From 2dbfa8444bdf7669a54006c4a83d1e60ba374528 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Adam Langley
Date: Tue, 26 Sep 2017 10:48:55 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] nistp521: add a comment to the P+P exceptional case in
point_add.
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This change adds a comment to the exceptional case in point_add that
handles the case of a doubling, which explains when this case may occur
during normal processing.
Thanks go to Antonio Sanso for noting this.
Reviewed-by: Emilia KÃ¤sper
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4424)
---
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
index e491fe55c2..d68d60ef32 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
@@ -1157,9 +1157,9 @@ static void copy_conditional(felem out, const felem in, limb mask)
* adapted for mixed addition (z2 = 1, or z2 = 0 for the point at infinity).
*
* This function includes a branch for checking whether the two input points
- * are equal (while not equal to the point at infinity). This case never
- * happens during single point multiplication, so there is no timing leak for
- * ECDH or ECDSA signing. */
+ * are equal (while not equal to the point at infinity). See comment below
+ * on constant-time.
+ */
static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
const felem x1, const felem y1, const felem z1,
const int mixed, const felem x2, const felem y2,
@@ -1253,6 +1253,22 @@ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
/* ftmp5[i] < 2^61 */
if (x_equal && y_equal && !z1_is_zero && !z2_is_zero) {
+ /*
+ * This is obviously not constant-time but it will almost-never happen
+ * for ECDH / ECDSA. The case where it can happen is during scalar-mult
+ * where the intermediate value gets very close to the group order.
+ * Since |ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits| produces signed digits for
+ * the scalar, it's possible for the intermediate value to be a small
+ * negative multiple of the base point, and for the final signed digit
+ * to be the same value. We believe that this only occurs for the scalar
+ * 1fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
+ * ffffffa51868783bf2f966b7fcc0148f709a5d03bb5c9b8899c47aebb6fb
+ * 71e913863f7, in that case the penultimate intermediate is -9G and
+ * the final digit is also -9G. Since this only happens for a single
+ * scalar, the timing leak is irrelevent. (Any attacker who wanted to
+ * check whether a secret scalar was that exact value, can already do
+ * so.)
+ */
point_double(x3, y3, z3, x1, y1, z1);
return;
}
--
2.34.1