openssl.git
3 years agoWindows: UTF-8 opt-in for command-line arguments and console input.
Andy Polyakov [Thu, 25 Aug 2016 06:06:26 +0000 (08:06 +0200)]
Windows: UTF-8 opt-in for command-line arguments and console input.

User can make Windows openssl.exe to treat command-line arguments
and console input as UTF-8 By setting OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8 environment
variable (to any value). This is likely to be required for data
interchangeability with other OSes and PKCS#12 containers generated
with Windows CryptoAPI.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoSupport broken PKCS#12 key generation.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 17:55:51 +0000 (18:55 +0100)]
Support broken PKCS#12 key generation.

OpenSSL versions before 1.1.0 didn't convert non-ASCII
UTF8 PKCS#12 passwords to Unicode correctly.

To correctly decrypt older files, if MAC verification fails
with the supplied password attempt to use the broken format
which is compatible with earlier versions of OpenSSL.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoDon't switch password formats using global state.
Andy Polyakov [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 17:54:10 +0000 (18:54 +0100)]
Don't switch password formats using global state.

To avoid possible race conditions don't switch password format using
global state in crypto/pkcs12

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix an uninitialised read on an error path
Matt Caswell [Thu, 25 Aug 2016 08:40:17 +0000 (09:40 +0100)]
Fix an uninitialised read on an error path

Found by Coverity.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoNEWS: add a number of the types that were made opaque
Richard Levitte [Thu, 25 Aug 2016 08:06:55 +0000 (10:06 +0200)]
NEWS: add a number of the types that were made opaque

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoUn-delete still documented X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify
Viktor Dukhovni [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 18:53:09 +0000 (14:53 -0400)]
Un-delete still documented X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify

It should not have been removed.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoConfigurations/10-main.conf: fix solaris64-*-cc link problems.
Andy Polyakov [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 15:05:05 +0000 (17:05 +0200)]
Configurations/10-main.conf: fix solaris64-*-cc link problems.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: /cmovb/cmovc/ as nasm doesn't recognize cmovb.
Andy Polyakov [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 15:13:09 +0000 (17:13 +0200)]
ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: /cmovb/cmovc/ as nasm doesn't recognize cmovb.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoClarify the error messages in 08f6ae5b28
Matt Caswell [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 12:36:07 +0000 (13:36 +0100)]
Clarify the error messages in 08f6ae5b28

Ensure it is clear to the user why there has been an error.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix no-ec2m
Matt Caswell [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 12:54:05 +0000 (13:54 +0100)]
Fix no-ec2m

The new curves test did not take into account no-ec2m

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoCRYPTO_atomic_add(): check that the object is lock free
Richard Levitte [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 07:14:44 +0000 (09:14 +0200)]
CRYPTO_atomic_add(): check that the object is lock free

If not, fall back to our own code, using the given mutex

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
3 years agoCRYPTO_atomic_add(): use acquire release memory order rather than relaxed
Richard Levitte [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 10:01:39 +0000 (12:01 +0200)]
CRYPTO_atomic_add(): use acquire release memory order rather than relaxed

For increments, the relaxed model is fine.  For decrements, it's
recommended to use the acquire release model.  We therefore go for the
latter.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
3 years agoCheck for __GNUC__ to use GNU C atomic buildins
Richard Levitte [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 11:03:20 +0000 (13:03 +0200)]
Check for __GNUC__ to use GNU C atomic buildins

Note: we trust any other compiler that fully implements GNU extension
to define __GNUC__

RT#4642

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
3 years agoTrust RSA_check_key() to return correct values
Richard Levitte [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 10:46:09 +0000 (12:46 +0200)]
Trust RSA_check_key() to return correct values

In apps/rsa.c, we were second guessing RSA_check_key() to leave error
codes lying around without returning -1 properly.  However, this also
catches other errors that are lying around and that we should not care
about.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoAvoid overflow in MDC2_Update()
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 22:28:29 +0000 (23:28 +0100)]
Avoid overflow in MDC2_Update()

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue.

CVE-2016-6303

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoPut DES into "not default" category.
Rich Salz [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 12:56:42 +0000 (08:56 -0400)]
Put DES into "not default" category.

Add CVE to CHANGES

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
3 years agoTo avoid SWEET32 attack, move 3DES to weak
Rich Salz [Sat, 30 Jul 2016 16:21:32 +0000 (12:21 -0400)]
To avoid SWEET32 attack, move 3DES to weak

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
3 years agoTypo fixes
Rob Percival [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 09:11:15 +0000 (10:11 +0100)]
Typo fixes

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoUpdates the CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX POD
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 17:41:18 +0000 (18:41 +0100)]
Updates the CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX POD

Ownership semantics and function names have changed.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoCorrect documentation about SCT setters resetting validation status
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 17:30:18 +0000 (18:30 +0100)]
Correct documentation about SCT setters resetting validation status

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemoves the SCT_verify* POD
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 17:11:13 +0000 (18:11 +0100)]
Removes the SCT_verify* POD

SCT_verify_v1 has been removed and SCT_verify is no longer part of the
public API.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoDocuments the SCT validation functions
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 17:05:28 +0000 (18:05 +0100)]
Documents the SCT validation functions

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemoves {o2i,i2o}_SCT_signature from PODs
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:39:53 +0000 (17:39 +0100)]
Removes {o2i,i2o}_SCT_signature from PODs

These functions have been removed from the public API.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoDocuments the CTLOG functions
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 15:51:57 +0000 (16:51 +0100)]
Documents the CTLOG functions

CTLOG_new_null() has been removed from the code, so it has also been
removed from this POD.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoDocument the i2o and o2i SCT functions
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 15:17:09 +0000 (16:17 +0100)]
Document the i2o and o2i SCT functions

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemoves d2i_SCT_LIST.pod
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 15:16:32 +0000 (16:16 +0100)]
Removes d2i_SCT_LIST.pod

This is covered by d2i_X509.pod.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoDocument that SCT_set_source returns 0 on failure.
Rob Percival [Fri, 5 Aug 2016 12:40:05 +0000 (13:40 +0100)]
Document that SCT_set_source returns 0 on failure.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoClarifies the format of a log's public key in the CONF file
Rob Percival [Thu, 4 Aug 2016 17:41:23 +0000 (18:41 +0100)]
Clarifies the format of a log's public key in the CONF file

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoRefer to OPENSSLDIR rather than "the OpenSSL install directory"
Rob Percival [Thu, 4 Aug 2016 16:05:18 +0000 (17:05 +0100)]
Refer to OPENSSLDIR rather than "the OpenSSL install directory"

The prior wording was less accurate.
See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1372#discussion_r73127000.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdds history section to CT PODs
Rob Percival [Thu, 4 Aug 2016 15:42:42 +0000 (16:42 +0100)]
Adds history section to CT PODs

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoFixes final issue in CT PODs highlighted by util/find-doc-nits.pl
Rob Percival [Thu, 4 Aug 2016 10:37:35 +0000 (11:37 +0100)]
Fixes final issue in CT PODs highlighted by util/find-doc-nits.pl

Fixes complaint "ct missing from SYNOPSIS".

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoRenames CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX.pod to CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new.pod
Rob Percival [Thu, 4 Aug 2016 10:36:11 +0000 (11:36 +0100)]
Renames CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX.pod to CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new.pod

util/fix-doc-nits.pl complains that
"CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX (filename) missing from NAME section".

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdds copyright section to ct.pod
Rob Percival [Thu, 4 Aug 2016 10:29:36 +0000 (11:29 +0100)]
Adds copyright section to ct.pod

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdds newline after =cut in PODs
Rob Percival [Thu, 4 Aug 2016 10:29:23 +0000 (11:29 +0100)]
Adds newline after =cut in PODs

util/find-doc-nits.pl complains that the file "doesn't end with =cut".

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdds missing function names to NAME section of PODs
Rob Percival [Thu, 4 Aug 2016 10:28:04 +0000 (11:28 +0100)]
Adds missing function names to NAME section of PODs

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd enum definitions to CT pods
Rob Percival [Tue, 2 Aug 2016 14:39:41 +0000 (15:39 +0100)]
Add enum definitions to CT pods

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemove unnecessary bold tags in CT pods
Rob Percival [Tue, 2 Aug 2016 14:39:23 +0000 (15:39 +0100)]
Remove unnecessary bold tags in CT pods

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd comment about calling CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free
Rob Percival [Mon, 1 Aug 2016 19:08:11 +0000 (20:08 +0100)]
Add comment about calling CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix comment about what SCT_LIST_validate does.
Rob Percival [Mon, 1 Aug 2016 19:07:15 +0000 (20:07 +0100)]
Fix comment about what SCT_LIST_validate does.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd SSL_get0_peer_scts to ssl.pod
Rob Percival [Mon, 1 Aug 2016 14:37:10 +0000 (15:37 +0100)]
Add SSL_get0_peer_scts to ssl.pod

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix comment about return value of ct_extract_tls_extension_scts
Rob Percival [Mon, 1 Aug 2016 14:36:38 +0000 (15:36 +0100)]
Fix comment about return value of ct_extract_tls_extension_scts

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoFirst draft of CT documentation
Rob Percival [Thu, 28 Apr 2016 06:37:24 +0000 (07:37 +0100)]
First draft of CT documentation

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemove some dead code from rec_layer_s3.c
Matt Caswell [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 10:28:58 +0000 (11:28 +0100)]
Remove some dead code from rec_layer_s3.c

It is never valid to call ssl3_read_bytes with
type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, and in fact we check for valid values
for type near the beginning of the function. Therefore this check will never
be true and can be removed.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemove useless assignment
Matt Caswell [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 10:25:23 +0000 (11:25 +0100)]
Remove useless assignment

The variable assignment c1 is never read before it is overwritten.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix some resource leaks in the apps
Matt Caswell [Wed, 24 Aug 2016 10:22:47 +0000 (11:22 +0100)]
Fix some resource leaks in the apps

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoec/ecp_nistz256: harmonize is_infinity with ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity.
Andy Polyakov [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 21:18:35 +0000 (23:18 +0200)]
ec/ecp_nistz256: harmonize is_infinity with ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity.

RT#4625

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoec/ecp_nistz256: harmonize is_infinity with ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity.
Andy Polyakov [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 21:16:04 +0000 (23:16 +0200)]
ec/ecp_nistz256: harmonize is_infinity with ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity.

RT#4625

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoec/asm/ecp_nistz256-*.pl: addition to perform stricter reduction.
Andy Polyakov [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 20:10:24 +0000 (22:10 +0200)]
ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-*.pl: addition to perform stricter reduction.

Addition was not preserving inputs' property of being fully reduced.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: addition to perform stricter reduction.
Andy Polyakov [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 20:04:21 +0000 (22:04 +0200)]
ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: addition to perform stricter reduction.

Addition was not preserving inputs' property of being fully reduced.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoevp/bio_enc.c: stop using pointer arithmetic for error detection.
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 11:31:36 +0000 (13:31 +0200)]
evp/bio_enc.c: stop using pointer arithmetic for error detection.

Thanks to David Benjamin for reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix no-sock
Matt Caswell [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 19:49:26 +0000 (20:49 +0100)]
Fix no-sock

The declaration of bio_type_lock is independent of no-sock so should not be
inside OPENSSL_NO_SOCK guards.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoSanity check ticket length.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 16:20:01 +0000 (17:20 +0100)]
Sanity check ticket length.

If a ticket callback changes the HMAC digest to SHA512 the existing
sanity checks are not sufficient and an attacker could perform a DoS
attack with a malformed ticket. Add additional checks based on
HMAC size.

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.

CVE-2016-6302

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
3 years ago80-test_pkcs12.t: skip the test on Windows with non-Greek locale.
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 07:45:03 +0000 (09:45 +0200)]
80-test_pkcs12.t: skip the test on Windows with non-Greek locale.

Test doesn't work on Windows with non-Greek locale, because of
Win32 perl[!] limitation, not OpenSSL. For example it passes on
Cygwin and MSYS...

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix math in BN_bn2dec comment.
David Benjamin [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 05:39:24 +0000 (22:39 -0700)]
Fix math in BN_bn2dec comment.

The bound on log(2)/3 on the second line is incorrect and has an extra
zero compared to the divisions in the third line. log(2)/3 = 0.10034...
which is bounded by 0.101 and not 0.1001. The divisions actually
correspond to 0.101 which is fine. The third line also dropped a factor
of three.

The actual code appears to be fine. Just the comments are wrong.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoSCT_set_source resets validation_status
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 17:31:16 +0000 (18:31 +0100)]
SCT_set_source resets validation_status

This makes it consistent with all of the other SCT setters.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoDocument that o2i_SCT_signature can leave the SCT in an inconsistent state
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:35:14 +0000 (17:35 +0100)]
Document that o2i_SCT_signature can leave the SCT in an inconsistent state

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemoves {i2o,o2i}_SCT_signature from the CT public API
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 16:27:35 +0000 (17:27 +0100)]
Removes {i2o,o2i}_SCT_signature from the CT public API

They may return if an SCT_signature struct is added in the future that
allows them to be refactored to conform to the i2d/d2i function signature
conventions.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoPrevent double-free of CTLOG public key
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 15:55:09 +0000 (16:55 +0100)]
Prevent double-free of CTLOG public key

Previously, if ct_v1_log_id_from_pkey failed, public_key would be freed by
CTLOG_free at the end of the function, and then again by the caller (who
would assume ownership was not transferred when CTLOG_new returned NULL).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoInternalizes SCT_verify and removes SCT_verify_v1
Rob Percival [Tue, 23 Aug 2016 11:52:43 +0000 (12:52 +0100)]
Internalizes SCT_verify and removes SCT_verify_v1

SCT_verify is impossible to call through the public API (SCT_CTX_new() is
not part of the public API), so rename it to SCT_CTX_verify and move it
out of the public API.

SCT_verify_v1 is redundant, since SCT_validate does the same verification
(by calling SCT_verify) and more. The API is less confusing with a single
verification function (SCT_validate).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoUpdate fuzz corpora
Kurt Roeckx [Fri, 12 Aug 2016 16:54:11 +0000 (18:54 +0200)]
Update fuzz corpora

This is a new minimal corpus with the following changes:
- asn1: files: 1135 (+474), tuples: 27236 (+7496)
- asn1parse: files: 305 (-3), tuples: 8758 (+11)
- bignum: files: 370 (-1), tuples: 9547 (+10)
- bndiv: files: 160 (+0), tuples: 2416 (+6)
- cms: files: 155 (-1), tuples: 3408 (+0)
- conf: files: 231 (-11), tuples: 4668 (+3)
- crl: files: 905 (+188), tuples: 22876 (+4096)
- ct: files: 117 (+35), tuples: 3557 (+908)
- x509: files: 920, tuples: 28334

Note that tuple count depends on the binary and is random.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify a bit X509_NAME_get_entry
FdaSilvaYY [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 17:44:10 +0000 (19:44 +0200)]
Constify a bit X509_NAME_get_entry

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify some X509_NAME, ASN1 printing code
FdaSilvaYY [Thu, 7 Jul 2016 21:45:55 +0000 (23:45 +0200)]
Constify some X509_NAME, ASN1 printing code

 ASN1_buf_print, asn1_print_*, X509_NAME_oneline, X509_NAME_print

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify some input parameters.
FdaSilvaYY [Thu, 11 Aug 2016 22:40:49 +0000 (00:40 +0200)]
Constify some input parameters.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify some inputs buffers
FdaSilvaYY [Sat, 6 Aug 2016 15:54:32 +0000 (17:54 +0200)]
Constify some inputs buffers

remove useless cast to call ASN1_STRING_set

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify ASN1_PCTX_*
FdaSilvaYY [Tue, 2 Aug 2016 18:19:00 +0000 (20:19 +0200)]
Constify ASN1_PCTX_*

... add a static keyword.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix bio_enc_test
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 15:11:55 +0000 (16:11 +0100)]
Fix bio_enc_test

There was a block of code at the start that used the Camellia cipher. The
original idea behind this was to fill the buffer with non-zero data so that
oversteps can be detected. However this block failed when using no-camellia.
This has been replaced with a RAND_bytes() call.

I also updated the the CTR test section, since it seems to be using a CBC
cipher instead of a CTR cipher.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd some sanity checks when checking CRL scores
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 23:01:57 +0000 (00:01 +0100)]
Add some sanity checks when checking CRL scores

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemove some dead code
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:53:09 +0000 (23:53 +0100)]
Remove some dead code

The assignment to ret is dead, because ret is assigned again later.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoSanity check an ASN1_object_size result
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:41:15 +0000 (23:41 +0100)]
Sanity check an ASN1_object_size result

If it's negative don't try and malloc it.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoCheck for error return from ASN1_object_size
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:39:28 +0000 (23:39 +0100)]
Check for error return from ASN1_object_size

Otherwise we try to malloc a -1 size.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoCheck for malloc error in bn_x931p.c
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:34:30 +0000 (23:34 +0100)]
Check for malloc error in bn_x931p.c

Ensure BN_CTX_get() has been successful

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix mem leak on error path
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:23:31 +0000 (23:23 +0100)]
Fix mem leak on error path

The mem pointed to by cAB can be leaked on an error path.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix mem leak on error path
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:20:45 +0000 (23:20 +0100)]
Fix mem leak on error path

The mem pointed to by cAB can be leaked on an error path.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix mem leak on error path
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 22:18:50 +0000 (23:18 +0100)]
Fix mem leak on error path

The mem pointed to by tmp can be leaked on an error path.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoEnsure the mime_hdr_free function can handle NULLs
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 21:27:27 +0000 (22:27 +0100)]
Ensure the mime_hdr_free function can handle NULLs

Sometimes it is called with a NULL pointer

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoEnsure CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free behaves properly with a NULL arg
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 21:21:30 +0000 (22:21 +0100)]
Ensure CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free behaves properly with a NULL arg

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix leak on error in tls_construct_cke_gost
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 21:17:20 +0000 (22:17 +0100)]
Fix leak on error in tls_construct_cke_gost

Don't leak pke_ctx on error.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoTest the support curves in tls
Kurt Roeckx [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 17:51:14 +0000 (19:51 +0200)]
Test the support curves in tls

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #1472

3 years agoClosing output file from inside the loop who open it
FdaSilvaYY [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 16:31:45 +0000 (18:31 +0200)]
Closing output file from inside the loop who open it

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #1471

3 years agoFix no-des
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 15:04:47 +0000 (16:04 +0100)]
Fix no-des

The PKCS12 command line utility is not available if no-des is used.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoRT2676: Reject RSA eponent if even or 1
Rich Salz [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 15:25:12 +0000 (11:25 -0400)]
RT2676: Reject RSA eponent if even or 1

Also, re-organize RSA check to use goto err.
Add a test case.
Try all checks, not just stopping at first (via Richard Levitte)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoConfigure: Properly cache the configured compiler command
Richard Levitte [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 13:39:49 +0000 (15:39 +0200)]
Configure: Properly cache the configured compiler command

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix a memory leak in EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters()
Kazuki Yamaguchi [Sat, 6 Aug 2016 13:24:44 +0000 (22:24 +0900)]
Fix a memory leak in EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters()

The variable 'buffer', allocated by EC_POINT_point2buf(), isn't
free'd on the success path.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoExpose alloc functions for EC{PK,}PARAMETERS
Kazuki Yamaguchi [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 04:55:34 +0000 (13:55 +0900)]
Expose alloc functions for EC{PK,}PARAMETERS

Declare EC{PK,}PARAMETERS_{new,free} functions in public headers. The
free functions are necessary because EC_GROUP_get_ec{pk,}parameters()
was made public by commit 60b350a3ef96 ("RT3676: Expose ECgroup i2d
functions").

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix loopargs_t object duplication into ASYNC context
FdaSilvaYY [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 22:51:20 +0000 (00:51 +0200)]
Fix loopargs_t object duplication into ASYNC context

Code was relying on an implicit data-sharing through duplication of
loopargs_t pointer-members made by ASYNC_start_job().

Now share structure address instead of structure content.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAvoid more compiler warnings for use of uninitialised variables
Richard Levitte [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 13:25:34 +0000 (15:25 +0200)]
Avoid more compiler warnings for use of uninitialised variables

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
3 years agoMake 'openssl req -x509' more equivalent to 'openssl req -new'
Richard Levitte [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 12:53:53 +0000 (14:53 +0200)]
Make 'openssl req -x509' more equivalent to 'openssl req -new'

The following would fail, or rather, freeze:

    openssl genrsa -out rsa2048.pem 2048
    openssl req -x509 -key rsa2048.pem -keyform PEM -out cert.pem

In that case, the second command wants to read a certificate request
from stdin, because -x509 wasn't fully flagged as being for creating
something new.  This changes makes it fully flagged.

RT#4655

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
3 years agobn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: implement slightly alternative page-walking.
Andy Polyakov [Wed, 16 Mar 2016 22:33:53 +0000 (23:33 +0100)]
bn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: implement slightly alternative page-walking.

Original strategy for page-walking was adjust stack pointer and then
touch pages in order. This kind of asks for double-fault, because
if touch fails, then signal will be delivered to frame above adjusted
stack pointer. But touching pages prior adjusting stack pointer would
upset valgrind. As compromise let's adjust stack pointer in pages,
touching top of the stack. This still asks for double-fault, but at
least prevents corruption of neighbour stack if allocation is to
overstep the guard page.

Also omit predict-non-taken hints as they reportedly trigger illegal
instructions in some VM setups.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoChoose a ciphersuite for testing that won't be affected by "no-*" options
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 09:42:08 +0000 (10:42 +0100)]
Choose a ciphersuite for testing that won't be affected by "no-*" options

The previous ciphersuite broke in no-ec builds.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix overflow check in BN_bn2dec()
Kazuki Yamaguchi [Sun, 21 Aug 2016 17:36:36 +0000 (02:36 +0900)]
Fix overflow check in BN_bn2dec()

Fix an off by one error in the overflow check added by 07bed46f332fc
("Check for errors in BN_bn2dec()").

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agossltestlib: Tell compiler we don't care about the value when we don't
Richard Levitte [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 12:02:31 +0000 (14:02 +0200)]
ssltestlib: Tell compiler we don't care about the value when we don't

In mempacket_test_read(), we've already fetched the top value of the
stack, so when we shift the stack, we don't care for the value.  The
compiler needs to be told, or it will complain harshly when we tell it
to be picky.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agocrypto/pkcs12: facilitate accessing data with non-interoperable password.
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 26 Jul 2016 14:42:41 +0000 (16:42 +0200)]
crypto/pkcs12: facilitate accessing data with non-interoperable password.

Originally PKCS#12 subroutines treated password strings as ASCII.
It worked as long as they were pure ASCII, but if there were some
none-ASCII characters result was non-interoperable. But fixing it
poses problem accessing data protected with broken password. In
order to make asscess to old data possible add retry with old-style
password.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agocrypto/pkcs12: default to UTF-8.
Andy Polyakov [Mon, 25 Jul 2016 23:48:01 +0000 (01:48 +0200)]
crypto/pkcs12: default to UTF-8.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd PKCS#12 UTF-8 interoperability test.
Andy Polyakov [Mon, 25 Jul 2016 23:46:03 +0000 (01:46 +0200)]
Add PKCS#12 UTF-8 interoperability test.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agocrypto/pkcs12: add UTF8 support.
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 24 Nov 2015 22:34:51 +0000 (23:34 +0100)]
crypto/pkcs12: add UTF8 support.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoPrevent DTLS Finished message injection
Matt Caswell [Thu, 30 Jun 2016 14:06:27 +0000 (15:06 +0100)]
Prevent DTLS Finished message injection

Follow on from CVE-2016-2179

The investigation and analysis of CVE-2016-2179 highlighted a related flaw.

This commit fixes a security "near miss" in the buffered message handling
code. Ultimately this is not currently believed to be exploitable due to
the reasons outlined below, and therefore there is no CVE for this on its
own.

The issue this commit fixes is a MITM attack where the attacker can inject
a Finished message into the handshake. In the description below it is
assumed that the attacker injects the Finished message for the server to
receive it. The attack could work equally well the other way around (i.e
where the client receives the injected Finished message).

The MITM requires the following capabilities:
- The ability to manipulate the MTU that the client selects such that it
is small enough for the client to fragment Finished messages.
- The ability to selectively drop and modify records sent from the client
- The ability to inject its own records and send them to the server

The MITM forces the client to select a small MTU such that the client
will fragment the Finished message. Ideally for the attacker the first
fragment will contain all but the last byte of the Finished message,
with the second fragment containing the final byte.

During the handshake and prior to the client sending the CCS the MITM
injects a plaintext Finished message fragment to the server containing
all but the final byte of the Finished message. The message sequence
number should be the one expected to be used for the real Finished message.

OpenSSL will recognise that the received fragment is for the future and
will buffer it for later use.

After the client sends the CCS it then sends its own Finished message in
two fragments. The MITM causes the first of these fragments to be
dropped. The OpenSSL server will then receive the second of the fragments
and reassemble the complete Finished message consisting of the MITM
fragment and the final byte from the real client.

The advantage to the attacker in injecting a Finished message is that
this provides the capability to modify other handshake messages (e.g.
the ClientHello) undetected. A difficulty for the attacker is knowing in
advance what impact any of those changes might have on the final byte of
the handshake hash that is going to be sent in the "real" Finished
message. In the worst case for the attacker this means that only 1 in
256 of such injection attempts will succeed.

It may be possible in some situations for the attacker to improve this such
that all attempts succeed. For example if the handshake includes client
authentication then the final message flight sent by the client will
include a Certificate. Certificates are ASN.1 objects where the signed
portion is DER encoded. The non-signed portion could be BER encoded and so
the attacker could re-encode the certificate such that the hash for the
whole handshake comes to a different value. The certificate re-encoding
would not be detectable because only the non-signed portion is changed. As
this is the final flight of messages sent from the client the attacker
knows what the complete hanshake hash value will be that the client will
send - and therefore knows what the final byte will be. Through a process
of trial and error the attacker can re-encode the certificate until the
modified handhshake also has a hash with the same final byte. This means
that when the Finished message is verified by the server it will be
correct in all cases.

In practice the MITM would need to be able to perform the same attack
against both the client and the server. If the attack is only performed
against the server (say) then the server will not detect the modified
handshake, but the client will and will abort the connection.
Fortunately, although OpenSSL is vulnerable to Finished message
injection, it is not vulnerable if *both* client and server are OpenSSL.
The reason is that OpenSSL has a hard "floor" for a minimum MTU size
that it will never go below. This minimum means that a Finished message
will never be sent in a fragmented form and therefore the MITM does not
have one of its pre-requisites. Therefore this could only be exploited
if using OpenSSL and some other DTLS peer that had its own and separate
Finished message injection flaw.

The fix is to ensure buffered messages are cleared on epoch change.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix DTLS buffered message DoS attack
Matt Caswell [Thu, 30 Jun 2016 12:17:08 +0000 (13:17 +0100)]
Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack

DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since
handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the
messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS).
That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to
reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the
future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived
early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one
or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled.

The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and
when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the
point that we need to use it.

However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS
messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented)
message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of
that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the
non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get
removed.

Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to
in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number
(starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current
message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future.
However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything
greater than that in the queue is just left there.

So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue
that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At
that point all the queues are flushed.

An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with
lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to
attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion.

I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not
seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a
client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be
an issue.

A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the
incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange,
CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0
to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future.
Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send
that could get orphaned would typically be 15.

The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by
max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of
"orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k.

Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so
renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be
orphaned per connection.

As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed.
Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have
to open many simultaneous connections.

Issue reported by Quan Luo.

CVE-2016-2179

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix enable-zlib
Matt Caswell [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 23:12:16 +0000 (00:12 +0100)]
Fix enable-zlib

The enable-zlib option was broken by the recent "const" changes.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agoVMS: Use strict refdef extern model when building library object files
Richard Levitte [Sun, 21 Aug 2016 21:36:49 +0000 (23:36 +0200)]
VMS: Use strict refdef extern model when building library object files

Most of the time, this isn't strictly needed.  However, in the default
extern model (called relaxed refdef), symbols are treated as weak
common objects unless they are initialised.  The librarian doesn't
include weak symbols in the (static) libraries, which renders them
invisible when linking a program with said those libraries, which is a
problem at times.

Using the strict refdef model is much more like standard C on all
other platforms, and thereby avoid the issues that come with the
relaxed refdef model.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd test/bio_enc_test.c.
Andy Polyakov [Sun, 21 Aug 2016 21:31:21 +0000 (23:31 +0200)]
Add test/bio_enc_test.c.

RT#4628

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>