+/* crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c */
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2009 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ * software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ * acknowledgment:
+ * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ */
+
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/aes.h>
+#include "cms_lcl.h"
+#include "asn1_locl.h"
+
+int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+ unsigned char *pass, ssize_t passlen)
+ {
+ CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
+ if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NOT_PWRI);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pwri = ri->d.pwri;
+ pwri->pass = pass;
+ if (pass && passlen < 0)
+ passlen = strlen((char *)pass);
+ pwri->passlen = passlen;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
+ int iter, int wrap_nid, int pbe_nid,
+ unsigned char *pass, ssize_t passlen,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *kekciph)
+ {
+ CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL;
+ CMS_EnvelopedData *env;
+ CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ X509_ALGOR *encalg = NULL;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ int ivlen;
+ env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms);
+ if (!env)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (wrap_nid <= 0)
+ wrap_nid = NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK;
+
+ if (pbe_nid <= 0)
+ pbe_nid = NID_id_pbkdf2;
+
+ /* Get from enveloped data */
+ if (kekciph == NULL)
+ kekciph = env->encryptedContentInfo->cipher;
+
+ if (kekciph == NULL)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, CMS_R_NO_CIPHER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (wrap_nid != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
+ CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */
+ encalg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+
+ if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+
+ if (ivlen > 0)
+ {
+ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, ivlen) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv) <= 0)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
+ ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ encalg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+ if (!encalg->parameter)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(&ctx, encalg->parameter) <= 0)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD,
+ CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+
+ encalg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(&ctx));
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ /* Initialize recipient info */
+ ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo);
+ if (!ri)
+ goto merr;
+
+ ri->d.pwri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo);
+ if (!ri->d.pwri)
+ goto merr;
+ ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS;
+
+ pwri = ri->d.pwri;
+ /* Since this is overwritten, free up empty structure already there */
+ X509_ALGOR_free(pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm);
+ pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ if (!pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm)
+ goto merr;
+ pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid);
+ pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new();
+ if (!pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter)
+ goto merr;
+
+ if(!ASN1_item_pack(encalg, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
+ &pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->value.sequence))
+ goto merr;
+ pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->parameter->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+
+ X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
+ encalg = NULL;
+
+ /* Setup PBE algorithm */
+
+ pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm = PKCS5_pbkdf2_set(iter, NULL, 0, -1, -1);
+
+ if (!pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm)
+ goto err;
+
+ CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_password(ri, pass, passlen);
+ pwri->version = 0;
+
+ if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri))
+ goto merr;
+
+ return ri;
+
+ merr:
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_PASSWORD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ err:
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ if (ri)
+ M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo);
+ if (encalg)
+ X509_ALGOR_free(encalg);
+ return NULL;
+
+ }
+
+/* This is an implementation of the key wrapping mechanism in RFC3211,
+ * at some point this should go into EVP.
+ */
+
+static int kek_unwrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
+ unsigned char *tmp;
+ int outl, rv = 0;
+ if (inlen < 2 * blocklen)
+ {
+ /* too small */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (inlen % blocklen)
+ {
+ /* Invalid size */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(inlen);
+ /* setup IV by decrypting last two blocks */
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp + inlen - 2 * blocklen, &outl,
+ in + inlen - 2 * blocklen, blocklen * 2);
+ /* Do a decrypt of last decrypted block to set IV to correct value
+ * output it to start of buffer so we don't corrupt decrypted block
+ * this works because buffer is at least two block lengths long.
+ */
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl,
+ tmp + inlen - blocklen, blocklen);
+ /* Can now decrypt first n - 1 blocks */
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, in, inlen - blocklen);
+
+ /* Reset IV to original value */
+ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ /* Decrypt again */
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, tmp, &outl, tmp, inlen);
+ /* Check check bytes */
+ if (((tmp[1] ^ tmp[4]) & (tmp[2] ^ tmp[5]) & (tmp[3] ^ tmp[6])) != 0xff)
+ {
+ /* Check byte failure */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (inlen < (size_t)(tmp[0] - 4 ))
+ {
+ /* Invalid length value */
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *outlen = (size_t)tmp[0];
+ memcpy(out, tmp + 4, *outlen);
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp, inlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(tmp);
+ return rv;
+
+ }
+
+static int kek_wrap_key(unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ size_t blocklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx);
+ size_t olen;
+ int dummy;
+ /* First decide length of output buffer: need header and round up to
+ * multiple of block length.
+ */
+ olen = (inlen + 4 + blocklen - 1)/blocklen;
+ olen *= blocklen;
+ if (olen < 2 * blocklen)
+ {
+ /* Key too small */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (inlen > 0xFF)
+ {
+ /* Key too large */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (out)
+ {
+ /* Set header */
+ out[0] = (unsigned char)inlen;
+ out[1] = in[0] ^ 0xFF;
+ out[2] = in[1] ^ 0xFF;
+ out[3] = in[2] ^ 0xFF;
+ memcpy(out + 4, in, inlen);
+ /* Add random padding to end */
+ if (olen > inlen + 4)
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(out + 4 + inlen, olen - 4 - inlen);
+ /* Encrypt twice */
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &dummy, out, olen);
+ }
+
+ *outlen = olen;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+/* Encrypt/Decrypt content key in PWRI recipient info */
+
+int cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
+ int en_de)
+ {
+ CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
+ CMS_PasswordRecipientInfo *pwri;
+ const unsigned char *p = NULL;
+ int plen;
+ int r = 0;
+ X509_ALGOR *algtmp, *kekalg = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX kekctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
+ unsigned char *key = NULL;
+ size_t keylen;
+
+ ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
+
+ pwri = ri->d.pwri;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&kekctx);
+
+ if (!pwri->pass)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PASSWORD);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ algtmp = pwri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
+
+ if (!algtmp || OBJ_obj2nid(algtmp->algorithm) != NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+ CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (algtmp->parameter->type == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ {
+ p = algtmp->parameter->value.sequence->data;
+ plen = algtmp->parameter->value.sequence->length;
+ kekalg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen);
+ }
+ if (kekalg == NULL)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+ CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_ENCRYPTION_PARAMETER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm);
+
+ if(!kekcipher)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+ CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier to set IV etc */
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(&kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de))
+ goto err;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&kekctx, 0);
+ if(EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(&kekctx, kekalg->parameter) < 0)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+ CMS_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_INITIALISATION_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ algtmp = pwri->keyDerivationAlgorithm;
+
+ /* Finish password based key derivation to setup key in "ctx" */
+
+ if (EVP_PBE_CipherInit(algtmp->algorithm,
+ (char *)pwri->pass, pwri->passlen,
+ algtmp->parameter, &kekctx, en_de) < 0)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Finally wrap/unwrap the key */
+
+ if (en_de)
+ {
+
+ if (!kek_wrap_key(NULL, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, &kekctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ key = OPENSSL_malloc(keylen);
+
+ if (!key)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!kek_wrap_key(key, &keylen, ec->key, ec->keylen, &kekctx))
+ goto err;
+ pwri->encryptedKey->data = key;
+ pwri->encryptedKey->length = keylen;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ key = OPENSSL_malloc(pwri->encryptedKey->length);
+
+ if (!key)
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!kek_unwrap_key(key, &keylen,
+ pwri->encryptedKey->data,
+ pwri->encryptedKey->length, &kekctx))
+ {
+ CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_PWRI_CRYPT,
+ CMS_R_UNWRAP_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ec->key = key;
+ ec->keylen = keylen;
+
+ }
+
+ r = 1;
+
+ err:
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&kekctx);
+
+ if (!r && key)
+ OPENSSL_free(key);
+ X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg);
+
+ return r;
+
+ }
projects / openssl.git / commitdiff