From: Shane Lontis Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2020 11:34:29 +0000 (+1000) Subject: Add ECDSA to providers X-Git-Tag: openssl-3.0.0-alpha1~257 X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=edd3b7a309f8767fc7d8a5c4f7d350b53e144c1b Add ECDSA to providers Added ECDSA support for OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10968) --- diff --git a/crypto/ec/build.info b/crypto/ec/build.info index 0e01d4af38..f70543dd00 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/build.info +++ b/crypto/ec/build.info @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ $COMMON=ec_lib.c ecp_smpl.c ecp_mont.c ecp_nist.c ec_cvt.c ec_mult.c \ ecdsa_ossl.c ecdsa_sign.c ecdsa_vrf.c curve25519.c \ curve448/arch_32/f_impl.c curve448/f_generic.c curve448/scalar.c \ curve448/curve448_tables.c curve448/eddsa.c curve448/curve448.c \ - $ECASM + $ECASM ecdsa_aid.c SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON ec_ameth.c ec_pmeth.c ecx_meth.c ecx_key.c \ ec_err.c ecdh_kdf.c eck_prn.c ec_evp_lib.c SOURCE[../../providers/libfips.a]=$COMMON diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_aid.c b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_aid.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..01bca40f8c --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_aid.c @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include + +#include +#include "crypto/ec.h" + +#define ASN1_SEQUENCE 0x30 +#define ASN1_OID 0x06 +#define OID_FIRST(a, b) a * 40 + b +#define DER_840() 0x86, 0x48 /* DER encoding of number 840 is 2 bytes */ +#define DER_10045() 0xCE, 0x3D /* DER encoding of number 10045 is 2 bytes */ +#define SHA1_SZ 7 +#define SHA2_SZ 8 +#define SHA3_SZ 9 + +/* + * -- RFC 3279 + * ansi-X9-62 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) 10045 } + * id-ecSigType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-X9-62 signatures(4) } + * + * ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ecSigType 1 } + */ +#define ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA1(name) \ +static const unsigned char algorithmidentifier_##name##_der[] = { \ + ASN1_SEQUENCE, 2 + SHA1_SZ, \ + ASN1_OID, SHA1_SZ, OID_FIRST(1, 2), DER_840(), DER_10045(), 4, 1 \ +} + +/* + * -- RFC 5758 + * + * ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) + * us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 } + * + * ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) + * us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 } + * + * ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) + * us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } + * + * ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) + * us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } + */ +#define ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA2(name, n) \ +static const unsigned char algorithmidentifier_##name##_der[] = { \ + ASN1_SEQUENCE, 2 + SHA2_SZ, \ + ASN1_OID, SHA2_SZ, OID_FIRST(1, 2), DER_840(), DER_10045(), 4, 3, n \ +} + +/* + * https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/computer-security-objects-register/algorithm-registration + * + * sigAlgs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 } + * + * id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224 ::= { sigAlgs 9 } + * id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256 ::= { sigAlgs 10 } + * id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384 ::= { sigAlgs 11 } + * id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512 ::= { sigAlgs 12 } + */ +#define ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA3(name, n) \ +static const unsigned char algorithmidentifier_##name##_der[] = { \ + ASN1_SEQUENCE, 2 + SHA3_SZ, \ + ASN1_OID, SHA3_SZ, OID_FIRST(2, 16), DER_840(), 1, 101, 3, 4, 3, n \ +} + +ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA1(sha1); +ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA2(sha224, 1); +ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA2(sha256, 2); +ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA2(sha384, 3); +ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA2(sha512, 4); +ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA3(sha3_224, 9); +ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA3(sha3_256, 10); +ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA3(sha3_384, 11); +ENCODE_ALGORITHMIDENTIFIER_SHA3(sha3_512, 12); +/* TODO - Add SHAKE OIDS when they are standardized */ + +#define MD_CASE(name) \ + case NID_##name: \ + *len = sizeof(algorithmidentifier_##name##_der); \ + return algorithmidentifier_##name##_der + +const unsigned char *ecdsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(int md_nid, size_t *len) +{ + switch (md_nid) { + MD_CASE(sha1); + MD_CASE(sha224); + MD_CASE(sha256); + MD_CASE(sha384); + MD_CASE(sha512); + MD_CASE(sha3_224); + MD_CASE(sha3_256); + MD_CASE(sha3_384); + MD_CASE(sha3_512); + default: + return NULL; + } +} diff --git a/doc/man7/provider-signature.pod b/doc/man7/provider-signature.pod index 771c55f6f5..edd4013fa6 100644 --- a/doc/man7/provider-signature.pod +++ b/doc/man7/provider-signature.pod @@ -332,6 +332,23 @@ Gets or sets the output size of the digest algorithm used for the input to the signature functions. The length of the "digest-size" parameter should not exceed that of a B. += item "algorithm-id" (B) + +Gets the DER encoded AlgorithmIdentifier that corresponds to the combination of +signature algorithm and digest algorithm for the signature operation. + +=item "kat" (B) + +Sets a flag to modify the sign operation to return an error if the initial +calculated signature is invalid. +In the normal mode of operation - new random values are chosen until the +signature operation succeeds. +By default it retries until a signature is calculated. +Setting the value to 0 causes the sign operation to retry, +otherwise the sign operation is only tried once and returns whether or not it +was successful. +Known answer tests can be performed if the random generator is overriden to +supply known values that either pass or fail. =back diff --git a/include/crypto/ec.h b/include/crypto/ec.h index 91540fd856..00b1b25aff 100644 --- a/include/crypto/ec.h +++ b/include/crypto/ec.h @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - # include /*- @@ -56,5 +55,6 @@ int ec_key_pairwise_check(const EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx); OPENSSL_CTX *ec_key_get_libctx(const EC_KEY *eckey); const char *ec_curve_nid2name(int nid); int ec_curve_name2nid(const char *name); +const unsigned char *ecdsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(int md_nid, size_t *len); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #endif diff --git a/include/openssl/core_names.h b/include/openssl/core_names.h index 1f67475a9a..2d48f00da2 100644 --- a/include/openssl/core_names.h +++ b/include/openssl/core_names.h @@ -257,6 +257,8 @@ extern "C" { #define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_DIGEST #define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES \ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_MGF1_PROPERTIES +#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE +#define OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT "kat" /* Asym cipher parameters */ #define OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_PAD_MODE OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PAD_MODE diff --git a/providers/defltprov.c b/providers/defltprov.c index 7bb23e300e..f89363341a 100644 --- a/providers/defltprov.c +++ b/providers/defltprov.c @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM deflt_keyexch[] = { { "DH:dhKeyAgreement", "provider=default", dh_keyexch_functions }, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - { "ECDH:id-ecPublicKey", "provider=default", ecdh_keyexch_functions }, + { "ECDH", "provider=default", ecdh_keyexch_functions }, { "X25519", "provider=default", x25519_keyexch_functions }, { "X448", "provider=default", x448_keyexch_functions }, #endif @@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM deflt_signature[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC { "ED25519:Ed25519", "provider=default", ed25519_signature_functions }, { "ED448:Ed448", "provider=default", ed448_signature_functions }, + { "ECDSA", "provider=default", ecdsa_signature_functions }, #endif { NULL, NULL, NULL } }; diff --git a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c index 61573f0337..b5bf5aa1fc 100644 --- a/providers/fips/fipsprov.c +++ b/providers/fips/fipsprov.c @@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_keyexch[] = { { "DH:dhKeyAgreement", "provider=fips,fips=yes", dh_keyexch_functions }, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - { "ECDH:id-ecPublicKey", "provider=fips,fips=yes", ecdh_keyexch_functions }, + { "ECDH", "provider=fips,fips=yes", ecdh_keyexch_functions }, #endif { NULL, NULL, NULL } }; @@ -807,6 +807,9 @@ static const OSSL_ALGORITHM fips_signature[] = { { "DSA:dsaEncryption", "provider=fips,fips=yes", dsa_signature_functions }, #endif { "RSA:rsaEncryption", "provider=fips,fips=yes", rsa_signature_functions }, +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + { "ECDSA", "provider=fips,fips=yes", ecdsa_signature_functions }, +#endif { NULL, NULL, NULL } }; diff --git a/providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h b/providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h index 94265adfc2..57a3122b13 100644 --- a/providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h +++ b/providers/implementations/include/prov/implementations.h @@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ extern const OSSL_DISPATCH dsa_signature_functions[]; extern const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_signature_functions[]; extern const OSSL_DISPATCH ed25519_signature_functions[]; extern const OSSL_DISPATCH ed448_signature_functions[]; +extern const OSSL_DISPATCH ecdsa_signature_functions[]; + /* Asym Cipher */ extern const OSSL_DISPATCH rsa_asym_cipher_functions[]; diff --git a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c index 43ccb5d0a9..47872553b3 100644 --- a/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c +++ b/providers/implementations/keymgmt/ec_kmgmt.c @@ -49,10 +49,8 @@ const char *ec_query_operation_name(int operation_id) switch (operation_id) { case OSSL_OP_KEYEXCH: return "ECDH"; -#if 0 case OSSL_OP_SIGNATURE: - return deflt_signature; -#endif + return "ECDSA"; } return NULL; } @@ -135,7 +133,8 @@ int domparams_to_params(const EC_KEY *ec, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl) if ((curve_name = ec_curve_nid2name(curve_nid)) == NULL) return 0; - if (!ossl_param_bld_push_utf8_string(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_NAME, curve_name, 0)) + if (!ossl_param_bld_push_utf8_string(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_NAME, + curve_name, 0)) return 0; } diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/build.info b/providers/implementations/signature/build.info index bb229be90d..6f19ca83f6 100644 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/build.info +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/build.info @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ $DSA_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a $EC_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a +$ECDSA_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a IF[{- !$disabled{dsa} -}] SOURCE[$DSA_GOAL]=dsa.c @@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ ENDIF IF[{- !$disabled{ec} -}] SOURCE[$EC_GOAL]=eddsa.c + SOURCE[$ECDSA_GOAL]=ecdsa.c ENDIF SOURCE[../../libfips.a]=rsa.c diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c index 99183e8f86..92c3b571c2 100644 --- a/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/dsa.c @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ typedef struct { char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; - /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature agorithm */ + /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */ unsigned char aid[OSSL_MAX_ALGORITHM_ID_SIZE]; size_t aid_len; diff --git a/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa.c b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..733c0a23a5 --- /dev/null +++ b/providers/implementations/signature/ecdsa.c @@ -0,0 +1,514 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +/* + * ECDSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for + * internal use. + */ +#include "internal/deprecated.h" + +#include /* memcpy */ +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "internal/nelem.h" +#include "internal/sizes.h" +#include "prov/providercommonerr.h" +#include "prov/implementations.h" +#include "prov/provider_ctx.h" +#include "crypto/ec.h" + +static OSSL_OP_signature_newctx_fn ecdsa_newctx; +static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_init_fn ecdsa_signature_init; +static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_init_fn ecdsa_signature_init; +static OSSL_OP_signature_sign_fn ecdsa_sign; +static OSSL_OP_signature_verify_fn ecdsa_verify; +static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_init_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_init; +static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_update_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_update; +static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_sign_final_fn ecdsa_digest_sign_final; +static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_init_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_init; +static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_update_fn ecdsa_digest_signverify_update; +static OSSL_OP_signature_digest_verify_final_fn ecdsa_digest_verify_final; +static OSSL_OP_signature_freectx_fn ecdsa_freectx; +static OSSL_OP_signature_dupctx_fn ecdsa_dupctx; +static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_get_ctx_params; +static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params; +static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_set_ctx_params; +static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_params_fn ecdsa_settable_ctx_params; +static OSSL_OP_signature_get_ctx_md_params_fn ecdsa_get_ctx_md_params; +static OSSL_OP_signature_gettable_ctx_md_params_fn ecdsa_gettable_ctx_md_params; +static OSSL_OP_signature_set_ctx_md_params_fn ecdsa_set_ctx_md_params; +static OSSL_OP_signature_settable_ctx_md_params_fn ecdsa_settable_ctx_md_params; + +/* + * What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface. + * We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes DSA structures, so + * we use that here too. + */ + +typedef struct { + OPENSSL_CTX *libctx; + EC_KEY *ec; + char mdname[OSSL_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; + + /* The Algorithm Identifier of the combined signature algorithm */ + unsigned char aid[OSSL_MAX_ALGORITHM_ID_SIZE]; + size_t aid_len; + size_t mdsize; + + EVP_MD *md; + EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx; + /* + * This indicates that KAT (CAVS) test is running. Externally an app will + * override the random callback such that the generated private key and k + * are known. + * Normal operation will loop to choose a new k if the signature is not + * valid - but for this mode of operation it forces a failure instead. + */ + unsigned int kattest; + /* + * Internally used to cache the results of calling the EC group + * sign_setup() methods which are then passed to the sign operation. + * This is used by CAVS failure tests to terminate a loop if the signature + * is not valid. + * This could of also been done with a simple flag. + */ + BIGNUM *kinv; + BIGNUM *r; +} PROV_ECDSA_CTX; + +static void *ecdsa_newctx(void *provctx) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_ECDSA_CTX)); + + if (ctx == NULL) + return NULL; + + ctx->libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx); + return ctx; +} + +static int ecdsa_signature_init(void *vctx, void *ec) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (ctx == NULL || ec == NULL || !EC_KEY_up_ref(ec)) + return 0; + EC_KEY_free(ctx->ec); + ctx->ec = ec; + return 1; +} + +static int ecdsa_sign(void *vctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + size_t sigsize, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + int ret; + unsigned int sltmp; + size_t ecsize = ECDSA_size(ctx->ec); + + if (sig == NULL) { + *siglen = ecsize; + return 1; + } + + if (ctx->kattest && !ECDSA_sign_setup(ctx->ec, NULL, &ctx->kinv, &ctx->r)) + return 0; + + if (sigsize < (size_t)ecsize) + return 0; + + if (ctx->mdsize != 0 && tbslen != ctx->mdsize) + return 0; + + ret = ECDSA_sign_ex(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, ctx->kinv, ctx->r, ctx->ec); + if (ret <= 0) + return 0; + + *siglen = sltmp; + return 1; +} + +static int ecdsa_verify(void *vctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (ctx->mdsize != 0 && tbslen != ctx->mdsize) + return 0; + + return ECDSA_verify(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, ctx->ec); +} + +static int get_md_nid(const EVP_MD *md) +{ + /* + * Because the ECDSA library deals with NIDs, we need to translate. + * We do so using EVP_MD_is_a(), and therefore need a name to NID + * map. + */ + static const OSSL_ITEM name_to_nid[] = { + { NID_sha1, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA1 }, + { NID_sha224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_224 }, + { NID_sha256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_256 }, + { NID_sha384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_384 }, + { NID_sha512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA2_512 }, + { NID_sha3_224, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_224 }, + { NID_sha3_256, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_256 }, + { NID_sha3_384, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_384 }, + { NID_sha3_512, OSSL_DIGEST_NAME_SHA3_512 }, + /* TODO - Add SHAKE OIDS when they are standardized */ + + }; + size_t i; + int mdnid = NID_undef; + + if (md == NULL) + goto end; + + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(name_to_nid); i++) { + if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, name_to_nid[i].ptr)) { + mdnid = (int)name_to_nid[i].id; + break; + } + } + + if (mdnid == NID_undef) + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_DIGEST); + + end: + return mdnid; +} + +static void free_md(PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx) +{ + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx); + EVP_MD_free(ctx->md); + ctx->mdctx = NULL; + ctx->md = NULL; + ctx->mdsize = 0; +} + +static int ecdsa_digest_signverify_init(void *vctx, const char *mdname, + const char *props, void *ec) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + size_t algorithmidentifier_len = 0; + const unsigned char *algorithmidentifier; + + free_md(ctx); + + if (!ecdsa_signature_init(vctx, ec)) + return 0; + + ctx->md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx->libctx, mdname, props); + algorithmidentifier = + ecdsa_algorithmidentifier_encoding(get_md_nid(ctx->md), + &algorithmidentifier_len); + if (algorithmidentifier == NULL) + goto error; + + ctx->mdsize = EVP_MD_size(ctx->md); + ctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (ctx->mdctx == NULL) + goto error; + + memcpy(ctx->aid, algorithmidentifier, algorithmidentifier_len); + ctx->aid_len = algorithmidentifier_len; + + if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx->mdctx, ctx->md, NULL)) + goto error; + return 1; +error: + free_md(ctx); + return 0; +} + +int ecdsa_digest_signverify_update(void *vctx, const unsigned char *data, + size_t datalen) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->mdctx, data, datalen); +} + +int ecdsa_digest_sign_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + size_t sigsize) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned int dlen = 0; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + /* + * If sig is NULL then we're just finding out the sig size. Other fields + * are ignored. Defer to ecdsa_sign. + */ + if (sig != NULL) { + /* + * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided + * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow - + * but that problem is much larger than just in DSA. + */ + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) + return 0; + } + + return ecdsa_sign(vctx, sig, siglen, sigsize, digest, (size_t)dlen); +} + +int ecdsa_digest_verify_final(void *vctx, const unsigned char *sig, + size_t siglen) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned int dlen = 0; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + /* + * TODO(3.0): There is the possibility that some externally provided + * digests exceed EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE. We should probably handle that somehow - + * but that problem is much larger than just in DSA. + */ + if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, digest, &dlen)) + return 0; + + return ecdsa_verify(ctx, sig, siglen, digest, (size_t)dlen); +} + +static void ecdsa_freectx(void *vctx) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + free_md(ctx); + EC_KEY_free(ctx->ec); + BN_clear_free(ctx->kinv); + BN_clear_free(ctx->r); + OPENSSL_free(ctx); +} + +static void *ecdsa_dupctx(void *vctx) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *dstctx; + + dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx)); + if (dstctx == NULL) + return NULL; + + *dstctx = *srcctx; + dstctx->ec = NULL; + dstctx->md = NULL; + dstctx->mdctx = NULL; + + if (srcctx->ec != NULL && !EC_KEY_up_ref(srcctx->ec)) + goto err; + /* Test KATS should not need to be supported */ + if (srcctx->kinv != NULL || srcctx->r != NULL) + goto err; + dstctx->ec = srcctx->ec; + + if (srcctx->md != NULL && !EVP_MD_up_ref(srcctx->md)) + goto err; + dstctx->md = srcctx->md; + + if (srcctx->mdctx != NULL) { + dstctx->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (dstctx->mdctx == NULL + || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(dstctx->mdctx, srcctx->mdctx)) + goto err; + } + + return dstctx; + err: + ecdsa_freectx(dstctx); + return NULL; +} + +static int ecdsa_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM *params) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + OSSL_PARAM *p; + + if (ctx == NULL || params == NULL) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->aid, ctx->aid_len)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, ctx->mdsize)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string(p, ctx->md == NULL + ? ctx->mdname + : EVP_MD_name(ctx->md))) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_ALGORITHM_ID, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_END +}; + +static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params(void) +{ + return known_gettable_ctx_params; +} + +static int ecdsa_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + const OSSL_PARAM *p; + char *mdname; + + if (ctx == NULL || params == NULL) + return 0; + + if (ctx->md != NULL) { + /* + * You cannot set the digest name/size when doing a DigestSign or + * DigestVerify. + */ + return 1; + } + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_uint(p, &ctx->kattest)) + return 0; + + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &ctx->mdsize)) + return 0; + + /* + * We never actually use the mdname, but we do support getting it later. + * This can be useful for applications that want to know the MD that they + * previously set. + */ + p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST); + mdname = ctx->mdname; + if (p != NULL + && !OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string(p, &mdname, sizeof(ctx->mdname))) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = { + OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST_SIZE, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), + OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_KAT, NULL), + OSSL_PARAM_END +}; + +static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_settable_ctx_params(void) +{ + /* + * TODO(3.0): Should this function return a different set of settable ctx + * params if the ctx is being used for a DigestSign/DigestVerify? In that + * case it is not allowed to set the digest size/digest name because the + * digest is explicitly set as part of the init. + */ + return known_settable_ctx_params; +} + +static int ecdsa_get_ctx_md_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM *params) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (ctx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_MD_CTX_get_params(ctx->mdctx, params); +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_gettable_ctx_md_params(void *vctx) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (ctx->md == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_MD_gettable_ctx_params(ctx->md); +} + +static int ecdsa_set_ctx_md_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (ctx->mdctx == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_MD_CTX_set_params(ctx->mdctx, params); +} + +static const OSSL_PARAM *ecdsa_settable_ctx_md_params(void *vctx) +{ + PROV_ECDSA_CTX *ctx = (PROV_ECDSA_CTX *)vctx; + + if (ctx->md == NULL) + return 0; + + return EVP_MD_settable_ctx_params(ctx->md); +} + +const OSSL_DISPATCH ecdsa_signature_functions[] = { + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_newctx }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_signature_init }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SIGN, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_sign }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_signature_init }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_VERIFY, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_verify }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_INIT, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_signverify_init }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_UPDATE, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_signverify_update }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_SIGN_FINAL, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_sign_final }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_INIT, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_signverify_init }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_UPDATE, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_signverify_update }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DIGEST_VERIFY_FINAL, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_digest_verify_final }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_freectx }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_dupctx }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_get_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_gettable_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void (*)(void))ecdsa_set_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_settable_ctx_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_get_ctx_md_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_GETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_gettable_ctx_md_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SET_CTX_MD_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_set_ctx_md_params }, + { OSSL_FUNC_SIGNATURE_SETTABLE_CTX_MD_PARAMS, + (void (*)(void))ecdsa_settable_ctx_md_params }, + { 0, NULL } +}; diff --git a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt index 8429213d25..1c85fdfaee 100644 --- a/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt +++ b/test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt @@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ Result = KEYOP_INIT_ERROR Reason = invalid salt length -Title = EC tests +Title = ECDSA tests Verify = P-256 Availablein = default