synchronize with 0.9.7-stable version of this file

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 1c40b76a3d0c567f80b5fd276d07c544cbb09671..f686c85b92ce667dd59011b7c7ac4522a2978739 100644 (file)
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -281,7 +281,15 @@ TODO: bug: pad  x  with leading zeros if necessary
          EC_GROUP_get_nid()
      [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de, Bodo Moeller]
  
          EC_GROUP_get_nid()
      [Nils Larsch <nla@trustcenter.de, Bodo Moeller]
  

- Changes between 0.9.6g and 0.9.7  [XX xxx 2002]
+ Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.7  [XX xxx 2002]
+
+  *) Change from security patch (see 0.9.6e below) that did not affect
+     the 0.9.6 release series:
+
+     Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
+     supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
+     (CAN-2002-0657)
+     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]

 
   *) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712.
      [Richard Levitte]
 
   *) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712.
      [Richard Levitte]


@@ -292,9 +300,6 @@ TODO: bug: pad  x  with leading zeros if necessary
   *) The "block size" for block ciphers in CFB and OFB mode should be 1.
      [Steve Henson, reported by Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen <yngve@opera.com>]
 
   *) The "block size" for block ciphers in CFB and OFB mode should be 1.
      [Steve Henson, reported by Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen <yngve@opera.com>]
 

-  *) The "block size" for block ciphers in CFB and OFB mode should be 1.
-     [Steve Henson]
-

   *) Make sure tests can be performed even if the corresponding algorithms
      have been removed entirely.  This was also the last step to make
      OpenSSL compilable with DJGPP under all reasonable conditions.
   *) Make sure tests can be performed even if the corresponding algorithms
      have been removed entirely.  This was also the last step to make
      OpenSSL compilable with DJGPP under all reasonable conditions.


@@ -317,8 +322,8 @@ TODO: bug: pad  x  with leading zeros if necessary
        # Place yourself outside of the OpenSSL source tree.  In
        # this example, the environment variable OPENSSL_SOURCE
        # is assumed to contain the absolute OpenSSL source directory.
        # Place yourself outside of the OpenSSL source tree.  In
        # this example, the environment variable OPENSSL_SOURCE
        # is assumed to contain the absolute OpenSSL source directory.

-       mkdir -p objtree/`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`
-       cd objtree/`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`
+       mkdir -p objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`"
+       cd objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`"

        (cd $OPENSSL_SOURCE; find . -type f -o -type l) | while read F; do
                mkdir -p `dirname $F`
                ln -s $OPENSSL_SOURCE/$F $F
        (cd $OPENSSL_SOURCE; find . -type f -o -type l) | while read F; do
                mkdir -p `dirname $F`
                ln -s $OPENSSL_SOURCE/$F $F


@@ -2001,7 +2006,7 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      overflow checks added in 0.9.6e.  This prevents DoS (the
      assertions could call abort()).
      [Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>, Bodo Moeller]
      overflow checks added in 0.9.6e.  This prevents DoS (the
      assertions could call abort()).
      [Arne Ansper <arne@ats.cyber.ee>, Bodo Moeller]

-  
+

  Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e  [30 Jul 2002]
 
   *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject
  Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e  [30 Jul 2002]
 
   *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject


@@ -2052,11 +2057,6 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655)
      [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
 
      too small for 64 bit platforms. (CAN-2002-0655)
      [Matthew Byng-Maddick <mbm@aldigital.co.uk> and Ben Laurie (CHATS)>
 

-  *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
-     supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions.
-     (CAN-2002-0657)
-     [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
-

   *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
      supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656)
      [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]
   *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could
      supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CAN-2002-0656)
      [Ben Laurie (CHATS)]


@@ -2151,13 +2151,13 @@ des-cbc           3624.96k     5258.21k     5530.91k     5624.30k     5628.26k
      value is 0.
      [Richard Levitte]
 
      value is 0.
      [Richard Levitte]
 

-  *) Add the configuration target linux-s390x.
-     [Neale Ferguson <Neale.Ferguson@SoftwareAG-USA.com> via Richard Levitte]
-

   *) [In 0.9.6d-engine release:]
      Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey().
      [Toomas Kiisk <vix@cyber.ee> via Richard Levitte]
 
   *) [In 0.9.6d-engine release:]
      Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey().
      [Toomas Kiisk <vix@cyber.ee> via Richard Levitte]
 

+  *) Add the configuration target linux-s390x.
+     [Neale Ferguson <Neale.Ferguson@SoftwareAG-USA.com> via Richard Levitte]
+

   *) The earlier bugfix for the SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C case of
      ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c) incorrectly used a local flag
      variable as an indication that a ClientHello message has been
   *) The earlier bugfix for the SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C case of
      ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c) incorrectly used a local flag
      variable as an indication that a ClientHello message has been