* Fix a slight bug in the state-machine. This caused the client end of a
authorGeoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
Thu, 30 Nov 2000 01:34:26 +0000 (01:34 +0000)
committerGeoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
Thu, 30 Nov 2000 01:34:26 +0000 (01:34 +0000)
  tunnel to not pro-actively close down when failing an SSL handshake.

* Change the cert-chain callback - originally this was the same one used in
  s_client and s_server but the output's as ugly as sin, so I've prettied
  tunala's copy output up a bit (and made the output level configurable).

* Remove the superfluous "errors" from the SSL state callback - these are just
  non-blocking side-effects.

demos/tunala/cb.c
demos/tunala/tunala.c
demos/tunala/tunala.h

index 4633c09..ac7122d 100644 (file)
@@ -5,10 +5,15 @@
 /* For callbacks generating output, here are their file-descriptors. */
 static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_info = NULL;
 static FILE *fp_cb_ssl_verify = NULL;
+/* Output level:
+ *     0 = nothing,
+ *     1 = minimal, just errors,
+ *     2 = minimal, all steps,
+ *     3 = detail, all steps */
+static unsigned int cb_ssl_verify_level = 1;
 
 /* Other static rubbish (to mirror s_cb.c where required) */
 static int int_verify_depth = 10;
-static int int_verify_error = X509_V_OK;
 
 /* This function is largely borrowed from the one used in OpenSSL's "s_client"
  * and "s_server" utilities. */
@@ -26,12 +31,18 @@ void cb_ssl_info(SSL *s, int where, int ret)
        str2 = SSL_state_string_long(s);
 
        if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP)
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:%s\n", str1, str2);
+               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "(%s) %s\n", str1, str2);
        else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
                if (ret == 0)
-                       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:failed in %s\n", str1, str2);
+                       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "(%s) failed in %s\n", str1, str2);
+/* In a non-blocking model, we get a few of these "error"s simply because we're
+ * calling "reads" and "writes" on the state-machine that are virtual NOPs
+ * simply to avoid wasting the time seeing if we *should* call them. Removing
+ * this case makes the "-out_state" output a lot easier on the eye. */
+#if 0
                else if (ret < 0)
                        fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_info, "%s:error in %s\n", str1, str2);
+#endif
        }
 }
 
@@ -40,52 +51,65 @@ void cb_ssl_info_set_output(FILE *fp)
        fp_cb_ssl_info = fp;
 }
 
-/* Stolen wholesale from apps/s_cb.c :-) */
+static const char *int_reason_no_issuer = "X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT";
+static const char *int_reason_not_yet = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID";
+static const char *int_reason_before = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD";
+static const char *int_reason_expired = "X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED";
+static const char *int_reason_after = "X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD";
+
+/* Stolen wholesale from apps/s_cb.c :-) And since then, mutilated ... */
 int cb_ssl_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 {
-       char buf[256];
+       char buf1[256]; /* Used for the subject name */
+       char buf2[256]; /* Used for the issuer name */
+       const char *reason = NULL; /* Error reason (if any) */
        X509 *err_cert;
        int err, depth;
-       BIO *bio;
 
-       if(!fp_cb_ssl_verify)
+       if(!fp_cb_ssl_verify || (cb_ssl_verify_level == 0))
                return ok;
-       /* There's no <damned>FILE*</damned> version of ASN1_TIME_print */
-       bio = BIO_new_fp(fp_cb_ssl_verify, BIO_NOCLOSE);
        err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
        err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
        depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
 
-       X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
-       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "depth=%d %s\n", depth, buf);
-       if(!ok) {
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify,"verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
-                       X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
-               if((int)int_verify_depth >= depth)
-                       int_verify_error = err;
-               else
-                       int_verify_error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
-       }
+       buf1[0] = buf2[0] = '\0';
+       /* Fill buf1 */
+       X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf1, 256);
+       /* Fill buf2 */
+       X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf2, 256);
        switch (ctx->error) {
        case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
-               X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert),
-                               buf, 256);
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "issuer= %s\n", buf);
+               reason = int_reason_no_issuer;
                break;
        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+               reason = int_reason_not_yet;
+               break;
        case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "notBefore=");
-               ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert));
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "\n");
+               reason = int_reason_before;
                break;
        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+               reason = int_reason_expired;
+               break;
        case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "notAfter=");
-               ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert));
-               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "\n");
+               reason = int_reason_after;
                break;
        }
-       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "verify return:%d\n",ok);
+
+       if((cb_ssl_verify_level == 1) && ok)
+               return ok;
+       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "chain-depth=%d, ", depth);
+       if(reason)
+               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "error=%s\n", reason);
+       else
+               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "error=%d\n", err);
+       if(cb_ssl_verify_level < 3)
+               return ok;
+       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> subject = %s\n", buf1);
+       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> issuer  = %s\n", buf2);
+       if(!ok)
+               fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify,"--> verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
+                       X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+       fprintf(fp_cb_ssl_verify, "--> verify return:%d\n",ok);
        return ok;
 }
 
@@ -99,5 +123,11 @@ void cb_ssl_verify_set_depth(unsigned int verify_depth)
        int_verify_depth = verify_depth;
 }
 
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_level(unsigned int level)
+{
+       if(level < 4)
+               cb_ssl_verify_level = level;
+}
+
 #endif /* !defined(NO_OPENSSL) */
 
index 19d7d11..2b3d65d 100644 (file)
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static const char *def_engine_id = NULL;
 static int def_server_mode = 0;
 static const char *def_cipher_list = NULL;
 static int def_out_state = 0;
-static int def_out_verify = 0;
+static unsigned int def_out_verify = 0;
 static int def_verify_mode = 0;
 static unsigned int def_verify_depth = 10;
 
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static const char *helpstring =
 " -server <0|1>          (default = 0, ie. an SSL client)\n"
 " -cipher <list>         (specifies cipher list to use)\n"
 " -out_state             (prints SSL handshake states)\n"
-" -out_verify            (prints certificate verification states)\n"
+" -out_verify <0|1|2|3>  (prints certificate verification states: def=1)\n"
 " -v_peer                (verify the peer certificate)\n"
 " -v_strict              (do not continue if peer doesn't authenticate)\n"
 " -v_once                (no verification in renegotiates)\n"
@@ -180,6 +180,20 @@ static int parse_server_mode(const char *s, int *servermode)
        return 1;
 }
 
+static int parse_verify_level(const char *s, unsigned int *verify_level)
+{
+       unsigned long l;
+       char *temp;
+       l = strtoul(s, &temp, 10);
+       if((temp == s) || (*temp != '\0') || (l > 3)) {
+               fprintf(stderr, "Error, '%s' is an invalid value for "
+                               "out_verify\n", s);
+               return 0;
+       }
+       *verify_level = (unsigned int)l;
+       return 1;
+}
+
 static int parse_verify_depth(const char *s, unsigned int *verify_depth)
 {
        unsigned long l;
@@ -215,7 +229,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
        int server_mode = def_server_mode;
        const char *cipher_list = def_cipher_list;
        int out_state = def_out_state;
-       int out_verify = def_out_verify;
+       unsigned int out_verify = def_out_verify;
        int verify_mode = def_verify_mode;
        unsigned int verify_depth = def_verify_depth;
 
@@ -310,7 +324,11 @@ next_arg:
                        out_state = 1;
                        goto next_arg;
                } else if(strcmp(*argv, "-out_verify") == 0) {
-                       out_verify = 1;
+                       if(argc < 2)
+                               return usage("-out_verify requires an argument", 0);
+                       argc--; argv++;
+                       if(!parse_verify_level(*argv, &out_verify))
+                               return 1;
                        goto next_arg;
                } else if(strcmp(*argv, "-v_peer") == 0) {
                        verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
@@ -570,8 +588,10 @@ static SSL_CTX *initialise_ssl_ctx(int server_mode, const char *engine_id,
                cb_ssl_info_set_output(stderr);
 
        /* out_verify */
-       if(out_verify)
+       if(out_verify > 0) {
                cb_ssl_verify_set_output(stderr);
+               cb_ssl_verify_set_level(out_verify);
+       }
 
        /* verify_depth */
        cb_ssl_verify_set_depth(verify_depth);
@@ -857,7 +877,7 @@ static int tunala_item_io(tunala_selector_t *selector, tunala_item_t *item)
                        return 0;
        }
        if((item->dirty_read == -1) || (item->dirty_send == -1)) {
-               if(state_machine_close_dirty(&item->sm))
+               if(!state_machine_close_dirty(&item->sm))
                        return 0;
        }
        return 1;
index 1aaa3e0..7d4e35d 100644 (file)
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ void cb_ssl_info_set_output(FILE *fp); /* Called if output should be sent too */
 int cb_ssl_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
 void cb_ssl_verify_set_output(FILE *fp);
 void cb_ssl_verify_set_depth(unsigned int verify_depth);
+void cb_ssl_verify_set_level(unsigned int level);
 #endif /* !defined(NO_OPENSSL) */
 #endif /* !defined(NO_BUFFER) */