X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Ft1_lib.c;h=e0f3425c5af9b5423d105875ce05164164eca620;hp=e120a87fc2bb78dc3a9f50833606e7baa16ac677;hb=5087afa108add621b4dd3dca0d921bf7774373d6;hpb=aa09c2c631f9e667f697370d9c24660f56a629f9

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index e120a87fc2..e0f3425c5a 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
 				const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
 				SSL_SESSION **psess);
+static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
+int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
 #endif
 
 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
@@ -239,6 +241,12 @@ static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
 		0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
 	};
 
+static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
+	{
+		0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
+		0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
+	};
+
 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
 	{
 	/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
@@ -318,22 +326,74 @@ static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
 		{
 		*pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
 		*pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+		return;
 		}
-	else
+	/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
+	switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
 		{
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+		*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+		*pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+		*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
+		*pcurveslen = 2;
+		break;
+
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+		*pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
+		*pcurveslen = 2;
+		break;
+	default:
 		*pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
 		*pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
 		}
-	/* If not set use default: for now static structure */
 	if (!*pcurves)
 		{
 		*pcurves = eccurves_default;
 		*pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
 		}
 	}
+/* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
+int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
+	{
+	const unsigned char *curves;
+	size_t curveslen, i;
+	unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+	if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
+		return 0;
+	/* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
+	if (suiteb_flags)
+		{
+		unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+		if (p[1])
+			return 0;
+		if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+			{
+			if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+				return 0;
+			}
+		else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+			{
+			if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+				return 0;
+			}
+		else	/* Should never happen */
+			return 0;
+		}
+	tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
+	for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
+		{
+		if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
+			return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
 
 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
- * matches.
+ * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
+ * an EC tmp key.
  */
 
 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
@@ -344,6 +404,25 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
 	/* Can't do anything on client side */
 	if (s->server == 0)
 		return -1;
+	if (nmatch == -2)
+		{
+		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+			{
+			/* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we 
+			 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
+			 * checks.
+			 */
+			unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+			if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+				return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
+			if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+				return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
+			/* Should never happen */
+			return NID_undef;
+			}
+		/* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
+		nmatch = 0;
+		}
 	tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
 				&supp, &supplen);
 	tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
@@ -446,6 +525,8 @@ int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
 	ncb.nidcnt = 0;
 	if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
 		return 0;
+	if (pext == NULL)
+		return 1;
 	return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
 	}
 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
@@ -523,6 +604,8 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
 		if (i == plen)
 			return 0;
 		}
+	if (!curve_id)
+		return 1;
 	/* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
 	for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
 		{
@@ -534,32 +617,136 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
 			}
 		if (i == plen)
 			return 0;
+		/* For clients can only check sent curve list */
+		if (!s->server)
+			return 1;
 		}
 	return 1;
 	}
-/* Check EC server key is compatible with client extensions */
-int tls1_check_ec_server_key(SSL *s)
+
+static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
+					size_t *pformatslen)
+	{
+	/* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
+	 * use default */
+	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
+		{
+		*pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+		*pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		*pformats = ecformats_default;
+		/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
+		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+			*pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
+		else
+			*pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
+		}
+	}
+
+/* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
+ * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
+ */
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
 	{
-	int rv;
-	CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->cert->pkeys + SSL_PKEY_ECC;
-	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
 	unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
-	if (!cpk->x509 || !cpk->privatekey)
-		return 0;
-	pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cpk->x509);
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+	int rv;
+	pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
 	if (!pkey)
 		return 0;
+	/* If not EC nothing to do */
+	if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
+		{
+		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+		return 1;
+		}
 	rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 	if (!rv)
 		return 0;
-	return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id);
+	/* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
+	 * supported curves extension.
+	 */
+	rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
+	if (!rv)
+		return 0;
+	/* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
+	 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
+	 */
+	if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
+		{
+		int check_md;
+		size_t i;
+		CERT *c = s->cert;
+		if (curve_id[0])
+			return 0;
+		/* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
+		if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+			check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
+		else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+			check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
+		else
+			return 0; /* Should never happen */
+		for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
+			if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+				break;
+		if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
+			return 0;
+		if (set_ee_md == 2)
+			{
+			if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
+			else
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
+			}
+		}
+	return rv;
 	}
 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
-int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
+int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
 	{
 	unsigned char curve_id[2];
 	EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+	/* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
+	if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+		return 1;
+#endif
+	/* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
+	 * no other curves permitted.
+	 */
+	if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+		{
+		/* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
+		if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
+			curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
+		else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
+			curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
+		else
+			return 0;
+		curve_id[0] = 0;
+		/* Check this curve is acceptable */
+		if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
+			return 0;
+		/* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
+		if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
+			return 1;
+		/* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
+		else 
+			{
+			unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
+			if (!ec)
+				return 0;
+			if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
+				return 0;
+			if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
+				return 1;
+			return 0;
+			}
+			
+		}
 	if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
 		{
 		/* Need a shared curve */
@@ -575,8 +762,13 @@ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
 			return 0;
 		}
 	if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
-		return 1;
+		return 0;
+/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
+#if 0
+	return 1;
+#else
 	return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
+#endif
 	}
 
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
@@ -627,19 +819,233 @@ static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
 #endif
 };
 
-int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
+	tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+	tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+};
+
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
 	{
-	size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+	/* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
+	 * preferences.
+	 */
+	switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
+		{
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+		return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
+
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
+		return 2;
+
+	case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+		*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
+		return 2;
+		}
+
+	/* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
+	if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
+		{
+		*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
+		return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
+		{
+		*psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
+		return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		*psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-	/* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
-	if (FIPS_mode())
-		slen -= 2;
+		/* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
+		if (FIPS_mode())
+			return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
+		else
+#endif
+			return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+		}
+	}
+/* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
+ * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
+ */
+int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
+				const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+	{
+	const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
+	size_t sent_sigslen, i;
+	int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+	/* Should never happen */
+	if (sigalg == -1)
+		return -1;
+	/* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+	if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+		{
+		unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
+		/* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
+		if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
+			return 0;
+		if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+			return 0;
+			}
+		/* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
+		if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+			{
+			if (curve_id[0])
+				return 0;
+			if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
+				{
+				if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+						SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+					return 0;
+					}
+				}
+			else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
+				{
+				if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+					{
+					SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+						SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+					return 0;
+					}
+				}
+			else
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
+	sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
+	for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
+		{
+		if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
+			break;
+		}
+	/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
+	if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	*pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
+	if (*pmd == NULL)
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	/* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
+	 * wish.
+	 */
+	if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
+		s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
+	return 1;
+	}
+/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
+ * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
+ * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
+ * session and not global settings.
+ * 
+ */
+void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
+	{
+	CERT *c = s->cert;
+	const unsigned char *sigalgs;
+	size_t i, sigalgslen;
+	int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
+	c->mask_a = 0;
+	c->mask_k = 0;
+	/* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
+	else
+		c->mask_ssl = 0;
+	/* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
+	 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
+	 * TLS 1.2.
+	 */
+	sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
+	for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
+		{
+		switch(sigalgs[1])
+			{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+		case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+			have_rsa = 1;
+			break;
 #endif
-	if (p)
-		memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
-	return (int)slen;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+		case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+			have_dsa = 1;
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+		case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+			have_ecdsa = 1;
+			break;
+#endif
+			}
+		}
+	/* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
+	 * signature algorithms.
+	 */
+	if (!have_rsa)
+		{
+		c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+		c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
+		}
+	if (!have_dsa)
+		{
+		c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
+		c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
+		}
+	if (!have_ecdsa)
+		{
+		c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+		c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
+		}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+	if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
+		{
+		c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
+		c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
+		}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+	/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+	if (!s->psk_client_callback)
+		{
+		c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+		c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+	c->valid = 1;
 	}
 
+/* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
+static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
+	{
+	unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
+	unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
+
+	if (a > b)
+		return 1;
+	else if (a < b)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
 	{
 	int extdatalen=0;
@@ -770,16 +1176,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		long lenmax; 
 		const unsigned char *plist;
 		size_t plistlen;
-		/* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
-		 * use default */
-		plist = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
-		if (plist)
-			plistlen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-		else
-			{
-			plist = ecformats_default;
-			plistlen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
-			}
+
+		tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
 
 		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
 		if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
@@ -859,13 +1257,16 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 
 	if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
 		{
-		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
+		size_t salglen;
+		const unsigned char *salg;
+		salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
+		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
 			return NULL; 
 		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
-		s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
-		s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
-		memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
-		ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+		s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
+		s2n(salglen, ret);
+		memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
+		ret += salglen;
 		}
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
@@ -981,7 +1382,27 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
                 ret += el;
                 }
 
-	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
+	/* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
+	/* 2 bytes for extension type */
+	/* 2 bytes for extension length */
+	/* 1 byte for the list length */
+	/* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
+	if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
+		{
+		size_t lenmax;
+                const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
+                const unsigned char list_len = 1;
+
+		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
+
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
+                /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
+		s2n(ext_len, ret);
+		*(ret++) = list_len;
+		*(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
+		}
+
+	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
 		return p;
 
 	s2n(extdatalen,p);
@@ -995,6 +1416,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 	int next_proto_neg_seen;
 #endif
+	unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+	unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+	int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+	using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
 
 	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
 	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
@@ -1036,25 +1461,28 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
         }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
-	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+	if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 		{
+		const unsigned char *plist;
+		size_t plistlen;
 		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
 
+		tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
+
 		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
-		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
-		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
+		if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
+		if (plistlen > 255)
 			{
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 			return NULL;
 			}
 		
 		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
-		s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
-		*(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
-		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
-		ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+		s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
+		*(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
+		memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
+		ret+=plistlen;
 
 		}
 	/* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
@@ -1168,6 +1596,79 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 #endif
 
+	/* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
+	 * to it. */
+	if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
+		{
+		size_t authz_length;
+		/* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
+		 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
+		 * has any authz data attached to it. */
+		const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
+		const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
+		size_t i;
+		unsigned authz_count = 0;
+
+		/* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
+		 * 	uint8_t authz_type
+		 * 	uint16_t length
+		 * 	uint8_t data[length]
+		 *
+		 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
+		for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
+			{
+			unsigned short length;
+			unsigned char type;
+
+			type = *(authz++);
+			if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
+				   type,
+				   s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
+				authz_count++;
+
+			n2s(authz, length);
+			/* n2s increments authz by 2 */
+			i += 2;
+			authz += length;
+			i += length;
+			}
+
+		if (authz_count)
+			{
+			/* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
+			 * 2 bytes for extension type
+			 * 2 bytes for extension length
+			 * 1 byte for the list length
+			 * n bytes for the list */
+			const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
+
+			if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
+			s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
+			s2n(ext_len, ret);
+			*(ret++) = authz_count;
+			s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
+			}
+
+		authz = orig_authz;
+		for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
+			{
+			unsigned short length;
+			unsigned char type;
+
+			authz_count++;
+			type = *(authz++);
+			if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
+				   type,
+				   s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
+				*(ret++) = type;
+			n2s(authz, length);
+			/* n2s increments authz by 2 */
+			i += 2;
+			authz += length;
+			i += length;
+			}
+		}
+
 	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
 		return p;
 
@@ -1182,7 +1683,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
 	unsigned short len;
 	unsigned char *data = *p;
 	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-	int sigalg_seen = 0;
+	size_t i;
 
 	s->servername_done = 0;
 	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
@@ -1194,6 +1695,24 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
 	s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
 	                       SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
 #endif
+	/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
+	if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
+		s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+		}
+	/* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
+	if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
+		s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+		}
+	/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
+	for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+		{
+		s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
+		s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
+		}
 
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 		goto ri_check;
@@ -1354,7 +1873,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
 
-			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
+			if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || 
+				ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
 				{
 				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
@@ -1390,7 +1910,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
 			int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
 			ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
 
-			if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
+			if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
+				ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
 				{
 				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
@@ -1469,15 +1990,14 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
 			{
 			int dsize;
-			if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 
+			if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2) 
 				{
 				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
 				}
-			sigalg_seen = 1;
 			n2s(data,dsize);
 			size -= 2;
-			if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 
+			if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) 
 				{
 				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
@@ -1487,6 +2007,16 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
 				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 				return 0;
 				}
+			/* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
+			 * error.
+			 */
+			if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
+				{
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+					SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+				*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+				return 0;
+				}
 			}
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
 		         s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
@@ -1619,7 +2149,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
-                         s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
+			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
 			{
 			/* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
 			 * renegotiation.
@@ -1648,23 +2178,85 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
 				return 0;
                         }
 
-		data+=size;
-		}
-				
-	*p = data;
-
-	ri_check:
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
+			{
+			unsigned char *sdata = data;
+			unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
 
-	/* Need RI if renegotiating */
+			if (size == 0)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
 
-	if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
-		!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
-		{
-		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-	 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
-				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
-		return 0;
-		}
+			server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
+
+			if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+
+			/* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
+			 * information as the original session so we ignore this
+			 * in the case of a session resumption. */
+			if (!s->hit)
+				{
+				if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
+					OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
+				s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
+					OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
+				if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
+					{
+					*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+					return 0;
+					}
+
+				s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
+					server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
+				memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
+				       sdata,
+				       server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
+
+				/* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
+				qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
+				      server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
+				      1 /* element size */,
+				      byte_compare);
+
+				for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
+					{
+					if (i > 0 &&
+					    s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
+					      s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
+						{
+						*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+						return 0;
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+
+		data+=size;
+		}
+
+	*p = data;
+
+	ri_check:
+
+	/* Need RI if renegotiating */
+
+	if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
+		!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+		{
+		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+	 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	/* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
+	if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
+		ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
 
 	return 1;
 	}
@@ -1678,7 +2270,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 		return 0;
 		}
 
-	if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 
+	if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) 
 		{
 		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
 		return 0;
@@ -1690,7 +2282,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
  * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
  * the length of the block. */
-static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
+static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
 	{
 	unsigned int off = 0;
 
@@ -1706,7 +2298,7 @@ static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
 	}
 #endif
 
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
+static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
 	{
 	unsigned short length;
 	unsigned short type;
@@ -1914,7 +2506,46 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
                                 return 0;
                         }
 
-		data+=size;		
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
+			{
+			/* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
+			 * an authz hello extension if the client
+			 * didn't request a proof. */
+			unsigned char *sdata = data;
+			unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
+
+			if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+				return 0;
+				}
+
+			if (!size)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+
+			server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
+			if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+
+			/* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
+			 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
+			if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
+				sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+				return 0;
+				}
+
+			s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
+			}
+ 
+		data += size;
 		}
 
 	if (data != d+n)
@@ -1960,7 +2591,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 		&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
 		{
 		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
 				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
 		return 0;
 		}
@@ -2011,36 +2642,10 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 
 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	/* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support 
-	 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension.  Note that the server is not
-	 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
-	 */
-
-	unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-	unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
-	int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
-	using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
-	
-	if (using_ecc)
-		{
-		if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
-		if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
-			{
-			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-			return -1;
-			}
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
-		s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
-		}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
 	return 1;
 	}
 
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
+static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
 	int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
@@ -2059,42 +2664,12 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
 		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
 
-	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
- 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 
- 	 * the certificate has changed.
- 	 */
-	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
-		{
-		int r;
-		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
-		switch (r)
-			{
-			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
-				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-				break;
-			/* status request response should be sent */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
-				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
-					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
-				else
-					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-				break;
-			/* something bad happened */
-			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
-				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
-				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-				goto err;
-			}
-		}
-	else
-		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
  	{
 		/* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
 		 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
-		 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
+		 * so this has to happen here in
+		 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
 
 		int r = 1;
 	
@@ -2146,8 +2721,8 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 			}
 	}
 
-#endif
  err:
+#endif
 	switch (ret)
 		{
 		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
@@ -2165,6 +2740,71 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 		}
 	}
 
+int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
+	{
+	int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+	int al;
+
+	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
+ 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
+ 	 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
+	 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
+ 	 */
+	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+		{
+		int r;
+		CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
+		certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+		/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
+		if (certpkey == NULL)
+			{
+			s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+			return 1;
+			}
+		/* Set current certificate to one we will use so
+		 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
+		 */
+		s->cert->key = certpkey;
+		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+		switch (r)
+			{
+			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+				break;
+			/* status request response should be sent */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+				else
+					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+				break;
+			/* something bad happened */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+
+ err:
+	switch (ret)
+		{
+		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+			ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+			return -1;
+
+		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+			ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+			return 1; 
+
+		default:
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	{
 	int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
@@ -2277,6 +2917,25 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 		}
 	}
 
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n) 
+	{
+	int al = -1;
+	if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
+		return 1;
+	if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) 
+		{
+		ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); 
+		return 0;
+		}
+
+	if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) 
+		{
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+		return 0;
+		}
+	return 1;
+}
+
 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
  * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
  * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
@@ -2613,11 +3272,147 @@ const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
 		}
 	}
 
+static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
+	{
+	switch(sig_alg)
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+		return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+		return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+	case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+		return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+#endif
+		}
+	return -1;
+	}
+
+/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
+static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
+			int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
+	{
+	int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
+	if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
+		return;
+	if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
+		{
+		hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
+					sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+		if (phash_nid)
+			*phash_nid = hash_nid;
+		}
+	if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
+		{
+		sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
+					sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+		if (psign_nid)
+			*psign_nid = sign_nid;
+		}
+	if (psignhash_nid)
+		{
+		if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
+			OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
+							hash_nid, sign_nid);
+		else
+			*psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
+		}
+	}
+/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
+static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
+				const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
+				const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
+	{
+	const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
+	size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
+	for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
+		{
+		/* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
+		if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
+			continue;
+		for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
+			{
+			if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
+				{
+				nmatch++;
+				if (shsig)
+					{
+					shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
+					shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
+					tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
+						&shsig->sign_nid,
+						&shsig->signandhash_nid,
+						ptmp);
+					shsig++;
+					}
+				break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	return nmatch;
+	}
+
+/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
+static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
+	{
+	const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
+	size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
+	size_t nmatch;
+	TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
+	CERT *c = s->cert;
+	unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
+	/* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
+	if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
+		{
+		conf = c->client_sigalgs;
+		conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
+		{
+		conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
+		conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	else
+		conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
+	if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
+		{
+		pref = conf;
+		preflen = conflen;
+		allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
+		allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		allow = conf;
+		allowlen = conflen;
+		pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
+		preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
+		}
+	nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+	if (!nmatch)
+		return 1;
+	salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
+	if (!salgs)
+		return 0;
+	nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+	c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
+	c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
+	return 1;
+	}
+		
+
 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
 
 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
 	{
-	int i, idx;
+	int idx;
+	size_t i;
 	const EVP_MD *md;
 	CERT *c = s->cert;
 	TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
@@ -2628,112 +3423,126 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
 	if (!c)
 		return 0;
 
-	c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
-	c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
-	c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
-	c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
-
-	if (c->sigalgs)
-		OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs);
-	c->sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((dsize/2) * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
-	if (!c->sigalgs)
+	c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
+	if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
 		return 0;
-	c->sigalgslen = dsize/2;
+	c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
+	memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
 
-	for (i = 0, sigptr = c->sigalgs; i < dsize; i += 2, sigptr++)
+	tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+	if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
 		{
-		sigptr->rhash = data[i];
-		sigptr->rsign = data[i + 1];
-		sigptr->hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(sigptr->rhash, tls12_md,
-					sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-		sigptr->sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(sigptr->rsign, tls12_sig,
-					sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
-		if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&sigptr->signandhash_nid,
-						sigptr->hash_nid,
-						sigptr->sign_nid))
-			sigptr->signandhash_nid = NID_undef;
-		switch(sigptr->rsign)
+		/* Use first set signature preference to force message
+		 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
+		 */
+		const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
+		if (s->server)
+			sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
+		else
+			sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
+		if (sigs)
 			{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-			case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
-			idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
-			break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-			case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
-			idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
-			break;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-			case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
-			idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
-			break;
-#endif
-			default:
-			continue;
+			idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
+			md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
+			c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+			c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+			if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
+				{
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+				}
 			}
+		}
+#endif
 
-		if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
+	for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
+			i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
+		{
+		idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
+		if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
 			{
 			md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
-			if (md)
+			c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+			c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+			if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
 				{
-				c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
-				if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
-					c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+				c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
 				}
 			}
 
 		}
-
-
-	/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
-	 * supported it stays as NULL.
+	/* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
+	 * use the certificate for signing.
 	 */
+	if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
+		{
+		/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
+		 * not supported it stays as NULL.
+	 	 */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
-		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
+		if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
+			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
-		{
-		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
-		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
-		}
+		if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
+			{
+			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+			}
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
-	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
-		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
+		if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
+			c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
 #endif
+		}
 	return 1;
 	}
 
-#endif
 
 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
-			int *psign, int *phash, int *psignandhash,
+			int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
 			unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
 	{
-	if (s->cert->sigalgs == NULL)
+	const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
+	if (psig == NULL)
 		return 0;
 	if (idx >= 0)
 		{
-		TLS_SIGALGS *psig;
-		if (idx >= (int)s->cert->sigalgslen)
+		idx <<= 1;
+		if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
 			return 0;
-		psig = s->cert->sigalgs + idx;
-		if (psign)
-			*psign = psig->sign_nid;
-		if (phash)
-			*phash = psig->hash_nid;
-		if (psignandhash)
-			*psignandhash = psig->signandhash_nid;
-		if (rsig)
-			*rsig = psig->rsign;
+		psig += idx;
 		if (rhash)
-			*rhash = psig->rhash;
+			*rhash = psig[0];
+		if (rsig)
+			*rsig = psig[1];
+		tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
 		}
-	return s->cert->sigalgslen;
+	return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
+	}
+
+int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
+			int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+			unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
+	{
+	TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
+	if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
+		return 0;
+	shsigalgs += idx;
+	if (phash)
+		*phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
+	if (psign)
+		*psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
+	if (psignhash)
+		*psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
+	if (rsig)
+		*rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
+	if (rhash)
+		*rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
+	return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
 	}
 	
 
@@ -2881,3 +3690,468 @@ tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
 	return ret;
 	}
 #endif
+
+#define MAX_SIGALGLEN	(TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
+
+typedef struct
+	{
+	size_t sigalgcnt;
+	int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
+	} sig_cb_st;
+
+static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+	{
+	sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
+	size_t i;
+	char etmp[20], *p;
+	int sig_alg, hash_alg;
+	if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
+		return 0;
+	if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
+		return 0;
+	memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
+	etmp[len] = 0;
+	p = strchr(etmp, '+');
+	if (!p)
+		return 0;
+	*p = 0;
+	p++;
+	if (!*p)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
+		sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+	else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
+		sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
+	else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
+		sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+	else return 0;
+
+	hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
+	if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
+		hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
+	if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
+		{
+		if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
+			&& sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
+			return 0;
+		}
+	sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
+	sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+/* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
+ * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
+int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
+	{
+	sig_cb_st sig;
+	sig.sigalgcnt = 0;
+	if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
+		return 0;
+	if (c == NULL)
+		return 1;
+	return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
+	}
+
+int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
+	{
+	unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
+	int rhash, rsign;
+	size_t i;
+	if (salglen & 1)
+		return 0;
+	sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
+	if (sigalgs == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
+		{
+		rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
+					sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+		rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
+				sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+
+		if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
+			goto err;
+		*sptr++ = rhash;
+		*sptr++ = rsign;
+		}
+
+	if (client)
+		{
+		if (c->client_sigalgs)
+			OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+		c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+		c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+			OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+		c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+		c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
+		}
+
+	return 1;
+
+	err:
+	OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
+	{
+	int sig_nid;
+	size_t i;
+	if (default_nid == -1)
+		return 1;
+	sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+	if (default_nid)
+		return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
+		if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+			return 1;
+	return 0;
+	}
+/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
+static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
+	{
+	X509_NAME *nm;
+	int i;
+	nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+	for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
+		{
+		if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
+			return 1;
+		}
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+/* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
+ * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to 
+ * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
+ * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
+ */
+
+/* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
+
+#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
+	(CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
+/* Strict mode flags */
+#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
+	 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
+	 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
+
+int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+									int idx)
+	{
+	int i;
+	int rv = 0;
+	int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
+	CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
+	CERT *c = s->cert;
+	unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
+	/* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
+	if (idx != -1)
+		{
+		/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
+		if (idx == -2)
+			{
+			cpk = c->key;
+			idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
+			}
+		else
+			cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+		x = cpk->x509;
+		pk = cpk->privatekey;
+		chain = cpk->chain;
+		strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
+		/* If no cert or key, forget it */
+		if (!x || !pk)
+			goto end;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
+		/* Allow any certificate to pass test */
+		if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
+			{
+			rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+			cpk->valid_flags = rv;
+			return rv;
+			}
+#endif
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		if (!x || !pk)
+			goto end;
+		idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
+		if (idx == -1)
+			goto end;
+		cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
+		if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
+			check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
+		else
+			check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
+		strict_mode = 1;
+		}
+
+	if (suiteb_flags)
+		{
+		int ok;
+		if (check_flags)
+			check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+		ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
+		if (ok != X509_V_OK)
+			{
+			if (check_flags)
+				rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
+			else
+				goto end;
+			}
+		}
+
+	/* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
+	 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
+	 * and strict mode.
+	 */
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
+		{
+		int default_nid;
+		unsigned char rsign = 0;
+		if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+			default_nid = 0;
+		/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
+		else
+			{
+			switch(idx)
+				{	
+			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
+			case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
+			case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
+				rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
+				default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
+				break;
+
+			case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
+			case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
+				rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
+				default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
+				break;
+
+			case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
+				rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
+				default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
+				break;
+
+			default:
+				default_nid = -1;
+				break;
+				}
+			}
+		/* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
+		 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
+		 * sha1.
+		 */
+		if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
+			{
+			size_t j;
+			const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
+			for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
+				{
+				if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
+					break;
+				}
+			if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
+				{
+				if (check_flags)
+					goto skip_sigs;
+				else
+					goto end;
+				}
+			}
+		/* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
+		if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
+			{
+			if (!check_flags) goto end;
+			}
+		else
+			rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+			{
+			if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
+							default_nid))
+				{
+				if (check_flags)
+					{
+					rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+					break;
+					}
+				else
+					goto end;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	/* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
+	else if(check_flags)
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
+	skip_sigs:
+	/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
+	if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
+	else if (!check_flags)
+		goto end;
+	if (!s->server)
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+	/* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
+	else if (strict_mode)
+		{
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+		for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+			{
+			X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+			if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
+				{
+				if (check_flags)
+					{
+					rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
+					break;
+					}
+				else
+					goto end;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	if (!s->server && strict_mode)
+		{
+		STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
+		int check_type = 0;
+		switch (pk->type)
+			{
+		case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+			check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
+			break;
+		case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+			check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
+			break;
+		case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+			check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
+			break;
+		case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+		case EVP_PKEY_DHX:
+				{
+				int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
+				if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
+					check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
+				if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
+					check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
+				}
+			}
+		if (check_type)
+			{
+			const unsigned char *ctypes;
+			int ctypelen;
+			if (c->ctypes)
+				{
+				ctypes = c->ctypes;
+				ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
+				ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
+				}
+			for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
+				{
+				if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
+					{
+					rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+					break;
+					}
+				}
+			if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
+				goto end;
+			}
+		else
+			rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+
+
+		ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
+
+		if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
+			rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+
+		if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+			{
+			if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
+				rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+			}
+		if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+			{
+			for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
+				{
+				X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+				if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
+					{
+					rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
+					break;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
+			goto end;
+		}
+	else
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+
+	if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
+
+	end:
+
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		{
+		if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
+			rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+		else if (cpk->digest)
+			rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+		}
+	else
+		rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+
+	/* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
+	 * if the chain is invalid.
+	 */
+	if (!check_flags)
+		{
+		if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
+			cpk->valid_flags = rv;
+		else
+			{
+			/* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
+			cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+			return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	return rv;
+	}
+
+/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
+void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
+	{
+	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
+	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
+	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
+	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
+	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
+	tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
+	}
+/* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
+int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+	{
+	return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
+	}
+
+#endif