Send bad_record_mac instead of decryption_failed

The decryption failed alert was deprecated a long time ago. It can
provide an attacker too much information to be able to distinguish between
MAC failures and decryption failures and can lead to oracle attacks.
Instead we should always use the bad_record_mac alert for these issues.
This fixes one instance that still exists. It does not represent a
security issue in this case because it is only ever sent if the record is
publicly invalid, i.e. we have detected it is invalid without using any
secret material.

Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10093)

diff --git a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
index a08b81c868ddc2e135d061ea17a5134a00f0f681..8e0b469cf4f8fa5ab59e27b8e390faae58d34e74 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
+++ b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
             RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
             return 1;
         }
             RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
             return 1;
         }

-        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,

                  SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
         return -1;
     }
                  SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
         return -1;
     }