Re-align some comments after running the reformat script.

This should be a one off operation (subsequent invokation of the
script should not move them)

This commit is for the 1.0.1 changes

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

diff --git a/apps/ca.c b/apps/ca.c
index ec8ca63a58e97f52b65c5578405b15c9c65678b7..174ad9abb5631ff30966bb28836d6bba32603b06 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/ca.c
+++ b/apps/ca.c
@@ -610,10 +610,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 
             oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r");
             if (oid_bio == NULL) {
 
             oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r");
             if (oid_bio == NULL) {

-                                /*-
-                                BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p);
-                                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-                                */
+                /*-
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p);
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                */

                 ERR_clear_error();
             } else {
                 OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio);
                 ERR_clear_error();
             } else {
                 OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio);

diff --git a/apps/gendh.c b/apps/gendh.c
index 2d919495f4efc3fff310f2ed9cc0d1215ece5e5b..adaa101783dfd1a7b3c40cb5a888abe1abad4306 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/gendh.c
+++ b/apps/gendh.c
@@ -122,8 +122,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
             outfile = *(++argv);
         } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-2") == 0)
             g = 2;
             outfile = *(++argv);
         } else if (strcmp(*argv, "-2") == 0)
             g = 2;

-        /*-     else if (strcmp(*argv,"-3") == 0)
-                        g=3; */
+/*-     else if (strcmp(*argv,"-3") == 0)
+                g=3; */

         else if (strcmp(*argv, "-5") == 0)
             g = 5;
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
         else if (strcmp(*argv, "-5") == 0)
             g = 5;
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE

diff --git a/apps/openssl.c b/apps/openssl.c
index e6109a0dd1600d6b1dcea49e82d4c16750517fbe..112ed7e602218c7af2b47641984a6280caec44aa 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/openssl.c
+++ b/apps/openssl.c
@@ -231,27 +231,27 @@ int main(int Argc, char *ARGV[])
     long errline;
 
 #if defined( OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (__INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64)
     long errline;
 
 #if defined( OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && (__INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64)

-        /*-
-         * 2011-03-22 SMS.
-         * If we have 32-bit pointers everywhere, then we're safe, and
-         * we bypass this mess, as on non-VMS systems.  (See ARGV,
-         * above.)
-         * Problem 1: Compaq/HP C before V7.3 always used 32-bit
-         * pointers for argv[].
-         * Fix 1: For a 32-bit argv[], when we're using 64-bit pointers
-         * everywhere else, we always allocate and use a 64-bit
-         * duplicate of argv[].
-         * Problem 2: Compaq/HP C V7.3 (Alpha, IA64) before ECO1 failed
-         * to NULL-terminate a 64-bit argv[].  (As this was written, the
-         * compiler ECO was available only on IA64.)
-         * Fix 2: Unless advised not to (VMS_TRUST_ARGV), we test a
-         * 64-bit argv[argc] for NULL, and, if necessary, use a
-         * (properly) NULL-terminated (64-bit) duplicate of argv[].
-         * The same code is used in either case to duplicate argv[].
-         * Some of these decisions could be handled in preprocessing,
-         * but the code tends to get even uglier, and the penalty for
-         * deciding at compile- or run-time is tiny.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * 2011-03-22 SMS.
+     * If we have 32-bit pointers everywhere, then we're safe, and
+     * we bypass this mess, as on non-VMS systems.  (See ARGV,
+     * above.)
+     * Problem 1: Compaq/HP C before V7.3 always used 32-bit
+     * pointers for argv[].
+     * Fix 1: For a 32-bit argv[], when we're using 64-bit pointers
+     * everywhere else, we always allocate and use a 64-bit
+     * duplicate of argv[].
+     * Problem 2: Compaq/HP C V7.3 (Alpha, IA64) before ECO1 failed
+     * to NULL-terminate a 64-bit argv[].  (As this was written, the
+     * compiler ECO was available only on IA64.)
+     * Fix 2: Unless advised not to (VMS_TRUST_ARGV), we test a
+     * 64-bit argv[argc] for NULL, and, if necessary, use a
+     * (properly) NULL-terminated (64-bit) duplicate of argv[].
+     * The same code is used in either case to duplicate argv[].
+     * Some of these decisions could be handled in preprocessing,
+     * but the code tends to get even uglier, and the penalty for
+     * deciding at compile- or run-time is tiny.
+     */

     char **Argv = NULL;
     int free_Argv = 0;
 
     char **Argv = NULL;
     int free_Argv = 0;
 

diff --git a/apps/req.c b/apps/req.c
index c72efd5ae8ba77d3327c78130c92e6e70ffeec89..57781c93c4cafed40162ecaa455fdc9909fde517 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/req.c
+++ b/apps/req.c
@@ -502,10 +502,10 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
 
             oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r");
             if (oid_bio == NULL) {
 
             oid_bio = BIO_new_file(p, "r");
             if (oid_bio == NULL) {

-                                /*-
-                                BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p);
-                                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
-                                */
+                /*-
+                BIO_printf(bio_err,"problems opening %s for extra oid's\n",p);
+                ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
+                */

             } else {
                 OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio);
                 BIO_free(oid_bio);
             } else {
                 OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio);
                 BIO_free(oid_bio);

diff --git a/apps/s_cb.c b/apps/s_cb.c
index c47cf7b09e99ded01f19796c61710073d9bbeb91..7918500a6cd7c78f914fda338af57f016731df53 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/s_cb.c
+++ b/apps/s_cb.c
@@ -191,10 +191,10 @@ int MS_CALLBACK verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
 {
     if (cert_file != NULL) {
 int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
 {
     if (cert_file != NULL) {

-                /*-
-                SSL *ssl;
-                X509 *x509;
-                */
+        /*-
+        SSL *ssl;
+        X509 *x509;
+        */

 
         if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, cert_file,
                                          SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
 
         if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, cert_file,
                                          SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {


@@ -212,20 +212,20 @@ int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
             return (0);
         }
 
             return (0);
         }
 

-                /*-
-                In theory this is no longer needed
-                ssl=SSL_new(ctx);
-                x509=SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
-
-                if (x509 != NULL) {
-                        EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
-                        pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
-                        EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp,
-                                                SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
-                        EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
-                }
-                SSL_free(ssl);
-                */
+        /*-
+        In theory this is no longer needed
+        ssl=SSL_new(ctx);
+        x509=SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
+
+        if (x509 != NULL) {
+                EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
+                pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
+                EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp,
+                                        SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
+                EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
+        }
+        SSL_free(ssl);
+        */

 
         /*
          * If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from the private
 
         /*
          * If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from the private

diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
index cc968defb06377355812300da75ed0dffe7b6354..0bbc06524820c67da0740b60458e40057ae70260 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -1559,8 +1559,8 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
                     openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds);
             }
 #endif
                     openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds);
             }
 #endif

-/*-                     printf("mode tty(%d %d%d) ssl(%d%d)\n",
-                                tty_on,read_tty,write_tty,read_ssl,write_ssl);*/
+/*-         printf("mode tty(%d %d%d) ssl(%d%d)\n",
+                    tty_on,read_tty,write_tty,read_ssl,write_ssl);*/

 
             /*
              * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is
 
             /*
              * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is

diff --git a/apps/s_socket.c b/apps/s_socket.c
index 802896a6aaab694ab0465cea36fff21c7d785dd2..9e5565d16a4b3cb6d9e7dd8d6035e8eb2f5a8296 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/s_socket.c
+++ b/apps/s_socket.c
@@ -426,13 +426,13 @@ static int do_accept(int acc_sock, int *sock, char **host)
     }
 
 /*-
     }
 
 /*-

-        ling.l_onoff=1;
-        ling.l_linger=0;
-        i=setsockopt(ret,SOL_SOCKET,SO_LINGER,(char *)&ling,sizeof(ling));
-        if (i < 0) { perror("linger"); return(0); }
-        i=0;
-        i=setsockopt(ret,SOL_SOCKET,SO_KEEPALIVE,(char *)&i,sizeof(i));
-        if (i < 0) { perror("keepalive"); return(0); }
+    ling.l_onoff=1;
+    ling.l_linger=0;
+    i=setsockopt(ret,SOL_SOCKET,SO_LINGER,(char *)&ling,sizeof(ling));
+    if (i < 0) { perror("linger"); return(0); }
+    i=0;
+    i=setsockopt(ret,SOL_SOCKET,SO_KEEPALIVE,(char *)&i,sizeof(i));
+    if (i < 0) { perror("keepalive"); return(0); }

 */
 
     if (host == NULL)
 */
 
     if (host == NULL)

diff --git a/apps/ts.c b/apps/ts.c
index 6a24dcbf9e1a66b9df0b306fc67f335602aecd2f..341a42bb1224d9779223eafb69889330dcee213b 100644 (file)
--- a/apps/ts.c
+++ b/apps/ts.c
@@ -1101,19 +1101,19 @@ static X509_STORE *create_cert_store(char *ca_path, char *ca_file)
 
 static int MS_CALLBACK verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
 
 static int MS_CALLBACK verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {

-        /*-
-        char buf[256];
-
-        if (!ok)
-                {
-                X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),
-                                  buf, sizeof(buf));
-                printf("%s\n", buf);
-                printf("error %d at %d depth lookup: %s\n",
-                       ctx->error, ctx->error_depth,
-                        X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
-                }
-        */
+    /*-
+    char buf[256];
+
+    if (!ok)
+            {
+            X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(ctx->current_cert),
+                              buf, sizeof(buf));
+            printf("%s\n", buf);
+            printf("error %d at %d depth lookup: %s\n",
+                   ctx->error, ctx->error_depth,
+                    X509_verify_cert_error_string(ctx->error));
+            }
+    */

 
     return ok;
 }
 
     return ok;
 }

diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c b/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c
index 2a8c3a336c4c08298e8d74ca4a8a455ef6c2ca01..51c6a0c34dafdacd5a0eb95eb453a1e27243869b 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_sign.c
@@ -252,13 +252,13 @@ int ASN1_item_sign_ctx(const ASN1_ITEM *it,
         rv = pkey->ameth->item_sign(ctx, it, asn, algor1, algor2, signature);
         if (rv == 1)
             outl = signature->length;
         rv = pkey->ameth->item_sign(ctx, it, asn, algor1, algor2, signature);
         if (rv == 1)
             outl = signature->length;

-                /*-
-                 * Return value meanings:
-                 * <=0: error.
-                 *   1: method does everything.
-                 *   2: carry on as normal.
-                 *   3: ASN1 method sets algorithm identifiers: just sign.
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * Return value meanings:
+         * <=0: error.
+         *   1: method does everything.
+         *   2: carry on as normal.
+         *   3: ASN1 method sets algorithm identifiers: just sign.
+         */

         if (rv <= 0)
             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
         if (rv <= 1)
         if (rv <= 0)
             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN_CTX, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
         if (rv <= 1)

diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_sock.c b/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
index 7469f07f25a3fa4cd4372c6b41ac3f269b8f90ff..bda882c40b08311549dd24cc4cfca7006fff9a8f 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/b_sock.c
@@ -530,13 +530,13 @@ int BIO_socket_ioctl(int fd, long type, void *arg)
     i = ioctlsocket(fd, type, (char *)arg);
 #  else
 #   if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
     i = ioctlsocket(fd, type, (char *)arg);
 #  else
 #   if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)

-        /*-
-         * 2011-02-18 SMS.
-         * VMS ioctl() can't tolerate a 64-bit "void *arg", but we
-         * observe that all the consumers pass in an "unsigned long *",
-         * so we arrange a local copy with a short pointer, and use
-         * that, instead.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * 2011-02-18 SMS.
+     * VMS ioctl() can't tolerate a 64-bit "void *arg", but we
+     * observe that all the consumers pass in an "unsigned long *",
+     * so we arrange a local copy with a short pointer, and use
+     * that, instead.
+     */

 #    if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
 #     define ARG arg_32p
 #     pragma pointer_size save
 #    if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
 #     define ARG arg_32p
 #     pragma pointer_size save

diff --git a/crypto/bio/bf_null.c b/crypto/bio/bf_null.c
index d9d0dc6bf4954a6938ef0fe50e79c61ba6c8d30f..e0c79e8291c0697a8f1e4771243c8a7e533e9929 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bio/bf_null.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bf_null.c
@@ -103,11 +103,11 @@ static int nullf_free(BIO *a)
 {
     if (a == NULL)
         return (0);
 {
     if (a == NULL)
         return (0);

-        /*-
-        a->ptr=NULL;
-        a->init=0;
-        a->flags=0;
-        */
+    /*-
+    a->ptr=NULL;
+    a->init=0;
+    a->flags=0;
+    */

     return (1);
 }
 
     return (1);
 }
 

diff --git a/crypto/bio/bio.h b/crypto/bio/bio.h
index 2298f301a6942e540026b9ab120fcd273e2379cf..81f13c725cbfc1c41e9ed414e3bbed82fe2d1c61 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bio/bio.h
+++ b/crypto/bio/bio.h
@@ -343,15 +343,15 @@ struct bio_st {
 DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO)
 
 typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct {
 DECLARE_STACK_OF(BIO)
 
 typedef struct bio_f_buffer_ctx_struct {

-        /*-
-         * Buffers are setup like this:
-         *
-         * <---------------------- size ----------------------->
-         * +---------------------------------------------------+
-         * | consumed | remaining          | free space        |
-         * +---------------------------------------------------+
-         * <-- off --><------- len ------->
-         */
+    /*-
+     * Buffers are setup like this:
+     *
+     * <---------------------- size ----------------------->
+     * +---------------------------------------------------+
+     * | consumed | remaining          | free space        |
+     * +---------------------------------------------------+
+     * <-- off --><------- len ------->
+     */

     /*- BIO *bio; *//*
      * this is now in the BIO struct
      */
     /*- BIO *bio; *//*
      * this is now in the BIO struct
      */

diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c b/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c
index 1a1e4d99acd028129d27b81a3ad859f8d3bc195e..d08292c3e9ac6cabe137d76620f8698e7b014b1d 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c
@@ -421,12 +421,12 @@ static long acpt_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
         ret = (long)data->bind_mode;
         break;
     case BIO_CTRL_DUP:
         ret = (long)data->bind_mode;
         break;
     case BIO_CTRL_DUP:

-/*-             dbio=(BIO *)ptr;
-                if (data->param_port) EAY EAY
-                        BIO_set_port(dbio,data->param_port);
-                if (data->param_hostname)
-                        BIO_set_hostname(dbio,data->param_hostname);
-                BIO_set_nbio(dbio,data->nbio); */
+/*-     dbio=(BIO *)ptr;
+        if (data->param_port) EAY EAY
+                BIO_set_port(dbio,data->param_port);
+        if (data->param_hostname)
+                BIO_set_hostname(dbio,data->param_hostname);
+        BIO_set_nbio(dbio,data->nbio); */

         break;
 
     default:
         break;
 
     default:

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_add.c b/crypto/bn/bn_add.c
index c48665a038a832afc198054fea5fa4d95568b92d..2f3d11044990d36d22d4f57fe20a6ad082449628 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_add.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_add.c
@@ -69,12 +69,12 @@ int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
     bn_check_top(a);
     bn_check_top(b);
 
     bn_check_top(a);
     bn_check_top(b);
 

-        /*-
-         *  a +  b      a+b
-         *  a + -b      a-b
-         * -a +  b      b-a
-         * -a + -b      -(a+b)
-         */
+    /*-
+     *  a +  b      a+b
+     *  a + -b      a-b
+     * -a +  b      b-a
+     * -a + -b      -(a+b)
+     */

     if (a_neg ^ b->neg) {
         /* only one is negative */
         if (a_neg) {
     if (a_neg ^ b->neg) {
         /* only one is negative */
         if (a_neg) {


@@ -265,12 +265,12 @@ int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
     bn_check_top(a);
     bn_check_top(b);
 
     bn_check_top(a);
     bn_check_top(b);
 

-        /*-
-         *  a -  b      a-b
-         *  a - -b      a+b
-         * -a -  b      -(a+b)
-         * -a - -b      b-a
-         */
+    /*-
+     *  a -  b      a-b
+     *  a - -b      a+b
+     * -a -  b      -(a+b)
+     * -a - -b      b-a
+     */

     if (a->neg) {
         if (b->neg) {
             tmp = a;
     if (a->neg) {
         if (b->neg) {
             tmp = a;

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
index 1ded19373834d92c14c7a2cd5d27fe5dc2e78a8c..fca401450a3311b8086e2981765270bfe3ca67e7 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -186,36 +186,36 @@ int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m,
     bn_check_top(p);
     bn_check_top(m);
 
     bn_check_top(p);
     bn_check_top(m);
 

-        /*-
-         * For even modulus  m = 2^k*m_odd,  it might make sense to compute
-         * a^p mod m_odd  and  a^p mod 2^k  separately (with Montgomery
-         * exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent
-         * reductions, and combine the results using the CRT.
-         *
-         * For now, we use Montgomery only if the modulus is odd; otherwise,
-         * exponentiation using the reciprocal-based quick remaindering
-         * algorithm is used.
-         *
-         * (Timing obtained with expspeed.c [computations  a^p mod m
-         * where  a, p, m  are of the same length: 256, 512, 1024, 2048,
-         * 4096, 8192 bits], compared to the running time of the
-         * standard algorithm:
-         *
-         *   BN_mod_exp_mont   33 .. 40 %  [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
-         *                     55 .. 77 %  [UltraSparc processor, but
-         *                                  debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc conf.]
-         *
-         *   BN_mod_exp_recp   50 .. 70 %  [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
-         *                     62 .. 118 % [UltraSparc, debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc]
-         *
-         * On the Sparc, BN_mod_exp_recp was faster than BN_mod_exp_mont
-         * at 2048 and more bits, but at 512 and 1024 bits, it was
-         * slower even than the standard algorithm!
-         *
-         * "Real" timings [linux-elf, solaris-sparcv9-gcc configurations]
-         * should be obtained when the new Montgomery reduction code
-         * has been integrated into OpenSSL.)
-         */
+    /*-
+     * For even modulus  m = 2^k*m_odd,  it might make sense to compute
+     * a^p mod m_odd  and  a^p mod 2^k  separately (with Montgomery
+     * exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent
+     * reductions, and combine the results using the CRT.
+     *
+     * For now, we use Montgomery only if the modulus is odd; otherwise,
+     * exponentiation using the reciprocal-based quick remaindering
+     * algorithm is used.
+     *
+     * (Timing obtained with expspeed.c [computations  a^p mod m
+     * where  a, p, m  are of the same length: 256, 512, 1024, 2048,
+     * 4096, 8192 bits], compared to the running time of the
+     * standard algorithm:
+     *
+     *   BN_mod_exp_mont   33 .. 40 %  [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
+     *                     55 .. 77 %  [UltraSparc processor, but
+     *                                  debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc conf.]
+     *
+     *   BN_mod_exp_recp   50 .. 70 %  [AMD K6-2, Linux, debug configuration]
+     *                     62 .. 118 % [UltraSparc, debug-solaris-sparcv8-gcc]
+     *
+     * On the Sparc, BN_mod_exp_recp was faster than BN_mod_exp_mont
+     * at 2048 and more bits, but at 512 and 1024 bits, it was
+     * slower even than the standard algorithm!
+     *
+     * "Real" timings [linux-elf, solaris-sparcv9-gcc configurations]
+     * should be obtained when the new Montgomery reduction code
+     * has been integrated into OpenSSL.)
+     */

 
 #define MONT_MUL_MOD
 #define MONT_EXP_WORD
 
 #define MONT_MUL_MOD
 #define MONT_EXP_WORD

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
index 02fb7c462d79a565224bc0fc047149ab740bfe4e..97c55ab72098159b2f883353ba27ac2aeb26b2ff 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
@@ -268,13 +268,13 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
             goto err;
     }
     sign = -1;
             goto err;
     }
     sign = -1;

-        /*-
-         * From  B = a mod |n|,  A = |n|  it follows that
-         *
-         *      0 <= B < A,
-         *     -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-         *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
-         */
+    /*-
+     * From  B = a mod |n|,  A = |n|  it follows that
+     *
+     *      0 <= B < A,
+     *     -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+     *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
+     */

 
     if (BN_is_odd(n) && (BN_num_bits(n) <= (BN_BITS <= 32 ? 450 : 2048))) {
         /*
 
     if (BN_is_odd(n) && (BN_num_bits(n) <= (BN_BITS <= 32 ? 450 : 2048))) {
         /*


@@ -286,12 +286,12 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
         int shift;
 
         while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
         int shift;
 
         while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {

-                        /*-
-                         *      0 < B < |n|,
-                         *      0 < A <= |n|,
-                         * (1) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-                         * (2)  sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|)
-                         */
+            /*-
+             *      0 < B < |n|,
+             *      0 < A <= |n|,
+             * (1) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+             * (2)  sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|)
+             */

 
             /*
              * Now divide B by the maximum possible power of two in the
 
             /*
              * Now divide B by the maximum possible power of two in the


@@ -337,18 +337,18 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
                     goto err;
             }
 
                     goto err;
             }
 

-                        /*-
-                         * We still have (1) and (2).
-                         * Both  A  and  B  are odd.
-                         * The following computations ensure that
-                         *
-                         *     0 <= B < |n|,
-                         *      0 < A < |n|,
-                         * (1) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-                         * (2)  sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|),
-                         *
-                         * and that either  A  or  B  is even in the next iteration.
-                         */
+            /*-
+             * We still have (1) and (2).
+             * Both  A  and  B  are odd.
+             * The following computations ensure that
+             *
+             *     0 <= B < |n|,
+             *      0 < A < |n|,
+             * (1) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+             * (2)  sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|),
+             *
+             * and that either  A  or  B  is even in the next iteration.
+             */

             if (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0) {
                 /* -sign*(X + Y)*a == B - A  (mod |n|) */
                 if (!BN_uadd(X, X, Y))
             if (BN_ucmp(B, A) >= 0) {
                 /* -sign*(X + Y)*a == B - A  (mod |n|) */
                 if (!BN_uadd(X, X, Y))


@@ -377,11 +377,11 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
         while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
             BIGNUM *tmp;
 
         while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
             BIGNUM *tmp;
 

-                        /*-
-                         *      0 < B < A,
-                         * (*) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-                         *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|)
-                         */
+            /*-
+             *      0 < B < A,
+             * (*) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+             *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|)
+             */

 
             /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
             if (BN_num_bits(A) == BN_num_bits(B)) {
 
             /* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */
             if (BN_num_bits(A) == BN_num_bits(B)) {


@@ -428,12 +428,12 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
                     goto err;
             }
 
                     goto err;
             }
 

-                        /*-
-                         * Now
-                         *      A = D*B + M;
-                         * thus we have
-                         * (**)  sign*Y*a  ==  D*B + M   (mod |n|).
-                         */
+            /*-
+             * Now
+             *      A = D*B + M;
+             * thus we have
+             * (**)  sign*Y*a  ==  D*B + M   (mod |n|).
+             */

 
             tmp = A;            /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
                                  * matter */
 
             tmp = A;            /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
                                  * matter */


@@ -443,25 +443,25 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
             B = M;
             /* ... so we have  0 <= B < A  again */
 
             B = M;
             /* ... so we have  0 <= B < A  again */
 

-                        /*-
-                         * Since the former  M  is now  B  and the former  B  is now  A,
-                         * (**) translates into
-                         *       sign*Y*a  ==  D*A + B    (mod |n|),
-                         * i.e.
-                         *       sign*Y*a - D*A  ==  B    (mod |n|).
-                         * Similarly, (*) translates into
-                         *      -sign*X*a  ==  A          (mod |n|).
-                         *
-                         * Thus,
-                         *   sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a  ==  B  (mod |n|),
-                         * i.e.
-                         *        sign*(Y + D*X)*a  ==  B  (mod |n|).
-                         *
-                         * So if we set  (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign),  we arrive back at
-                         *      -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-                         *       sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
-                         * Note that  X  and  Y  stay non-negative all the time.
-                         */
+            /*-
+             * Since the former  M  is now  B  and the former  B  is now  A,
+             * (**) translates into
+             *       sign*Y*a  ==  D*A + B    (mod |n|),
+             * i.e.
+             *       sign*Y*a - D*A  ==  B    (mod |n|).
+             * Similarly, (*) translates into
+             *      -sign*X*a  ==  A          (mod |n|).
+             *
+             * Thus,
+             *   sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a  ==  B  (mod |n|),
+             * i.e.
+             *        sign*(Y + D*X)*a  ==  B  (mod |n|).
+             *
+             * So if we set  (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign),  we arrive back at
+             *      -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+             *       sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
+             * Note that  X  and  Y  stay non-negative all the time.
+             */

 
             /*
              * most of the time D is very small, so we can optimize tmp :=
 
             /*
              * most of the time D is very small, so we can optimize tmp :=


@@ -498,13 +498,13 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse(BIGNUM *in,
         }
     }
 
         }
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
-         *      A == gcd(a,n);
-         * we have
-         *       sign*Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|),
-         * where  Y  is non-negative.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
+     *      A == gcd(a,n);
+     * we have
+     *       sign*Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|),
+     * where  Y  is non-negative.
+     */

 
     if (sign < 0) {
         if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y))
 
     if (sign < 0) {
         if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y))


@@ -588,22 +588,22 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
             goto err;
     }
     sign = -1;
             goto err;
     }
     sign = -1;

-        /*-
-         * From  B = a mod |n|,  A = |n|  it follows that
-         *
-         *      0 <= B < A,
-         *     -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-         *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
-         */
+    /*-
+     * From  B = a mod |n|,  A = |n|  it follows that
+     *
+     *      0 <= B < A,
+     *     -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+     *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
+     */

 
     while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
         BIGNUM *tmp;
 
 
     while (!BN_is_zero(B)) {
         BIGNUM *tmp;
 

-                /*-
-                 *      0 < B < A,
-                 * (*) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-                 *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|)
-                 */
+        /*-
+         *      0 < B < A,
+         * (*) -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+         *      sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|)
+         */

 
         /*
          * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,
 
         /*
          * Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on, so that when BN_div is invoked,


@@ -616,12 +616,12 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
         if (!BN_div(D, M, pA, B, ctx))
             goto err;
 
         if (!BN_div(D, M, pA, B, ctx))
             goto err;
 

-                /*-
-                 * Now
-                 *      A = D*B + M;
-                 * thus we have
-                 * (**)  sign*Y*a  ==  D*B + M   (mod |n|).
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * Now
+         *      A = D*B + M;
+         * thus we have
+         * (**)  sign*Y*a  ==  D*B + M   (mod |n|).
+         */

 
         tmp = A;                /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
                                  * matter */
 
         tmp = A;                /* keep the BIGNUM object, the value does not
                                  * matter */


@@ -631,25 +631,25 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
         B = M;
         /* ... so we have  0 <= B < A  again */
 
         B = M;
         /* ... so we have  0 <= B < A  again */
 

-                /*-
-                 * Since the former  M  is now  B  and the former  B  is now  A,
-                 * (**) translates into
-                 *       sign*Y*a  ==  D*A + B    (mod |n|),
-                 * i.e.
-                 *       sign*Y*a - D*A  ==  B    (mod |n|).
-                 * Similarly, (*) translates into
-                 *      -sign*X*a  ==  A          (mod |n|).
-                 *
-                 * Thus,
-                 *   sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a  ==  B  (mod |n|),
-                 * i.e.
-                 *        sign*(Y + D*X)*a  ==  B  (mod |n|).
-                 *
-                 * So if we set  (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign),  we arrive back at
-                 *      -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
-                 *       sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
-                 * Note that  X  and  Y  stay non-negative all the time.
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * Since the former  M  is now  B  and the former  B  is now  A,
+         * (**) translates into
+         *       sign*Y*a  ==  D*A + B    (mod |n|),
+         * i.e.
+         *       sign*Y*a - D*A  ==  B    (mod |n|).
+         * Similarly, (*) translates into
+         *      -sign*X*a  ==  A          (mod |n|).
+         *
+         * Thus,
+         *   sign*Y*a + D*sign*X*a  ==  B  (mod |n|),
+         * i.e.
+         *        sign*(Y + D*X)*a  ==  B  (mod |n|).
+         *
+         * So if we set  (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign),  we arrive back at
+         *      -sign*X*a  ==  B   (mod |n|),
+         *       sign*Y*a  ==  A   (mod |n|).
+         * Note that  X  and  Y  stay non-negative all the time.
+         */

 
         if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx))
             goto err;
 
         if (!BN_mul(tmp, D, X, ctx))
             goto err;


@@ -663,13 +663,13 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
         sign = -sign;
     }
 
         sign = -sign;
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
-         *      A == gcd(a,n);
-         * we have
-         *       sign*Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|),
-         * where  Y  is non-negative.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * The while loop (Euclid's algorithm) ends when
+     *      A == gcd(a,n);
+     * we have
+     *       sign*Y*a  ==  A  (mod |n|),
+     * where  Y  is non-negative.
+     */

 
     if (sign < 0) {
         if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y))
 
     if (sign < 0) {
         if (!BN_sub(Y, n, Y))

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_kron.c b/crypto/bn/bn_kron.c
index 71808321d5b6f2c669d88ff7ccfc224b48e8cbe9..88d731ac75cd3b3e65a1673008cebafd2cdc0e6f 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_kron.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_kron.c
@@ -66,13 +66,13 @@ int BN_kronecker(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
     int ret = -2;               /* avoid 'uninitialized' warning */
     int err = 0;
     BIGNUM *A, *B, *tmp;
     int ret = -2;               /* avoid 'uninitialized' warning */
     int err = 0;
     BIGNUM *A, *B, *tmp;

-        /*-
-         * In 'tab', only odd-indexed entries are relevant:
-         * For any odd BIGNUM n,
-         *     tab[BN_lsw(n) & 7]
-         * is $(-1)^{(n^2-1)/8}$ (using TeX notation).
-         * Note that the sign of n does not matter.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * In 'tab', only odd-indexed entries are relevant:
+     * For any odd BIGNUM n,
+     *     tab[BN_lsw(n) & 7]
+     * is $(-1)^{(n^2-1)/8}$ (using TeX notation).
+     * Note that the sign of n does not matter.
+     */

     static const int tab[8] = { 0, 1, 0, -1, 0, -1, 0, 1 };
 
     bn_check_top(a);
     static const int tab[8] = { 0, 1, 0, -1, 0, -1, 0, 1 };
 
     bn_check_top(a);

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c b/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
index 3b751d3edc2510700c6801e58eaef5403583f742..b174850b6bb1b3870fd18fb29e947be28d802452 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_mul.c
@@ -527,11 +527,11 @@ void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2,
         bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, dna, dnb, p);
     }
 
         bn_mul_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, dna, dnb, p);
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign
-         * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
-         * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
-         */
+    /*-
+     * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign
+     * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+     * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+     */

 
     c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
 
 
     c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
 


@@ -542,12 +542,12 @@ void bn_mul_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n2,
         c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2));
     }
 
         c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2));
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1])
-         * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
-         * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
-         * c1 holds the carry bits
-         */
+    /*-
+     * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1])
+     * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+     * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+     * c1 holds the carry bits
+     */

     c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
     if (c1) {
         p = &(r[n + n2]);
     c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
     if (c1) {
         p = &(r[n + n2]);


@@ -689,11 +689,11 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n,
         }
     }
 
         }
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign
-         * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
-         * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
-         */
+    /*-
+     * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]), c1 is the sign
+     * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+     * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+     */

 
     c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
 
 
     c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
 


@@ -704,12 +704,12 @@ void bn_mul_part_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n,
         c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2));
     }
 
         c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(t[n2]), &(t[n2]), t, n2));
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1])
-         * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
-         * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
-         * c1 holds the carry bits
-         */
+    /*-
+     * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])+(a[0]*b[0])+(a[1]*b[1])
+     * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+     * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+     * c1 holds the carry bits
+     */

     c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
     if (c1) {
         p = &(r[n + n2]);
     c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
     if (c1) {
         p = &(r[n + n2]);


@@ -828,13 +828,13 @@ void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2,
         bn_mul_recursive(r, &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, 0, 0, &(t[n2]));
     }
 
         bn_mul_recursive(r, &(a[n]), &(b[n]), n, 0, 0, &(t[n2]));
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * s0 == low(al*bl)
-         * s1 == low(ah*bh)+low((al-ah)*(bh-bl))+low(al*bl)+high(al*bl)
-         * We know s0 and s1 so the only unknown is high(al*bl)
-         * high(al*bl) == s1 - low(ah*bh+s0+(al-ah)*(bh-bl))
-         * high(al*bl) == s1 - (r[0]+l[0]+t[0])
-         */
+    /*-
+     * s0 == low(al*bl)
+     * s1 == low(ah*bh)+low((al-ah)*(bh-bl))+low(al*bl)+high(al*bl)
+     * We know s0 and s1 so the only unknown is high(al*bl)
+     * high(al*bl) == s1 - low(ah*bh+s0+(al-ah)*(bh-bl))
+     * high(al*bl) == s1 - (r[0]+l[0]+t[0])
+     */

     if (l != NULL) {
         lp = &(t[n2 + n]);
         c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(lp, &(r[0]), &(l[0]), n));
     if (l != NULL) {
         lp = &(t[n2 + n]);
         c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(lp, &(r[0]), &(l[0]), n));


@@ -859,22 +859,22 @@ void bn_mul_high(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, BN_ULONG *l, int n2,
             lp[i] = ((~mp[i]) + 1) & BN_MASK2;
     }
 
             lp[i] = ((~mp[i]) + 1) & BN_MASK2;
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * s[0] = low(al*bl)
-         * t[3] = high(al*bl)
-         * t[10] = (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) neg is the sign
-         * r[10] = (a[1]*b[1])
-         */
-        /*-
-         * R[10] = al*bl
-         * R[21] = al*bl + ah*bh + (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])
-         * R[32] = ah*bh
-         */
-        /*-
-         * R[1]=t[3]+l[0]+r[0](+-)t[0] (have carry/borrow)
-         * R[2]=r[0]+t[3]+r[1](+-)t[1] (have carry/borrow)
-         * R[3]=r[1]+(carry/borrow)
-         */
+    /*-
+     * s[0] = low(al*bl)
+     * t[3] = high(al*bl)
+     * t[10] = (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0]) neg is the sign
+     * r[10] = (a[1]*b[1])
+     */
+    /*-
+     * R[10] = al*bl
+     * R[21] = al*bl + ah*bh + (a[0]-a[1])*(b[1]-b[0])
+     * R[32] = ah*bh
+     */
+    /*-
+     * R[1]=t[3]+l[0]+r[0](+-)t[0] (have carry/borrow)
+     * R[2]=r[0]+t[3]+r[1](+-)t[1] (have carry/borrow)
+     * R[3]=r[1]+(carry/borrow)
+     */

     if (l != NULL) {
         lp = &(t[n2]);
         c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(lp, &(t[n2 + n]), &(l[0]), n));
     if (l != NULL) {
         lp = &(t[n2]);
         c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(lp, &(t[n2 + n]), &(l[0]), n));

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_print.c b/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
index 71a347e2597abcd3e6d06701c276c393021e9b05..4dcaae32bf5c67e026bddf20ebc7a8418916f910 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
@@ -106,12 +106,12 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
     BIGNUM *t = NULL;
     BN_ULONG *bn_data = NULL, *lp;
 
     BIGNUM *t = NULL;
     BN_ULONG *bn_data = NULL, *lp;
 

-        /*-
-         * get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer
-         * num <= (BN_num_bits(a) + 1) * log(2)
-         *     <= 3 * BN_num_bits(a) * 0.1001 + log(2) + 1     (rounding error)
-         *     <= BN_num_bits(a)/10 + BN_num_bits/1000 + 1 + 1
-         */
+    /*-
+     * get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer
+     * num <= (BN_num_bits(a) + 1) * log(2)
+     *     <= 3 * BN_num_bits(a) * 0.1001 + log(2) + 1     (rounding error)
+     *     <= BN_num_bits(a)/10 + BN_num_bits/1000 + 1 + 1
+     */

     i = BN_num_bits(a) * 3;
     num = (i / 10 + i / 1000 + 1) + 1;
     bn_data =
     i = BN_num_bits(a) * 3;
     num = (i / 10 + i / 1000 + 1) + 1;
     bn_data =

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c b/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
index 51daae44814f0dd671d7bfd46510341ec370350b..3ca69879ee2d40f2f5ba04392099b15a693d0670 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqr.c
@@ -249,23 +249,23 @@ void bn_sqr_recursive(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n2, BN_ULONG *t)
     bn_sqr_recursive(r, a, n, p);
     bn_sqr_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), n, p);
 
     bn_sqr_recursive(r, a, n, p);
     bn_sqr_recursive(&(r[n2]), &(a[n]), n, p);
 

-        /*-
-         * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]), it is negative or zero
-         * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
-         * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
-         */
+    /*-
+     * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0]), it is negative or zero
+     * r[10] holds (a[0]*b[0])
+     * r[32] holds (b[1]*b[1])
+     */

 
     c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
 
     /* t[32] is negative */
     c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2));
 
 
     c1 = (int)(bn_add_words(t, r, &(r[n2]), n2));
 
     /* t[32] is negative */
     c1 -= (int)(bn_sub_words(&(t[n2]), t, &(t[n2]), n2));
 

-        /*-
-         * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0])+(a[0]*a[0])+(a[1]*a[1])
-         * r[10] holds (a[0]*a[0])
-         * r[32] holds (a[1]*a[1])
-         * c1 holds the carry bits
-         */
+    /*-
+     * t[32] holds (a[0]-a[1])*(a[1]-a[0])+(a[0]*a[0])+(a[1]*a[1])
+     * r[10] holds (a[0]*a[0])
+     * r[32] holds (a[1]*a[1])
+     * c1 holds the carry bits
+     */

     c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
     if (c1) {
         p = &(r[n + n2]);
     c1 += (int)(bn_add_words(&(r[n]), &(r[n]), &(t[n2]), n2));
     if (c1) {
         p = &(r[n + n2]);

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
index 772c8080bb5d818fb3472eb566a98837feb8d727..232af99a216d853552d8260dcaf9f02908ad6aa5 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
@@ -132,14 +132,14 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
     /* we'll set  q  later (if needed) */
 
     if (e == 1) {
     /* we'll set  q  later (if needed) */
 
     if (e == 1) {

-                /*-
-                 * The easy case:  (|p|-1)/2  is odd, so 2 has an inverse
-                 * modulo  (|p|-1)/2,  and square roots can be computed
-                 * directly by modular exponentiation.
-                 * We have
-                 *     2 * (|p|+1)/4 == 1   (mod (|p|-1)/2),
-                 * so we can use exponent  (|p|+1)/4,  i.e.  (|p|-3)/4 + 1.
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * The easy case:  (|p|-1)/2  is odd, so 2 has an inverse
+         * modulo  (|p|-1)/2,  and square roots can be computed
+         * directly by modular exponentiation.
+         * We have
+         *     2 * (|p|+1)/4 == 1   (mod (|p|-1)/2),
+         * so we can use exponent  (|p|+1)/4,  i.e.  (|p|-3)/4 + 1.
+         */

         if (!BN_rshift(q, p, 2))
             goto end;
         q->neg = 0;
         if (!BN_rshift(q, p, 2))
             goto end;
         q->neg = 0;


@@ -152,32 +152,32 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
     }
 
     if (e == 2) {
     }
 
     if (e == 2) {

-                /*-
-                 * |p| == 5  (mod 8)
-                 *
-                 * In this case  2  is always a non-square since
-                 * Legendre(2,p) = (-1)^((p^2-1)/8)  for any odd prime.
-                 * So if  a  really is a square, then  2*a  is a non-square.
-                 * Thus for
-                 *      b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8),
-                 *      i := (2*a)*b^2
-                 * we have
-                 *     i^2 = (2*a)^((1 + (|p|-5)/4)*2)
-                 *         = (2*a)^((p-1)/2)
-                 *         = -1;
-                 * so if we set
-                 *      x := a*b*(i-1),
-                 * then
-                 *     x^2 = a^2 * b^2 * (i^2 - 2*i + 1)
-                 *         = a^2 * b^2 * (-2*i)
-                 *         = a*(-i)*(2*a*b^2)
-                 *         = a*(-i)*i
-                 *         = a.
-                 *
-                 * (This is due to A.O.L. Atkin,
-                 * <URL: http://listserv.nodak.edu/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind9211&L=nmbrthry&O=T&P=562>,
-                 * November 1992.)
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * |p| == 5  (mod 8)
+         *
+         * In this case  2  is always a non-square since
+         * Legendre(2,p) = (-1)^((p^2-1)/8)  for any odd prime.
+         * So if  a  really is a square, then  2*a  is a non-square.
+         * Thus for
+         *      b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8),
+         *      i := (2*a)*b^2
+         * we have
+         *     i^2 = (2*a)^((1 + (|p|-5)/4)*2)
+         *         = (2*a)^((p-1)/2)
+         *         = -1;
+         * so if we set
+         *      x := a*b*(i-1),
+         * then
+         *     x^2 = a^2 * b^2 * (i^2 - 2*i + 1)
+         *         = a^2 * b^2 * (-2*i)
+         *         = a*(-i)*(2*a*b^2)
+         *         = a*(-i)*i
+         *         = a.
+         *
+         * (This is due to A.O.L. Atkin,
+         * <URL: http://listserv.nodak.edu/scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind9211&L=nmbrthry&O=T&P=562>,
+         * November 1992.)
+         */

 
         /* t := 2*a */
         if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t, A, p))
 
         /* t := 2*a */
         if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t, A, p))


@@ -277,24 +277,24 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
         goto end;
     }
 
         goto end;
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * Now we know that (if  p  is indeed prime) there is an integer
-         * k,  0 <= k < 2^e,  such that
-         *
-         *      a^q * y^k == 1   (mod p).
-         *
-         * As  a^q  is a square and  y  is not,  k  must be even.
-         * q+1  is even, too, so there is an element
-         *
-         *     X := a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2),
-         *
-         * and it satisfies
-         *
-         *     X^2 = a^q * a     * y^k
-         *         = a,
-         *
-         * so it is the square root that we are looking for.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * Now we know that (if  p  is indeed prime) there is an integer
+     * k,  0 <= k < 2^e,  such that
+     *
+     *      a^q * y^k == 1   (mod p).
+     *
+     * As  a^q  is a square and  y  is not,  k  must be even.
+     * q+1  is even, too, so there is an element
+     *
+     *     X := a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2),
+     *
+     * and it satisfies
+     *
+     *     X^2 = a^q * a     * y^k
+     *         = a,
+     *
+     * so it is the square root that we are looking for.
+     */

 
     /* t := (q-1)/2  (note that  q  is odd) */
     if (!BN_rshift1(t, q))
 
     /* t := (q-1)/2  (note that  q  is odd) */
     if (!BN_rshift1(t, q))


@@ -333,15 +333,15 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
         goto end;
 
     while (1) {
         goto end;
 
     while (1) {

-                /*-
-                 * Now  b  is  a^q * y^k  for some even  k  (0 <= k < 2^E
-                 * where  E  refers to the original value of  e,  which we
-                 * don't keep in a variable),  and  x  is  a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2).
-                 *
-                 * We have  a*b = x^2,
-                 *    y^2^(e-1) = -1,
-                 *    b^2^(e-1) = 1.
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * Now  b  is  a^q * y^k  for some even  k  (0 <= k < 2^E
+         * where  E  refers to the original value of  e,  which we
+         * don't keep in a variable),  and  x  is  a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2).
+         *
+         * We have  a*b = x^2,
+         *    y^2^(e-1) = -1,
+         *    b^2^(e-1) = 1.
+         */

 
         if (BN_is_one(b)) {
             if (!BN_copy(ret, x))
 
         if (BN_is_one(b)) {
             if (!BN_copy(ret, x))

diff --git a/crypto/cast/casttest.c b/crypto/cast/casttest.c
index b3bd85c520ec9653cac6c386e0a8aeb94f1233e8..dc31bc6604a80876283895f20dbd42ab4e409402 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/cast/casttest.c
+++ b/crypto/cast/casttest.c
@@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[CFB_TEST_SIZE] = {
     0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F,
     0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A,
     0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45
     0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F,
     0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A,
     0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45

-/*-     0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
-        0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
-        0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
+/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
+    0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
+    0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/

 };
 # endif
 
 };
 # endif
 

diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_def.c b/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
index 30a19921509ffe3d8b127c8df5bf4786c32887b9..e3ffeb21ef4a3ed82c0b3053724b13dbc4598308 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
+++ b/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
@@ -567,16 +567,16 @@ static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from)
                 }
                 e++;
             }
                 }
                 e++;
             }

-                        /*-
-                         * So at this point we have
-                         * np which is the start of the name string which is
-                         *   '\0' terminated.
-                         * cp which is the start of the section string which is
-                         *   '\0' terminated.
-                         * e is the 'next point after'.
-                         * r and rr are the chars replaced by the '\0'
-                         * rp and rrp is where 'r' and 'rr' came from.
-                         */
+            /*-
+             * So at this point we have
+             * np which is the start of the name string which is
+             *   '\0' terminated.
+             * cp which is the start of the section string which is
+             *   '\0' terminated.
+             * e is the 'next point after'.
+             * r and rr are the chars replaced by the '\0'
+             * rp and rrp is where 'r' and 'rr' came from.
+             */

             p = _CONF_get_string(conf, cp, np);
             if (rrp != NULL)
                 *rrp = rr;
             p = _CONF_get_string(conf, cp, np);
             if (rrp != NULL)
                 *rrp = rr;

diff --git a/crypto/des/des.c b/crypto/des/des.c
index 402695160d20213f661276272fdd737e98c6afad..2bff281258e83699636f7256ed5daf3f479f9c65 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/des/des.c
+++ b/crypto/des/des.c
@@ -228,14 +228,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
     }
     if (error)
         usage();
     }
     if (error)
         usage();

-        /*-
-         * We either
-         * do checksum or
-         * do encrypt or
-         * do decrypt or
-         * do decrypt then ckecksum or
-         * do checksum then encrypt
-         */
+    /*-
+     * We either
+     * do checksum or
+     * do encrypt or
+     * do decrypt or
+     * do decrypt then ckecksum or
+     * do checksum then encrypt
+     */

     if (((eflag + dflag) == 1) || cflag) {
         if (eflag)
             do_encrypt = DES_ENCRYPT;
     if (((eflag + dflag) == 1) || cflag) {
         if (eflag)
             do_encrypt = DES_ENCRYPT;

diff --git a/crypto/des/destest.c b/crypto/des/destest.c
index 994eeefd53c05dce3275017473601990592c03b8..c6be34203853bb432f8af3c08b6f723af8a2ec43 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/des/destest.c
+++ b/crypto/des/destest.c
@@ -404,13 +404,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
                           DES_ENCRYPT);
     DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(&cbc_data[16], &cbc_out[16], i - 16, &ks, &ks2,
                           &ks3, &iv3, &iv2, DES_ENCRYPT);
                           DES_ENCRYPT);
     DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(&cbc_data[16], &cbc_out[16], i - 16, &ks, &ks2,
                           &ks3, &iv3, &iv2, DES_ENCRYPT);

-        /*-     if (memcmp(cbc_out,cbc3_ok,
-                (unsigned int)(strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1+7)/8*8) != 0)
-                {
-                printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");
-                err=1;
-                }
-        */
+/*- if (memcmp(cbc_out,cbc3_ok,
+        (unsigned int)(strlen((char *)cbc_data)+1+7)/8*8) != 0)
+        {
+        printf("des_ede3_cbc_encrypt encrypt error\n");
+        err=1;
+        }
+*/

     memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv));
     memset(iv2, '\0', sizeof iv2);
     DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, i, &ks, &ks2, &ks3, &iv3, &iv2,
     memcpy(iv3, cbc_iv, sizeof(cbc_iv));
     memset(iv2, '\0', sizeof iv2);
     DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt(cbc_out, cbc_in, i, &ks, &ks2, &ks3, &iv3, &iv2,

diff --git a/crypto/des/enc_read.c b/crypto/des/enc_read.c
index ed44abcaeac6977a47deeab20fed77fe5dbfbb71..fcb66541bdd172fb589de2645b5ccf83a03b9e8d 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/des/enc_read.c
+++ b/crypto/des/enc_read.c
@@ -205,12 +205,12 @@ int DES_enc_read(int fd, void *buf, int len, DES_key_schedule *sched,
          */
         num = len;
     } else {
          */
         num = len;
     } else {

-                /*-
-                 * >output is a multiple of 8 byes, if len < rnum
-                 * >we must be careful.  The user must be aware that this
-                 * >routine will write more bytes than he asked for.
-                 * >The length of the buffer must be correct.
-                 * FIXED - Should be ok now 18-9-90 - eay */
+        /*-
+         * >output is a multiple of 8 byes, if len < rnum
+         * >we must be careful.  The user must be aware that this
+         * >routine will write more bytes than he asked for.
+         * >The length of the buffer must be correct.
+         * FIXED - Should be ok now 18-9-90 - eay */

         if (len < rnum) {
 
             if (DES_rw_mode & DES_PCBC_MODE)
         if (len < rnum) {
 
             if (DES_rw_mode & DES_PCBC_MODE)

diff --git a/crypto/des/ofb64ede.c b/crypto/des/ofb64ede.c
index 03399bc297fa7210ed95435676bef9733a49a0f5..45c67505a600f870b0a59de0065316aaa7c9a2bc 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/des/ofb64ede.c
+++ b/crypto/des/ofb64ede.c
@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ void DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt(register const unsigned char *in,
         n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
     }
     if (save) {
         n = (n + 1) & 0x07;
     }
     if (save) {

-/*-             v0=ti[0];
-                v1=ti[1];*/
+/*-     v0=ti[0];
+        v1=ti[1];*/

         iv = &(*ivec)[0];
         l2c(v0, iv);
         l2c(v1, iv);
         iv = &(*ivec)[0];
         l2c(v0, iv);
         l2c(v1, iv);

diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
index 3fa64328f691d26060705e4c19687b1348a2f8ea..61a73b34c68ee701d8ed61e34ff9d792132df03a 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -200,11 +200,11 @@ static int dsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
             goto decerr;
         if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(ndsa) != 2)
             goto decerr;
             goto decerr;
         if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(ndsa) != 2)
             goto decerr;

-                /*-
-                 * Handle Two broken types:
-                 * SEQUENCE {parameters, priv_key}
-                 * SEQUENCE {pub_key, priv_key}
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * Handle Two broken types:
+         * SEQUENCE {parameters, priv_key}
+         * SEQUENCE {pub_key, priv_key}
+         */

 
         t1 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 0);
         t2 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 1);
 
         t1 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 0);
         t2 = sk_ASN1_TYPE_value(ndsa, 1);

diff --git a/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c b/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
index 511858a68197b3d1609f27796a967a9cb151b6fa..14d885df15cd91e5ab76693eb6677eacbf3595ee 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
+++ b/crypto/dso/dso_vms.c
@@ -178,23 +178,23 @@ static int vms_load(DSO *dso)
         goto err;
     }
 
         goto err;
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * A file specification may look like this:
-         *
-         *      node::dev:[dir-spec]name.type;ver
-         *
-         * or (for compatibility with TOPS-20):
-         *
-         *      node::dev:<dir-spec>name.type;ver
-         *
-         * and the dir-spec uses '.' as separator.  Also, a dir-spec
-         * may consist of several parts, with mixed use of [] and <>:
-         *
-         *      [dir1.]<dir2>
-         *
-         * We need to split the file specification into the name and
-         * the rest (both before and after the name itself).
-         */
+    /*-
+     * A file specification may look like this:
+     *
+     *      node::dev:[dir-spec]name.type;ver
+     *
+     * or (for compatibility with TOPS-20):
+     *
+     *      node::dev:<dir-spec>name.type;ver
+     *
+     * and the dir-spec uses '.' as separator.  Also, a dir-spec
+     * may consist of several parts, with mixed use of [] and <>:
+     *
+     *      [dir1.]<dir2>
+     *
+     * We need to split the file specification into the name and
+     * the rest (both before and after the name itself).
+     */

     /*
      * Start with trying to find the end of a dir-spec, and save the position
      * of the byte after in sp1
     /*
      * Start with trying to find the end of a dir-spec, and save the position
      * of the byte after in sp1

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec.h b/crypto/ec/ec.h
index 390d9738507aa7fb2926b52eea5726d5c7203957..c4e7aea938c23f86eace2b7a8cb69a5ecb079386 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ec/ec.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec.h
@@ -116,14 +116,14 @@ typedef enum {
 typedef struct ec_method_st EC_METHOD;
 
 typedef struct ec_group_st
 typedef struct ec_method_st EC_METHOD;
 
 typedef struct ec_group_st

-        /*-
-         EC_METHOD *meth;
-         -- field definition
-         -- curve coefficients
-         -- optional generator with associated information (order, cofactor)
-         -- optional extra data (precomputed table for fast computation of multiples of generator)
-         -- ASN1 stuff
-        */
+    /*-
+     EC_METHOD *meth;
+     -- field definition
+     -- curve coefficients
+     -- optional generator with associated information (order, cofactor)
+     -- optional extra data (precomputed table for fast computation of multiples of generator)
+     -- ASN1 stuff
+    */

     EC_GROUP;
 
 typedef struct ec_point_st EC_POINT;
     EC_GROUP;
 
 typedef struct ec_point_st EC_POINT;

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
index 9a39477f3081b10cf9d8eb3e2aee5672351eea4e..077c7fc8dda59597377ae63fb79442c5f90493cd 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
@@ -632,12 +632,12 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
     if (lh == NULL)
         goto err;
 
     if (lh == NULL)
         goto err;
 

-        /*-
-         * We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
-         *      y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b.
-         *  <=> x^3 + a*x^2 + x*y + b + y^2 = 0
-         *  <=> ((x + a) * x + y ) * x + b + y^2 = 0
-         */
+    /*-
+     * We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
+     *      y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b.
+     *  <=> x^3 + a*x^2 + x*y + b + y^2 = 0
+     *  <=> ((x + a) * x + y ) * x + b + y^2 = 0
+     */

     if (!BN_GF2m_add(lh, &point->X, &group->a))
         goto err;
     if (!field_mul(group, lh, lh, &point->X, ctx))
     if (!BN_GF2m_add(lh, &point->X, &group->a))
         goto err;
     if (!field_mul(group, lh, lh, &point->X, ctx))

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
index fb6a43e6ad68e3eeddfe442e2be4cba6ed7ba436..319e651f67ffdff588f09dacca46ebb6eb0835e9 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
@@ -120,14 +120,14 @@ struct ec_method_st {
     void (*point_finish) (EC_POINT *);
     void (*point_clear_finish) (EC_POINT *);
     int (*point_copy) (EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *);
     void (*point_finish) (EC_POINT *);
     void (*point_clear_finish) (EC_POINT *);
     int (*point_copy) (EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *);

-        /*-
-         * used by EC_POINT_set_to_infinity,
-         * EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
-         * EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
-         * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp,     ..._GF2m,
-         * EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp,     ..._GF2m,
-         * EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m:
-         */
+    /*-
+     * used by EC_POINT_set_to_infinity,
+     * EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+     * EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp,
+     * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp,     ..._GF2m,
+     * EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp,     ..._GF2m,
+     * EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp, ..._GF2m:
+     */

     int (*point_set_to_infinity) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
     int (*point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp) (const EC_GROUP *,
                                                   EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x,
     int (*point_set_to_infinity) (const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
     int (*point_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp) (const EC_GROUP *,
                                                   EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *x,

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
index 807641a0f4655bfd4548319316145aa526379bbe..23b8c3089b2fa82ff9aff624ae3dd01c4d0ae4c3 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
@@ -602,13 +602,13 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
     if (!(tmp = EC_POINT_new(group)))
         goto err;
 
     if (!(tmp = EC_POINT_new(group)))
         goto err;
 

-        /*-
-         * prepare precomputed values:
-         *    val_sub[i][0] :=     points[i]
-         *    val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i]
-         *    val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i]
-         *    ...
-         */
+    /*-
+     * prepare precomputed values:
+     *    val_sub[i][0] :=     points[i]
+     *    val_sub[i][1] := 3 * points[i]
+     *    val_sub[i][2] := 5 * points[i]
+     *    ...
+     */

     for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) {
         if (i < num) {
             if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], points[i]))
     for (i = 0; i < num + num_scalar; i++) {
         if (i < num) {
             if (!EC_POINT_copy(val_sub[i][0], points[i]))

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
index ece7b7540030ae0db9957f5412a85b244e62b6e5..9a59ef0c19e417666021467dbf0dc722d2fddc3a 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp224.c
@@ -618,11 +618,11 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const widefelem in)
     /* output[3] <= 2^56 + 2^16 */
     out[2] = output[2] & 0x00ffffffffffffff;
 
     /* output[3] <= 2^56 + 2^16 */
     out[2] = output[2] & 0x00ffffffffffffff;
 

-        /*-
-         * out[0] < 2^56, out[1] < 2^56, out[2] < 2^56,
-         * out[3] <= 2^56 + 2^16 (due to final carry),
-         * so out < 2*p
-         */
+    /*-
+     * out[0] < 2^56, out[1] < 2^56, out[2] < 2^56,
+     * out[3] <= 2^56 + 2^16 (due to final carry),
+     * so out < 2*p
+     */

     out[3] = output[3];
 }
 
     out[3] = output[3];
 }
 


@@ -1048,10 +1048,10 @@ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
     felem_scalar(ftmp5, 2);
     /* ftmp5[i] < 2 * 2^57 = 2^58 */
 
     felem_scalar(ftmp5, 2);
     /* ftmp5[i] < 2 * 2^57 = 2^58 */
 

-        /*-
-         * x_out = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)^2 - (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 -
-         *  2*z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2
-         */
+    /*-
+     * x_out = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)^2 - (z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3 -
+     *  2*z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2
+     */

     felem_diff_128_64(tmp2, ftmp5);
     /* tmp2[i] < 2^117 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^118 */
     felem_reduce(x_out, tmp2);
     felem_diff_128_64(tmp2, ftmp5);
     /* tmp2[i] < 2^117 + 2^64 + 8 < 2^118 */
     felem_reduce(x_out, tmp2);


@@ -1066,10 +1066,10 @@ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
     felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp3, ftmp2);
     /* tmp2[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^59 = 2^118 */
 
     felem_mul(tmp2, ftmp3, ftmp2);
     /* tmp2[i] < 4 * 2^57 * 2^59 = 2^118 */
 

-        /*-
-         * y_out = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)*(z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 - x_out) -
-         *  z2^3*y1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3
-         */
+    /*-
+     * y_out = (z1^3*y2 - z2^3*y1)*(z2^2*x1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^2 - x_out) -
+     *  z2^3*y1*(z1^2*x2 - z2^2*x1)^3
+     */

     widefelem_diff(tmp2, tmp);
     /* tmp2[i] < 2^118 + 2^120 < 2^121 */
     felem_reduce(y_out, tmp2);
     widefelem_diff(tmp2, tmp);
     /* tmp2[i] < 2^118 + 2^120 < 2^121 */
     felem_reduce(y_out, tmp2);

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
index ea63c10f49f11bbce2c39e86b2efe0798717d70b..a5887086c63856e56748069fb3c838cbfb60ff78 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
@@ -437,25 +437,25 @@ static void felem_shrink(smallfelem out, const felem in)
     /* As tmp[3] < 2^65, high is either 1 or 0 */
     high <<= 63;
     high >>= 63;
     /* As tmp[3] < 2^65, high is either 1 or 0 */
     high <<= 63;
     high >>= 63;

-        /*-
-         * high is:
-         *   all ones   if the high word of tmp[3] is 1
-         *   all zeros  if the high word of tmp[3] if 0 */
+    /*-
+     * high is:
+     *   all ones   if the high word of tmp[3] is 1
+     *   all zeros  if the high word of tmp[3] if 0 */

     low = tmp[3];
     mask = low >> 63;
     low = tmp[3];
     mask = low >> 63;

-        /*-
-         * mask is:
-         *   all ones   if the MSB of low is 1
-         *   all zeros  if the MSB of low if 0 */
+    /*-
+     * mask is:
+     *   all ones   if the MSB of low is 1
+     *   all zeros  if the MSB of low if 0 */

     low &= bottom63bits;
     low -= kPrime3Test;
     /* if low was greater than kPrime3Test then the MSB is zero */
     low = ~low;
     low >>= 63;
     low &= bottom63bits;
     low -= kPrime3Test;
     /* if low was greater than kPrime3Test then the MSB is zero */
     low = ~low;
     low >>= 63;

-        /*-
-         * low is:
-         *   all ones   if low was > kPrime3Test
-         *   all zeros  if low was <= kPrime3Test */
+    /*-
+     * low is:
+     *   all ones   if low was > kPrime3Test
+     *   all zeros  if low was <= kPrime3Test */

     mask = (mask & low) | high;
     tmp[0] -= mask & kPrime[0];
     tmp[1] -= mask & kPrime[1];
     mask = (mask & low) | high;
     tmp[0] -= mask & kPrime[0];
     tmp[1] -= mask & kPrime[1];


@@ -795,17 +795,17 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const longfelem in)
 
     felem_reduce_(out, in);
 
 
     felem_reduce_(out, in);
 

-        /*-
-         * out[0] > 2^100 - 2^36 - 2^4 - 3*2^64 - 3*2^96 - 2^64 - 2^96 > 0
-         * out[1] > 2^100 - 2^64 - 7*2^96 > 0
-         * out[2] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 5*2^64 - 5*2^96 > 0
-         * out[3] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 7*2^64 - 5*2^96 - 3*2^96 > 0
-         *
-         * out[0] < 2^100 + 2^64 + 7*2^64 + 5*2^96 < 2^101
-         * out[1] < 2^100 + 3*2^64 + 5*2^64 + 3*2^97 < 2^101
-         * out[2] < 2^100 + 5*2^64 + 2^64 + 3*2^65 + 2^97 < 2^101
-         * out[3] < 2^100 + 7*2^64 + 7*2^96 + 3*2^64 < 2^101
-         */
+    /*-
+     * out[0] > 2^100 - 2^36 - 2^4 - 3*2^64 - 3*2^96 - 2^64 - 2^96 > 0
+     * out[1] > 2^100 - 2^64 - 7*2^96 > 0
+     * out[2] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 5*2^64 - 5*2^96 > 0
+     * out[3] > 2^100 - 2^36 + 2^4 - 7*2^64 - 5*2^96 - 3*2^96 > 0
+     *
+     * out[0] < 2^100 + 2^64 + 7*2^64 + 5*2^96 < 2^101
+     * out[1] < 2^100 + 3*2^64 + 5*2^64 + 3*2^97 < 2^101
+     * out[2] < 2^100 + 5*2^64 + 2^64 + 3*2^65 + 2^97 < 2^101
+     * out[3] < 2^100 + 7*2^64 + 7*2^96 + 3*2^64 < 2^101
+     */

 }
 
 /*-
 }
 
 /*-


@@ -824,17 +824,17 @@ static void felem_reduce_zero105(felem out, const longfelem in)
 
     felem_reduce_(out, in);
 
 
     felem_reduce_(out, in);
 

-        /*-
-         * out[0] > 2^105 - 2^41 - 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
-         * out[1] > 2^105 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
-         * out[2] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
-         * out[3] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^103 > 0
-         *
-         * out[0] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
-         * out[1] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
-         * out[2] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
-         * out[3] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^103 + 2^71 < 2^106
-         */
+    /*-
+     * out[0] > 2^105 - 2^41 - 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
+     * out[1] > 2^105 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
+     * out[2] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 > 0
+     * out[3] > 2^105 - 2^41 + 2^9 - 2^71 - 2^103 - 2^103 > 0
+     *
+     * out[0] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
+     * out[1] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
+     * out[2] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^71 + 2^103 < 2^106
+     * out[3] < 2^105 + 2^71 + 2^103 + 2^71 < 2^106
+     */

 }
 
 /*
 }
 
 /*


@@ -1099,7 +1099,8 @@ static void smallfelem_inv_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in)
  *
  * Building on top of the field operations we have the operations on the
  * elliptic curve group itself. Points on the curve are represented in Jacobian
  *
  * Building on top of the field operations we have the operations on the
  * elliptic curve group itself. Points on the curve are represented in Jacobian

- * coordinates */
+ * coordinates
+ */

 
 /*-
  * point_double calculates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in)
 
 /*-
  * point_double calculates 2*(x_in, y_in, z_in)


@@ -1108,7 +1109,8 @@ static void smallfelem_inv_contract(smallfelem out, const smallfelem in)
  *   http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b
  *
  * Outputs can equal corresponding inputs, i.e., x_out == x_in is allowed.
  *   http://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian-3.html#doubling-dbl-2001-b
  *
  * Outputs can equal corresponding inputs, i.e., x_out == x_in is allowed.

- * while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested). */
+ * while x_out == y_in is not (maybe this works, but it's not tested).
+ */

 static void
 point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
              const felem x_in, const felem y_in, const felem z_in)
 static void
 point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
              const felem x_in, const felem y_in, const felem z_in)


@@ -1239,7 +1241,8 @@ static void copy_small_conditional(felem out, const smallfelem in, limb mask)
  * This function includes a branch for checking whether the two input points
  * are equal, (while not equal to the point at infinity). This case never
  * happens during single point multiplication, so there is no timing leak for
  * This function includes a branch for checking whether the two input points
  * are equal, (while not equal to the point at infinity). This case never
  * happens during single point multiplication, so there is no timing leak for

- * ECDH or ECDSA signing. */
+ * ECDH or ECDSA signing.
+ */

 static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
                       const felem x1, const felem y1, const felem z1,
                       const int mixed, const smallfelem x2,
 static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
                       const felem x1, const felem y1, const felem z1,
                       const int mixed, const smallfelem x2,

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
index c1ef3fedacbd5056ab3d12a01497d0a1ea19fe8d..cc7634512d442bd23b54dfa48e662a8ee65b2ef6 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistp521.c
@@ -414,15 +414,16 @@ static void felem_square(largefelem out, const felem in)
     felem_scalar(inx2, in, 2);
     felem_scalar(inx4, in, 4);
 
     felem_scalar(inx2, in, 2);
     felem_scalar(inx4, in, 4);
 

-        /*-
-         * We have many cases were we want to do
-         *   in[x] * in[y] +
-         *   in[y] * in[x]
-         * This is obviously just
-         *   2 * in[x] * in[y]
-         * However, rather than do the doubling on the 128 bit result, we
-         * double one of the inputs to the multiplication by reading from
-         * |inx2| */
+    /*-
+     * We have many cases were we want to do
+     *   in[x] * in[y] +
+     *   in[y] * in[x]
+     * This is obviously just
+     *   2 * in[x] * in[y]
+     * However, rather than do the doubling on the 128 bit result, we
+     * double one of the inputs to the multiplication by reading from
+     * |inx2|
+     */

 
     out[0] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * in[0];
     out[1] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[1];
 
     out[0] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * in[0];
     out[1] = ((uint128_t) in[0]) * inx2[1];


@@ -610,10 +611,10 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const largefelem in)
 
     out[1] += ((limb) in[0]) >> 58;
     out[1] += (((limb) (in[0] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;
 
     out[1] += ((limb) in[0]) >> 58;
     out[1] += (((limb) (in[0] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;

-        /*-
-         * out[1] < 2^58 + 2^6 + 2^58
-         *        = 2^59 + 2^6
-         */
+    /*-
+     * out[1] < 2^58 + 2^6 + 2^58
+     *        = 2^59 + 2^6
+     */

     out[2] += ((limb) (in[0] >> 64)) >> 52;
 
     out[2] += ((limb) in[1]) >> 58;
     out[2] += ((limb) (in[0] >> 64)) >> 52;
 
     out[2] += ((limb) in[1]) >> 58;


@@ -642,10 +643,10 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const largefelem in)
 
     out[8] += ((limb) in[7]) >> 58;
     out[8] += (((limb) (in[7] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;
 
     out[8] += ((limb) in[7]) >> 58;
     out[8] += (((limb) (in[7] >> 64)) & bottom52bits) << 6;

-        /*-
-         * out[x > 1] < 2^58 + 2^6 + 2^58 + 2^12
-         *            < 2^59 + 2^13
-         */
+    /*-
+     * out[x > 1] < 2^58 + 2^6 + 2^58 + 2^12
+     *            < 2^59 + 2^13
+     */

     overflow1 = ((limb) (in[7] >> 64)) >> 52;
 
     overflow1 += ((limb) in[8]) >> 58;
     overflow1 = ((limb) (in[7] >> 64)) >> 52;
 
     overflow1 += ((limb) in[8]) >> 58;


@@ -660,11 +661,11 @@ static void felem_reduce(felem out, const largefelem in)
 
     out[1] += out[0] >> 58;
     out[0] &= bottom58bits;
 
     out[1] += out[0] >> 58;
     out[0] &= bottom58bits;

-        /*-
-         * out[0] < 2^58
-         * out[1] < 2^59 + 2^6 + 2^13 + 2^2
-         *        < 2^59 + 2^14
-         */
+    /*-
+     * out[0] < 2^58
+     * out[1] < 2^59 + 2^6 + 2^13 + 2^2
+     *        < 2^59 + 2^14
+     */

 }
 
 static void felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in)
 }
 
 static void felem_square_reduce(felem out, const felem in)


@@ -1055,13 +1056,13 @@ point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
     felem_scalar64(ftmp2, 3);
     /* ftmp2[i] < 3*2^60 + 3*2^15 */
     felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp2);
     felem_scalar64(ftmp2, 3);
     /* ftmp2[i] < 3*2^60 + 3*2^15 */
     felem_mul(tmp, ftmp, ftmp2);

-        /*-
-         * tmp[i] < 17(3*2^121 + 3*2^76)
-         *        = 61*2^121 + 61*2^76
-         *        < 64*2^121 + 64*2^76
-         *        = 2^127 + 2^82
-         *        < 2^128
-         */
+    /*-
+     * tmp[i] < 17(3*2^121 + 3*2^76)
+     *        = 61*2^121 + 61*2^76
+     *        < 64*2^121 + 64*2^76
+     *        = 2^127 + 2^82
+     *        < 2^128
+     */

     felem_reduce(alpha, tmp);
 
     /* x' = alpha^2 - 8*beta */
     felem_reduce(alpha, tmp);
 
     /* x' = alpha^2 - 8*beta */


@@ -1096,30 +1097,30 @@ point_double(felem x_out, felem y_out, felem z_out,
     felem_diff64(beta, x_out);
     /* beta[i] < 2^61 + 2^60 + 2^16 */
     felem_mul(tmp, alpha, beta);
     felem_diff64(beta, x_out);
     /* beta[i] < 2^61 + 2^60 + 2^16 */
     felem_mul(tmp, alpha, beta);

-        /*-
-         * tmp[i] < 17*((2^59 + 2^14)(2^61 + 2^60 + 2^16))
-         *        = 17*(2^120 + 2^75 + 2^119 + 2^74 + 2^75 + 2^30)
-         *        = 17*(2^120 + 2^119 + 2^76 + 2^74 + 2^30)
-         *        < 2^128
-         */
+    /*-
+     * tmp[i] < 17*((2^59 + 2^14)(2^61 + 2^60 + 2^16))
+     *        = 17*(2^120 + 2^75 + 2^119 + 2^74 + 2^75 + 2^30)
+     *        = 17*(2^120 + 2^119 + 2^76 + 2^74 + 2^30)
+     *        < 2^128
+     */

     felem_square(tmp2, gamma);
     felem_square(tmp2, gamma);

-        /*-
-         * tmp2[i] < 17*(2^59 + 2^14)^2
-         *         = 17*(2^118 + 2^74 + 2^28)
-         */
+    /*-
+     * tmp2[i] < 17*(2^59 + 2^14)^2
+     *         = 17*(2^118 + 2^74 + 2^28)
+     */

     felem_scalar128(tmp2, 8);
     felem_scalar128(tmp2, 8);

-        /*-
-         * tmp2[i] < 8*17*(2^118 + 2^74 + 2^28)
-         *         = 2^125 + 2^121 + 2^81 + 2^77 + 2^35 + 2^31
-         *         < 2^126
-         */
+    /*-
+     * tmp2[i] < 8*17*(2^118 + 2^74 + 2^28)
+     *         = 2^125 + 2^121 + 2^81 + 2^77 + 2^35 + 2^31
+     *         < 2^126
+     */

     felem_diff128(tmp, tmp2);
     felem_diff128(tmp, tmp2);

-        /*-
-         * tmp[i] < 2^127 - 2^69 + 17(2^120 + 2^119 + 2^76 + 2^74 + 2^30)
-         *        = 2^127 + 2^124 + 2^122 + 2^120 + 2^118 + 2^80 + 2^78 + 2^76 +
-         *          2^74 + 2^69 + 2^34 + 2^30
-         *        < 2^128
-         */
+    /*-
+     * tmp[i] < 2^127 - 2^69 + 17(2^120 + 2^119 + 2^76 + 2^74 + 2^30)
+     *        = 2^127 + 2^124 + 2^122 + 2^120 + 2^118 + 2^80 + 2^78 + 2^76 +
+     *          2^74 + 2^69 + 2^34 + 2^30
+     *        < 2^128
+     */

     felem_reduce(y_out, tmp);
 }
 
     felem_reduce(y_out, tmp);
 }
 


@@ -1281,11 +1282,11 @@ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
     felem_scalar128(tmp2, 2);
     /* tmp2[i] < 17*2^121 */
     felem_diff128(tmp, tmp2);
     felem_scalar128(tmp2, 2);
     /* tmp2[i] < 17*2^121 */
     felem_diff128(tmp, tmp2);

-        /*-
-         * tmp[i] < 2^127 - 2^69 + 17*2^122
-         *        = 2^126 - 2^122 - 2^6 - 2^2 - 1
-         *        < 2^127
-         */
+    /*-
+     * tmp[i] < 2^127 - 2^69 + 17*2^122
+     *        = 2^126 - 2^122 - 2^6 - 2^2 - 1
+     *        < 2^127
+     */

     felem_reduce(y_out, tmp);
 
     copy_conditional(x_out, x2, z1_is_zero);
     felem_reduce(y_out, tmp);
 
     copy_conditional(x_out, x2, z1_is_zero);

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
index 77627bb5c47f4d393ef0c52a13c515ac39dea40a..e5cec8be82663d51969be7ecd99dd903ed94ca35 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_oct.c
@@ -96,11 +96,11 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group,
     if (y == NULL)
         goto err;
 
     if (y == NULL)
         goto err;
 

-        /*-
-         * Recover y.  We have a Weierstrass equation
-         *     y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b,
-         * so  y  is one of the square roots of  x^3 + a*x + b.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * Recover y.  We have a Weierstrass equation
+     *     y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b,
+     * so  y  is one of the square roots of  x^3 + a*x + b.
+     */

 
     /* tmp1 := x^3 */
     if (!BN_nnmod(x, x_, &group->field, ctx))
 
     /* tmp1 := x^3 */
     if (!BN_nnmod(x, x_, &group->field, ctx))

diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
index d196dedfb31471c93426303a27bcf82731a7cc42..2b848216d78c19e6f37cc4ff769d5bf94c8b4bd1 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
@@ -320,11 +320,11 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_group_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
             goto err;
     }
 
             goto err;
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * check the discriminant:
-         * y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b is an elliptic curve <=> 4*a^3 + 27*b^2 != 0 (mod p)
-         * 0 =< a, b < p
-         */
+    /*-
+     * check the discriminant:
+     * y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b is an elliptic curve <=> 4*a^3 + 27*b^2 != 0 (mod p)
+     * 0 =< a, b < p
+     */

     if (BN_is_zero(a)) {
         if (BN_is_zero(b))
             goto err;
     if (BN_is_zero(a)) {
         if (BN_is_zero(b))
             goto err;


@@ -900,10 +900,10 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
             goto err;
         if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, n1, p))
             goto err;
             goto err;
         if (!BN_mod_add_quick(n1, n0, n1, p))
             goto err;

-                /*-
-                 * n1 = 3 * (X_a + Z_a^2) * (X_a - Z_a^2)
-                 *    = 3 * X_a^2 - 3 * Z_a^4
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * n1 = 3 * (X_a + Z_a^2) * (X_a - Z_a^2)
+         *    = 3 * X_a^2 - 3 * Z_a^4
+         */

     } else {
         if (!field_sqr(group, n0, &a->X, ctx))
             goto err;
     } else {
         if (!field_sqr(group, n0, &a->X, ctx))
             goto err;


@@ -1024,15 +1024,15 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
     if (Z6 == NULL)
         goto err;
 
     if (Z6 == NULL)
         goto err;
 

-        /*-
-         * We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
-         *      y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b.
-         * The point to consider is given in Jacobian projective coordinates
-         * where  (X, Y, Z)  represents  (x, y) = (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3).
-         * Substituting this and multiplying by  Z^6  transforms the above equation into
-         *      Y^2 = X^3 + a*X*Z^4 + b*Z^6.
-         * To test this, we add up the right-hand side in 'rh'.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * We have a curve defined by a Weierstrass equation
+     *      y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b.
+     * The point to consider is given in Jacobian projective coordinates
+     * where  (X, Y, Z)  represents  (x, y) = (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3).
+     * Substituting this and multiplying by  Z^6  transforms the above equation into
+     *      Y^2 = X^3 + a*X*Z^4 + b*Z^6.
+     * To test this, we add up the right-hand side in 'rh'.
+     */

 
     /* rh := X^2 */
     if (!field_sqr(group, rh, &point->X, ctx))
 
     /* rh := X^2 */
     if (!field_sqr(group, rh, &point->X, ctx))


@@ -1099,12 +1099,12 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
 int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a,
                       const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 {
 int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a,
                       const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
 {

-        /*-
-         * return values:
-         *  -1   error
-         *   0   equal (in affine coordinates)
-         *   1   not equal
-         */
+    /*-
+     * return values:
+     *  -1   error
+     *   0   equal (in affine coordinates)
+     *   1   not equal
+     */

 
     int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
                       const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);
 
     int (*field_mul) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
                       const BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *);


@@ -1143,12 +1143,12 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a,
     if (Zb23 == NULL)
         goto end;
 
     if (Zb23 == NULL)
         goto end;
 

-        /*-
-         * We have to decide whether
-         *     (X_a/Z_a^2, Y_a/Z_a^3) = (X_b/Z_b^2, Y_b/Z_b^3),
-         * or equivalently, whether
-         *     (X_a*Z_b^2, Y_a*Z_b^3) = (X_b*Z_a^2, Y_b*Z_a^3).
-         */
+    /*-
+     * We have to decide whether
+     *     (X_a/Z_a^2, Y_a/Z_a^3) = (X_b/Z_b^2, Y_b/Z_b^3),
+     * or equivalently, whether
+     *     (X_a*Z_b^2, Y_a*Z_b^3) = (X_b*Z_a^2, Y_b*Z_a^3).
+     */

 
     if (!b->Z_is_one) {
         if (!field_sqr(group, Zb23, &b->Z, ctx))
 
     if (!b->Z_is_one) {
         if (!field_sqr(group, Zb23, &b->Z, ctx))

diff --git a/crypto/idea/ideatest.c b/crypto/idea/ideatest.c
index d137a8f03abfc6da8496b4bbd9f2f4da7b4f105e..a967dd58a7ae255c2aef33dc62ed62dc93301506 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/idea/ideatest.c
+++ b/crypto/idea/ideatest.c
@@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[CFB_TEST_SIZE] = {
     0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F,
     0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A,
     0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45
     0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F,
     0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A,
     0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45

-/*-     0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
-        0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
-        0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
+/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
+    0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
+    0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/

 };
 
 static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher);
 };
 
 static int cfb64_test(unsigned char *cfb_cipher);

diff --git a/crypto/lhash/lhash.c b/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
index e33b6fba48a8a7892c9c48c11f7c4022793a3e12..53c5c138bb67add321c2c3f3e6827f730004f02b 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
+++ b/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
@@ -434,9 +434,9 @@ unsigned long lh_strhash(const char *c)
     if ((c == NULL) || (*c == '\0'))
         return (ret);
 /*-
     if ((c == NULL) || (*c == '\0'))
         return (ret);
 /*-

-        unsigned char b[16];
-        MD5(c,strlen(c),b);
-        return(b[0]|(b[1]<<8)|(b[2]<<16)|(b[3]<<24));
+    unsigned char b[16];
+    MD5(c,strlen(c),b);
+    return(b[0]|(b[1]<<8)|(b[2]<<16)|(b[3]<<24));

 */
 
     n = 0x100;
 */
 
     n = 0x100;

diff --git a/crypto/o_time.c b/crypto/o_time.c
index 292bf07ee15860c505de8a6b4b7aabb84e7c9013..e18b71d484ff63dafb39f122f2f070f935faa3e0 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/o_time.c
+++ b/crypto/o_time.c
@@ -159,30 +159,30 @@ struct tm *OPENSSL_gmtime(const time_t *timer, struct tm *result)
          * do it the hard way.
          */
         {
          * do it the hard way.
          */
         {

-                /*-
-                 * The VMS epoch is the astronomical Smithsonian date,
-                   if I remember correctly, which is November 17, 1858.
-                   Furthermore, time is measure in thenths of microseconds
-                   and stored in quadwords (64 bit integers).  unix_epoch
-                   below is January 1st 1970 expressed as a VMS time.  The
-                   following code was used to get this number:
-
-                   #include <stdio.h>
-                   #include <stdlib.h>
-                   #include <lib$routines.h>
-                   #include <starlet.h>
-
-                   main()
-                   {
-                     unsigned long systime[2];
-                     unsigned short epoch_values[7] =
-                       { 1970, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
-
-                     lib$cvt_vectim(epoch_values, systime);
-
-                     printf("%u %u", systime[0], systime[1]);
-                   }
-                */
+            /*-
+             * The VMS epoch is the astronomical Smithsonian date,
+               if I remember correctly, which is November 17, 1858.
+               Furthermore, time is measure in thenths of microseconds
+               and stored in quadwords (64 bit integers).  unix_epoch
+               below is January 1st 1970 expressed as a VMS time.  The
+               following code was used to get this number:
+
+               #include <stdio.h>
+               #include <stdlib.h>
+               #include <lib$routines.h>
+               #include <starlet.h>
+
+               main()
+               {
+                 unsigned long systime[2];
+                 unsigned short epoch_values[7] =
+                   { 1970, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+
+                 lib$cvt_vectim(epoch_values, systime);
+
+                 printf("%u %u", systime[0], systime[1]);
+               }
+            */

             unsigned long unix_epoch[2] = { 1273708544, 8164711 };
             unsigned long deltatime[2];
             unsigned long systime[2];
             unsigned long unix_epoch[2] = { 1273708544, 8164711 };
             unsigned long deltatime[2];
             unsigned long systime[2];

diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem.h b/crypto/pem/pem.h
index 000a6ca72ca086701309142f730d7d26df908615..a33025809e485e18d04362744b5daceb092372ea 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/pem/pem.h
+++ b/crypto/pem/pem.h
@@ -173,8 +173,8 @@ typedef struct pem_ctx_st {
     struct {
         int cipher;
         /*-
     struct {
         int cipher;
         /*-

-           unused, and wrong size
-           unsigned char iv[8]; */
+        unused, and wrong size
+        unsigned char iv[8]; */

     } DEK_info;
 
     PEM_USER *originator;
     } DEK_info;
 
     PEM_USER *originator;


@@ -182,9 +182,9 @@ typedef struct pem_ctx_st {
     int num_recipient;
     PEM_USER **recipient;
 
     int num_recipient;
     PEM_USER **recipient;
 

-        /*-
-            XXX(ben): don#t think this is used!
-                STACK *x509_chain;      / * certificate chain */
+/*-
+    XXX(ben): don#t think this is used!
+        STACK *x509_chain;      / * certificate chain */

     EVP_MD *md;                 /* signature type */
 
     int md_enc;                 /* is the md encrypted or not? */
     EVP_MD *md;                 /* signature type */
 
     int md_enc;                 /* is the md encrypted or not? */


@@ -194,9 +194,9 @@ typedef struct pem_ctx_st {
     EVP_CIPHER *dec;            /* date encryption cipher */
     int key_len;                /* key length */
     unsigned char *key;         /* key */
     EVP_CIPHER *dec;            /* date encryption cipher */
     int key_len;                /* key length */
     unsigned char *key;         /* key */

-        /*-
-            unused, and wrong size
-           unsigned char iv[8]; */
+  /*-
+    unused, and wrong size
+    unsigned char iv[8]; */

 
     int data_enc;               /* is the data encrypted */
     int data_len;
 
     int data_enc;               /* is the data encrypted */
     int data_len;

diff --git a/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/crypto/rand/randfile.c
index 8abb536d20ab31cb817e71b5a81094517ca2e593..9537c56a78959d167edfa9a12ada360debfd15a2 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rand/randfile.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -112,10 +112,10 @@ static FILE *(*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) =
 
 int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
 {
 
 int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
 {

-        /*-
-         * If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes.
-         * if bytes == -1, read complete file.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes.
+     * if bytes == -1, read complete file.
+     */

 
     MS_STATIC unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
 
     MS_STATIC unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO

diff --git a/crypto/rc2/rc2test.c b/crypto/rc2/rc2test.c
index 8347356312777e38c9cbca3cf3ff3d64924428fe..e61df342ea26d41b51ddd3a420a2a9849d5ed8fe 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rc2/rc2test.c
+++ b/crypto/rc2/rc2test.c
@@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ static unsigned char cfb_cipher64[CFB_TEST_SIZE] = {
     0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F,
     0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A,
     0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45
     0x59, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x00, 0x58, 0x6C, 0x3F,
     0x2C, 0x17, 0x25, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x38, 0xB7, 0x2A,
     0x39, 0x61, 0x37, 0xDC, 0x79, 0xFB, 0x9F, 0x45

-/*-     0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
-        0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
-        0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/
+/*- 0xF9,0x78,0x32,0xB5,0x42,0x1A,0x6B,0x38,
+    0x9A,0x44,0xD6,0x04,0x19,0x43,0xC4,0xD9,
+    0x3D,0x1E,0xAE,0x47,0xFC,0xCF,0x29,0x0B,*/

 };
 
 /*
 };
 
 /*

diff --git a/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c b/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c
index 583e8e5de660f3746af74ca7027b7491b203a886..6ebd54d46cad6ee58131becda0e51eae290c95fe 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c
+++ b/crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c
@@ -80,36 +80,36 @@ void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, size_t len, const unsigned char *indata,
     d = key->data;
 
 #if defined(RC4_CHUNK)
     d = key->data;
 
 #if defined(RC4_CHUNK)

-        /*-
-         * The original reason for implementing this(*) was the fact that
-         * pre-21164a Alpha CPUs don't have byte load/store instructions
-         * and e.g. a byte store has to be done with 64-bit load, shift,
-         * and, or and finally 64-bit store. Peaking data and operating
-         * at natural word size made it possible to reduce amount of
-         * instructions as well as to perform early read-ahead without
-         * suffering from RAW (read-after-write) hazard. This resulted
-         * in ~40%(**) performance improvement on 21064 box with gcc.
-         * But it's not only Alpha users who win here:-) Thanks to the
-         * early-n-wide read-ahead this implementation also exhibits
-         * >40% speed-up on SPARC and 20-30% on 64-bit MIPS (depending
-         * on sizeof(RC4_INT)).
-         *
-         * (*)  "this" means code which recognizes the case when input
-         *      and output pointers appear to be aligned at natural CPU
-         *      word boundary
-         * (**) i.e. according to 'apps/openssl speed rc4' benchmark,
-         *      crypto/rc4/rc4speed.c exhibits almost 70% speed-up...
-         *
-         * Cavets.
-         *
-         * - RC4_CHUNK="unsigned long long" should be a #1 choice for
-         *   UltraSPARC. Unfortunately gcc generates very slow code
-         *   (2.5-3 times slower than one generated by Sun's WorkShop
-         *   C) and therefore gcc (at least 2.95 and earlier) should
-         *   always be told that RC4_CHUNK="unsigned long".
-         *
-         *                                      <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
-         */
+    /*-
+     * The original reason for implementing this(*) was the fact that
+     * pre-21164a Alpha CPUs don't have byte load/store instructions
+     * and e.g. a byte store has to be done with 64-bit load, shift,
+     * and, or and finally 64-bit store. Peaking data and operating
+     * at natural word size made it possible to reduce amount of
+     * instructions as well as to perform early read-ahead without
+     * suffering from RAW (read-after-write) hazard. This resulted
+     * in ~40%(**) performance improvement on 21064 box with gcc.
+     * But it's not only Alpha users who win here:-) Thanks to the
+     * early-n-wide read-ahead this implementation also exhibits
+     * >40% speed-up on SPARC and 20-30% on 64-bit MIPS (depending
+     * on sizeof(RC4_INT)).
+     *
+     * (*)  "this" means code which recognizes the case when input
+     *      and output pointers appear to be aligned at natural CPU
+     *      word boundary
+     * (**) i.e. according to 'apps/openssl speed rc4' benchmark,
+     *      crypto/rc4/rc4speed.c exhibits almost 70% speed-up...
+     *
+     * Cavets.
+     *
+     * - RC4_CHUNK="unsigned long long" should be a #1 choice for
+     *   UltraSPARC. Unfortunately gcc generates very slow code
+     *   (2.5-3 times slower than one generated by Sun's WorkShop
+     *   C) and therefore gcc (at least 2.95 and earlier) should
+     *   always be told that RC4_CHUNK="unsigned long".
+     *
+     *                                      <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+     */

 
 # define RC4_STEP       ( \
                         x=(x+1) &0xff,  \
 
 # define RC4_STEP       ( \
                         x=(x+1) &0xff,  \


@@ -131,34 +131,34 @@ void RC4(RC4_KEY *key, size_t len, const unsigned char *indata,
             1
         };
 
             1
         };
 

-                /*-
-                 * I reckon we can afford to implement both endian
-                 * cases and to decide which way to take at run-time
-                 * because the machine code appears to be very compact
-                 * and redundant 1-2KB is perfectly tolerable (i.e.
-                 * in case the compiler fails to eliminate it:-). By
-                 * suggestion from Terrel Larson <terr@terralogic.net>
-                 * who also stands for the is_endian union:-)
-                 *
-                 * Special notes.
-                 *
-                 * - is_endian is declared automatic as doing otherwise
-                 *   (declaring static) prevents gcc from eliminating
-                 *   the redundant code;
-                 * - compilers (those I've tried) don't seem to have
-                 *   problems eliminating either the operators guarded
-                 *   by "if (sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)==8)" or the condition
-                 *   expressions themselves so I've got 'em to replace
-                 *   corresponding #ifdefs from the previous version;
-                 * - I chose to let the redundant switch cases when
-                 *   sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)!=8 be (were also #ifdefed
-                 *   before);
-                 * - in case you wonder "&(sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)*8-1)" in
-                 *   [LB]ESHFT guards against "shift is out of range"
-                 *   warnings when sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)!=8
-                 *
-                 *                      <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * I reckon we can afford to implement both endian
+         * cases and to decide which way to take at run-time
+         * because the machine code appears to be very compact
+         * and redundant 1-2KB is perfectly tolerable (i.e.
+         * in case the compiler fails to eliminate it:-). By
+         * suggestion from Terrel Larson <terr@terralogic.net>
+         * who also stands for the is_endian union:-)
+         *
+         * Special notes.
+         *
+         * - is_endian is declared automatic as doing otherwise
+         *   (declaring static) prevents gcc from eliminating
+         *   the redundant code;
+         * - compilers (those I've tried) don't seem to have
+         *   problems eliminating either the operators guarded
+         *   by "if (sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)==8)" or the condition
+         *   expressions themselves so I've got 'em to replace
+         *   corresponding #ifdefs from the previous version;
+         * - I chose to let the redundant switch cases when
+         *   sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)!=8 be (were also #ifdefed
+         *   before);
+         * - in case you wonder "&(sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)*8-1)" in
+         *   [LB]ESHFT guards against "shift is out of range"
+         *   warnings when sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)!=8
+         *
+         *                      <appro@fy.chalmers.se>
+         */

         if (!is_endian.little) { /* BIG-ENDIAN CASE */
 # define BESHFT(c)      (((sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)-(c)-1)*8)&(sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)*8-1))
             for (; len & (0 - sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)); len -= sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)) {
         if (!is_endian.little) { /* BIG-ENDIAN CASE */
 # define BESHFT(c)      (((sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)-(c)-1)*8)&(sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)*8-1))
             for (; len & (0 - sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)); len -= sizeof(RC4_CHUNK)) {

diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
index b6a28cc3ffd36970366fff21084d3fb7f455bc0a..41bc0844e48ed93c46ea9f9f1d81b380ca3c4779 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.c
@@ -97,12 +97,12 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
     hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
     if (hLen < 0)
         goto err;
     hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
     if (hLen < 0)
         goto err;

-        /*-
-         * Negative sLen has special meanings:
-         *      -1      sLen == hLen
-         *      -2      salt length is autorecovered from signature
-         *      -N      reserved
-         */
+    /*-
+     * Negative sLen has special meanings:
+     *      -1      sLen == hLen
+     *      -2      salt length is autorecovered from signature
+     *      -N      reserved
+     */

     if (sLen == -1)
         sLen = hLen;
     else if (sLen == -2)
     if (sLen == -1)
         sLen = hLen;
     else if (sLen == -2)


@@ -201,12 +201,12 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
     hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
     if (hLen < 0)
         goto err;
     hLen = EVP_MD_size(Hash);
     if (hLen < 0)
         goto err;

-        /*-
-         * Negative sLen has special meanings:
-         *      -1      sLen == hLen
-         *      -2      salt length is maximized
-         *      -N      reserved
-         */
+    /*-
+     * Negative sLen has special meanings:
+     *      -1      sLen == hLen
+     *      -2      salt length is maximized
+     *      -N      reserved
+     */

     if (sLen == -1)
         sLen = hLen;
     else if (sLen == -2)
     if (sLen == -1)
         sLen = hLen;
     else if (sLen == -2)

diff --git a/crypto/threads/mttest.c b/crypto/threads/mttest.c
index 34664f0fc81c1df599fae85c86936af1d6f07844..8f67db6ee3c9c5cd9d9422f0a167c22829c884ba 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/threads/mttest.c
+++ b/crypto/threads/mttest.c
@@ -333,8 +333,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
             fprintf(stderr, "-----\n");
             lh_stats(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx), stderr);
             fprintf(stderr, "-----\n");
             fprintf(stderr, "-----\n");
             lh_stats(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx), stderr);
             fprintf(stderr, "-----\n");

-                /*-     lh_node_stats(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx),stderr);
-                        fprintf(stderr,"-----\n"); */
+    /*-     lh_node_stats(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx),stderr);
+            fprintf(stderr,"-----\n"); */

             lh_node_usage_stats(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx), stderr);
             fprintf(stderr, "-----\n");
         }
             lh_node_usage_stats(SSL_CTX_sessions(s_ctx), stderr);
             fprintf(stderr, "-----\n");
         }


@@ -369,11 +369,11 @@ int ndoit(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx[2])
 
     fprintf(stdout, "started thread %lu\n", CRYPTO_thread_id());
     for (i = 0; i < number_of_loops; i++) {
 
     fprintf(stdout, "started thread %lu\n", CRYPTO_thread_id());
     for (i = 0; i < number_of_loops; i++) {

-/*-             fprintf(stderr,"%4d %2d ctx->ref (%3d,%3d)\n",
-                        CRYPTO_thread_id(),i,
-                        ssl_ctx[0]->references,
-                        ssl_ctx[1]->references); */
-        /*      pthread_delay_np(&tm); */
+/*-     fprintf(stderr,"%4d %2d ctx->ref (%3d,%3d)\n",
+            CRYPTO_thread_id(),i,
+            ssl_ctx[0]->references,
+            ssl_ctx[1]->references); */
+/*      pthread_delay_np(&tm); */

 
         ret = doit(ctx);
         if (ret != 0) {
 
         ret = doit(ctx);
         if (ret != 0) {


@@ -801,23 +801,23 @@ void solaris_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line)
             (type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
 # endif
 
             (type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
 # endif
 

-        /*-
-        if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
-        fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
-                CRYPTO_thread_id(),
-                mode,file,line);
-        */
+    /*-
+    if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
+    fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
+            CRYPTO_thread_id(),
+            mode,file,line);
+    */

     if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
         /*-
     if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
         /*-

-                if (mode & CRYPTO_READ)
-                        rw_rdlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
-                else
-                        rw_wrlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */
+        if (mode & CRYPTO_READ)
+                rw_rdlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
+        else
+                rw_wrlock(&(lock_cs[type])); */

 
         mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type]));
         lock_count[type]++;
     } else {
 
         mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type]));
         lock_count[type]++;
     } else {

-/*              rw_unlock(&(lock_cs[type]));  */
+/*      rw_unlock(&(lock_cs[type]));  */

         mutex_unlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
     }
 }
         mutex_unlock(&(lock_cs[type]));
     }
 }


@@ -987,10 +987,10 @@ void pthreads_locking_callback(int mode, int type, char *file, int line)
             (type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
 # endif
 /*-
             (type & CRYPTO_READ) ? "r" : "w", file, line);
 # endif
 /*-

-        if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
-                fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
-                CRYPTO_thread_id(),
-                mode,file,line);
+    if (CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT == type)
+            fprintf(stderr,"(t,m,f,l) %ld %d %s %d\n",
+            CRYPTO_thread_id(),
+            mode,file,line);

 */
     if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
         pthread_mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type]));
 */
     if (mode & CRYPTO_LOCK) {
         pthread_mutex_lock(&(lock_cs[type]));

diff --git a/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c b/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
index 24f7bb9d387bea27c1eaf55644ca5961d482df0e..e33bb4f833b5941da6c8c723273ae4bbf0fe1811 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
+++ b/crypto/whrlpool/wp_dgst.c
@@ -132,18 +132,18 @@ void WHIRLPOOL_BitUpdate(WHIRLPOOL_CTX *c, const void *_inp, size_t bits)
     } else                      /* bit-oriented loop */
 #endif
     {
     } else                      /* bit-oriented loop */
 #endif
     {

-                /*-
-                           inp
-                           |
-                           +-------+-------+-------
-                              |||||||||||||||||||||
-                           +-------+-------+-------
-                +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
-                ||||||||||||||                          c->data
-                +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
-                        |
-                        c->bitoff/8
-                */
+        /*-
+                   inp
+                   |
+                   +-------+-------+-------
+                      |||||||||||||||||||||
+                   +-------+-------+-------
+        +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
+        ||||||||||||||                          c->data
+        +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
+                |
+                c->bitoff/8
+        */

         while (bits) {
             unsigned int byteoff = bitoff / 8;
             unsigned char b;
         while (bits) {
             unsigned int byteoff = bitoff / 8;
             unsigned char b;

diff --git a/crypto/x509/by_dir.c b/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
index 90a3784858218b4d8bae38ad94bcf08395ecacd6..9ee8f8d8597aa56d5a9c3d8b5f592faea0f3fdfd 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/by_dir.c
@@ -424,8 +424,8 @@ static int get_cert_by_subject(X509_LOOKUP *xl, int type, X509_NAME *name,
              * If we were going to up the reference count, we would need to
              * do it on a perl 'type' basis
              */
              * If we were going to up the reference count, we would need to
              * do it on a perl 'type' basis
              */

-        /*-             CRYPTO_add(&tmp->data.x509->references,1,
-                                CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);*/
+        /*- CRYPTO_add(&tmp->data.x509->references,1,
+                    CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);*/

             goto finish;
         }
     }
             goto finish;
         }
     }

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c b/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
index b42409fc766fe64b09265943f5cc1fbe36404572..a910636f823d03902c403d80a050d96ba86a5b98 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
@@ -309,8 +309,8 @@ int X509_STORE_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, int type, X509_NAME *name,
             return 0;
     }
 
             return 0;
     }
 

-/*-     if (ret->data.ptr != NULL)
-                X509_OBJECT_free_contents(ret); */
+/*- if (ret->data.ptr != NULL)
+            X509_OBJECT_free_contents(ret); */

 
     ret->type = tmp->type;
     ret->data.ptr = tmp->data.ptr;
 
     ret->type = tmp->type;
     ret->data.ptr = tmp->data.ptr;

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c b/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c
index 40b23e512a6b9b299ff6d38f13e9376de3fae91c..0ff439c99f1bfef8de201cc5818b9c03a98b49b8 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_r2x.c
@@ -84,8 +84,8 @@ X509 *X509_REQ_to_X509(X509_REQ *r, int days, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
             goto err;
         if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(xi->version, 2))
             goto err;
             goto err;
         if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(xi->version, 2))
             goto err;

-/*-             xi->extensions=ri->attributes; <- bad, should not ever be done
-                ri->attributes=NULL; */
+/*-     xi->extensions=ri->attributes; <- bad, should not ever be done
+        ri->attributes=NULL; */

     }
 
     xn = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(r);
     }
 
     xn = X509_REQ_get_subject_name(r);

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index d02eebfc7a17deef565aa68a99c9b379496c9bdb..136bfbda617a1d5540c76bd3508a0c686744006f 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -461,15 +461,15 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
     int allow_proxy_certs;
     cb = ctx->verify_cb;
 
     int allow_proxy_certs;
     cb = ctx->verify_cb;
 

-        /*-
-         *  must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
-         * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
-         *     use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
-         * 0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
-         *     used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
-         * 1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
-         *     all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
-         */
+    /*-
+     *  must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
+     * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
+     *     use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
+     * 0:  we only accept non-CA certificates.  This is currently not
+     *     used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
+     * 1:  we only accept CA certificates.  This is currently used for
+     *     all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
+     */

     must_be_ca = -1;
 
     /* CRL path validation */
     must_be_ca = -1;
 
     /* CRL path validation */

diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509name.c b/crypto/x509/x509name.c
index fc0475f7c2e1024ba96472d0effa3438c2aa98d9..6ea601f96228797de46d53e2e01321b015ed15f9 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/x509/x509name.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509name.c
@@ -162,16 +162,16 @@ X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc)
         set_prev = ret->set - 1;
     set_next = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc)->set;
 
         set_prev = ret->set - 1;
     set_next = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, loc)->set;
 

-        /*-
-         * set_prev is the previous set
-         * set is the current set
-         * set_next is the following
-         * prev  1 1    1 1     1 1     1 1
-         * set   1      1       2       2
-         * next  1 1    2 2     2 2     3 2
-         * so basically only if prev and next differ by 2, then
-         * re-number down by 1
-         */
+    /*-
+     * set_prev is the previous set
+     * set is the current set
+     * set_next is the following
+     * prev  1 1    1 1     1 1     1 1
+     * set   1      1       2       2
+     * next  1 1    2 2     2 2     3 2
+     * so basically only if prev and next differ by 2, then
+     * re-number down by 1
+     */

     if (set_prev + 1 < set_next)
         for (i = loc; i < n; i++)
             sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, i)->set--;
     if (set_prev + 1 < set_next)
         for (i = loc; i < n; i++)
             sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(sk, i)->set--;

diff --git a/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.h b/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.h
index e0ca6e64c4013951209397da9d791bee3f9fdfbe..a2510453a57a75f649f9f8f3688d742c547f19ec 100644 (file)
--- a/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.h
+++ b/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.h
@@ -106,14 +106,14 @@ extern "C" {
     /*
      * Functions for Digest (MD5, SHA1) stuff
      */
     /*
      * Functions for Digest (MD5, SHA1) stuff
      */

-/* output : output data buffer */
-/* input : input data buffer */
-/* algo : hash algorithm, MD5 or SHA1 */
-/*-
- * typedef int t_zencod_hash ( KEY *output, const KEY *input, int algo ) ;
- * typedef int t_zencod_sha_hash ( KEY *output, const KEY *input, int algo ) ;
- */
-/* For now separate this stuff that mad it easier to test */
+    /* output : output data buffer */
+    /* input : input data buffer */
+    /* algo : hash algorithm, MD5 or SHA1 */
+    /*-
+     * typedef int t_zencod_hash ( KEY *output, const KEY *input, int algo ) ;
+     * typedef int t_zencod_sha_hash ( KEY *output, const KEY *input, int algo ) ;
+     */
+    /* For now separate this stuff that mad it easier to test */

     typedef int t_zencod_md5_init(ZEN_MD_DATA *data);
     typedef int t_zencod_md5_update(ZEN_MD_DATA *data, const KEY * input);
     typedef int t_zencod_md5_do_final(ZEN_MD_DATA *data, KEY * output);
     typedef int t_zencod_md5_init(ZEN_MD_DATA *data);
     typedef int t_zencod_md5_update(ZEN_MD_DATA *data, const KEY * input);
     typedef int t_zencod_md5_do_final(ZEN_MD_DATA *data, KEY * output);

diff --git a/engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c b/engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c
index 58b5c2b615dfc17bc239f40f2b1a033a2bdad226..6c93c4584d6ddd2cfa63d9d877e1e01e2a5b9703 100644 (file)
--- a/engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c
+++ b/engines/ccgost/gost_ctl.c
@@ -18,20 +18,20 @@ static char *gost_params[GOST_PARAM_MAX + 1] = { NULL };
 static const char *gost_envnames[] = { "CRYPT_PARAMS" };
 
 const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN gost_cmds[] = {
 static const char *gost_envnames[] = { "CRYPT_PARAMS" };
 
 const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN gost_cmds[] = {

-/*-     { GOST_CTRL_RNG,
-        "RNG",
-        "Type of random number generator to use",
-        ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-        },
-        { GOST_CTRL_RNG_PARAMS,
-        "RNG_PARAMS",
-        "Parameter for random number generator",
-        ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
-        },
+/*- { GOST_CTRL_RNG,
+    "RNG",
+    "Type of random number generator to use",
+    ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
+    },
+    { GOST_CTRL_RNG_PARAMS,
+    "RNG_PARAMS",
+    "Parameter for random number generator",
+    ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
+    },

 */ {GOST_CTRL_CRYPT_PARAMS,
 */ {GOST_CTRL_CRYPT_PARAMS,

-               "CRYPT_PARAMS",
-               "OID of default GOST 28147-89 parameters",
-               ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},
+           "CRYPT_PARAMS",
+           "OID of default GOST 28147-89 parameters",
+           ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING},

     {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
 };
 
     {0, NULL, NULL, 0}
 };
 

diff --git a/engines/e_cswift.c b/engines/e_cswift.c
index 70c2f226c33e3d57299f27625af3d9c22c248ca8..c429802d5f9b840493f3928a432e4a49a3071fff 100644 (file)
--- a/engines/e_cswift.c
+++ b/engines/e_cswift.c
@@ -1037,11 +1037,11 @@ static int cswift_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
     while (num >= (int)sizeof(buf32)) {
         largenum.value = buf;
         largenum.nbytes = sizeof(buf32);
     while (num >= (int)sizeof(buf32)) {
         largenum.value = buf;
         largenum.nbytes = sizeof(buf32);

-                /*-
-                 * tell CryptoSwift how many bytes we want and where we want it.
-                 * Note: - CryptoSwift cannot do more than 4096 bytes at a time.
-                 *       - CryptoSwift can only do multiple of 32-bits.
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * tell CryptoSwift how many bytes we want and where we want it.
+         * Note: - CryptoSwift cannot do more than 4096 bytes at a time.
+         *       - CryptoSwift can only do multiple of 32-bits.
+         */

         swrc =
             p_CSwift_SimpleRequest(hac, SW_CMD_RAND, NULL, 0, &largenum, 1);
         if (swrc != SW_OK) {
         swrc =
             p_CSwift_SimpleRequest(hac, SW_CMD_RAND, NULL, 0, &largenum, 1);
         if (swrc != SW_OK) {

diff --git a/engines/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h b/engines/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h
index db9480d2ac0a47ccb0883a58d736465f2e32a9ba..9fc7b89acbd1394ab9207406ec2604dc321cc0e2 100644 (file)
--- a/engines/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h
+++ b/engines/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h
@@ -214,12 +214,12 @@ typedef struct {
     int (*mutex_acquire) (HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
     void (*mutex_release) (HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
     void (*mutex_destroy) (HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
     int (*mutex_acquire) (HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
     void (*mutex_release) (HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);
     void (*mutex_destroy) (HWCryptoHook_Mutex *);

-  /*-
-   * For greater efficiency, can use condition vars internally for
-   * synchronisation.  In this case maxsimultaneous is ignored, but
-   * the other mutex stuff must be available.  In singlethreaded
-   * programs, set everything to 0.
-   */
+   /*-
+    * For greater efficiency, can use condition vars internally for
+    * synchronisation.  In this case maxsimultaneous is ignored, but
+    * the other mutex stuff must be available.  In singlethreaded
+    * programs, set everything to 0.
+    */

     size_t condvarsize;
     int (*condvar_init) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *,
                          HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
     size_t condvarsize;
     int (*condvar_init) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *,
                          HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);


@@ -227,103 +227,103 @@ typedef struct {
     void (*condvar_signal) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *);
     void (*condvar_broadcast) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *);
     void (*condvar_destroy) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *);
     void (*condvar_signal) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *);
     void (*condvar_broadcast) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *);
     void (*condvar_destroy) (HWCryptoHook_CondVar *);

-  /*-
-   * The semantics of acquiring and releasing mutexes and broadcasting
-   * and waiting on condition variables are expected to be those from
-   * POSIX threads (pthreads).  The mutexes may be (in pthread-speak)
-   * fast mutexes, recursive mutexes, or nonrecursive ones.
-   *
-   * The _release/_signal/_broadcast and _destroy functions must
-   * always succeed when given a valid argument; if they are given an
-   * invalid argument then the program (crypto plugin + application)
-   * has an internal error, and they should abort the program.
-   */
+   /*-
+    * The semantics of acquiring and releasing mutexes and broadcasting
+    * and waiting on condition variables are expected to be those from
+    * POSIX threads (pthreads).  The mutexes may be (in pthread-speak)
+    * fast mutexes, recursive mutexes, or nonrecursive ones.
+    *
+    * The _release/_signal/_broadcast and _destroy functions must
+    * always succeed when given a valid argument; if they are given an
+    * invalid argument then the program (crypto plugin + application)
+    * has an internal error, and they should abort the program.
+    */

     int (*getpassphrase) (const char *prompt_info,
                           int *len_io, char *buf,
                           HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
                           HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
     int (*getpassphrase) (const char *prompt_info,
                           int *len_io, char *buf,
                           HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
                           HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);

-  /*-
-   * Passphrases and the prompt_info, if they contain high-bit-set
-   * characters, are UTF-8.  The prompt_info may be a null pointer if
-   * no prompt information is available (it should not be an empty
-   * string).  It will not contain text like `enter passphrase';
-   * instead it might say something like `Operator Card for John
-   * Smith' or `SmartCard in nFast Module #1, Slot #1'.
-   *
-   * buf points to a buffer in which to return the passphrase; on
-   * entry *len_io is the length of the buffer.  It should be updated
-   * by the callback.  The returned passphrase should not be
-   * null-terminated by the callback.
-   */
+   /*-
+    * Passphrases and the prompt_info, if they contain high-bit-set
+    * characters, are UTF-8.  The prompt_info may be a null pointer if
+    * no prompt information is available (it should not be an empty
+    * string).  It will not contain text like `enter passphrase';
+    * instead it might say something like `Operator Card for John
+    * Smith' or `SmartCard in nFast Module #1, Slot #1'.
+    *
+    * buf points to a buffer in which to return the passphrase; on
+    * entry *len_io is the length of the buffer.  It should be updated
+    * by the callback.  The returned passphrase should not be
+    * null-terminated by the callback.
+    */

     int (*getphystoken) (const char *prompt_info,
                          const char *wrong_info,
                          HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
                          HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);
     int (*getphystoken) (const char *prompt_info,
                          const char *wrong_info,
                          HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext * ppctx,
                          HWCryptoHook_CallerContext * cactx);

-  /*-
-   * Requests that the human user physically insert a different
-   * smartcard, DataKey, etc.  The plugin should check whether the
-   * currently inserted token(s) are appropriate, and if they are it
-   * should not make this call.
-   *
-   * prompt_info is as before.  wrong_info is a description of the
-   * currently inserted token(s) so that the user is told what
-   * something is.  wrong_info, like prompt_info, may be null, but
-   * should not be an empty string.  Its contents should be
-   * syntactically similar to that of prompt_info.
-   */
-  /*-
-   * Note that a single LoadKey operation might cause several calls to
-   * getpassphrase and/or requestphystoken.  If requestphystoken is
-   * not provided (ie, a null pointer is passed) then the plugin may
-   * not support loading keys for which authorisation by several cards
-   * is required.  If getpassphrase is not provided then cards with
-   * passphrases may not be supported.
-   *
-   * getpassphrase and getphystoken do not need to check that the
-   * passphrase has been entered correctly or the correct token
-   * inserted; the crypto plugin will do that.  If this is not the
-   * case then the crypto plugin is responsible for calling these
-   * routines again as appropriate until the correct token(s) and
-   * passphrase(s) are supplied as required, or until any retry limits
-   * implemented by the crypto plugin are reached.
-   *
-   * In either case, the application must allow the user to say `no'
-   * or `cancel' to indicate that they do not know the passphrase or
-   * have the appropriate token; this should cause the callback to
-   * return nonzero indicating error.
-   */
+   /*-
+    * Requests that the human user physically insert a different
+    * smartcard, DataKey, etc.  The plugin should check whether the
+    * currently inserted token(s) are appropriate, and if they are it
+    * should not make this call.
+    *
+    * prompt_info is as before.  wrong_info is a description of the
+    * currently inserted token(s) so that the user is told what
+    * something is.  wrong_info, like prompt_info, may be null, but
+    * should not be an empty string.  Its contents should be
+    * syntactically similar to that of prompt_info.
+    */
+   /*-
+    * Note that a single LoadKey operation might cause several calls to
+    * getpassphrase and/or requestphystoken.  If requestphystoken is
+    * not provided (ie, a null pointer is passed) then the plugin may
+    * not support loading keys for which authorisation by several cards
+    * is required.  If getpassphrase is not provided then cards with
+    * passphrases may not be supported.
+    *
+    * getpassphrase and getphystoken do not need to check that the
+    * passphrase has been entered correctly or the correct token
+    * inserted; the crypto plugin will do that.  If this is not the
+    * case then the crypto plugin is responsible for calling these
+    * routines again as appropriate until the correct token(s) and
+    * passphrase(s) are supplied as required, or until any retry limits
+    * implemented by the crypto plugin are reached.
+    *
+    * In either case, the application must allow the user to say `no'
+    * or `cancel' to indicate that they do not know the passphrase or
+    * have the appropriate token; this should cause the callback to
+    * return nonzero indicating error.
+    */

     void (*logmessage) (void *logstream, const char *message);
     void (*logmessage) (void *logstream, const char *message);

-  /*-
-   * A log message will be generated at least every time something goes
-   * wrong and an ErrMsgBuf is filled in (or would be if one was
-   * provided).  Other diagnostic information may be written there too,
-   * including more detailed reasons for errors which are reported in an
-   * ErrMsgBuf.
-   *
-   * When a log message is generated, this callback is called.  It
-   * should write a message to the relevant logging arrangements.
-   *
-   * The message string passed will be null-terminated and may be of arbitrary
-   * length.  It will not be prefixed by the time and date, nor by the
-   * name of the library that is generating it - if this is required,
-   * the logmessage callback must do it.  The message will not have a
-   * trailing newline (though it may contain internal newlines).
-   *
-   * If a null pointer is passed for logmessage a default function is
-   * used.  The default function treats logstream as a FILE* which has
-   * been converted to a void*.  If logstream is 0 it does nothing.
-   * Otherwise it prepends the date and time and library name and
-   * writes the message to logstream.  Each line will be prefixed by a
-   * descriptive string containing the date, time and identity of the
-   * crypto plugin.  Errors on the logstream are not reported
-   * anywhere, and the default function doesn't flush the stream, so
-   * the application must set the buffering how it wants it.
-   *
-   * The crypto plugin may also provide a facility to have copies of
-   * log messages sent elsewhere, and or for adjusting the verbosity
-   * of the log messages; any such facilities will be configured by
-   * external means.
-   */
+   /*-
+    * A log message will be generated at least every time something goes
+    * wrong and an ErrMsgBuf is filled in (or would be if one was
+    * provided).  Other diagnostic information may be written there too,
+    * including more detailed reasons for errors which are reported in an
+    * ErrMsgBuf.
+    *
+    * When a log message is generated, this callback is called.  It
+    * should write a message to the relevant logging arrangements.
+    *
+    * The message string passed will be null-terminated and may be of arbitrary
+    * length.  It will not be prefixed by the time and date, nor by the
+    * name of the library that is generating it - if this is required,
+    * the logmessage callback must do it.  The message will not have a
+    * trailing newline (though it may contain internal newlines).
+    *
+    * If a null pointer is passed for logmessage a default function is
+    * used.  The default function treats logstream as a FILE* which has
+    * been converted to a void*.  If logstream is 0 it does nothing.
+    * Otherwise it prepends the date and time and library name and
+    * writes the message to logstream.  Each line will be prefixed by a
+    * descriptive string containing the date, time and identity of the
+    * crypto plugin.  Errors on the logstream are not reported
+    * anywhere, and the default function doesn't flush the stream, so
+    * the application must set the buffering how it wants it.
+    *
+    * The crypto plugin may also provide a facility to have copies of
+    * log messages sent elsewhere, and or for adjusting the verbosity
+    * of the log messages; any such facilities will be configured by
+    * external means.
+    */

 } HWCryptoHook_InitInfo;
 
 typedef
 } HWCryptoHook_InitInfo;
 
 typedef

diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c
index 614530a527a2d51e945d19bca47bd6fea94d60ca..c18ec03bd14b56db22c3ff4e4bf50d7456325bf9 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_both.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.c
@@ -569,12 +569,12 @@ static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,
 
 static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
 {
 
 static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max, int *ok)
 {

-        /*-
-         * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
-         * if so:
-         * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
-         * (2) update s->init_num
-         */
+    /*-
+     * (0) check whether the desired fragment is available
+     * if so:
+     * (1) copy over the fragment to s->init_buf->data[]
+     * (2) update s->init_num
+     */

     pitem *item;
     hm_fragment *frag;
     int al;
     pitem *item;
     hm_fragment *frag;
     int al;


@@ -1289,10 +1289,10 @@ dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, unsigned long frag_off,
     struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
     unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
 
     struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
     unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
 

-        /*-
-          OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
-          OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
-         */
+    /*-
+      OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
+      OPENSSL_assert(s->init_off == 0);
+     */

 
     /* XDTLS:  the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
     memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));
 
     /* XDTLS:  the requested message ought to be found, otherwise error */
     memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be));


@@ -1603,16 +1603,16 @@ int dtls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
      */
     OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
 
      */
     OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
 

-        /*-
-         * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
-         * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
-         * some random stuff.
-         *  - Message Type, 1 byte
-         *  - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
-         *  - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
-         *  - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
-         *  - Padding
-         */
+    /*-
+     * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
+     * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
+     * some random stuff.
+     *  - Message Type, 1 byte
+     *  - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
+     *  - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
+     *  - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
+     *  - Padding
+     */

     buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
     p = buf;
     /* Message Type */
     buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
     p = buf;
     /* Message Type */

diff --git a/ssl/d1_clnt.c b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
index 57c970cff1660881ef7f6530e21d625d9bdafb3a..1394781c047a8c6bead48d7b624f53a638ddbfc6 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_clnt.c
@@ -1094,25 +1094,25 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                 goto err;
             }
 
                 goto err;
             }
 

-                        /*-
-                         *   20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
-                        **  in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
-                        **
-                        **  Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
-                        **  n = krb5_ap_req.length;
-                        **  memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
-                        **  if (krb5_ap_req.data)
-                        **    kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
-                        **
-                        **  Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
-                        **  (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
-                        **  Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
-                        **  with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
-                        **  Example:
-                        **  KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
-                        **  Where "xx xx" = length bytes.  Shown here with
-                        **  optional authenticator omitted.
-                        */
+            /*-
+             *   20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+            **  in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+            **
+            **  Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+            **  n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+            **  memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+            **  if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+            **    kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+            **
+            **  Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+            **  (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
+            **  Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+            **  with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+            **  Example:
+            **  KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+            **  Where "xx xx" = length bytes.  Shown here with
+            **  optional authenticator omitted.
+            */

 
             /*  KerberosWrapper.Ticket              */
             s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
 
             /*  KerberosWrapper.Ticket              */
             s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);


@@ -1138,13 +1138,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
                 goto err;
 
             if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf) <= 0)
                 goto err;
 

-                        /*-
-                         *  20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
-                         *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
-                         *      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
-                         *                              kssl_ctx->length);
-                         *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
-                         */
+            /*-
+             *  20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
+             *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+             *      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+             *                              kssl_ctx->length);
+             *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+             */

 
             memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
             EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
 
             memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
             EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);


@@ -1498,12 +1498,12 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 
         d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
                                      SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);
 
         d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d,
                                      SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n);

-                /*-
-                 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
-                 l2n3(n,d);
-                 l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
-                 s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
-                */
+        /*-
+         *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
+         l2n3(n,d);
+         l2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d);
+         s->d1->handshake_write_seq++;
+        */

 
         s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
         /* number of bytes to write */
 
         s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
         /* number of bytes to write */

diff --git a/ssl/d1_pkt.c b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
index 246af2d7cf58de7843603a17e452b4bd0948f022..2abb7ef1d7f60cc42923ae2845065b5d06bbdcb7 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -432,12 +432,12 @@ static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
     rr->data = rr->input;
 
     enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
     rr->data = rr->input;
 
     enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);

-        /*-
-         * enc_err is:
-         *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
-         *    1: if the padding is valid
-         *   -1: if the padding is invalid
-         */
+    /*-
+     * enc_err is:
+     *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+     *    1: if the padding is valid
+     *   -1: if the padding is invalid
+     */

     if (enc_err == 0) {
         /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
         rr->length = 0;
     if (enc_err == 0) {
         /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
         rr->length = 0;


@@ -540,14 +540,14 @@ static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
     }
 
     rr->off = 0;
     }
 
     rr->off = 0;

-        /*-
-         * So at this point the following is true
-         * ssl->s3->rrec.type   is the type of record
-         * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
-         * ssl->s3->rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
-         * ssl->s3->rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
-         *                         after use :-).
-         */
+    /*-
+     * So at this point the following is true
+     * ssl->s3->rrec.type   is the type of record
+     * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
+     * ssl->s3->rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
+     * ssl->s3->rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
+     *                         after use :-).
+     */

 
     /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
     s->packet_length = 0;
 
     /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
     s->packet_length = 0;


@@ -820,12 +820,12 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
  start:
     s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
 
  start:
     s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
 

-        /*-
-         * s->s3->rrec.type         - is the type of record
-         * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
-         * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
-         * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * s->s3->rrec.type         - is the type of record
+     * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
+     * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
+     * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes.
+     */

     rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
 
     /*
     rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
 
     /*


@@ -1047,11 +1047,11 @@ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
         }
     }
 
         }
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
-         * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
-         * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
-         */
+    /*-
+     * s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+     * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
+     * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
+     */

 
     /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
     if ((!s->server) &&
 
     /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
     if ((!s->server) &&

diff --git a/ssl/kssl.c b/ssl/kssl.c
index c223a5660c40841e3d333e0587883d16abbe7e2f..cf585679dcccfe06e9e5b7a28c773d1fdf575c14 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/kssl.c
+++ b/ssl/kssl.c
@@ -1391,20 +1391,20 @@ krb5_error_code kssl_sget_tkt( /* UPDATE */ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
         }
     }
 
         }
     }
 

-        /*-     Actual Kerberos5 krb5_recvauth() has initial conversation here
-         *      o       check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS
-         *              unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION
-         *      o       check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS
-         *      o       send "0" msg if all OK
-         */
+    /*-     Actual Kerberos5 krb5_recvauth() has initial conversation here
+     *      o       check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS
+     *              unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION
+     *      o       check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS
+     *      o       send "0" msg if all OK
+     */

 
 

-        /*-
-         * 20010411 was using AP_REQ instead of true KerberosWrapper
-         *
-         *  if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context,
-         *                      &krb5in_data, krb5server, krb5keytab,
-         *                      &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0)  { Error }
-         */
+    /*-
+     * 20010411 was using AP_REQ instead of true KerberosWrapper
+     *
+     *  if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context,
+     *                      &krb5in_data, krb5server, krb5keytab,
+     *                      &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0)  { Error }
+     */

 
     p = (unsigned char *)indata->data;
     if ((asn1ticket = (KRB5_TKTBODY *)d2i_KRB5_TICKET(NULL, &p,
 
     p = (unsigned char *)indata->data;
     if ((asn1ticket = (KRB5_TKTBODY *)d2i_KRB5_TICKET(NULL, &p,

diff --git a/ssl/s23_srvr.c b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
index 3f8ddb8d02f48ffba529acae9034f01b4d77922a..50f98dced44f5a0576a2aa8c16a9f9eef8fce958 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s23_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s23_srvr.c
@@ -421,19 +421,19 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
         v[0] = p[3];            /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
         v[1] = p[4];
 
         v[0] = p[3];            /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
         v[1] = p[4];
 

-                /*-
-                 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
-                 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
-                 * record. It's format is:
-                 * Byte  Content
-                 * 0-1   msg_length
-                 * 2     msg_type
-                 * 3-4   version
-                 * 5-6   cipher_spec_length
-                 * 7-8   session_id_length
-                 * 9-10  challenge_length
-                 * ...   ...
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+         * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+         * record. It's format is:
+         * Byte  Content
+         * 0-1   msg_length
+         * 2     msg_type
+         * 3-4   version
+         * 5-6   cipher_spec_length
+         * 7-8   session_id_length
+         * 9-10  challenge_length
+         * ...   ...
+         */

         n = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
         if (n > (1024 * 4)) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
         n = ((p[0] & 0x7f) << 8) | p[1];
         if (n > (1024 * 4)) {
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);

diff --git a/ssl/s2_pkt.c b/ssl/s2_pkt.c
index 341b139b1622a82007ec4be466d48f4098330cc2..614b9a35d2ea9f74cfc78a2b3cf874b58f267795 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s2_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s2_pkt.c
@@ -535,19 +535,19 @@ static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
             s->s2->three_byte_header = 0;
             p = 0;
         } else if ((bs <= 1) && (!s->s2->escape)) {
             s->s2->three_byte_header = 0;
             p = 0;
         } else if ((bs <= 1) && (!s->s2->escape)) {

-                        /*-
-                         * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, thus
-                         * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
-                         */
+            /*-
+             * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, thus
+             * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
+             */

             s->s2->three_byte_header = 0;
             p = 0;
         } else {                /* we may have to use a 3 byte header */
 
             s->s2->three_byte_header = 0;
             p = 0;
         } else {                /* we may have to use a 3 byte header */
 

-                        /*-
-                         * If s->s2->escape is not set, then
-                         * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, and thus
-                         * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER.
-                         */
+            /*-
+             * If s->s2->escape is not set, then
+             * j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER, and thus
+             * j < SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER.
+             */

             p = (j % bs);
             p = (p == 0) ? 0 : (bs - p);
             if (s->s2->escape) {
             p = (j % bs);
             p = (p == 0) ? 0 : (bs - p);
             if (s->s2->escape) {


@@ -559,12 +559,12 @@ static int n_do_ssl_write(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
         }
     }
 
         }
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * Now
-         *      j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
-         * holds, and if s->s2->three_byte_header is set, then even
-         *      j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * Now
+     *      j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_2_BYTE_HEADER
+     * holds, and if s->s2->three_byte_header is set, then even
+     *      j <= SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER.
+     */

 
     /*
      * mac_size is the number of MAC bytes len is the number of data bytes we
 
     /*
      * mac_size is the number of MAC bytes len is the number of data bytes we

diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
index 887f43e9537e0286f3b17ed4765bbc9b19929dca..598d27edccb5aae9192827486c0671e7a1a9893c 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c
@@ -761,25 +761,25 @@ void tls_fips_digest_extra(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx,
     if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
         return;
     block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx);
     if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(cipher_ctx) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
         return;
     block_size = EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(mac_ctx);

-        /*-
-         * We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
-         * digests and TLS to deal with.
-         * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
-         * otherwise.
-         * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
-         * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
-         * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
-         * So we have:
-         * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
-         * equivalently:
-         * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
-         * HMAC adds a constant overhead.
-         * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
-         * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
-         * for SHA384/SHA512 and
-         * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
-         * otherwise.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * We are in FIPS mode if we get this far so we know we have only SHA*
+     * digests and TLS to deal with.
+     * Minimum digest padding length is 17 for SHA384/SHA512 and 9
+     * otherwise.
+     * Additional header is 13 bytes. To get the number of digest blocks
+     * processed round up the amount of data plus padding to the nearest
+     * block length. Block length is 128 for SHA384/SHA512 and 64 otherwise.
+     * So we have:
+     * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 13 + block_size - 1)/block_size
+     * equivalently:
+     * blocks = (payload_len + digest_pad + 12)/block_size + 1
+     * HMAC adds a constant overhead.
+     * We're ultimately only interested in differences so this becomes
+     * blocks = (payload_len + 29)/128
+     * for SHA384/SHA512 and
+     * blocks = (payload_len + 21)/64
+     * otherwise.
+     */

     digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29;
     blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
     blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
     digest_pad = block_size == 64 ? 21 : 29;
     blocks_orig = (orig_len + digest_pad) / block_size;
     blocks_data = (data_len + digest_pad) / block_size;

diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index 65400572d120b6e001dec959399722a30abb6c00..0e5acecabb0677b5c6fc1124652431a6ecde1158 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -674,36 +674,36 @@ int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
         /* Do the message type and length last */
         d = p = &(buf[4]);
 
         /* Do the message type and length last */
         d = p = &(buf[4]);
 

-                /*-
-                 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
-                 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
-                 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
-                 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
-                 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
-                 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
-                 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
-                 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
-                 * 1.0.
-                 *
-                 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
-                 *      1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
-                 *      2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
-                 *      3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
-                 *      4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
-                 *      5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
-                 *      6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
-                 *         know that is maximum server supports.
-                 *      7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
-                 *         containing version 1.0.
-                 *
-                 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
-                 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
-                 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
-                 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
-                 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
-                 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
-                 * the negotiated version.
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
+         * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
+         * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
+         * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
+         * choke if we initially report a higher version then
+         * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
+         * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
+         * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
+         * 1.0.
+         *
+         * Possible scenario with previous logic:
+         *      1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
+         *      2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
+         *      3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
+         *      4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+         *      5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
+         *      6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
+         *         know that is maximum server supports.
+         *      7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
+         *         containing version 1.0.
+         *
+         * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
+         * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
+         * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
+         * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
+         * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
+         * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
+         * the negotiated version.
+         */

 #if 0
         *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
         *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
 #if 0
         *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
         *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;


@@ -2361,25 +2361,25 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                 goto err;
             }
 
                 goto err;
             }
 

-                        /*-
-                         * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
-                         * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
-                         *
-                         * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
-                         * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
-                         * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
-                         * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
-                         *   kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
-                         *
-                         * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
-                         * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
-                         * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
-                         * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
-                         * Example:
-                         * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
-                         * Where "xx xx" = length bytes.  Shown here with
-                         * optional authenticator omitted.
-                         */
+            /*-
+             * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+             * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+             *
+             * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+             * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+             * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+             * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+             *   kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+             *
+             * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+             * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
+             * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+             * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+             * Example:
+             * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+             * Where "xx xx" = length bytes.  Shown here with
+             * optional authenticator omitted.
+             */

 
             /*  KerberosWrapper.Ticket              */
             s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
 
             /*  KerberosWrapper.Ticket              */
             s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);


@@ -2407,13 +2407,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
                 goto err;
 
             if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
                 goto err;
 

-                        /*-
-                         * 20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
-                         *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
-                         *      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
-                         *                              kssl_ctx->length);
-                         *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
-                         */
+            /*-
+             * 20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
+             *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+             *      EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+             *                              kssl_ctx->length);
+             *      EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+             */

 
             memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
             EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
 
             memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
             EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);


@@ -2531,26 +2531,26 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
              * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
              */
             if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
              * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
              */
             if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {

-                                /*-
-                                 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
-                                 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
-                                 * To add such support, one needs to add
-                                 * code that checks for appropriate
-                                 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
-                                 * For example, the cert have an ECC
-                                 * key on the same curve as the server's
-                                 * and the key should be authorized for
-                                 * key agreement.
-                                 *
-                                 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
-                                 * to skip sending the certificate verify
-                                 * message.
-                                 *
-                                 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
-                                 *     (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
-                                 *      EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
-                                 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
-                                 */
+                /*-
+                 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
+                 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
+                 * To add such support, one needs to add
+                 * code that checks for appropriate
+                 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+                 * For example, the cert have an ECC
+                 * key on the same curve as the server's
+                 * and the key should be authorized for
+                 * key agreement.
+                 *
+                 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
+                 * to skip sending the certificate verify
+                 * message.
+                 *
+                 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
+                 *     (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
+                 *      EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
+                 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
+                 */

             }
 
             if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
             }
 
             if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {

diff --git a/ssl/s3_enc.c b/ssl/s3_enc.c
index 63b9f0b48af69d81373159bf21f4fa38de129559..b4a1456781ec8027d5915add0e82e22dd67bf1b1 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_enc.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_enc.c
@@ -737,13 +737,14 @@ int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
          * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
          */
 
          * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle.
          */
 

-                /*-
-                 * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
-                 *   16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
-                 *
-                 * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
-                 * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
-                 * total size. */
+        /*-
+         * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5:
+         *   16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75.
+         *
+         * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size
+         * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller
+         * total size.
+         */

         unsigned char header[75];
         unsigned j = 0;
         memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);
         unsigned char header[75];
         unsigned j = 0;
         memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size);

diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index bee7a7e670253e43fecc1934a2b0ed0507a7424d..5644dd8f26b751c2716373c3668293c71cbf5b14 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -415,12 +415,12 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
     rr->data = rr->input;
 
     enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
     rr->data = rr->input;
 
     enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);

-        /*-
-         * enc_err is:
-         *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
-         *    1: if the padding is valid
-         *    -1: if the padding is invalid
-         */
+    /*-
+     * enc_err is:
+     *    0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+     *    1: if the padding is valid
+     *    -1: if the padding is invalid
+     */

     if (enc_err == 0) {
         al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
     if (enc_err == 0) {
         al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);


@@ -528,14 +528,14 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
     }
 
     rr->off = 0;
     }
 
     rr->off = 0;

-        /*-
-         * So at this point the following is true
-         * ssl->s3->rrec.type   is the type of record
-         * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
-         * ssl->s3->rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
-         * ssl->s3->rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
-         *                         after use :-).
-         */
+    /*-
+     * So at this point the following is true
+     * ssl->s3->rrec.type   is the type of record
+     * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
+     * ssl->s3->rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
+     * ssl->s3->rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
+     *                         after use :-).
+     */

 
     /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
     s->packet_length = 0;
 
     /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
     s->packet_length = 0;


@@ -1030,12 +1030,12 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
  start:
     s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
 
  start:
     s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
 

-        /*-
-         * s->s3->rrec.type         - is the type of record
-         * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
-         * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
-         * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * s->s3->rrec.type         - is the type of record
+     * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
+     * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
+     * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes.
+     */

     rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
 
     /* get new packet if necessary */
     rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
 
     /* get new packet if necessary */


@@ -1153,11 +1153,11 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
         }
     }
 
         }
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
-         * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
-         * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
-         */
+    /*-
+     * s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+     * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
+     * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
+     */

 
     /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
     if ((!s->server) &&
 
     /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
     if ((!s->server) &&

diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 486362d22102dde6082485133f35b8cffc1f8e83..ef3964aa212e3c9e63f7776ce983f488f2541986 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -1425,17 +1425,17 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
         }
     }
 
         }
     }
 

-        /*-
-         * we now have the following setup.
-         * client_random
-         * cipher_list          - our prefered list of ciphers
-         * ciphers              - the clients prefered list of ciphers
-         * compression          - basically ignored right now
-         * ssl version is set   - sslv3
-         * s->session           - The ssl session has been setup.
-         * s->hit               - session reuse flag
-         * s->tmp.new_cipher    - the new cipher to use.
-         */
+    /*-
+     * we now have the following setup.
+     * client_random
+     * cipher_list          - our prefered list of ciphers
+     * ciphers              - the clients prefered list of ciphers
+     * compression          - basically ignored right now
+     * ssl version is set   - sslv3
+     * s->session           - The ssl session has been setup.
+     * s->hit               - session reuse flag
+     * s->tmp.new_cipher    - the new cipher to use.
+     */

 
     /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
     if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
 
     /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
     if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {


@@ -1481,22 +1481,22 @@ int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
         memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
         p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
 
         memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
         p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
 

-                /*-
-                 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
-                 * back in the server hello:
-                 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
-                 *   we send back the old session ID.
-                 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
-                 *   is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
-                 *   (which doesn't actually identify the session).
-                 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
-                 *   session ID.
-                 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
-                 *   we send back a 0-length session ID.
-                 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
-                 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
-                 * to send back.
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * There are several cases for the session ID to send
+         * back in the server hello:
+         * - For session reuse from the session cache,
+         *   we send back the old session ID.
+         * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
+         *   is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
+         *   (which doesn't actually identify the session).
+         * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
+         *   session ID.
+         * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
+         *   we send back a 0-length session ID.
+         * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
+         * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
+         * to send back.
+         */

         if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
             && !s->hit)
             s->session->session_id_length = 0;
         if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
             && !s->hit)
             s->session->session_id_length = 0;


@@ -2524,11 +2524,11 @@ int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
             }
         }
 
             }
         }
 

-                /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
-                 *  but it caused problems for apache.
-                 *  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
-                 *  if (s->kssl_ctx)  s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
-                 */
+        /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
+         *  but it caused problems for apache.
+         *  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+         *  if (s->kssl_ctx)  s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+         */

     } else
 #endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 
     } else
 #endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 


@@ -3341,14 +3341,14 @@ int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
         i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
         SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
 
         i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
         SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
 

-                /*-
-                 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
-                 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
-                 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
-                 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
-                 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
-                 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+         * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
+         * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+         * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+         * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+         * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+         */

         if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
                           26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
                           EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
         if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
                           26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
                           EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))


@@ -3431,12 +3431,12 @@ int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
 {
     if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
         unsigned char *p;
 {
     if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
         unsigned char *p;

-                /*-
-                 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
-                 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
-                 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
-                 * + (ocsp response)
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+         * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
+         * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
+         * + (ocsp response)
+         */

         if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
             return -1;
 
         if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
             return -1;
 


@@ -3508,13 +3508,13 @@ int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
 
     p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
 
 
     p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
 

-        /*-
-         * The payload looks like:
-         *   uint8 proto_len;
-         *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
-         *   uint8 padding_len;
-         *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
-         */
+    /*-
+     * The payload looks like:
+     *   uint8 proto_len;
+     *   uint8 proto[proto_len];
+     *   uint8 padding_len;
+     *   uint8 padding[padding_len];
+     */

     proto_len = p[0];
     if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
         return 0;
     proto_len = p[0];
     if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
         return 0;

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
index 99cf6779611bce6ab8fabdee85ab09b4459e9572..51a4a04a23814f2dba3ca9d73b6c28e1ab828ffc 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = {
     /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
     {0, SSL_TXT_kDHd, 0, SSL_kDHd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
     /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
     /* no such ciphersuites supported! */
     {0, SSL_TXT_kDHd, 0, SSL_kDHd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
     /* no such ciphersuites supported! */

-    {0, SSL_TXT_kDH, 0, SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, /
+    {0, SSL_TXT_kDH, 0, SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},

         {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, 0, SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
     {0, SSL_TXT_DH, 0, SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
      0},
         {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, 0, SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0},
     {0, SSL_TXT_DH, 0, SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kEDH, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
      0},


@@ -1856,14 +1856,14 @@ int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm)
     if (cm == NULL || cm->type == NID_undef)
         return 1;
 
     if (cm == NULL || cm->type == NID_undef)
         return 1;
 

-        /*-
-         * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the
-         * compression number ranges should be the following:
-         *
-         *   0 to  63:  methods defined by the IETF
-         *  64 to 192:  external party methods assigned by IANA
-         * 193 to 255:  reserved for private use
-         */
+    /*-
+     * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the
+     * compression number ranges should be the following:
+     *
+     *   0 to  63:  methods defined by the IETF
+     *  64 to 192:  external party methods assigned by IANA
+     * 193 to 255:  reserved for private use
+     */

     if (id < 193 || id > 255) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,
                SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE);
     if (id < 193 || id > 255) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD,
                SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE);

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index e3ce9ba0c3039f8a83f55b65c60b5c3c3c7dc717..18ec248f08a4bbdfbe06bde6606b87faef9cd704 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -1749,12 +1749,12 @@ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth)
     ret->references = 1;
     ret->quiet_shutdown = 0;
 
     ret->references = 1;
     ret->quiet_shutdown = 0;
 

-/*      ret->cipher=NULL;*/
+/*  ret->cipher=NULL;*/

 /*-
 /*-

-        ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
-        ret->master_key=NULL;
-        ret->key_arg=NULL;
-        ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
+    ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
+    ret->master_key=NULL;
+    ret->key_arg=NULL;
+    ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */

 
     ret->info_callback = NULL;
 
 
     ret->info_callback = NULL;
 

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
index 74c1d1537f39b23c34818a4a4b5c2be387267f58..fb4e8c52598f4d3f7ffc7151d427c00dccdd0a48 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -326,21 +326,21 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
             return (0);
         }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
             return (0);
         }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT

-                /*-
-                 * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
-                 * Note that:
-                 * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
-                 *     ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
-                 *     When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
-                 *     ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
-                 *     At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
-                 *     however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
-                 *     whether a ticket is expected or not.
-                 *
-                 * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
-                 *     ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
-                 *     ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
+         * Note that:
+         * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
+         *     ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
+         *     When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
+         *     ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
+         *     At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
+         *     however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
+         *     whether a ticket is expected or not.
+         *
+         * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
+         *     ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
+         *     ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
+         */

         if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
             ss->session_id_length = 0;
             goto sess_id_done;
         if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
             ss->session_id_length = 0;
             goto sess_id_done;

diff --git a/ssl/ssl_task.c b/ssl/ssl_task.c
index 521885fc501a8bc55cf27e7742cf858ed0b219f2..fb770753e28d4f263335202f94cd7cb19c6f51e5 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssl_task.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_task.c
@@ -292,8 +292,8 @@ int doit(io_channel chan, SSL_CTX *s_ctx)
     if ((s_to_c == NULL) || (c_to_s == NULL))
         goto err;
 /*- original, DRM 24-SEP-1997
     if ((s_to_c == NULL) || (c_to_s == NULL))
         goto err;
 /*- original, DRM 24-SEP-1997

-        BIO_set_fd ( c_to_s, "", chan );
-        BIO_set_fd ( s_to_c, "", chan );
+    BIO_set_fd ( c_to_s, "", chan );
+    BIO_set_fd ( s_to_c, "", chan );

 */
     BIO_set_fd(c_to_s, 0, chan);
     BIO_set_fd(s_to_c, 0, chan);
 */
     BIO_set_fd(c_to_s, 0, chan);
     BIO_set_fd(s_to_c, 0, chan);

diff --git a/ssl/ssltest.c b/ssl/ssltest.c
index 615302ab31b8fcb9547d72e2be0c92428cd6be0b..9fa226c62632e42a7bfdac6f2ceba90214195659 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -1170,40 +1170,40 @@ int doit_biopair(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count,
     (void)BIO_set_ssl(s_ssl_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
 
     do {
     (void)BIO_set_ssl(s_ssl_bio, s_ssl, BIO_NOCLOSE);
 
     do {

-                /*-
-                 * c_ssl_bio:          SSL filter BIO
-                 *
-                 * client:             pseudo-I/O for SSL library
-                 *
-                 * client_io:          client's SSL communication; usually to be
-                 *                     relayed over some I/O facility, but in this
-                 *                     test program, we're the server, too:
-                 *
-                 * server_io:          server's SSL communication
-                 *
-                 * server:             pseudo-I/O for SSL library
-                 *
-                 * s_ssl_bio:          SSL filter BIO
-                 *
-                 * The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair":
-                 * client + client_io, server + server_io.
-                 * BIO pairs are symmetric.  A BIO pair behaves similar
-                 * to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must
-                 * be handled by the same thread).
-                 * [Here we could connect client and server to the ends
-                 * of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less
-                 * suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.]
-                 *
-                 * Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints:
-                 *
-                 * BIO_ctrl_pending(bio)              number of bytes we can read now
-                 * BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio)     number of bytes needed to fulfil
-                 *                                      other side's read attempt
-                 * BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio)   number of bytes we can write now
-                 *
-                 * ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee;
-                 * it depends on the application which one you should use.
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * c_ssl_bio:          SSL filter BIO
+         *
+         * client:             pseudo-I/O for SSL library
+         *
+         * client_io:          client's SSL communication; usually to be
+         *                     relayed over some I/O facility, but in this
+         *                     test program, we're the server, too:
+         *
+         * server_io:          server's SSL communication
+         *
+         * server:             pseudo-I/O for SSL library
+         *
+         * s_ssl_bio:          SSL filter BIO
+         *
+         * The client and the server each employ a "BIO pair":
+         * client + client_io, server + server_io.
+         * BIO pairs are symmetric.  A BIO pair behaves similar
+         * to a non-blocking socketpair (but both endpoints must
+         * be handled by the same thread).
+         * [Here we could connect client and server to the ends
+         * of a single BIO pair, but then this code would be less
+         * suitable as an example for BIO pairs in general.]
+         *
+         * Useful functions for querying the state of BIO pair endpoints:
+         *
+         * BIO_ctrl_pending(bio)              number of bytes we can read now
+         * BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(bio)     number of bytes needed to fulfil
+         *                                      other side's read attempt
+         * BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee(bio)   number of bytes we can write now
+         *
+         * ..._read_request is never more than ..._write_guarantee;
+         * it depends on the application which one you should use.
+         */

 
         /*
          * We have non-blocking behaviour throughout this test program, but
 
         /*
          * We have non-blocking behaviour throughout this test program, but


@@ -1569,10 +1569,10 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
                 printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
                        SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
 /*-
                 printf("server waiting in SSL_accept - %s\n",
                        SSL_state_string_long(s_ssl));
 /*-

-                        else if (s_write)
-                                printf("server:SSL_write()\n");
-                        else
-                                printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */
+            else if (s_write)
+                printf("server:SSL_write()\n");
+            else
+                printf("server:SSL_read()\n"); */

         }
 
         if (do_client && debug) {
         }
 
         if (do_client && debug) {


@@ -1580,10 +1580,10 @@ int doit(SSL *s_ssl, SSL *c_ssl, long count)
                 printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
                        SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
 /*-
                 printf("client waiting in SSL_connect - %s\n",
                        SSL_state_string_long(c_ssl));
 /*-

-                        else if (c_write)
-                                printf("client:SSL_write()\n");
-                        else
-                                printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */
+            else if (c_write)
+                printf("client:SSL_write()\n");
+            else
+                printf("client:SSL_read()\n"); */

         }
 
         if (!do_client && !do_server) {
         }
 
         if (!do_client && !do_server) {

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 45157fe69957d9cfeeb97f16856e9ffd35a7078f..243a70f7a6086539a169d9145dee026f1e63c2d2 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -386,14 +386,14 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
         unsigned long size_str;
         long lenmax;
 
         unsigned long size_str;
         long lenmax;
 

-                /*-
-                 * check for enough space.
-                 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
-                 * 2 for servernamelist length
-                 * 1 for the hostname type
-                 * 2 for hostname length
-                 * + hostname length
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 for the servername type and entension length
+         * 2 for servernamelist length
+         * 1 for the hostname type
+         * 2 for hostname length
+         * + hostname length
+         */

 
         if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
             || (size_str =
 
         if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
             || (size_str =


@@ -447,12 +447,12 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
             return NULL;
         }
 
             return NULL;
         }
 

-                /*-
-                 * check for enough space.
-                 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
-                 * 1 for the srp user identity
-                 * + srp user identity length
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * check for enough space.
+         * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
+         * 1 for the srp user identity
+         * + srp user identity length
+         */

         if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
             return NULL;
 
         if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
             return NULL;
 


@@ -622,11 +622,11 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
         return NULL;
     s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
     s2n(1, ret);
         return NULL;
     s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
     s2n(1, ret);

-        /*-
-         * Set mode:
-         * 1: peer may send requests
-         * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
-         */
+    /*-
+     * Set mode:
+     * 1: peer may send requests
+     * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+     */

     if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
         *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
     else
     if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
         *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
     else


@@ -855,11 +855,11 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
             return NULL;
         s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
         s2n(1, ret);
             return NULL;
         s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
         s2n(1, ret);

-                /*-
-                 * Set mode:
-                 * 1: peer may send requests
-                 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
-                 */
+        /*-
+         * Set mode:
+         * 1: peer may send requests
+         * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
+         */

         if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
             *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
         else
         if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
             *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
         else


@@ -1399,23 +1399,23 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
         else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
                  s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
         else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
                  s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {

-                        /*-
-                         * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
-                         * renegotiation.
-                         *
-                         * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
-                         * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
-                         * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
-                         * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
-                         * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
-                         * anything like that, but this might change).
-                         *
-                         * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
-                         * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
-                         * 0.  (We are talking about a check that will happen
-                         * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
-                         * Finished message could have been computed.)
-                         */
+            /*-
+             * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
+             * renegotiation.
+             *
+             * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
+             * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
+             * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
+             * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
+             * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
+             * anything like that, but this might change).
+             *
+             * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
+             * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
+             * 0.  (We are talking about a check that will happen
+             * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
+             * Finished message could have been computed.)
+             */

             s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
         }
 # endif
             s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
         }
 # endif


@@ -2676,16 +2676,16 @@ int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
      */
     OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
 
      */
     OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
 

-        /*-
-         * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
-         * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
-         * some random stuff.
-         *  - Message Type, 1 byte
-         *  - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
-         *  - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
-         *  - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
-         *  - Padding
-         */
+    /*-
+     * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
+     * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
+     * some random stuff.
+     *  - Message Type, 1 byte
+     *  - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
+     *  - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
+     *  - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
+     *  - Padding
+     */

     buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
     p = buf;
     /* Message Type */
     buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
     p = buf;
     /* Message Type */

diff --git a/test/methtest.c b/test/methtest.c
index eb8cb304545743f868f9f4d96de9ae28d98d5dde..de66c1063ba2ce82ebe6beb87f1a93974a8e25cc 100644 (file)
--- a/test/methtest.c
+++ b/test/methtest.c
@@ -86,13 +86,13 @@ char *argv[];
     METH_arg(tmp2, METH_TYPE_DIR, "/usr/local/ssl/certs");
     METH_push(top, METH_X509_CA_BY_SUBJECT, tmp2);
 
     METH_arg(tmp2, METH_TYPE_DIR, "/usr/local/ssl/certs");
     METH_push(top, METH_X509_CA_BY_SUBJECT, tmp2);
 

-/*-     tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_dir);
-        METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_DIR,"/home/eay/.mycerts");
-        METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);
+/*- tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_dir);
+    METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_DIR,"/home/eay/.mycerts");
+    METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);

 
 

-        tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_primary);
-        METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_FILE,"/home/eay/.mycerts/primary.pem");
-        METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);
+    tmp=METH_new(x509_by_issuer_primary);
+    METH_arg(tmp,METH_TYPE_FILE,"/home/eay/.mycerts/primary.pem");
+    METH_push(top,METH_X509_BY_ISSUER,tmp);

 */
 
     METH_init(top);
 */
 
     METH_init(top);