From: Guido Vranken Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2016 09:43:37 +0000 (+0100) Subject: Prevent overflows in stack API X-Git-Tag: OpenSSL_1_1_1-pre1~3512 X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=9731a9ce7d0f404d21ed418f9bc983b174e130cb Prevent overflows in stack API Reviewed-by: Rich Salz Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell --- diff --git a/crypto/stack/stack.c b/crypto/stack/stack.c index acd350a220..25e2635fd7 100644 --- a/crypto/stack/stack.c +++ b/crypto/stack/stack.c @@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ OPENSSL_sk_compfunc OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func(OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_sk_compfu OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_dup(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk) { OPENSSL_STACK *ret; + if ( sk->num_alloc < 0 || sk->num < 0 ) { + return NULL; + } if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return NULL; @@ -62,6 +65,10 @@ OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy(const OPENSSL_STACK *sk, OPENSSL_STACK *ret; int i; + if ( sk->num < 0 ) { + return NULL; + } + if ((ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return NULL; @@ -113,21 +120,48 @@ OPENSSL_STACK *OPENSSL_sk_new(OPENSSL_sk_compfunc c) int OPENSSL_sk_insert(OPENSSL_STACK *st, const void *data, int loc) { - const char **s; - - if (st == NULL) + if ( st == NULL || st->num < 0 || st->num == INT_MAX || st->num_alloc < 0 ) { return 0; + } + if (st->num_alloc <= st->num + 1) { - s = OPENSSL_realloc((char *)st->data, - (unsigned int)sizeof(char *) * st->num_alloc * 2); - if (s == NULL) + + /* Overflow checks by Guido + * Cast to size_t to avoid triggering -ftrapv via overflow of st->num_alloc + */ + if ( (size_t)(st->num_alloc) * 2 < (size_t)(st->num_alloc) ) { + return 0; + } + + if ( (size_t)(st->num_alloc) * 2 > INT_MAX ) + { + return 0; + } + + /* Avond overflow due to multiplication by sizeof(char*) */ + if ( (size_t)(st->num_alloc) * 2 > (~(size_t)0) / sizeof(char*) ) { + return 0; + } + + /* Remove cast to unsigned int to avoid undersized allocations on > 32 bit. */ + st->data = OPENSSL_realloc((char *)st->data, + sizeof(char *) * st->num_alloc * 2); + if (st->data == NULL) { + /* Reset these counters to prevent subsequent operations on + * (now non-existing) heap memory + */ + st->num_alloc = 0; + st->num = 0; return (0); - st->data = s; + } st->num_alloc *= 2; } if ((loc >= (int)st->num) || (loc < 0)) st->data[st->num] = data; else { + if ( loc == INT_MAX ) { + return 0; + } memmove(&st->data[loc + 1], &st->data[loc], sizeof(st->data[0]) * (st->num - loc)); st->data[loc] = data; @@ -151,7 +185,7 @@ void *OPENSSL_sk_delete(OPENSSL_STACK *st, int loc) { const char *ret; - if (st == NULL || loc < 0 || loc >= st->num) + if (st == NULL || loc < 0 || loc >= st->num ) return NULL; ret = st->data[loc];