# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_SESSION_TICKET 460
# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_STATUS_REQUEST 461
# define SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_USE_SRTP 462
+# define SSL_F_TLS_EXT_FINAL_ 484
+# define SSL_F_TLS_EXT_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS 485
+# define SSL_F_TLS_EXT_FINAL_EMS 486
# define SSL_F_TLS_EXT_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE 483
# define SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY 351
# define SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER 387
"tls_construct_server_status_request"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_USE_SRTP),
"tls_construct_server_use_srtp"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_EXT_FINAL_), "tls_ext_final_ems"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_EXT_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS),
+ "tls_ext_final_ec_pt_formats"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_EXT_FINAL_EMS), "tls_ext_final_ems"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_EXT_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE), "tls_ext_final_renegotiate"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY), "tls_get_message_body"},
{ERR_FUNC(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER), "tls_get_message_header"},
void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s);
__owur int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s);
-__owur int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
__owur RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts,
size_t numexts,
unsigned int type);
static int tls_ext_init_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int tls_ext_final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
int *al);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static int tls_ext_final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
+ int *al);
+#endif
+static int tls_ext_init_session_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
static int tls_ext_init_status_request(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
+static int tls_ext_final_status_request(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
+ int *al);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
static int tls_ext_init_npn(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
static int tls_ext_init_srp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
static int tls_ext_init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
+static int tls_ext_init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
+static int tls_ext_final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
static int tls_ext_init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context);
#endif
tls_parse_server_ec_pt_formats,
tls_construct_server_ec_pt_formats,
tls_construct_client_ec_pt_formats,
- NULL,
+ tls_ext_final_ec_pt_formats,
EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY
},
{
#endif
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,
- NULL,
+ tls_ext_init_session_ticket,
tls_parse_client_session_ticket,
tls_parse_server_session_ticket,
tls_construct_server_session_ticket,
tls_parse_server_status_request,
tls_construct_server_status_request,
tls_construct_client_status_request,
- NULL,
+ tls_ext_final_status_request,
EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
| EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE
},
#endif
{
TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,
- NULL,
+ tls_ext_init_ems,
tls_parse_client_ems,
tls_parse_server_ems,
tls_construct_server_ems,
tls_construct_client_ems,
- NULL,
+ tls_ext_final_ems,
EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY
},
{
static int tls_ext_final_renegotiate(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
int *al)
{
- if (!s->server)
+ if (!s->server) {
+ /*
+ * Check if we can connect to a server that doesn't support safe
+ * renegotiation
+ */
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
+ && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
+ && !sent) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EXT_FINAL_RENEGOTIATE,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 1;
+ }
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
if (s->renegotiate
return 0;
}
+
return 1;
}
int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
int altmp = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- if (!s->server)
- return 1;
-
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &altmp,
s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
}
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static int tls_ext_final_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
+ int *al)
+{
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+
+ if (s->server)
+ return 1;
+
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
+ * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
+ * must contain uncompressed.
+ */
+ if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
+ && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+ && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
+ && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
+ /* we are using an ECC cipher */
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned char *list;
+ int found_uncompressed = 0;
+ list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
+ if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
+ found_uncompressed = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found_uncompressed) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EXT_FINAL_EC_PT_FORMATS,
+ SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int tls_ext_init_session_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
+{
+ if (!s->server)
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int tls_ext_init_status_request(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
if (s->server)
return 1;
}
+static int tls_ext_final_status_request(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent,
+ int *al)
+{
+ if (s->server)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
+ * that we don't receive a status message
+ */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
static int tls_ext_init_npn(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
- if (s->server)
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
return 1;
}
static int tls_ext_init_alpn(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+ s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
if (s->server) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
}
-
return 1;
}
static int tls_ext_init_etm(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
- if (s->server)
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls_ext_init_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
+{
+ if (!s->server)
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls_ext_final_ems(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
+{
+ if (!s->server && s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
+ * original session.
+ */
+ if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
+ !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EXT_FINAL_EMS, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
return 1;
}
return 1;
}
-
-static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
-{
- RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
- PACKET extpkt;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
-
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
-
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
- /* Extensions block may be completely absent in SSLv3 */
- if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
- return 0;
- }
- PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
- }
-
- /*
- * TODO(TLS1.3): We give multiple contexts for now until we're ready to
- * give something more specific
- */
-
- if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
- | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
- &extensions, al))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
- * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
- * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
- * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
- * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
- */
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)
- && !extensions[TLSEXT_IDX_renegotiate].present) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
- | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
- | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
- extensions,al))
- return 0;
-
- if (s->hit) {
- /*
- * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
- * original session.
- */
- if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
- !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /*
- * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
- * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
- * must contain uncompressed.
- */
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
- && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
- /* we are using an ECC cipher */
- size_t i;
- unsigned char *list;
- int found_uncompressed = 0;
- list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
- if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
- found_uncompressed = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!found_uncompressed) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->
- initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
- /*
- * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
- * that we don't receive a status message
- */
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
-
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->servername_done = 0;
- default:
- return 1;
- }
-}
-
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
-{
- int al = -1;
- if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
- return 1;
- if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
- PACKET session_id;
+ PACKET session_id, extpkt;
size_t session_id_len;
const unsigned char *cipherchars;
int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
unsigned int compression;
unsigned int sversion;
int protverr;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
SSL_COMP *comp;
#endif
#endif
/* TLS extensions */
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- /* wrong packet length */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
+ PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
+ } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): We give multiple contexts for now until we're ready to
+ * give something more specific
+ */
+
+ if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+ | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ &extensions, &al))
+ goto f_err;
+
+
+ if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
+ | EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
+ | EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
+ | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
+ extensions, &al))
+ goto f_err;
+
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
int tls_parse_server_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al);
int tls_parse_server_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al);
int tls_parse_server_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al);
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
projects / openssl.git / commitdiff