X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Ft1_lib.c;h=ddafa0c623dab82f18e738609f8dd344bd3c8353;hp=156497988a622e3484fbca499fe307dbbcf9f2ec;hb=de4dc598024fd0a9c2b7a466fd5323755d369522;hpb=b8fef8ee929a8775262cb4371f62c35f7058dbed

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 156497988a..ddafa0c623 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -343,6 +343,10 @@ int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
      */
     unsigned long dup_list = 0;
 
+    if (ngroups == 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+        return 0;
+    }
     if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
         return 0;
@@ -945,6 +949,37 @@ size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
     }
 }
 
+/*
+ * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
+ * specified EC curve.
+ */
+int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
+{
+   const uint16_t *sigs;
+   size_t siglen, i;
+
+    if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+        sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
+        siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+    } else {
+        sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
+        siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
+        const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
+
+        if (lu == NULL)
+            continue;
+        if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
+                && lu->curve != NID_undef
+                && curve == lu->curve)
+            return 1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
  * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
@@ -2492,7 +2527,7 @@ static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
 {
     const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
-    int mdnid, pknid;
+    int mdnid, pknid, supported;
     size_t i;
 
     /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
@@ -2505,19 +2540,39 @@ static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
             lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
             if (lu == NULL
                 || !X509_get_signature_info(s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509, &mdnid,
-                                            &pknid, NULL, NULL))
+                                            &pknid, NULL, NULL)
+                /*
+                 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
+                 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
+                 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
+                 * signing certificate.
+                 */
+                || mdnid != lu->hash
+                || pknid != lu->sig)
                 continue;
-            /*
-             * TODO this does not differentiate between the
-             * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
-             * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
-             * signing certificate.
-             */
-            if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
-                return 1;
+
+            ERR_set_mark();
+            supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
+                                                     mdnid);
+            if (supported == 0)
+                continue;
+            else if (supported < 0)
+            {
+                /* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons,
+                 * just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */
+                ERR_pop_to_mark();
+            }
+            return 1;
         }
         return 0;
     }
+    supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
+                                             sig->hash);
+    if (supported == 0)
+        return 0;
+    else if (supported < 0)
+        ERR_clear_error();
+
     return 1;
 }