Allow for higher granularity of entropy estimates by using 'double'

instead of 'unsigned' counters.
Seed PRNG in MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/GetHTTPS.cpp.

Partially submitted by Yoram Meroz <yoram@mail.idrive.com>.

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 74253ca4e3b104580b97fe23a07dbbad4ad67074..7641ec98ebaf00c9fd292d902f920a31c9a333e9 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -231,7 +231,9 @@
      has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data
      (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded).  Also an error is recorded on the thread's
      error queue. New function RAND_pseudo_bytes() generates output that is
      has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data
      (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded).  Also an error is recorded on the thread's
      error queue. New function RAND_pseudo_bytes() generates output that is

-     guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable.
+     guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like
+     RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate
+     (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy).

      [Ulf Möller]
 
   *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically,
      [Ulf Möller]
 
   *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically,

diff --git a/MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/GetHTTPS.cpp b/MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/GetHTTPS.cpp
index 8e02333154955d895d867c5e9e4610b6efb38426..ed8e1cc962f1aa9a587645e814fd6fc135e1d487 100644 (file)
--- a/MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/GetHTTPS.cpp
+++ b/MacOS/GetHTTPS.src/GetHTTPS.cpp
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
  *                             Also-- before attempting to compile this, make sure the aliases in "OpenSSL-0.9.4:include:openssl" 
  *                             are installed!  Use the AppleScript applet in the "openssl-0.9.4" folder to do this!
  */
  *                             Also-- before attempting to compile this, make sure the aliases in "OpenSSL-0.9.4:include:openssl" 
  *                             are installed!  Use the AppleScript applet in the "openssl-0.9.4" folder to do this!
  */

+/* modified to seed the PRNG */

 
 
 //     Include some funky libs I've developed over time
 
 
 //     Include some funky libs I've developed over time


@@ -32,8 +33,9 @@
 
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>

+#include <openssl/rand.h>

 
 

-
+#include <timer.h>

 
 //     Let's try grabbing some data from here:
 
 
 //     Let's try grabbing some data from here:
 


@@ -77,8 +79,11 @@ SSL_CTX                              *ssl_ctx = nil;
 SSL                                    *ssl = nil;
 
 char                           tempString[256];
 SSL                                    *ssl = nil;
 
 char                           tempString[256];

-
+UnsignedWide           microTickCount;

        
        

+#warning   -- USE A TRUE RANDOM SEED, AND ADD ENTROPY WHENEVER POSSIBLE. --
+const char seed[] = "uyq9,7-b(VHGT^%$&^F/,876;,;./lkJHGFUY{PO*";       // Just gobbledygook
+

        printf("OpenSSL Demo by Roy Wood, roy@centricsystems.ca\n\n");
        
        BailIfError(errCode = MacSocket_Startup());
        printf("OpenSSL Demo by Roy Wood, roy@centricsystems.ca\n\n");
        
        BailIfError(errCode = MacSocket_Startup());


@@ -113,6 +118,10 @@ char                               tempString[256];
 //     ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
                        
 
 //     ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv3_client_method());
                        
 

+       RAND_seed (seed, sizeof (seed));
+       Microseconds (&microTickCount);
+       RAND_add (&microTickCount, sizeof (microTickCount), 0);         // Entropy is actually > 0, needs an estimate
+

        //      Create an SSL thingey and try to negotiate the connection
        
        ssl = SSL_new(ssl_ctx);
        //      Create an SSL thingey and try to negotiate the connection
        
        ssl = SSL_new(ssl_ctx);

diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index be08e06658d17a256eb78b1e379f40538e2ffa0c..34843d04dbe32c39432edd2c4f8a79af5df57e5e 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 

-#define ENTROPY_NEEDED 16  /* require 128 bits of randomness */
+#define ENTROPY_NEEDED 16  /* require 128 bits = 16 bytes of randomness */

 
 #ifndef MD_RAND_DEBUG
 # ifndef NDEBUG
 
 #ifndef MD_RAND_DEBUG
 # ifndef NDEBUG


@@ -138,13 +138,13 @@ static int state_num=0,state_index=0;
 static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 static long md_count[2]={0,0};
 static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 static long md_count[2]={0,0};

-static unsigned entropy=0;
+static double entropy=0;

 
 const char *RAND_version="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 
 static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
 static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
 
 const char *RAND_version="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 
 static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void);
 static void ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);

-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, int add_entropy);
+static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);

 static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
 static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
 
 static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
 static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
 


@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void)
        entropy=0;
        }
 
        entropy=0;
        }
 

-static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, int add)
+static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)

        {
        int i,j,k,st_idx;
        long md_c[2];
        {
        int i,j,k,st_idx;
        long md_c[2];


@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static void ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, int add)
 #ifndef THREADS        
        assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
 #endif
 #ifndef THREADS        
        assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
 #endif

-       if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED)
+       if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */

            entropy += add;
        }
 
            entropy += add;
        }
 

diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand.h b/crypto/rand/rand.h
index b5d2166b060e68d5c12e0b8cb8c7bd8f7f0e6d25..e5d6696cb40c56403d848f919b5aafd60ff659ff 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rand/rand.h
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand.h
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ typedef struct rand_meth_st
        void (*seed)(const void *buf, int num);
        int (*bytes)(unsigned char *buf, int num);
        void (*cleanup)(void);
        void (*seed)(const void *buf, int num);
        int (*bytes)(unsigned char *buf, int num);
        void (*cleanup)(void);

-       void (*add)(const void *buf, int num, int entropy);
+       void (*add)(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);

        int (*pseudorand)(unsigned char *buf, int num);
        } RAND_METHOD;
 
        int (*pseudorand)(unsigned char *buf, int num);
        } RAND_METHOD;
 


@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ void RAND_cleanup(void );
 int  RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
 int  RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
 void RAND_seed(const void *buf,int num);
 int  RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
 int  RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
 void RAND_seed(const void *buf,int num);

-void RAND_add(const void *buf,int num,int entropy);
+void RAND_add(const void *buf,int num,double entropy);

 int  RAND_load_file(const char *file,long max_bytes);
 int  RAND_write_file(const char *file);
 const char *RAND_file_name(char *file,int num);
 int  RAND_load_file(const char *file,long max_bytes);
 int  RAND_write_file(const char *file);
 const char *RAND_file_name(char *file,int num);

diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 9a0b804292bc4c907627f8187316caabc3923999..b09a300c46e5bb84353ab6de01a0cc6b24a88e79 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
                rand_meth->seed(buf,num);
        }
 
                rand_meth->seed(buf,num);
        }
 

-void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, int entropy)
+void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy)

        {
        if (rand_meth != NULL)
                rand_meth->add(buf,num,entropy);
        {
        if (rand_meth != NULL)
                rand_meth->add(buf,num,entropy);

diff --git a/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod b/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod
index 10be71a8948a064c17c894e58b355a976ea9da86..927c59d4c3a582b8af08068f8b11da06169b1763 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/RAND_add.pod
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ RAND_add, RAND_seed, RAND_screen - Add entropy to the PRNG
 
  void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);
 
 
  void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);
 

- void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, int entropy);
+ void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);

 
  void RAND_screen(void);
 
 
  void RAND_screen(void);
 


@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ increases the uncertainty about the state and makes the PRNG output
 less predictable. Suitable input comes from user interaction (random
 key presses, mouse movements) and certain hardware events. The
 B<entropy> argument is (the lower bound of) an estimate of how much
 less predictable. Suitable input comes from user interaction (random
 key presses, mouse movements) and certain hardware events. The
 B<entropy> argument is (the lower bound of) an estimate of how much

-randomness is contained in B<buf>. Details about sources of randomness
-and how to estimate their entropy can be found in the literature,
-e.g. RFC 1750.
+randomness is contained in B<buf>, measured in bytes. Details about
+sources of randomness and how to estimate their entropy can be found
+in the literature, e.g. RFC 1750.

 
 RAND_add() may be called with sensitive data such as user entered
 passwords. The seed values cannot be recovered from the PRNG output.
 
 RAND_add() may be called with sensitive data such as user entered
 passwords. The seed values cannot be recovered from the PRNG output.