rk[j] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
ROTATE(tp9,24) ^ ROTATE(tpb,8);
#else
- rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
+ rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
(tp9 >> 8) ^ (tp9 << 24) ^
(tpb >> 24) ^ (tpb << 8);
#endif
rk[j] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
#else
- rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
+ rk[j] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
(tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
(tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
#endif
(u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
- /* now do the linear transform using words */
+ /* now do the linear transform using words */
{
int i;
u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m;
t[i] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
#else
- t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
+ t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
(tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
(tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
#endif
(u32)Td4[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16 ^
(u32)Td4[(s0 >> 24) ] << 24;
- /* now do the linear transform using words */
+ /* now do the linear transform using words */
{
int i;
u32 tp1, tp2, tp4, tp8, tp9, tpb, tpd, tpe, m;
t[i] = tpe ^ ROTATE(tpd,16) ^
ROTATE(tp9,8) ^ ROTATE(tpb,24);
#else
- t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
+ t[i] = tpe ^ (tpd >> 16) ^ (tpd << 16) ^
(tp9 >> 24) ^ (tp9 << 8) ^
(tpb >> 8) ^ (tpb << 24);
#endif
goto end;
if (j & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
const unsigned char *sp = p;
-
+
ep = p + len;
if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
goto end;
# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ASM */
/*-
- * BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards
+ * BN_div computes dv := num / divisor, rounding towards
* zero, and sets up rm such that dv*divisor + rm = num holds.
* Thus:
* dv->neg == num->neg ^ divisor->neg (unless the result is zero)
bn_check_top(m);
/*-
- * For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute
+ * For even modulus m = 2^k*m_odd, it might make sense to compute
* a^p mod m_odd and a^p mod 2^k separately (with Montgomery
* exponentiation for the odd part), using appropriate exponent
* reductions, and combine the results using the CRT.
* i.e.
* sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
*
- * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
+ * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
* Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
* i.e.
* sign*(Y + D*X)*a == B (mod |n|).
*
- * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
+ * So if we set (X, Y, sign) := (Y + D*X, X, -sign), we arrive back at
* -sign*X*a == B (mod |n|),
* sign*Y*a == A (mod |n|).
* Note that X and Y stay non-negative all the time.
*/
if (is_single_word) {
BN_ULONG size_limit;
-
+
if (bits == BN_BITS2) {
/*
* Shifting by this much has undefined behaviour so we do it a
static CONF_MODULE *module_find(const char *name);
static int module_init(CONF_MODULE *pmod, const char *name, const char *value,
const CONF *cnf);
-static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, const char *name,
+static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf, const char *name,
const char *value);
/* Main function: load modules from a CONF structure */
}
/* Load a module from a DSO */
-static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf,
+static CONF_MODULE *module_load_dso(const CONF *cnf,
const char *name, const char *value)
{
DSO *dso = NULL;
} else
BN_zero(group->cofactor);
-
/*
* Some groups have an order with
* factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail.
{
long ret = 1;
BIO *next;
-
+
next = BIO_next(b);
if (next == NULL)
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return -1;
-
+
len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
/*
* Spec says IV is 120 bits or fewer - it allows non byte aligned lengths.
- * We don't support this at this stage
+ * We don't support this at this stage
*/
if ((len > 15) || (len < 1) || (taglen > 16) || (taglen < 1)) {
return -1;
{"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet",
"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet",
NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet,7,&(lvalues[5609]),0},
-
+
{"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet",
"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet",
NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet,7,&(lvalues[5616]),0},
-
+
{"id-GostR3410-94-a","id-GostR3410-94-a",NID_id_GostR3410_94_a,7,
&(lvalues[5623]),0},
{"id-GostR3410-94-aBis","id-GostR3410-94-aBis",
BIO_free_all(btmp);
BIO_free_all(etmp);
BIO_free_all(bio);
- return NULL;
+ return NULL;
}
static BIO *PKCS7_find_digest(EVP_MD_CTX **pmd, BIO *bio, int nid)
/*
* Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid
* leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel
- * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
+ * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access
* pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|.
*
* TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL.
TSerr(TS_F_TS_GET_STATUS_TEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
-
+
for (i = 0, p = result; i < sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(text); ++i) {
ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
length = ASN1_STRING_length(current);
/*
* If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
- * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
+ * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
* Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
*/
if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
*/
void BN_with_flags(BIGNUM *dest, const BIGNUM *b, int flags);
-/* Wrapper function to make using BN_GENCB easier, */
+/* Wrapper function to make using BN_GENCB easier */
int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b);
BN_GENCB *BN_GENCB_new(void);
# define BUF_strlcpy(dst, src, size) OPENSSL_strlcpy(dst, src, size)
# define BUF_strlcat(dst, src, size) OPENSSL_strlcat(dst, src, size)
# define BUF_strnlen(str, maxlen) OPENSSL_strnlen(str, maxlen)
-
+
struct buf_mem_st {
size_t length; /* current number of bytes */
char *data;
# define ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR (4|ERR_R_FATAL)
# define ERR_R_DISABLED (5|ERR_R_FATAL)
# define ERR_R_INIT_FAIL (6|ERR_R_FATAL)
-# define ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT (7)
+# define ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT (7)
/*
* 99 is the maximum possible ERR_R_... code, higher values are reserved for
void PKCS12_PBE_add(void);
int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert,
STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
-PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *pass, const char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
- X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca, int nid_key, int nid_cert,
+PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(const char *pass, const char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
+ X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca, int nid_key, int nid_cert,
int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype);
PKCS12_SAFEBAG *PKCS12_add_cert(STACK_OF(PKCS12_SAFEBAG) **pbags, X509 *cert);
} SRP_VBASE;
/*
- * Internal structure storing N and g pair
+ * Internal structure storing N and g pair
*/
typedef struct SRP_gN_st {
char *id;
GENERAL_NAME *a2i_GENERAL_NAME(GENERAL_NAME *out,
const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method,
- X509V3_CTX *ctx, int gen_type,
+ X509V3_CTX *ctx, int gen_type,
const char *value, int is_nc);
# ifdef HEADER_CONF_H
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