From: Dr. Stephen Henson Date: Sat, 16 May 2009 16:22:11 +0000 (+0000) Subject: PR: 1931 X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_0_0-beta3~78 X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=abda7c114791fa7fe95672ec7a66fc4733c40dbc PR: 1931 Submitted by: Robin Seggelmann Approved by: steve@openssl.org Fix fragment handling memory leak. --- diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c index 928a005e53..ebc03482f0 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_both.c +++ b/ssl/d1_both.c @@ -562,7 +562,16 @@ dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok) if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len) goto err; - if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq) + /* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */ + memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be)); + seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8); + seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq; + item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be); + + /* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is + * too far in the future or the fragment is already in the queue */ + if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq || + msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL) { unsigned char devnull [256];