recover_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
445 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER);
448 static int rsa_verify_recover(void *vprsactx,
452 const unsigned char *sig,
455 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
459 *routlen = RSA_size(prsactx->rsa);
463 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
464 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
465 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
466 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
468 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
471 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
475 if (prsactx->tbuf[ret] != RSA_X931_hash_id(prsactx->mdnid)) {
476 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
479 if (ret != EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
480 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
481 "Should be %d, but got %d",
482 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md), ret);
487 if (routsize < (size_t)ret) {
488 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
491 memcpy(rout, prsactx->tbuf, ret);
494 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
498 ret = int_rsa_verify(prsactx->mdnid, NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp,
499 sig, siglen, prsactx->rsa);
501 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
509 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
510 "Only X.931 or PKCS#1 v1.5 padding allowed");
514 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, prsactx->rsa,
517 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
525 static int rsa_verify_init(void *vprsactx, void *vrsa)
527 return rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY);
530 static int rsa_verify(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
531 const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
533 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
536 if (prsactx->md != NULL) {
537 switch (prsactx->pad_mode) {
538 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
539 if (!RSA_verify(prsactx->mdnid, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen,
541 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
545 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
546 if (rsa_verify_recover(prsactx, NULL, &rslen, 0, sig, siglen) <= 0)
549 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
555 * We need to check this for the RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1()
558 mdsize = rsa_get_md_size(prsactx);
559 if (tbslen != mdsize) {
560 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH,
561 "Should be %d, but got %d",
566 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
568 ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf,
569 prsactx->rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
571 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
574 ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(prsactx->rsa, tbs,
575 prsactx->md, prsactx->mgf1_md,
579 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
585 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE,
586 "Only X.931, PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS padding allowed");
590 if (!setup_tbuf(prsactx))
592 rslen = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, prsactx->tbuf, prsactx->rsa,
595 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_LIB_RSA);
600 if ((rslen != tbslen) || memcmp(tbs, prsactx->tbuf, rslen))
606 static int rsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
607 void *vrsa, int operation)
609 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
611 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 0;
612 if (!rsa_signature_init(vprsactx, vrsa, operation)
613 || !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, NULL))
616 prsactx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
617 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
620 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(prsactx->mdctx, prsactx->md, NULL))
626 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
627 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
628 prsactx->mdctx = NULL;
633 static int rsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vprsactx,
634 const unsigned char *data,
637 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
639 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
642 return EVP_DigestUpdate(prsactx->mdctx, data, datalen);
645 static int rsa_digest_sign_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
646 const char *props, void *vrsa)
648 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, props, vrsa,
652 static int rsa_digest_sign_final(void *vprsactx, unsigned char *sig,
653 size_t *siglen, size_t sigsize)
655 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
656 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
657 unsigned int dlen = 0;
659 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
660 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
664 * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields
665 * are ignored. Defer to rsa_sign.
669 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
670 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
671 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
673 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
677 return rsa_sign(vprsactx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen);
680 static int rsa_digest_verify_init(void *vprsactx, const char *mdname,
681 const char *props, void *vrsa)
683 return rsa_digest_signverify_init(vprsactx, mdname, props, vrsa,
687 int rsa_digest_verify_final(void *vprsactx, const unsigned char *sig,
690 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
691 unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
692 unsigned int dlen = 0;
694 prsactx->flag_allow_md = 1;
695 if (prsactx == NULL || prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
699 * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided
700 * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow -
701 * but that problem is much larger than just in RSA.
703 if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(prsactx->mdctx, digest, &dlen))
706 return rsa_verify(vprsactx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen);
709 static void rsa_freectx(void *vprsactx)
711 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
716 RSA_free(prsactx->rsa);
717 EVP_MD_CTX_free(prsactx->mdctx);
718 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->md);
719 EVP_MD_free(prsactx->mgf1_md);
720 OPENSSL_free(prsactx->propq);
723 OPENSSL_clear_free(prsactx, sizeof(prsactx));
726 static void *rsa_dupctx(void *vprsactx)
728 PROV_RSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
729 PROV_RSA_CTX *dstctx;
731 dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
738 dstctx->mdctx = NULL;
741 if (srcctx->rsa != NULL && !RSA_up_ref(srcctx->rsa))
743 dstctx->rsa = srcctx->rsa;
745 if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md))
747 dstctx->md = srcctx->md;
749 if (srcctx->mgf1_md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->mgf1_md))
751 dstctx->mgf1_md = srcctx->mgf1_md;
753 if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) {
754 dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
755 if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL
756 || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx))
766 static int rsa_get_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
768 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
771 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
774 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID);
776 && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, prsactx->aid, prsactx->aid_len))
779 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
781 switch (p->data_type) {
782 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER:
783 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->pad_mode))
786 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
789 const char *word = NULL;
791 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
792 if (prsactx->pad_mode == (int)padding_item[i].id) {
793 word = padding_item[i].ptr;
799 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, word))
802 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
810 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
811 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mdname))
814 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
815 if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, prsactx->mgf1_mdname))
818 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
820 if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER) {
821 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, prsactx->saltlen))
823 } else if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
824 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
825 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
826 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "digest"))
829 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX:
830 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "max"))
833 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
834 if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, "auto"))
838 if (BIO_snprintf(p->data, p->data_size, "%d", prsactx->saltlen)
849 static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
850 OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0),
851 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
852 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
853 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
854 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
858 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_params(void)
860 return known_gettable_ctx_params;
863 static int rsa_set_ctx_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
865 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
868 if (prsactx == NULL || params == NULL)
871 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST);
872 /* Not allowed during certain operations */
873 if (p != NULL && !prsactx->flag_allow_md)
876 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
877 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
878 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
879 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
880 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES);
882 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
887 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
888 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
891 /* TODO(3.0) PSS check needs more work */
892 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
893 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->md == NULL */
894 if (prsactx->md == NULL || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->md, mdname))
896 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
900 /* non-PSS code follows */
901 if (!rsa_setup_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
905 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE);
908 const char *err_extra_text = NULL;
910 switch (p->data_type) {
911 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
912 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pad_mode))
915 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
922 for (i = 0; padding_item[i].id != 0; i++) {
923 if (strcmp(p->data, padding_item[i].ptr) == 0) {
924 pad_mode = padding_item[i].id;
935 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
937 * OAEP padding is for asymmetric cipher only so is not compatible
938 * with signature use.
940 err_extra_text = "OAEP padding not allowed for signing / verifying";
942 case RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING:
943 if ((prsactx->operation
944 & (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY)) == 0) {
946 "PSS padding only allowed for sign and verify operations";
949 if (prsactx->md == NULL
950 && !rsa_setup_md(prsactx, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1, NULL)) {
951 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST,
952 "%s could not be fetched",
953 OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1);
957 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
958 err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
960 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
961 err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
964 err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
966 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
967 err_extra_text = "X.931 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
969 if (RSA_get0_pss_params(prsactx->rsa) == NULL)
974 if (err_extra_text == NULL)
975 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV,
976 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
978 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
979 PROV_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
983 if (!rsa_check_padding(prsactx->mdnid, pad_mode))
985 prsactx->pad_mode = pad_mode;
988 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN);
992 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
993 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED,
994 "PSS saltlen can only be specified if "
995 "PSS padding has been specified first");
999 switch (p->data_type) {
1000 case OSSL_PARAM_INTEGER: /* Support for legacy pad mode number */
1001 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &saltlen))
1004 case OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING:
1005 if (strcmp(p->data, "digest") == 0)
1006 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
1007 else if (strcmp(p->data, "max") == 0)
1008 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
1009 else if (strcmp(p->data, "auto") == 0)
1010 saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
1012 saltlen = atoi(p->data);
1019 * RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX seems curiously named in this check.
1020 * Contrary to what it's name suggests, it's the currently
1021 * lowest saltlen number possible.
1023 if (saltlen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
1024 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1028 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1029 switch (prsactx->saltlen) {
1030 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO:
1031 if (prsactx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
1032 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
1036 case RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST:
1037 if (prsactx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md)) {
1038 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1039 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1040 "Should be more than %d, but would be "
1041 "set to match digest size (%d)",
1042 prsactx->min_saltlen,
1043 EVP_MD_size(prsactx->md));
1048 if (saltlen >= 0 && saltlen < prsactx->min_saltlen) {
1049 ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_PROV,
1050 PROV_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL,
1051 "Should be more than %d, "
1052 "but would be set to %d",
1053 prsactx->min_saltlen, saltlen);
1059 prsactx->saltlen = saltlen;
1062 p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST);
1064 char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE] = "", *pmdname = mdname;
1065 char mdprops[OSSL_MAX_PROPQUERY_SIZE] = "", *pmdprops = mdprops;
1066 const OSSL_PARAM *propsp =
1067 OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params,
1068 OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES);
1070 if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &pmdname, sizeof(mdname)))
1075 else if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(propsp,
1076 &pmdprops, sizeof(mdprops)))
1079 if (prsactx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
1080 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD);
1084 if (rsa_pss_restricted(prsactx)) {
1085 /* TODO(3.0) figure out what to do for prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL */
1086 if (prsactx->mgf1_md == NULL
1087 || EVP_MD_is_a(prsactx->mgf1_md, mdname))
1089 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
1093 /* non-PSS code follows */
1094 if (!rsa_setup_mgf1_md(prsactx, mdname, pmdprops))
1101 static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
1102 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PAD_MODE, NULL, 0),
1103 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1104 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1105 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
1106 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
1107 OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_PSS_SALTLEN, NULL, 0),
1111 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_params(void)
1114 * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx
1115 * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that
1116 * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the
1117 * digest is explicitly set as part of the init.
1119 return known_settable_ctx_params;
1122 static int rsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, OSSL_PARAM *params)
1124 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1126 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1129 return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1132 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1134 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1136 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1139 return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1142 static int rsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
1144 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1146 if (prsactx->mdctx == NULL)
1149 return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(prsactx->mdctx, params);
1152 static const OSSL_PARAM *rsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vprsactx)
1154 PROV_RSA_CTX *prsactx = (PROV_RSA_CTX *)vprsactx;
1156 if (prsactx->md == NULL)
1159 return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(prsactx->md);
1162 const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[] = {
1163 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_newctx },
1164 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign_init },
1165 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))rsa_sign },
1166 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_init },
1167 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))rsa_verify },
1168 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT,
1169 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover_init },
1170 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_RECOVER,
1171 (void (*)(void))rsa_verify_recover },
1172 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT,
1173 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_init },
1174 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE,
1175 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1176 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL,
1177 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_sign_final },
1178 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT,
1179 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_init },
1180 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE,
1181 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_signverify_update },
1182 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL,
1183 (void (*)(void))rsa_digest_verify_final },
1184 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_freectx },
1185 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))rsa_dupctx },
1186 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_params },
1187 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1188 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_params },
1189 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_params },
1190 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
1191 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_params },
1192 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1193 (void (*)(void))rsa_get_ctx_md_params },
1194 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1195 (void (*)(void))rsa_gettable_ctx_md_params },
1196 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1197 (void (*)(void))rsa_set_ctx_md_params },
1198 { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS,
1199 (void (*)(void))rsa_settable_ctx_md_params },