From: Kurt Roeckx Date: Sun, 18 Feb 2018 18:26:55 +0000 (+0100) Subject: Propagate the request for prediction resistance to the get entropy call X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_1_1-pre3~48 X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=eb238134e0a0fb5ac5c8239ade1dfe77a815aba5 Propagate the request for prediction resistance to the get entropy call Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre GH: #5402 --- diff --git a/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h b/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h index d90d9c5f63..27ca703fcf 100644 --- a/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h +++ b/crypto/include/internal/rand_int.h @@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool); /* DRBG entropy callbacks. */ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout, - int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len); + int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len, + int prediction_resistance); void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(unsigned char **pout, size_t max_len); diff --git a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c index 02ad071ad4..360ea7ce3d 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c @@ -327,7 +327,8 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength, - drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen); + drbg->min_entropylen, + drbg->max_entropylen, 0); if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); @@ -411,7 +412,8 @@ int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg) * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen) + const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen, + int prediction_resistance) { unsigned char *entropy = NULL; size_t entropylen = 0; @@ -435,7 +437,9 @@ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR; if (drbg->get_entropy != NULL) entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, drbg->strength, - drbg->min_entropylen, drbg->max_entropylen); + drbg->min_entropylen, + drbg->max_entropylen, + prediction_resistance); if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen || entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY); @@ -551,7 +555,7 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, drbg->meth->reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, NULL, 0); } else if (reseeded == 0) { /* do a full reseeding if it has not been done yet above */ - RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0); + RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, NULL, 0, 0); } } @@ -627,7 +631,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, } if (reseed_required || prediction_resistance) { - if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen)) { + if (!RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, adin, adinlen, prediction_resistance)) { RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, RAND_R_RESEED_ERROR); return 0; } diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c index 76d5767ccd..1e60ec4bb6 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c @@ -171,8 +171,9 @@ size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool) * its entropy will be used up first. */ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - unsigned char **pout, - int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) + unsigned char **pout, + int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len, + int prediction_resistance) { size_t ret = 0; size_t entropy_available = 0; diff --git a/include/openssl/rand_drbg.h b/include/openssl/rand_drbg.h index 17ca979da2..790dca5e88 100644 --- a/include/openssl/rand_drbg.h +++ b/include/openssl/rand_drbg.h @@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ void RAND_DRBG_free(RAND_DRBG *drbg); * Object "use" functions. */ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg, - const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen); + const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen, + int prediction_resistance); int RAND_DRBG_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int prediction_resistance, const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen); @@ -95,7 +96,8 @@ void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *dctx, int idx); typedef size_t (*RAND_DRBG_get_entropy_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, unsigned char **pout, int entropy, size_t min_len, - size_t max_len); + size_t max_len, + int prediction_resistance); typedef void (*RAND_DRBG_cleanup_entropy_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); typedef size_t (*RAND_DRBG_get_nonce_fn)(RAND_DRBG *ctx, unsigned char **pout, diff --git a/test/drbgtest.c b/test/drbgtest.c index c64628a756..4c872f8871 100644 --- a/test/drbgtest.c +++ b/test/drbgtest.c @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ typedef struct test_ctx_st { } TEST_CTX; static size_t kat_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout, - int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) + int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len, + int prediction_resistance) { TEST_CTX *t = (TEST_CTX *)RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(drbg, app_data_index); @@ -182,7 +183,7 @@ static int single_kat(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td) /* Reseed DRBG with test entropy and additional input */ t.entropy = td->entropyreseed; t.entropylen = td->entropyreseedlen; - if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adinreseed, td->adinreseedlen) + if (!TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adinreseed, td->adinreseedlen, 0) || !TEST_true(RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg, buff, td->kat2len, 0, td->adin2, td->adin2len)) || !TEST_mem_eq(td->kat2, td->kat2len, buff, td->kat2len))) @@ -415,12 +416,12 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td) /* Test explicit reseed with too large additional input */ if (!init(drbg, td, &t) - || RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, drbg->max_adinlen + 1) > 0) + || RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, drbg->max_adinlen + 1, 0) > 0) goto err; /* Test explicit reseed with entropy source failure */ t.entropylen = 0; - if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0) + if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0) || !uninstantiate(drbg)) goto err; @@ -428,7 +429,7 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td) if (!init(drbg, td, &t)) goto err; t.entropylen = drbg->max_entropylen + 1; - if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0) + if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0) || !uninstantiate(drbg)) goto err; @@ -436,7 +437,7 @@ static int error_check(DRBG_SELFTEST_DATA *td) if (!init(drbg, td, &t)) goto err; t.entropylen = drbg->min_entropylen - 1; - if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen), 0) + if (!TEST_int_le(RAND_DRBG_reseed(drbg, td->adin, td->adinlen, 0), 0) || !uninstantiate(drbg)) goto err; @@ -504,7 +505,8 @@ static HOOK_CTX *get_hook_ctx(RAND_DRBG *drbg) /* Intercepts and counts calls to the get_entropy() callback */ static size_t get_entropy_hook(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout, - int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len) + int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len, + int prediction_resistance) { size_t ret; HOOK_CTX *ctx = get_hook_ctx(drbg); @@ -512,8 +514,8 @@ static size_t get_entropy_hook(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout, if (ctx->fail != 0) return 0; - ret = ctx->get_entropy( - drbg, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len); + ret = ctx->get_entropy(drbg, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len, + prediction_resistance); if (ret != 0) ctx->reseed_count++;