X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Ft1_lib.c;h=c4670346648a3f1331deea8a9f1c3de989a7b869;hp=1aaf8905c8179cae1dad30400a0b9184de3e5727;hb=fbed9f8158ef50518706798a1488f9af4be3eb7d;hpb=02c27b113cfc6000d94644e19c06c0f45e3480af

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 1aaf8905c8..c467034664 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
@@ -153,13 +154,19 @@ int tls1_new(SSL *s)
 
 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
 	{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
+		{
+		OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
+		}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
 	ssl3_free(s);
 	}
 
 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
 	{
 	ssl3_clear(s);
-	s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
+	s->version = s->method->version;
 	}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
@@ -195,7 +202,9 @@ static int nid_list[] =
 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
 	{
 	/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
-	if ((curve_id < 1) || (curve_id > sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) return 0;
+	if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
+				sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
+		return 0;
 	return nid_list[curve_id-1];
 	}
 
@@ -266,6 +275,11 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 	int extdatalen=0;
 	unsigned char *ret = p;
 
+	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
+	if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
+					&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+		return p;
+
 	ret+=2;
 
 	if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
@@ -302,8 +316,33 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		ret+=size_str;
 		}
 
+        /* Add the renegotiation option: TODOEKR switch */
+        {
+          int el;
+          
+          if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
+              {
+              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+              return NULL;
+              }
+
+          if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+          
+          s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
+          s2n(el,ret);
+
+          if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+              {
+              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+              return NULL;
+              }
+
+          ret += el;
+        }
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
+	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 		{
 		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
@@ -322,7 +361,8 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
 		ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
 		}
-	if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
+	if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
+	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 		{
 		/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
@@ -352,10 +392,25 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 	if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
 		{
 		int ticklen;
-		if (s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
+		if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
 			ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
+		else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
+			 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
+			{
+			ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
+			s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+			if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
+				return NULL;
+			memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
+			       s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
+			       ticklen);
+			s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
+			}
 		else
 			ticklen = 0;
+		if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
+		    s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
+			goto skip_ext;
 		/* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
  		 * rest for ticket
   		 */
@@ -368,9 +423,11 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 			ret += ticklen;
 			}
 		}
+		skip_ext:
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 		{
 		size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
 		
@@ -387,6 +444,55 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 #endif
 
+	if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
+	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+		{
+		int i;
+		long extlen, idlen, itmp;
+		OCSP_RESPID *id;
+
+		idlen = 0;
+		for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
+			{
+			id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
+			itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
+			if (itmp <= 0)
+				return NULL;
+			idlen += itmp + 2;
+			}
+
+		if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
+			{
+			extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
+			if (extlen < 0)
+				return NULL;
+			}
+		else
+			extlen = 0;
+			
+		if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
+		if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
+			return NULL;
+		s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
+		*(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
+		s2n(idlen, ret);
+		for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
+			{
+			/* save position of id len */
+			unsigned char *q = ret;
+			id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
+			/* skip over id len */
+			ret += 2;
+			itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
+			/* write id len */
+			s2n(itmp, q);
+			}
+		s2n(extlen, ret);
+		if (extlen > 0)
+			i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
+		}
+
 	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
 		return p;
 
@@ -399,6 +505,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 	int extdatalen=0;
 	unsigned char *ret = p;
 
+	/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
+	if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+		return p;
+	
 	ret+=2;
 	if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
 
@@ -409,8 +519,34 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
 		s2n(0,ret);
 		}
+
+	if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
+        {
+          int el;
+          
+          if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
+              {
+              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+              return NULL;
+              }
+
+          if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+          
+          s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
+          s2n(el,ret);
+
+          if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+              {
+              SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+              return NULL;
+              }
+
+          ret += el;
+        }
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
+	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
+	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 		{
 		/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
 		long lenmax; 
@@ -432,7 +568,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 	/* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-	
+
 	if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
 		&& !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) 
 		{ 
@@ -441,8 +577,16 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		s2n(0,ret);
 		}
 
+	if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
+		{ 
+		if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; 
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
+		s2n(0,ret);
+		}
+
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
+	if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
+	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 		{
 		size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
 		
@@ -458,6 +602,20 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		ret += sol;
 		}
 #endif
+	if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 
+		&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
+		{ const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
+			0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
+			0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
+			0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 
+			0x03,   0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 
+			0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 
+			0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
+			if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
+			memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
+			ret+=36;
+
+		}
 
 	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
 		return p;
@@ -472,14 +630,17 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 	unsigned short size;
 	unsigned short len;
 	unsigned char *data = *p;
+	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+
 	s->servername_done = 0;
+	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
 
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
-		return 1;
+		goto ri_check;
 	n2s(data,len);
 
 	if (data > (d+n-len)) 
-		return 1;
+		goto ri_check;
 
 	while (data <= (d+n-4))
 		{
@@ -487,8 +648,10 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 		n2s(data,size);
 
 		if (data+size > (d+n))
-	   		return 1;
-
+	   		goto ri_check;
+#if 0
+		fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
+#endif
 		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
 			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
 						s->tlsext_debug_arg);
@@ -562,6 +725,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 						s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
 						if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
 							OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
+							s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
 							*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
 							return 0;
 						}
@@ -589,7 +753,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
+	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -616,7 +781,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			fprintf(stderr,"\n");
 #endif
 			}
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
+	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
@@ -646,7 +812,8 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
+	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 
@@ -675,12 +842,141 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				}
 			}
 #endif
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
+			{
+			if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+			    !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			}
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
+			{
+			if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
+				return 0;
+			renegotiate_seen = 1;
+			}
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
+		         s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+			{
+		
+			if (size < 5) 
+				{
+				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+
+			s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
+			size--;
+			if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
+				{
+				const unsigned char *sdata;
+				int dsize;
+				/* Read in responder_id_list */
+				n2s(data,dsize);
+				size -= 2;
+				if (dsize > size  ) 
+					{
+					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+					return 0;
+					}
+				while (dsize > 0)
+					{
+					OCSP_RESPID *id;
+					int idsize;
+					if (dsize < 4)
+						{
+						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+						return 0;
+						}
+					n2s(data, idsize);
+					dsize -= 2 + idsize;
+					if (dsize < 0)
+						{
+						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+						return 0;
+						}
+					sdata = data;
+					data += idsize;
+					id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
+								&sdata, idsize);
+					if (!id)
+						{
+						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+						return 0;
+						}
+					if (data != sdata)
+						{
+						OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+						return 0;
+						}
+					if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
+						&& !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
+						sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
+						{
+						OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+						*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+						return 0;
+						}
+					if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
+							s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
+						{
+						OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
+						*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+						return 0;
+						}
+					}
+
+				/* Read in request_extensions */
+				n2s(data,dsize);
+				size -= 2;
+				if (dsize > size) 
+					{
+					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+					return 0;
+					}
+				sdata = data;
+				if (dsize > 0)
+					{
+					s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
+						d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
+							&sdata, dsize);
+					if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
+						|| (data + dsize != sdata))
+						{
+						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+						return 0;
+						}
+					}
+				}
+				/* We don't know what to do with any other type
+ 			 	* so ignore it.
+ 			 	*/
+				else
+					s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+			}
 
 		/* session ticket processed earlier */
 		data+=size;
 		}
 				
 	*p = data;
+
+	ri_check:
+
+	/* Need RI if renegotiating */
+
+	if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
+		!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+		{
+		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+	 	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
 	return 1;
 	}
 
@@ -690,11 +986,11 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 	unsigned short size;
 	unsigned short len;  
 	unsigned char *data = *p;
-
 	int tlsext_servername = 0;
+	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
 
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
-		return 1;
+		goto ri_check;
 
 	n2s(data,len);
 
@@ -704,7 +1000,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 		n2s(data,size);
 
 		if (data+size > (d+n))
-	   		return 1;
+	   		goto ri_check;
 
 		if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
 			s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
@@ -721,7 +1017,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
+	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 			int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
@@ -752,6 +1049,12 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
 			{
+			if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
+			    !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
 			if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
 				|| (size > 0))
 				{
@@ -761,7 +1064,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
 			}
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
+	             s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
 			{
 			unsigned char *sdata = data;
 
@@ -791,7 +1095,26 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				}
 			}
 #endif
-
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
+		         s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+			{
+			/* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
+			 * a status request message.
+			 */ 
+			if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
+				{
+				*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			/* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
+			s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+			}
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
+			{
+			if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
+				return 0;
+			renegotiate_seen = 1;
+			}
 		data+=size;		
 		}
 
@@ -823,6 +1146,26 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 		}
 
 	*p = data;
+
+	ri_check:
+
+	/* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
+	 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
+	 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
+	 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
+	 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
+	 * absence on initial connect only.
+	 */
+	if (!renegotiate_seen && 
+		(s->new_session || !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT))
+		&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
+		{
+		*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+				SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+		return 0;
+		}
+
 	return 1;
 	}
 
@@ -874,7 +1217,8 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			return -1;
 			}
-		for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; i <= sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
+		for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
+				sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
 			s2n(i,j);
 		}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
@@ -966,6 +1310,36 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 	else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) 		
 		ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
 
+	/* If status request then ask callback what to do.
+ 	 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case 
+ 	 * the certificate has changed.
+ 	 */
+	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+		{
+		int r;
+		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+		switch (r)
+			{
+			/* We don't want to send a status request response */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+				s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+				break;
+			/* status request response should be sent */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
+				if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+					s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
+				else
+					s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
+				break;
+			/* something bad happened */
+			case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+				ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+				al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				goto err;
+			}
+		}
+	else
+		s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
 
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
  	{
@@ -1022,8 +1396,8 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 			al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
 			}
 	}
-#endif
 
+#endif
  err:
 	switch (ret)
 		{
@@ -1111,6 +1485,35 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 		}
 #endif
 
+	/* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
+ 	 * tell the callback
+ 	 */
+	if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
+			&& s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+		{
+		int r;
+		/* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
+ 		 * there is no response.
+ 		 */
+		if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
+			{
+			OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
+			s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
+			}
+		s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+		r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
+		if (r == 0)
+			{
+			al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
+			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+			}
+		if (r < 0)
+			{
+			al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+			}
+		}
+
 	switch (ret)
 		{
 		case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
@@ -1139,10 +1542,25 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
 	/* Point after session ID in client hello */
 	const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
 	unsigned short i;
+
+	/* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
+ 	 * to permit stateful resumption.
+ 	 */
+	if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+		return 1;
+
 	if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
 		return 1;
 	if (p >= limit)
 		return -1;
+	/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
+	if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+		{
+		i = *(p++);
+		p+= i;
+		if (p >= limit)
+			return -1;
+		}
 	/* Skip past cipher list */
 	n2s(p, i);
 	p+= i;
@@ -1170,8 +1588,8 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
  			 * trigger a full handshake
  			 */
 			if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-				return 0;
-			/* If zero length not client will accept a ticket
+				return 1;
+			/* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
  			 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
  			 */
 			if (size == 0)
@@ -1179,6 +1597,15 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
 				s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
 				return 0;	/* Cache miss */
 				}
+			if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
+				{
+				/* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
+				 * generating the session from ticket now,
+				 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
+				 * external mechanism to calculate the master
+				 * secret later. */
+				return 0;
+				}
 			return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
 									ret);
 			}
@@ -1194,39 +1621,59 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
 	unsigned char *sdec;
 	const unsigned char *p;
-	int slen, mlen;
+	int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
 	unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 	HMAC_CTX hctx;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+	SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+	/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
+	if (eticklen < 48)
+		goto tickerr;
+	/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
+	HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+	if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
+		{
+		unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
+		int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
+							&ctx, &hctx, 0);
+		if (rv < 0)
+			return -1;
+		if (rv == 0)
+			goto tickerr;
+		if (rv == 2)
+			renew_ticket = 1;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		/* Check key name matches */
+		if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
+			goto tickerr;
+		HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+					tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
+		EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+				tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
+		}
 	/* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
  	 * integrity checks on ticket.
  	 */
-	mlen = EVP_MD_size(tlsext_tick_md());
+	mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
+	if (mlen < 0)
+		{
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+		return -1;
+		}
 	eticklen -= mlen;
-	/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
-	if (eticklen < 48)
-		goto tickerr;
-	/* Check key name matches */
-	if (memcmp(etick, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
-		goto tickerr;
 	/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
-	HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
-	HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
-				tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
 	HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
 	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
 	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
 	if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
 		goto tickerr;
-	/* Set p to start of IV */
-	p = etick + 16;
-	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
 	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
-	EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
-					s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, p);
 	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
-	p += 16;
-	eticklen -= 32;
+	p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+	eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
 	sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
 	if (!sdec)
 		{
@@ -1253,6 +1700,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 			memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
 		sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
 		*psess = sess;
+		s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
 		return 1;
 		}
 	/* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to