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2d2a5ba)
operations no longer require two distinct BN_CTX structures. This may put
more "strain" on the current BN_CTX implementation (which has a fixed limit
to the number of variables it will hold), but so far this limit is not
triggered by any of the tests pass and I will be changing BN_CTX in the
near future to avoid this problem anyway.
This also changes the default RSA implementation code to use the BN_CTX in
favour of initialising some of its variables locally in each function.
Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.8 [xx XXX xxxx]
Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.8 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Add a missing BN_CTX parameter to the 'rsa_mod_exp' callback in RSA_METHOD
+ to allow all RSA operations to function using a single BN_CTX.
+ [Geoff Thorpe]
+
*) Preliminary support for certificate policy evaluation and checking. This
is initially intended to pass the tests outlined in "Conformance Testing
of Relying Party Client Certificate Path Processing Logic" v1.07.
*) Preliminary support for certificate policy evaluation and checking. This
is initially intended to pass the tests outlined in "Conformance Testing
of Relying Party Client Certificate Path Processing Logic" v1.07.
int (*rsa_priv_dec)(int flen,const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to,
RSA *rsa,int padding);
int (*rsa_priv_dec)(int flen,const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to,
RSA *rsa,int padding);
- int (*rsa_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r0,const BIGNUM *I,RSA *rsa); /* Can be null */
+ int (*rsa_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r0,const BIGNUM *I,RSA *rsa,BN_CTX *ctx); /* Can be null */
int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); /* Can be null */
int (*bn_mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); /* Can be null */
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
{
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
* length of the modulus */
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
* length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
- i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
+ j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
+ i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
to[k]=0;
r=num;
err:
for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
to[k]=0;
r=num;
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
-
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if(!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
{
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+ { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa,ctx)) goto err; }
else
{
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
else
{
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
}
if (blinding)
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
}
if (blinding)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
* length of the modulus */
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
* length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
- i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
+ j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
+ i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
to[k]=0;
r=num;
err:
for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
to[k]=0;
r=num;
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (local_blinding)
BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
if (buf != NULL)
if (local_blinding)
BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
if (buf != NULL)
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
int j,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
int j,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
int local_blinding = 0;
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
- ctx=BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
-
+ if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-
- if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if(!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* make data into a big number */
}
/* make data into a big number */
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
- if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
/* do the decrypt */
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
/* do the decrypt */
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
+ { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa,ctx)) goto err; }
else
{
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
else
{
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n))
goto err;
}
if (blinding)
rsa->_method_mod_n))
goto err;
}
if (blinding)
- if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
- j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+ j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (local_blinding)
BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
if (buf != NULL)
if (local_blinding)
BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
if (buf != NULL)
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
int i,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
int i,num=0,r= -1;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- BN_init(&f);
- BN_init(&ret);
- ctx=BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
-
+ if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (buf == NULL)
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if(!f || !ret || !buf)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
- if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
{
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
goto err;
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
p=buf;
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
p=buf;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err:
- if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(&f);
- BN_clear_free(&ret);
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
if (buf != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
- BN_init(&m1);
- BN_init(&r1);
- BN_init(&vrfy);
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
+ if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
* affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
if (BN_get_sign(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
* affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
if (BN_get_sign(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(r0,r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
* adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
* negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
* adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
* negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
*/
if (BN_get_sign(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
*/
if (BN_get_sign(r0))
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
/* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
* will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
* the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
* for absolute equality, just congruency. */
/* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
* will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
* the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
* for absolute equality, just congruency. */
- if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
- if (BN_get_sign(&vrfy))
- if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
- if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
+ if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
+ if (BN_get_sign(vrfy))
+ if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
/* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
* miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
* mod_exp and return that instead. */
/* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
* miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
* mod_exp and return that instead. */
- BN_clear_free(&m1);
- BN_clear_free(&r1);
- BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
/* RSA stuff */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* RSA stuff */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static int aep_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa);
+static int aep_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
#endif
/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
#endif
/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static int aep_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
+static int aep_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
int to_return = 0;
AEP_RV rv = AEP_R_OK;
int to_return = 0;
AEP_RV rv = AEP_R_OK;
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
if (!aep_dso)
{
AEPHKerr(AEPHK_F_AEP_RSA_MOD_EXP,AEPHK_R_NOT_LOADED);
if (!aep_dso)
{
AEPHKerr(AEPHK_F_AEP_RSA_MOD_EXP,AEPHK_R_NOT_LOADED);
if (rv == FAIL_TO_SW){
const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
if (rv == FAIL_TO_SW){
const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
- to_return = (*meth->rsa_mod_exp)(r0, I, rsa);
+ to_return = (*meth->rsa_mod_exp)(r0, I, rsa, ctx);
goto err;
}
else if (rv != AEP_R_OK)
goto err;
}
else if (rv != AEP_R_OK)
- if(ctx)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return to_return;
}
#endif
return to_return;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* RSA stuff */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* RSA stuff */
-static int atalla_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa);
+static int atalla_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
#endif
/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
static int atalla_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
#endif
/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
static int atalla_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-static int atalla_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
+static int atalla_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
int to_return = 0;
if(!atalla_dso)
int to_return = 0;
if(!atalla_dso)
ATALLAerr(ATALLA_F_ATALLA_RSA_MOD_EXP,ATALLA_R_NOT_LOADED);
goto err;
}
ATALLAerr(ATALLA_F_ATALLA_RSA_MOD_EXP,ATALLA_R_NOT_LOADED);
goto err;
}
- if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
if(!rsa->d || !rsa->n)
{
ATALLAerr(ATALLA_F_ATALLA_RSA_MOD_EXP,ATALLA_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
if(!rsa->d || !rsa->n)
{
ATALLAerr(ATALLA_F_ATALLA_RSA_MOD_EXP,ATALLA_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
}
to_return = atalla_mod_exp(r0, I, rsa->d, rsa->n, ctx);
err:
}
to_return = atalla_mod_exp(r0, I, rsa->d, rsa->n, ctx);
err:
- if(ctx)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return to_return;
}
#endif
return to_return;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* RSA stuff */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* RSA stuff */
-static int cswift_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa);
+static int cswift_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
#endif
/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
static int cswift_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
#endif
/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
static int cswift_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-static int cswift_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
+static int cswift_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
- if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
if(!rsa->p || !rsa->q || !rsa->dmp1 || !rsa->dmq1 || !rsa->iqmp)
{
CSWIFTerr(CSWIFT_F_CSWIFT_RSA_MOD_EXP,CSWIFT_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
if(!rsa->p || !rsa->q || !rsa->dmp1 || !rsa->dmq1 || !rsa->iqmp)
{
CSWIFTerr(CSWIFT_F_CSWIFT_RSA_MOD_EXP,CSWIFT_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
to_return = cswift_mod_exp_crt(r0, I, rsa->p, rsa->q, rsa->dmp1,
rsa->dmq1, rsa->iqmp, ctx);
err:
to_return = cswift_mod_exp_crt(r0, I, rsa->p, rsa->q, rsa->dmp1,
rsa->dmq1, rsa->iqmp, ctx);
err:
- if(ctx)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return to_return;
}
#endif
return to_return;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* RSA stuff */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
/* RSA stuff */
-static int hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa);
+static int hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
#endif
/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
#endif
/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
static int hwcrhk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
-static int hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
+static int hwcrhk_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
char tempbuf[1024];
HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
{
char tempbuf[1024];
HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf rmsg;
-static int nuron_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
+static int nuron_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
- return nuron_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,NULL);
+ return nuron_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx);
const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *dp,
const BIGNUM *dq, const BIGNUM *qinv, BN_CTX *ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
const BIGNUM *q, const BIGNUM *dp,
const BIGNUM *dq, const BIGNUM *qinv, BN_CTX *ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-static int ubsec_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa);
+static int ubsec_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
#endif
static int ubsec_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
#endif
static int ubsec_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
-static int ubsec_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
+static int ubsec_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
- if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- goto err;
-
if(!rsa->p || !rsa->q || !rsa->dmp1 || !rsa->dmq1 || !rsa->iqmp)
{
UBSECerr(UBSEC_F_UBSEC_RSA_MOD_EXP, UBSEC_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
if(!rsa->p || !rsa->q || !rsa->dmp1 || !rsa->dmq1 || !rsa->iqmp)
{
UBSECerr(UBSEC_F_UBSEC_RSA_MOD_EXP, UBSEC_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
* Do in software as hardware failed.
*/
const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
* Do in software as hardware failed.
*/
const RSA_METHOD *meth = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
- to_return = (*meth->rsa_mod_exp)(r0, I, rsa);
+ to_return = (*meth->rsa_mod_exp)(r0, I, rsa, ctx);
- if(ctx)
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return to_return;
}
#endif
return to_return;
}
#endif