openssl.git
3 years agoFix no-des
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 15:04:47 +0000 (16:04 +0100)]
Fix no-des

The PKCS12 command line utility is not available if no-des is used.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoRT2676: Reject RSA eponent if even or 1
Rich Salz [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 15:25:12 +0000 (11:25 -0400)]
RT2676: Reject RSA eponent if even or 1

Also, re-organize RSA check to use goto err.
Add a test case.
Try all checks, not just stopping at first (via Richard Levitte)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoConfigure: Properly cache the configured compiler command
Richard Levitte [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 13:39:49 +0000 (15:39 +0200)]
Configure: Properly cache the configured compiler command

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix a memory leak in EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters()
Kazuki Yamaguchi [Sat, 6 Aug 2016 13:24:44 +0000 (22:24 +0900)]
Fix a memory leak in EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters()

The variable 'buffer', allocated by EC_POINT_point2buf(), isn't
free'd on the success path.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoExpose alloc functions for EC{PK,}PARAMETERS
Kazuki Yamaguchi [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 04:55:34 +0000 (13:55 +0900)]
Expose alloc functions for EC{PK,}PARAMETERS

Declare EC{PK,}PARAMETERS_{new,free} functions in public headers. The
free functions are necessary because EC_GROUP_get_ec{pk,}parameters()
was made public by commit 60b350a3ef96 ("RT3676: Expose ECgroup i2d
functions").

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix loopargs_t object duplication into ASYNC context
FdaSilvaYY [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 22:51:20 +0000 (00:51 +0200)]
Fix loopargs_t object duplication into ASYNC context

Code was relying on an implicit data-sharing through duplication of
loopargs_t pointer-members made by ASYNC_start_job().

Now share structure address instead of structure content.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAvoid more compiler warnings for use of uninitialised variables
Richard Levitte [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 13:25:34 +0000 (15:25 +0200)]
Avoid more compiler warnings for use of uninitialised variables

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
3 years agoMake 'openssl req -x509' more equivalent to 'openssl req -new'
Richard Levitte [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 12:53:53 +0000 (14:53 +0200)]
Make 'openssl req -x509' more equivalent to 'openssl req -new'

The following would fail, or rather, freeze:

    openssl genrsa -out rsa2048.pem 2048
    openssl req -x509 -key rsa2048.pem -keyform PEM -out cert.pem

In that case, the second command wants to read a certificate request
from stdin, because -x509 wasn't fully flagged as being for creating
something new.  This changes makes it fully flagged.

RT#4655

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
3 years agobn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: implement slightly alternative page-walking.
Andy Polyakov [Wed, 16 Mar 2016 22:33:53 +0000 (23:33 +0100)]
bn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: implement slightly alternative page-walking.

Original strategy for page-walking was adjust stack pointer and then
touch pages in order. This kind of asks for double-fault, because
if touch fails, then signal will be delivered to frame above adjusted
stack pointer. But touching pages prior adjusting stack pointer would
upset valgrind. As compromise let's adjust stack pointer in pages,
touching top of the stack. This still asks for double-fault, but at
least prevents corruption of neighbour stack if allocation is to
overstep the guard page.

Also omit predict-non-taken hints as they reportedly trigger illegal
instructions in some VM setups.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoChoose a ciphersuite for testing that won't be affected by "no-*" options
Matt Caswell [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 09:42:08 +0000 (10:42 +0100)]
Choose a ciphersuite for testing that won't be affected by "no-*" options

The previous ciphersuite broke in no-ec builds.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix overflow check in BN_bn2dec()
Kazuki Yamaguchi [Sun, 21 Aug 2016 17:36:36 +0000 (02:36 +0900)]
Fix overflow check in BN_bn2dec()

Fix an off by one error in the overflow check added by 07bed46f332fc
("Check for errors in BN_bn2dec()").

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agossltestlib: Tell compiler we don't care about the value when we don't
Richard Levitte [Mon, 22 Aug 2016 12:02:31 +0000 (14:02 +0200)]
ssltestlib: Tell compiler we don't care about the value when we don't

In mempacket_test_read(), we've already fetched the top value of the
stack, so when we shift the stack, we don't care for the value.  The
compiler needs to be told, or it will complain harshly when we tell it
to be picky.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agocrypto/pkcs12: facilitate accessing data with non-interoperable password.
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 26 Jul 2016 14:42:41 +0000 (16:42 +0200)]
crypto/pkcs12: facilitate accessing data with non-interoperable password.

Originally PKCS#12 subroutines treated password strings as ASCII.
It worked as long as they were pure ASCII, but if there were some
none-ASCII characters result was non-interoperable. But fixing it
poses problem accessing data protected with broken password. In
order to make asscess to old data possible add retry with old-style
password.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agocrypto/pkcs12: default to UTF-8.
Andy Polyakov [Mon, 25 Jul 2016 23:48:01 +0000 (01:48 +0200)]
crypto/pkcs12: default to UTF-8.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd PKCS#12 UTF-8 interoperability test.
Andy Polyakov [Mon, 25 Jul 2016 23:46:03 +0000 (01:46 +0200)]
Add PKCS#12 UTF-8 interoperability test.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agocrypto/pkcs12: add UTF8 support.
Andy Polyakov [Tue, 24 Nov 2015 22:34:51 +0000 (23:34 +0100)]
crypto/pkcs12: add UTF8 support.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoPrevent DTLS Finished message injection
Matt Caswell [Thu, 30 Jun 2016 14:06:27 +0000 (15:06 +0100)]
Prevent DTLS Finished message injection

Follow on from CVE-2016-2179

The investigation and analysis of CVE-2016-2179 highlighted a related flaw.

This commit fixes a security "near miss" in the buffered message handling
code. Ultimately this is not currently believed to be exploitable due to
the reasons outlined below, and therefore there is no CVE for this on its
own.

The issue this commit fixes is a MITM attack where the attacker can inject
a Finished message into the handshake. In the description below it is
assumed that the attacker injects the Finished message for the server to
receive it. The attack could work equally well the other way around (i.e
where the client receives the injected Finished message).

The MITM requires the following capabilities:
- The ability to manipulate the MTU that the client selects such that it
is small enough for the client to fragment Finished messages.
- The ability to selectively drop and modify records sent from the client
- The ability to inject its own records and send them to the server

The MITM forces the client to select a small MTU such that the client
will fragment the Finished message. Ideally for the attacker the first
fragment will contain all but the last byte of the Finished message,
with the second fragment containing the final byte.

During the handshake and prior to the client sending the CCS the MITM
injects a plaintext Finished message fragment to the server containing
all but the final byte of the Finished message. The message sequence
number should be the one expected to be used for the real Finished message.

OpenSSL will recognise that the received fragment is for the future and
will buffer it for later use.

After the client sends the CCS it then sends its own Finished message in
two fragments. The MITM causes the first of these fragments to be
dropped. The OpenSSL server will then receive the second of the fragments
and reassemble the complete Finished message consisting of the MITM
fragment and the final byte from the real client.

The advantage to the attacker in injecting a Finished message is that
this provides the capability to modify other handshake messages (e.g.
the ClientHello) undetected. A difficulty for the attacker is knowing in
advance what impact any of those changes might have on the final byte of
the handshake hash that is going to be sent in the "real" Finished
message. In the worst case for the attacker this means that only 1 in
256 of such injection attempts will succeed.

It may be possible in some situations for the attacker to improve this such
that all attempts succeed. For example if the handshake includes client
authentication then the final message flight sent by the client will
include a Certificate. Certificates are ASN.1 objects where the signed
portion is DER encoded. The non-signed portion could be BER encoded and so
the attacker could re-encode the certificate such that the hash for the
whole handshake comes to a different value. The certificate re-encoding
would not be detectable because only the non-signed portion is changed. As
this is the final flight of messages sent from the client the attacker
knows what the complete hanshake hash value will be that the client will
send - and therefore knows what the final byte will be. Through a process
of trial and error the attacker can re-encode the certificate until the
modified handhshake also has a hash with the same final byte. This means
that when the Finished message is verified by the server it will be
correct in all cases.

In practice the MITM would need to be able to perform the same attack
against both the client and the server. If the attack is only performed
against the server (say) then the server will not detect the modified
handshake, but the client will and will abort the connection.
Fortunately, although OpenSSL is vulnerable to Finished message
injection, it is not vulnerable if *both* client and server are OpenSSL.
The reason is that OpenSSL has a hard "floor" for a minimum MTU size
that it will never go below. This minimum means that a Finished message
will never be sent in a fragmented form and therefore the MITM does not
have one of its pre-requisites. Therefore this could only be exploited
if using OpenSSL and some other DTLS peer that had its own and separate
Finished message injection flaw.

The fix is to ensure buffered messages are cleared on epoch change.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix DTLS buffered message DoS attack
Matt Caswell [Thu, 30 Jun 2016 12:17:08 +0000 (13:17 +0100)]
Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack

DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since
handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the
messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS).
That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to
reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the
future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived
early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one
or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled.

The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and
when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the
point that we need to use it.

However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS
messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented)
message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of
that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the
non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get
removed.

Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to
in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number
(starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current
message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future.
However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything
greater than that in the queue is just left there.

So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue
that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At
that point all the queues are flushed.

An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with
lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to
attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion.

I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not
seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a
client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be
an issue.

A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the
incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange,
CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0
to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future.
Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send
that could get orphaned would typically be 15.

The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by
max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of
"orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k.

Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so
renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be
orphaned per connection.

As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed.
Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have
to open many simultaneous connections.

Issue reported by Quan Luo.

CVE-2016-2179

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix enable-zlib
Matt Caswell [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 23:12:16 +0000 (00:12 +0100)]
Fix enable-zlib

The enable-zlib option was broken by the recent "const" changes.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agoVMS: Use strict refdef extern model when building library object files
Richard Levitte [Sun, 21 Aug 2016 21:36:49 +0000 (23:36 +0200)]
VMS: Use strict refdef extern model when building library object files

Most of the time, this isn't strictly needed.  However, in the default
extern model (called relaxed refdef), symbols are treated as weak
common objects unless they are initialised.  The librarian doesn't
include weak symbols in the (static) libraries, which renders them
invisible when linking a program with said those libraries, which is a
problem at times.

Using the strict refdef model is much more like standard C on all
other platforms, and thereby avoid the issues that come with the
relaxed refdef model.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd test/bio_enc_test.c.
Andy Polyakov [Sun, 21 Aug 2016 21:31:21 +0000 (23:31 +0200)]
Add test/bio_enc_test.c.

RT#4628

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoevp/bio_enc.c: refine non-overlapping logic.
Andy Polyakov [Sun, 21 Aug 2016 21:30:37 +0000 (23:30 +0200)]
evp/bio_enc.c: refine non-overlapping logic.

RT#4628

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoecp_nistz256.c: get is_one on 32-bit platforms right.
Andy Polyakov [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 11:33:13 +0000 (13:33 +0200)]
ecp_nistz256.c: get is_one on 32-bit platforms right.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoMove BIO index lock creation
Rich Salz [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 23:06:43 +0000 (19:06 -0400)]
Move BIO index lock creation

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoupdate ordinals
Dr. Stephen Henson [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 12:07:57 +0000 (13:07 +0100)]
update ordinals

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd X509_getm_notBefore, X509_getm_notAfter
Dr. Stephen Henson [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 12:02:09 +0000 (13:02 +0100)]
Add X509_getm_notBefore, X509_getm_notAfter

Add mutable versions of X509_get0_notBefore and X509_get0_notAfter.

Rename X509_SIG_get0_mutable to X509_SIG_getm.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
3 years agoDuplicate includes
FdaSilvaYY [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 16:47:55 +0000 (18:47 +0200)]
Duplicate includes

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1475)

3 years agoFix off by 1 in ASN1_STRING_set()
Kurt Roeckx [Sat, 6 Aug 2016 17:16:00 +0000 (19:16 +0200)]
Fix off by 1 in ASN1_STRING_set()

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
MR: #3176

3 years agoAdd BIO_get_new_index()
Rich Salz [Sat, 20 Aug 2016 01:04:41 +0000 (21:04 -0400)]
Add BIO_get_new_index()

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agofix warning about trailing comma
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 18:32:19 +0000 (19:32 +0100)]
fix warning about trailing comma

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agomake update
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 15:51:07 +0000 (16:51 +0100)]
make update

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agorename ordinals
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 14:30:13 +0000 (15:30 +0100)]
rename ordinals

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify certificate and CRL time routines.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 11:39:57 +0000 (12:39 +0100)]
Constify certificate and CRL time routines.

Update certificate and CRL time routines to match new standard.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd -dane_ee_no_namechecks s_client(1) option
Viktor Dukhovni [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 15:59:47 +0000 (11:59 -0400)]
Add -dane_ee_no_namechecks s_client(1) option

The DANE API supports a DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS option, but
there was no way to exercise/enable it via s_client.  This commit
addresses that gap.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoSet certificate times in one function.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 15:21:21 +0000 (16:21 +0100)]
Set certificate times in one function.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoAvoid duplicated code.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 15:12:31 +0000 (16:12 +0100)]
Avoid duplicated code.

The certificate and CRL time setting functions used similar code,
combine into a single utility function.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoRT3940: For now, just document the issue.
Rich Salz [Sat, 13 Aug 2016 14:47:50 +0000 (10:47 -0400)]
RT3940: For now, just document the issue.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoMEMPACKET is typedef'd in ssltestlib.h, don't do so again in ssltestlib.c
Richard Levitte [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 15:14:26 +0000 (17:14 +0200)]
MEMPACKET is typedef'd in ssltestlib.h, don't do so again in ssltestlib.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoAllow to run all speed test when async_jobs active
FdaSilvaYY [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 06:44:43 +0000 (08:44 +0200)]
Allow to run all speed test when async_jobs active

... without any interruption.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1468)

3 years agomake update
Dr. Stephen Henson [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 11:59:55 +0000 (12:59 +0100)]
make update

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConvert PKCS12* functions to use const getters
Matt Caswell [Sat, 13 Aug 2016 11:07:42 +0000 (12:07 +0100)]
Convert PKCS12* functions to use const getters

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agoUpdate function error code
Matt Caswell [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 12:50:01 +0000 (13:50 +0100)]
Update function error code

A function error code needed updating due to merge issues.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix some clang warnings
Matt Caswell [Tue, 19 Jul 2016 10:34:21 +0000 (11:34 +0100)]
Fix some clang warnings

Clang was complaining about some unused functions. Moving the stack
declaration to the header seems to sort it. Also the certstatus variable
in dtlstest needed to be declared static.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix DTLS replay protection
Matt Caswell [Fri, 1 Jul 2016 14:20:33 +0000 (15:20 +0100)]
Fix DTLS replay protection

The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks
in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6.

A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with
the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we
have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand
edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked
against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then
we also reject the new record.

If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off
the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record.
If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark
the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge
of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge
is in line with the newly received sequence number.

Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being
sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we
have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or
validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an
unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately,
even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if
currently in a handshake/renegotiation.

This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next
epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very
large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is
moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are
dropped causing a denial of service.

A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this
case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a
message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code
will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number
(as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about
so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be
handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent
legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a
security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the
initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g.
injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and
the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying
to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet.
Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That
issue isn't addressed here though.

This addressed an OCAP Audit issue.

CVE-2016-2181

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd DTLS replay protection test
Matt Caswell [Tue, 5 Jul 2016 08:50:55 +0000 (09:50 +0100)]
Add DTLS replay protection test

Injects a record from epoch 1 during epoch 0 handshake, with a record
sequence number in the future, to test that the record replay protection
feature works as expected. This is described more fully in the next commit.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix DTLS unprocessed records bug
Matt Caswell [Tue, 5 Jul 2016 08:51:08 +0000 (09:51 +0100)]
Fix DTLS unprocessed records bug

During a DTLS handshake we may get records destined for the next epoch
arrive before we have processed the CCS. In that case we can't decrypt or
verify the record yet, so we buffer it for later use. When we do receive
the CCS we work through the queue of unprocessed records and process them.

Unfortunately the act of processing wipes out any existing packet data
that we were still working through. This includes any records from the new
epoch that were in the same packet as the CCS. We should only process the
buffered records if we've not got any data left.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd a DTLS unprocesed records test
Matt Caswell [Mon, 4 Jul 2016 13:59:06 +0000 (14:59 +0100)]
Add a DTLS unprocesed records test

Add a test to inject a record from the next epoch during the handshake and
make sure it doesn't get processed immediately.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoSplit create_ssl_connection()
Matt Caswell [Mon, 4 Jul 2016 13:55:50 +0000 (14:55 +0100)]
Split create_ssl_connection()

Split the create_ssl_connection() helper function into two steps: one to
create the SSL objects, and one to actually create the connection. This
provides the ability to make changes to the SSL object before the
connection is actually made.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd a DTLS packet mem BIO
Matt Caswell [Mon, 4 Jul 2016 13:53:28 +0000 (14:53 +0100)]
Add a DTLS packet mem BIO

This adds a BIO similar to a normal mem BIO but with datagram awareness.
It also has the capability to inject additional packets at arbitrary
locations into the BIO, for testing purposes.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd a (D)TLS dumper BIO
Matt Caswell [Mon, 4 Jul 2016 13:51:56 +0000 (14:51 +0100)]
Add a (D)TLS dumper BIO

Dump out the records passed over the BIO. Only works for DTLS at the
moment but could easily be extended to TLS.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd more details on how to add a new SSL test
Emilia Kasper [Fri, 19 Aug 2016 12:19:32 +0000 (14:19 +0200)]
Add more details on how to add a new SSL test

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agomake update
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 14:26:47 +0000 (15:26 +0100)]
make update

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd X509_get0_serialNumber() and constify OCSP_cert_to_id()
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 14:16:31 +0000 (15:16 +0100)]
Add X509_get0_serialNumber() and constify OCSP_cert_to_id()

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoconstify X509_REQ_get0_signature()
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 14:13:00 +0000 (15:13 +0100)]
constify X509_REQ_get0_signature()

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoconstify i2o_ECPublicKey
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 12:59:32 +0000 (13:59 +0100)]
constify i2o_ECPublicKey

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoSort %disabled in Configure
Benjamin Kaduk [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 20:47:04 +0000 (15:47 -0500)]
Sort %disabled in Configure

@disablables is sorted, but these were just added at the end of
%disabled in commits c2e27310 and 22e3dcb7.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix missing dane_tlsa_rrdata option error message
Viktor Dukhovni [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 20:57:55 +0000 (16:57 -0400)]
Fix missing dane_tlsa_rrdata option error message

The error message said "dane_tlsa_rrset" instead of "dane_tlsa_rrdata".

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify i2a*
Dr. Stephen Henson [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 15:48:33 +0000 (16:48 +0100)]
Constify i2a*

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoSimplify indentation of DECLARE_ and IMPLEMENT_ lines
Richard Levitte [Thu, 18 Aug 2016 11:24:27 +0000 (13:24 +0200)]
Simplify indentation of DECLARE_ and IMPLEMENT_ lines

There's no reason we should enumerate every type of IMPLEMENT_ and
DECLARE_ line (and forget the ones we add a little now and then).
They all start with the same first word, let's just take'm all.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoIndent ssl/
Emilia Kasper [Fri, 5 Aug 2016 17:03:17 +0000 (19:03 +0200)]
Indent ssl/

Run util/openssl-format-source on ssl/

Some comments and hand-formatted tables were fixed up
manually by disabling auto-formatting.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoConvert X509_REVOKED* functions to use const getters
Matt Caswell [Mon, 15 Aug 2016 11:41:25 +0000 (12:41 +0100)]
Convert X509_REVOKED* functions to use const getters

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agoTest that the peers send at most one fatal alert
Emilia Kasper [Fri, 12 Aug 2016 12:29:24 +0000 (14:29 +0200)]
Test that the peers send at most one fatal alert

Duplicate alerts have happened, see
70c22888c1648fe8652e77107f3c74bf2212de36

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoPort multi-buffer tests
Emilia Kasper [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 13:11:08 +0000 (15:11 +0200)]
Port multi-buffer tests

Make maximum fragment length configurable and add various fragmentation
tests, in addition to the existing multi-buffer tests.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoFix some doc nits.
Rich Salz [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 20:38:08 +0000 (16:38 -0400)]
Fix some doc nits.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoDon't try to init dasync internally
Richard Levitte [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 13:06:23 +0000 (15:06 +0200)]
Don't try to init dasync internally

Since dasync isn't installed, and is only ever used as a dynamic
engine, there's no reason to consider it for initialization when
building static engines.

Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
3 years agomake update
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 16:29:18 +0000 (17:29 +0100)]
make update

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify X509_SIG.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 16:27:05 +0000 (17:27 +0100)]
Constify X509_SIG.

Constify X509_SIG_get0() and order arguments to mactch new standard.

Add X509_SIG_get0_mutable() to support modification or initialisation
of an X509_SIG structure.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoSmall nits and cleanups
FdaSilvaYY [Sun, 7 Aug 2016 10:04:26 +0000 (12:04 +0200)]
Small nits and cleanups

using util/openssl-format-source on s_derver, s_client, ca.c, speed.c only...

Fix/merge some #ifndef

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify char* input parameters in apps code
FdaSilvaYY [Thu, 4 Aug 2016 21:52:22 +0000 (23:52 +0200)]
Constify char* input parameters in apps code

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoSimplify and add help about OPT_PVK* options
FdaSilvaYY [Thu, 4 Aug 2016 22:19:36 +0000 (00:19 +0200)]
Simplify and add help about OPT_PVK* options

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoImprove error message
FdaSilvaYY [Wed, 3 Aug 2016 22:23:39 +0000 (00:23 +0200)]
Improve error message

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoRelocalise some globals variables
FdaSilvaYY [Wed, 3 Aug 2016 20:49:25 +0000 (22:49 +0200)]
Relocalise some globals variables

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify ssl_cert_type()
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 14:49:36 +0000 (15:49 +0100)]
Constify ssl_cert_type()

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify X509_certificate_type()
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 13:58:56 +0000 (14:58 +0100)]
Constify X509_certificate_type()

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify X509_get0_signature()
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 13:10:52 +0000 (14:10 +0100)]
Constify X509_get0_signature()

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConvert X509* functions to use const getters
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 12:50:48 +0000 (13:50 +0100)]
Convert X509* functions to use const getters

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConvert X509_CRL* functions to use const getters
Matt Caswell [Sat, 13 Aug 2016 13:44:07 +0000 (14:44 +0100)]
Convert X509_CRL* functions to use const getters

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agoMake X509_NAME_get0_der() conform to OpenSSL style
Matt Caswell [Mon, 15 Aug 2016 09:07:30 +0000 (10:07 +0100)]
Make X509_NAME_get0_der() conform to OpenSSL style

Put the main object first in the params list.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agoCorrupt signature in place.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 11:34:22 +0000 (12:34 +0100)]
Corrupt signature in place.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConvert OCSP* functions to use const getters
Matt Caswell [Fri, 12 Aug 2016 20:37:55 +0000 (21:37 +0100)]
Convert OCSP* functions to use const getters

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify private key decode.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 23:21:55 +0000 (00:21 +0100)]
Constify private key decode.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoconstify X509_ALGOR_get0()
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 19:18:04 +0000 (20:18 +0100)]
constify X509_ALGOR_get0()

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoConstify ASN1_item_unpack().
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 19:14:02 +0000 (20:14 +0100)]
Constify ASN1_item_unpack().

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd missing session id and tlsext_status accessors
Remi Gacogne [Sat, 6 Aug 2016 10:54:29 +0000 (12:54 +0200)]
Add missing session id and tlsext_status accessors

 * SSL_SESSION_set1_id()
 * SSL_SESSION_get0_id_context()
 * SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_cb()
 * SSL_CTX_get_tlsext_status_arg()

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agodasync is an internal testing engine, so don't install it
Richard Levitte [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 08:45:03 +0000 (10:45 +0200)]
dasync is an internal testing engine, so don't install it

Unfortunately, it means that the VMS IVP gets a bit crippled.  This
will be fixed later on.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoVMS: no ENDIF on one line IF statements, in config.com
Richard Levitte [Wed, 17 Aug 2016 08:39:11 +0000 (10:39 +0200)]
VMS: no ENDIF on one line IF statements, in config.com

Correct small error from last config.com change

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
3 years agoConvert SSL_SESSION* functions to use const getters
Matt Caswell [Sat, 13 Aug 2016 13:29:41 +0000 (14:29 +0100)]
Convert SSL_SESSION* functions to use const getters

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agoConvert PKCS8* functions to use const getters
Matt Caswell [Sat, 13 Aug 2016 12:40:05 +0000 (13:40 +0100)]
Convert PKCS8* functions to use const getters

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agoConvert TS_STATUS_INFO* functions to use const getters
Matt Caswell [Sat, 13 Aug 2016 13:32:17 +0000 (14:32 +0100)]
Convert TS_STATUS_INFO* functions to use const getters

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
3 years agotwo typo fixes
FdaSilvaYY [Thu, 11 Aug 2016 22:29:27 +0000 (00:29 +0200)]
two typo fixes

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1461)

3 years agoFix compilation when using MASM on x86
Gergely Nagy [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 12:46:13 +0000 (14:46 +0200)]
Fix compilation when using MASM on x86

The generated asm code from x86cpuid.pl contains CMOVE instructions
which are only available on i686 and later CPUs.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1459)

3 years agoProvide compat macros for SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto() and SSL_set_ecdh_auto()
Matt Caswell [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 12:28:14 +0000 (13:28 +0100)]
Provide compat macros for SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto() and SSL_set_ecdh_auto()

These functions are no longer relevant to 1.1.0 (we always have auto ecdh
on) - but no reason to break old code that tries to call it. The macros will
only return a dummy "success" result if the app was trying to enable ecdh.
Disabling can't be done in quite this way any more.

Fixes Github Issue #1437

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
3 years agoEnsure we unpad in constant time for read pipelining
Matt Caswell [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 13:07:29 +0000 (14:07 +0100)]
Ensure we unpad in constant time for read pipelining

The read pipelining code broke constant time unpadding. See GitHub
issue #1438

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoCorrupt signature earlier.
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 14:19:55 +0000 (15:19 +0100)]
Corrupt signature earlier.

If -badsig is selected corrupt the signature before printing out
any details so the output reflects the modified signature.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agomake update
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 14:08:06 +0000 (15:08 +0100)]
make update

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoAdd ASN1_STRING_get0_data(), deprecate ASN1_STRING_data().
Dr. Stephen Henson [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 13:06:48 +0000 (14:06 +0100)]
Add ASN1_STRING_get0_data(), deprecate ASN1_STRING_data().

Deprecate the function ASN1_STRING_data() and replace with a new function
ASN1_STRING_get0_data() which returns a constant pointer. Update library
to use new function.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoRemove duplicate ordinals
Richard Levitte [Tue, 16 Aug 2016 12:08:54 +0000 (14:08 +0200)]
Remove duplicate ordinals

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agoARMv8 assembly pack: add Samsung Mongoose results.
Andy Polyakov [Sun, 14 Aug 2016 20:37:58 +0000 (22:37 +0200)]
ARMv8 assembly pack: add Samsung Mongoose results.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
3 years agoConfigure: recognize -static as link option and disable incompatible options.
Andy Polyakov [Sun, 14 Aug 2016 15:24:10 +0000 (17:24 +0200)]
Configure: recognize -static as link option and disable incompatible options.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
3 years agotest/ssl_test.tmpl: make it work with elderly perl.
Andy Polyakov [Fri, 12 Aug 2016 14:25:33 +0000 (16:25 +0200)]
test/ssl_test.tmpl: make it work with elderly perl.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>