X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Ft1_lib.c;h=b05d148beb380fc68c830819cd2f80beecc5dc28;hp=6e7b5edbc4cc82f7a3c8ee0923bebf0d79ac4fd7;hb=63414e64e66e376654e993ac966e3b2f9d849d3b;hpb=3e41ac35281827b59e55d51058cf6bb086c1f2b5 diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index 6e7b5edbc4..b05d148beb 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -1,111 +1,10 @@ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include @@ -114,17 +13,16 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include +#include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include -static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, - const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, +static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen, + const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess); -static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); -static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = { tls1_enc, @@ -133,14 +31,13 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = { tls1_generate_master_secret, tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, - TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, tls1_export_keying_material, 0, - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl3_set_handshake_header, + tls_close_construct_packet, ssl3_handshake_write }; @@ -151,14 +48,13 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = { tls1_generate_master_secret, tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, - TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, tls1_export_keying_material, SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl3_set_handshake_header, + tls_close_construct_packet, ssl3_handshake_write }; @@ -169,15 +65,31 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = { tls1_generate_master_secret, tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, - TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, tls1_export_keying_material, SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ssl3_set_handshake_header, + tls_close_construct_packet, + ssl3_handshake_write +}; + +SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = { + tls13_enc, + tls1_mac, + tls13_setup_key_block, + tls13_generate_master_secret, + tls13_change_cipher_state, + tls13_final_finish_mac, + TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, + TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, + tls13_alert_code, + tls1_export_keying_material, + SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF, + ssl3_set_handshake_header, + tls_close_construct_packet, ssl3_handshake_write }; @@ -200,7 +112,7 @@ int tls1_new(SSL *s) void tls1_free(SSL *s) { - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); + OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket); ssl3_free(s); } @@ -221,12 +133,6 @@ typedef struct { unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */ } tls_curve_info; -/* Mask for curve type */ -# define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3 -# define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0 -# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1 -# define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2 - /* * Table of curve information. * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup @@ -261,8 +167,7 @@ static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = { {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ - /* X25519 (29) */ - {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, + {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */ }; static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { @@ -279,55 +184,21 @@ static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = { 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ }; -static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = { - 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */ - 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ - 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ - 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ - 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ - 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ - 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ - - /* - * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set - * via an explicit callback or parameters. - */ - 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ - 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ - 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ - 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ - 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ - 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ - 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ - 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ - 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ - 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ - 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ - 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ - 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ - 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ - 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ - 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ - 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ - 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ - 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ - 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ - 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ - 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ -}; - - static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = { 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 }; -int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) +int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags) { + const tls_curve_info *cinfo; /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))) return 0; - return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid; + cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1; + if (pflags) + *pflags = cinfo->flags; + return cinfo->nid; } int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) @@ -335,7 +206,7 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) size_t i; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) { if (nid_list[i].nid == nid) - return i + 1; + return (int)(i + 1); } return 0; } @@ -352,14 +223,14 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.) */ -static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, - const unsigned char **pcurves, - size_t *num_curves) +int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves, + size_t *num_curves) { size_t pcurveslen = 0; + if (sess) { - *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; + *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups; + pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len; } else { /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */ switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { @@ -378,8 +249,8 @@ static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, pcurveslen = 2; break; default: - *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; + *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups; + pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len; } if (!*pcurves) { *pcurves = eccurves_default; @@ -392,14 +263,13 @@ static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); *num_curves = 0; return 0; - } else { - *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2; - return 1; } + *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2; + return 1; } /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */ -static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op) +int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op) { const tls_curve_info *cinfo; if (curve[0]) @@ -446,17 +316,18 @@ int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) } /*- - * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef + * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef * if there is no match. * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches - * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for + * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match. */ -int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) +int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch) { const unsigned char *pref, *supp; size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j; int k; + /* Can't do anything on client side */ if (s->server == 0) return -1; @@ -467,6 +338,7 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) * these are acceptable due to previous checks. */ unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id; + if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) @@ -481,39 +353,27 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int * but s->options is a long... */ - if (!tls1_get_curvelist - (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp, - &num_supp)) + if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, + (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, + &supp, &num_supp)) /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */ return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; - if (!tls1_get_curvelist - (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, - &num_pref)) + if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, + (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0, + &pref, &num_pref)) return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; - /* - * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them - * are allowed. - */ - if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) { - supp = eccurves_all; - num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; - } else if (num_pref == 0 && - (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { - pref = eccurves_all; - num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; - } - - k = 0; - for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) { + for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) { const unsigned char *tsupp = supp; + for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) { if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) { if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED)) continue; if (nmatch == k) { int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1]; - return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id); + + return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL); } k++; } @@ -525,34 +385,35 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) return NID_undef; } -int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, - int *curves, size_t ncurves) +int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, + int *groups, size_t ngroups) { - unsigned char *clist, *p; + unsigned char *glist, *p; size_t i; /* - * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve + * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group * ids < 32 */ unsigned long dup_list = 0; - clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2); - if (clist == NULL) + glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2); + if (glist == NULL) return 0; - for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) { + for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) { unsigned long idmask; int id; - id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]); + /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */ + id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]); idmask = 1L << id; if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) { - OPENSSL_free(clist); + OPENSSL_free(glist); return 0; } dup_list |= idmask; s2n(id, p); } OPENSSL_free(*pext); - *pext = clist; - *pextlen = ncurves * 2; + *pext = glist; + *pextlen = ngroups * 2; return 1; } @@ -591,9 +452,8 @@ static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) return 1; } -/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */ -int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, - const char *str) +/* Set groups based on a colon separate list */ +int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str) { nid_cb_st ncb; ncb.nidcnt = 0; @@ -601,7 +461,7 @@ int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, return 0; if (pext == NULL) return 1; - return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt); + return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt); } /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */ @@ -650,9 +510,9 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is * supported (see RFC4492). */ - if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { - pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; + if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) { + pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats; + num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) { if (*comp_id == *pformats) break; @@ -689,15 +549,15 @@ static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, return 1; } -static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, - size_t *num_formats) +void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, + size_t *num_formats) { /* * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default */ - if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { - *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; + if (s->ext.ecpointformats) { + *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats; + *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len; } else { *pformats = ecformats_default; /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */ @@ -767,7 +627,7 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* - * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity + * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility * @s: SSL connection * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using * @@ -798,7 +658,7 @@ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) return 1; } /* Need a shared curve */ - if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0)) + if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0)) return 1; return 0; } @@ -813,54 +673,107 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ -/* - * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this - * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. - */ - -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ -#else -# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, +/* Default sigalg schemes */ +static const unsigned int tls12_sigalgs[] = { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, + TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, + TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, #endif -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ -#else -# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, -#endif + TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256, + TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384, + TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512, -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC -# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ -#else -# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, + TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, + TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, + TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, #endif + TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, -#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ - tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ - tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ - tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) - -static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) - tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001, - TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256, - TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512 + TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256, + TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384, + TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512 #endif }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = { - tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) - tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) +static const unsigned int suiteb_sigalgs[] = { + TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, + TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 }; #endif -size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs) + +typedef struct sigalg_lookup_st { + unsigned int sigalg; + int hash; + int sig; +} SIGALG_LOOKUP; + +static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_EC}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_EC}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_EC}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_EC}, +#endif + /* + * PSS must appear before PKCS1 so that we prefer that when signing where + * possible + */ + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_RSA}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_RSA}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_RSA}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_RSA}, +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256, NID_sha256, EVP_PKEY_DSA}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384, NID_sha384, EVP_PKEY_DSA}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512, NID_sha512, EVP_PKEY_DSA}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, NID_sha1, EVP_PKEY_DSA}, +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512}, + {TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_2001} +#endif +}; + +static int tls_sigalg_get_hash(unsigned int sigalg) +{ + size_t i; + const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr; + + for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); + i++, curr++) { + if (curr->sigalg == sigalg) + return curr->hash; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int tls_sigalg_get_sig(unsigned int sigalg) +{ + size_t i; + const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr; + + for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); + i++, curr++) { + if (curr->sigalg == sigalg) + return curr->sig; + } + + return 0; +} +size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const unsigned int **psigs) { /* * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other @@ -870,19 +783,23 @@ size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs) switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; - return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs); + return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs); case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; - return 2; + return 1; case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: - *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2; - return 2; + *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1; + return 1; } #endif - /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */ - if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) { + /* + * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server + * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and + * determining which shared algorithm to use. + */ + if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) { *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; return s->cert->client_sigalgslen; } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) { @@ -890,7 +807,7 @@ size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs) return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; } else { *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; - return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); + return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs); } } @@ -898,22 +815,23 @@ size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs) * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature * algorithms and if so return relevant digest. */ -int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, - const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey) +int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, unsigned int sig, + EVP_PKEY *pkey) { - const unsigned char *sent_sigs; + const unsigned int *sent_sigs; + char sigalgstr[2]; size_t sent_sigslen, i; - int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); + int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); /* Should never happen */ - if (sigalg == -1) + if (pkeyid == -1) return -1; /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ - if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) { + if (pkeyid != tls_sigalg_get_sig(sig)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { + if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) { unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id; /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) @@ -927,13 +845,13 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, if (curve_id[0]) return 0; if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) { - if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) { + if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha256) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); return 0; } } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) { - if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) { + if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha384) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST); return 0; @@ -946,1769 +864,105 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, #endif /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ - sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs); - for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) { - if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1]) + sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs); + for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) { + if (sig == *sent_sigs) break; } /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */ if (i == sent_sigslen - && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 + && (tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig) != NID_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); - return 0; - } - *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]); - if (*pmd == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); - return 0; - } - /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */ - if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, - EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), - (void *)sig)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); - return 0; - } - /* - * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish. - */ - s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd; - return 1; -} - -/* - * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't - * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported - * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level. - * - * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported - * by the client. - * - * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not. - */ -void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) -{ - s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0; - s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0; - ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK); - ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver); -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ - if (!s->psk_client_callback) { - s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; - s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { - s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; - s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; - } -#endif -} - -/* - * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not - * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on - * @c: cipher to check - * @op: Security check that you want to do - * - * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled. - */ -int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op) -{ - if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k - || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a) - return 1; - if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0) - return 1; - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) - || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) - return 1; - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) - || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) - return 1; - - return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c); -} - -static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s) -{ - if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) - return 0; - return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL); -} - -static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) { - unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1); - unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2); - if (u1 < u2) - return -1; - else if (u1 > u2) - return 1; - else - return 0; -} - -/* - * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be - * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. - * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those - * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions - * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error - * occurred. - */ -static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) { - PACKET extensions = *packet; - size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0; - unsigned int *extension_types = NULL; - int ret = 0; - - /* First pass: count the extensions. */ - while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) { - unsigned int type; - PACKET extension; - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) || - !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { - goto done; - } - num_extensions++; - } - - if (num_extensions <= 1) - return 1; - - extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions); - if (extension_types == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto done; - } - - /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */ - extensions = *packet; - for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) { - PACKET extension; - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) || - !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { - /* This should not happen. */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto done; - } - } - - if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto done; - } - /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */ - qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint); - for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) { - if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i]) - goto done; - } - ret = 1; - done: - OPENSSL_free(extension_types); - return ret; -} - -unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, - unsigned char *limit, int *al) -{ - int extdatalen = 0; - unsigned char *orig = buf; - unsigned char *ret = buf; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ - int using_ecc = 0; - if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - int i; - unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); - - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { - const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); - - alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; - alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; - if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) - || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) { - using_ecc = 1; - break; - } - } - } -#endif - - ret += 2; - - if (ret >= limit) - return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - - /* Add RI if renegotiating */ - if (s->renegotiate) { - int el; - - if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - ret += el; - } - /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */ - if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION) - goto done; - - if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { - /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ - unsigned long size_str; - long lenmax; - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 for the servername type and entension length - * 2 for servernamelist length - * 1 for the hostname type - * 2 for hostname length - * + hostname length - */ - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 - || (size_str = - strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) - return NULL; - - /* extension type and length */ - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); - s2n(size_str + 5, ret); - - /* length of servername list */ - s2n(size_str + 3, ret); - - /* hostname type, length and hostname */ - *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; - s2n(size_str, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); - ret += size_str; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - /* Add SRP username if there is one */ - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the - * Client Hello message */ - - int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); - if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 for the srp type type and entension length - * 1 for the srp user identity - * + srp user identity length - */ - if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) - return NULL; - - /* fill in the extension */ - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); - s2n(login_len + 1, ret); - (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; - memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); - ret += login_len; - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (using_ecc) { - /* - * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message - */ - long lenmax; - const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats; - size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len; - size_t i; - unsigned char *etmp; - - tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) - return NULL; - if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) - return NULL; - if (num_formats > 255) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); - /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */ - s2n(num_formats + 1, ret); - *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats; - memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats); - ret += num_formats; - - /* - * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message - */ - pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) - return NULL; - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) - return NULL; - if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) - return NULL; - if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); - etmp = ret + 4; - /* Copy curve ID if supported */ - for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { - if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { - *etmp++ = pcurves[0]; - *etmp++ = pcurves[1]; - } - } - - curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4; - - s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret); - s2n(curves_list_len, ret); - ret += curves_list_len; - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (tls_use_ticket(s)) { - int ticklen; - if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) - ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; - else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { - ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; - s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); - if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) - return NULL; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); - s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; - } else - ticklen = 0; - if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && - s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) - goto skip_ext; - /* - * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for - * ticket - */ - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); - s2n(ticklen, ret); - if (ticklen) { - memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); - ret += ticklen; - } - } - skip_ext: - - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - size_t salglen; - const unsigned char *salg; - unsigned char *etmp; - salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg); - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); - etmp = ret; - /* Skip over lengths for now */ - ret += 4; - salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen); - /* Fill in lengths */ - s2n(salglen + 2, etmp); - s2n(salglen, etmp); - ret += salglen; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { - int i; - long extlen, idlen, itmp; - OCSP_RESPID *id; - - idlen = 0; - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); - if (itmp <= 0) - return NULL; - idlen += itmp + 2; - } - - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { - extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); - if (extlen < 0) - return NULL; - } else - extlen = 0; - - if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); - if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) - return NULL; - s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); - *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; - s2n(idlen, ret); - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { - /* save position of id len */ - unsigned char *q = ret; - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - /* skip over id len */ - ret += 2; - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); - /* write id len */ - s2n(itmp, q); - } - s2n(extlen, ret); - if (extlen > 0) - i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - /* Add Heartbeat extension */ - if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); - s2n(1, ret); - /*- - * Set mode: - * 1: peer may send requests - * 2: peer not allowed to send requests - */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) - *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - else - *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { - /* - * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support - * for Next Protocol Negotiation - */ - if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } -#endif - - /* - * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so - * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation - * (see longer comment below) - */ - if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); - s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); - s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); - ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; - s->s3->alpn_sent = 1; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { - int el; - - /* Returns 0 on success!! */ - if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - ret += el; - } -#endif - custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext); - /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */ - if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al)) - return NULL; -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret); - s2n(0, ret); -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT - if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } -#endif - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - - /* - * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See - * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this - * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always - * appear last. - */ - if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { - int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - - if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { - hlen = 0x200 - hlen; - if (hlen >= 4) - hlen -= 4; - else - hlen = 0; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); - s2n(hlen, ret); - memset(ret, 0, hlen); - ret += hlen; - } - } - - done: - - if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) - return orig; - - s2n(extdatalen, orig); - return ret; -} - -unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, - unsigned char *limit, int *al) -{ - int extdatalen = 0; - unsigned char *orig = buf; - unsigned char *ret = buf; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - int next_proto_neg_seen; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); - using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); -#endif - - ret += 2; - if (ret >= limit) - return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - - if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { - int el; - - if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - ret += el; - } - - /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */ - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) - goto done; - - if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 - && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (using_ecc) { - const unsigned char *plist; - size_t plistlen; - /* - * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message - */ - long lenmax; - - tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) - return NULL; - if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) - return NULL; - if (plistlen > 255) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); - s2n(plistlen + 1, ret); - *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen; - memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); - ret += plistlen; - - } - /* - * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves - * extension - */ -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } - - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { - int el; - - /* Returns 0 on success!! */ - if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - ret += el; - } -#endif - - if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 - || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) - && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { - const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { - 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ - 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ - 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, - 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, - 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, - 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 - }; - if (limit - ret < 36) - return NULL; - memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36); - ret += 36; - - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) { - if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); - s2n(1, ret); - /*- - * Set mode: - * 1: peer may send requests - * 2: peer not allowed to send requests - */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) - *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - else - *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; - if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { - const unsigned char *npa; - unsigned int npalen; - int r; - - r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, - s-> - ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); - if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); - s2n(npalen, ret); - memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); - ret += npalen; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - } - } -#endif - if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al)) - return NULL; -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) { - /* - * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable - * for other cases too. - */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD - || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 - || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT - || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; - else { - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } - } -#endif - if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) { - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); - s2n(0, ret); - } - - if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { - const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; - unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; - - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); - s2n(3 + len, ret); - s2n(1 + len, ret); - *ret++ = len; - memcpy(ret, selected, len); - ret += len; - } - - done: - - if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) - return orig; - - s2n(extdatalen, orig); - return ret; -} - -/* - * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. - * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length. - * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. - * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. - */ -static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) -{ - PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; - - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) - || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { - return 0; - } - - save_protocol_list = protocol_list; - do { - /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) - || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { - return 0; - } - } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); - - if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, - &s->s3->alpn_proposed, - &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -/* - * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. - * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_* - * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. - * returns 1 on success, 0 - */ -static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al) -{ - const unsigned char *selected = NULL; - unsigned char selected_len = 0; - - if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) { - int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, - s->s3->alpn_proposed, - s->s3->alpn_proposed_len, - s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); - - if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); - if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - return 0; - } - s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -#endif - } else { - *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL; - *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - return 0; - } - } - - return 1; -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -/*- - * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X - * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|. - * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: - * SNI, - * elliptic_curves - * ec_point_formats - * - * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, - * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. - * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from - * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). - */ -static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt) -{ - unsigned int type; - PACKET sni, tmppkt; - size_t ext_len; - - static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { - 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ - 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ - 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ - 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ - 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ - 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ - - 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ - 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ - 0x01, /* 1 point format */ - 0x00, /* uncompressed */ - /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ - 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ - 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ - 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ - 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ - 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ - 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ - 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ - 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ - }; - - /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ - static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; - - tmppkt = *pkt; - - if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) - || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { - return; - } - - if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) - return; - - ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? - sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; - - s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, - ext_len); -} -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - -/* - * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of - * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions. - * - * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no - * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise - * ignored. - * - * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. - * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert. - */ -static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) -{ - unsigned int type; - int renegotiate_seen = 0; - PACKET extensions; - - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - s->servername_done = 0; - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -#endif - - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; - s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); - s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL; - s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | - SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) - ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt); -# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); - s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL; -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); - s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; -#endif - - s->srtp_profile = NULL; - - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) - goto ri_check; - - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) - return 0; - - if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) - return 0; - - /* - * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but, - * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon - * resumption. - */ - while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) { - PACKET extension; - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) - return 0; - - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension), - PACKET_remaining(&extension), - s->tlsext_debug_arg); - - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { - if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al)) - return 0; - renegotiate_seen = 1; - } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { - } -/*- - * The servername extension is treated as follows: - * - * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. - * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, - * in which case an fatal alert is generated. - * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. - * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order - * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. - * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when - * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. - * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time - * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the - * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and - * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername - * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches - * the value of the Host: field. - * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION - * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the - * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername - * extension. - * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. - * - */ - - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { - unsigned int servname_type; - PACKET sni, hostname; - - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni) - /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ - || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { - return 0; - } - - /* - * Although the server_name extension was intended to be - * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the - * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as - * such. - * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types - * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other - * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. - * - * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, - * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. - */ - if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) - || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name - || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { - return 0; - } - - if (!s->hit) { - if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - - if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - - if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - s->servername_done = 1; - } else { - /* - * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST - * fall back to a full handshake. - */ - s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname - && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname, - strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname)); - } - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { - PACKET srp_I; - - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I)) - return 0; - - if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) - return 0; - - /* - * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user - * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. - */ - if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { - PACKET ec_point_format_list; - - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, - &ec_point_format_list) - || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (!s->hit) { - if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, - &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, - &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { - PACKET elliptic_curve_list; - - /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, - &elliptic_curve_list) - || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 - || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (!s->hit) { - if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list, - &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, - &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension), - PACKET_remaining(&extension), - s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { - PACKET supported_sig_algs; - - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs) - || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0 - || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (!s->hit) { - if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs), - PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) { - return 0; - } - } - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { - if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, - (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) { - return 0; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { - const unsigned char *ext_data; - PACKET responder_id_list, exts; - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list)) - return 0; - - while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { - OCSP_RESPID *id; - PACKET responder_id; - const unsigned char *id_data; - - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, - &responder_id) - || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { - return 0; - } - - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL - && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = - sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); - id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, - PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); - if (id == NULL) - return 0; - - if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - return 0; - } - - if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - - /* Read in request_extensions */ - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts)) - return 0; - - if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { - ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); - sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, - X509_EXTENSION_free); - s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = - d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, - PACKET_remaining(&exts)); - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL - || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { - return 0; - } - } - } else -#endif - { - /* - * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it. - */ - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; - } - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { - unsigned int hbtype; - - if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype) - || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - switch (hbtype) { - case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - break; - case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - break; - default: - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { - /*- - * We shouldn't accept this extension on a - * renegotiation. - * - * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we - * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on - * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when - * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an - * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing - * anything like that, but this might change). - * - * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake - * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > - * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen - * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new - * Finished message could have been computed.) - */ - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - } -#endif - - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { - if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al)) - return 0; - } - - /* session ticket processed earlier */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) - && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { - if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al)) - return 0; - } -#endif -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; -#endif - /* - * Note: extended master secret extension handled in - * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early() - */ - - /* - * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a - * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom - * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the - * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate - * ServerHello may be later returned. - */ - else if (!s->hit) { - if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension), - PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0) - return 0; - } - } - - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */ - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - ri_check: - - /* Need RI if renegotiating */ - - if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; - } - - /* - * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly. - * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early. - * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must - * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers. - */ - return 1; -} - -int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) -{ - int al = -1; - custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext); - if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return 0; - } - if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -/* - * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No - * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly - * fill the length of the block. - */ -static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt) -{ - unsigned int len; - - while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { - if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len) - || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len)) - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} -#endif - -static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) -{ - unsigned int length, type, size; - int tlsext_servername = 0; - int renegotiate_seen = 0; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -#endif - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; - - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | - SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); -#endif - -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; -#endif - - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; - - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length)) - goto ri_check; - - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) { - const unsigned char *data; - PACKET spkt; - - if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size) - || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size)) - goto ri_check; - - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); - - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { - if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al)) - return 0; - renegotiate_seen = 1; - } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { - } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { - if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - tlsext_servername = 1; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { - unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length; - if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length) - || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!s->hit) { - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = - OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = - ecpointformatlist_length; - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, - ecpointformatlist_length)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - } - } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { - if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, - s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { - /* - * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status - * request message. - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT - /* - * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation - * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we - * need to let control continue to flow to that. - */ - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp && - s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { - /* Simply copy it off for later processing */ - if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) { - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts); - s->tlsext_scts = NULL; - } - s->tlsext_scts_len = size; - if (size > 0) { - s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); - if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size); - } - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { - unsigned char *selected; - unsigned char selected_len; - /* We must have requested it. */ - if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - /* The data must be valid */ - if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (s-> - ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, - size, - s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != - SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); - if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; - } -#endif - - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { - unsigned len; - /* We must have requested it. */ - if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - /*- - * The extension data consists of: - * uint16 list_length - * uint8 proto_length; - * uint8 proto[proto_length]; - */ - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len) - || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len - || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len) - || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); - if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { - unsigned int hbtype; - if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - switch (hbtype) { - case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - break; - case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - break; - default: - *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - return 0; - } - } -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP - else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { - if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al)) - return 0; - } -#endif -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) { - /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD - && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; - } -#endif - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) { - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; - if (!s->hit) - s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; - } - /* - * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a - * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback - */ - else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0) - return 0; - } - - if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { - if (s->tlsext_hostname) { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { - s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); - if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - } else { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); + return 0; + } + *pmd = tls12_get_hash(tls_sigalg_get_hash(sig)); + if (*pmd == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); + return 0; } - - ri_check: - /* - * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid - * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello - * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. - * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which - * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on - * initial connect only. + * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we + * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array. */ - if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) - && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff; + sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff; + if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, + EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), + (void *)sigalgstr)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return 0; } - - if (s->hit) { - /* - * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with - * original session. - */ - if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) != - !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); - return 0; - } - } - + /* + * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish. + */ + s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd; return 1; } -int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) +/* + * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't + * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported + * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level. + * + * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported + * by the client. + * + * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not. + */ +void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) { - s->s3->alpn_sent = 0; - return 1; + s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0; + s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0; + ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK); + ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ + if (!s->psk_client_callback) { + s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; + s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK; + } +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP + if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { + s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; + s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; + } +#endif } -int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) +/* + * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not + * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on + * @c: cipher to check + * @op: Security check that you want to do + * + * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled. + */ +int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op) { - return 1; + if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k + || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a) + return 1; + if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0) + return 1; + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) + || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) + return 1; + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) + || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) + return 1; + + return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c); } -static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) +int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s) { - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* - * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely - * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. - */ - /* - * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely - * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. - */ -#endif - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL - && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = - s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s-> - initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - - switch (ret) { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - return 1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done = 0; - default: - return 1; - } + if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) + return 0; + return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL); } + /* Initialise digests to default values */ void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s) { @@ -2737,7 +991,8 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) { int al; size_t i; - /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */ + + /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; @@ -2757,7 +1012,7 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */ if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, - SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS); + SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS); al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; goto err; } @@ -2770,178 +1025,16 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) return 0; } -int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) -{ - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; - int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - /* - * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be - * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed, - * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may - * influence which certificate is sent - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { - int r; - CERT_PKEY *certpkey; - certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); - /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ - if (certpkey == NULL) { - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - return 1; - } - /* - * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate - * et al can pick it up. - */ - s->cert->key = certpkey; - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - switch (r) { - /* We don't want to send a status request response */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - break; - /* status request response should be sent */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - else - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - break; - /* something bad happened */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - } else - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - - if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) { - goto err; - } - - err: - switch (ret) { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - return 1; - - default: - return 1; - } -} - -int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) -{ - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - /* - * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher - * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it - * must contain uncompressed. - */ - unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) - && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) - && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) - && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) - && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { - /* we are using an ECC cipher */ - size_t i; - unsigned char *list; - int found_uncompressed = 0; - list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; - for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { - if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { - found_uncompressed = 1; - break; - } - } - if (!found_uncompressed) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); - return -1; - } - } - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL - && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = - s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, - s-> - initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - - /* - * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event - * that we don't receive a status message - */ - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; - - switch (ret) { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - return 1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done = 0; - default: - return 1; - } -} - -int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) -{ - int al = -1; - if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) - return 1; - if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return 0; - } - - if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); - return 0; - } - return 1; -} - /*- - * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the - * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions - * need to be handled at the same time. - * - * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master - * secret. + * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any. * - * session_id: ClientHello session ID. - * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix) + * hello: The parsed ClientHello data * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to * point to the resulting session. * * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will - * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. + * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1. * * Returns: * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. @@ -2953,129 +1046,78 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. * * Side effects: - * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue + * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if - * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. - * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. - * - * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present. - * + * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. + * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0. */ -int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, - const PACKET *session_id, - SSL_SESSION **ret) +int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, + SSL_SESSION **ret) { - unsigned int i; - PACKET local_ext = *ext; - int retv = -1; - - int have_ticket = 0; - int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s); + int retv; + size_t size; + RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext; *ret = NULL; - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; /* - * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful + * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version + * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful * resumption. */ - if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION)) + if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s)) return 0; - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) { - retv = 0; - goto end; + ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket]; + if (!ticketext->present) + return 0; + + size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data); + if (size == 0) { + /* + * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have + * one. + */ + s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; + return 1; + } + if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) { + /* + * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than + * generating the session from ticket now, trigger + * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to + * calculate the master secret later. + */ + return 2; } - while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) { - unsigned int type, size; - if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) { - /* Shouldn't ever happen */ - retv = -1; - goto end; - } - if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) { - retv = 0; - goto end; - } - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) { - int r; - const unsigned char *etick; + retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size, + hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret); + switch (retv) { + case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ + s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; + return 2; - /* Duplicate extension */ - if (have_ticket != 0) { - retv = -1; - goto end; - } - have_ticket = 1; - - if (size == 0) { - /* - * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have - * one. - */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - retv = 1; - continue; - } - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { - /* - * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than - * generating the session from ticket now, trigger - * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to - * calculate the master secret later. - */ - retv = 2; - continue; - } - if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) { - /* Shouldn't ever happen */ - retv = -1; - goto end; - } - r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id), - PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret); - switch (r) { - case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - retv = 2; - break; - case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ - retv = r; - break; - case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - retv = 3; - break; - default: /* fatal error */ - retv = -1; - break; - } - continue; - } else { - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; - if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) { - retv = -1; - goto end; - } - } + case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ + return 3; + + case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ + s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; + return 3; + + default: /* fatal error */ + return -1; } - if (have_ticket == 0) - retv = 0; -end: - return retv; } /*- * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. * * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. - * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. + * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension. * sess_id: points at the session ID. * sesslen: the length of the session ID. * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to @@ -3089,20 +1131,19 @@ end: * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. */ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, - int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, - int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) + size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, + size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) { SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *sdec; const unsigned char *p; - int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1; + int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen; + size_t mlen; unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; - /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ - if (eticklen < 48) - return 2; + /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (hctx == NULL) @@ -3112,9 +1153,9 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, ret = -2; goto err; } - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { + if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) { unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; - int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, + int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, ctx, hctx, 0); if (rv < 0) goto err; @@ -3126,30 +1167,39 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, renew_ticket = 1; } else { /* Check key name matches */ - if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) { + if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name, + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) { ret = 2; goto err; } - if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key, + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key), EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, - etick + 16) <= 0) { + || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, + tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, + etick + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= + 0) { goto err; - } + } } /* * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity * checks on ticket. */ mlen = HMAC_size(hctx); - if (mlen < 0) { + if (mlen == 0) { + goto err; + } + /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ + if (eticklen <= + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) { + ret = 2; goto err; } eticklen -= mlen; /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 - || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { + || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { goto err; } HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); @@ -3162,18 +1212,18 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); - if (sdec == NULL - || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { + if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, + (int)eticklen) <= 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_free(sdec); return -1; } - if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { + if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_free(sdec); return 2; } - slen += mlen; + slen += declen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL; p = sdec; @@ -3201,193 +1251,169 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. */ return 2; -err: + err: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); return ret; } -/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ - -typedef struct { - int nid; - int id; -} tls12_lookup; - -static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { - {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, - {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, - {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, - {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, - {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, - {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}, - {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411}, - {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256}, - {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512}, -}; - -static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { - {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, - {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, - {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}, - {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001}, - {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256}, - {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512} -}; - -static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) -{ - size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { - if (table[i].nid == nid) - return table[i].id; - } - return -1; -} - -static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) +int tls12_get_sigandhash(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, + const EVP_MD *md, int *ispss) { + int md_id, sig_id, tmpispss = 0; size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { - if ((table[i].id) == id) - return table[i].nid; - } - return NID_undef; -} + const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr; -int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, - const EVP_MD *md) -{ - int sig_id, md_id; - if (!md) + if (md == NULL) return 0; - md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md)); - if (md_id == -1) + md_id = EVP_MD_type(md); + sig_id = EVP_PKEY_id(pk); + if (md_id == NID_undef) return 0; - sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); - if (sig_id == -1) - return 0; - p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; - p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; - return 1; -} -int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) -{ - return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig)); + for (i = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); + i++, curr++) { + if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) { + if (sig_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { + tmpispss = SIGID_IS_PSS(curr->sigalg); + if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && tmpispss) { + size_t j; + + /* + * Check peer actually sent a PSS sig id - it could have + * been a PKCS1 sig id instead. + */ + for (j = 0; j < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; j++) + if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs[j].rsigalg == curr->sigalg) + break; + + if (j == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) + continue; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curr->sigalg)) + return 0; + *ispss = tmpispss; + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; } typedef struct { int nid; int secbits; int md_idx; - unsigned char tlsext_hash; } tls12_hash_info; static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = { - {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, - {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, - {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, - {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, - {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, - {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}, - {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411}, - {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256}, - {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512}, + {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX}, + {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX}, + {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX}, + {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX}, + {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX}, + {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX}, }; -static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg) +static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(int hash_nid) { unsigned int i; - if (hash_alg == 0) + if (hash_nid == NID_undef) return NULL; - for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) - { - if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg) + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) { + if (tls12_md_info[i].nid == hash_nid) return tls12_md_info + i; } return NULL; } -const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) +const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(int hash_nid) { const tls12_hash_info *inf; - if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode()) + if (hash_nid == NID_md5 && FIPS_mode()) return NULL; - inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg); + inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_nid); if (!inf) return NULL; return ssl_md(inf->md_idx); } -static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) +static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid) { - switch (sig_alg) { + switch (sig_nid) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: + case EVP_PKEY_RSA: return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: + case EVP_PKEY_DSA: return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: + case EVP_PKEY_EC: return SSL_PKEY_ECC; #endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST - case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001: +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; - case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256: + case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; - case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512: + case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; -# endif +#endif } return -1; } /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */ static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, - int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) + int *psignhash_nid, unsigned int data) { int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef; if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) return; if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { - hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md)); + hash_nid = tls_sigalg_get_hash(data); if (phash_nid) *phash_nid = hash_nid; } if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) { - sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig)); + sign_nid = tls_sigalg_get_sig(data); if (psign_nid) *psign_nid = sign_nid; } if (psignhash_nid) { if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef - || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, - sign_nid) <= 0) + || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0) *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; } } /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */ -static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp) +static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, unsigned int ptmp) { /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */ - const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]); + const tls12_hash_info *hinf + = tls12_get_hash_info(tls_sigalg_get_hash(ptmp)); + unsigned char sigalgstr[2]; + if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL) return 0; /* See if public key algorithm allowed */ - if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1) + if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(tls_sigalg_get_sig(ptmp)) == -1) return 0; /* Finally see if security callback allows it */ - return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp); + sigalgstr[0] = (ptmp >> 8) & 0xff; + sigalgstr[1] = ptmp & 0xff; + return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)sigalgstr); } /* @@ -3398,7 +1424,7 @@ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp) void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op) { - const unsigned char *sigalgs; + const unsigned int *sigalgs; size_t i, sigalgslen; int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; /* @@ -3406,24 +1432,24 @@ void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op) * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep * down calls to security callback only check if we have to. */ - sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs); - for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) { - switch (sigalgs[1]) { + sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs); + for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) { + switch (tls_sigalg_get_sig(*sigalgs)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: - if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs)) + case EVP_PKEY_RSA: + if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs)) have_rsa = 1; break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: - if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs)) + case EVP_PKEY_DSA: + if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs)) have_dsa = 1; break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: - if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs)) + case EVP_PKEY_EC: + if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs)) have_ecdsa = 1; break; #endif @@ -3437,40 +1463,39 @@ void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op) *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; } -size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen) +int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + const unsigned int *psig, size_t psiglen) { - unsigned char *tmpout = out; size_t i; - for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) { - if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) { - *tmpout++ = psig[0]; - *tmpout++ = psig[1]; + + for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) { + if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, *psig)) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig)) + return 0; } } - return tmpout - out; + return 1; } /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ -static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, - const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen, - const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen) +static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, + const unsigned int *pref, size_t preflen, + const unsigned int *allow, size_t allowlen) { - const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp; + const unsigned int *ptmp, *atmp; size_t i, j, nmatch = 0; - for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) { + for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) { /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */ - if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp)) + if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, *ptmp)) continue; - for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) { - if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) { + for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) { + if (*ptmp == *atmp) { nmatch++; if (shsig) { - shsig->rhash = ptmp[0]; - shsig->rsign = ptmp[1]; + shsig->rsigalg = *ptmp; tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, &shsig->sign_nid, - &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp); + &shsig->signandhash_nid, *ptmp); shsig++; } break; @@ -3483,7 +1508,7 @@ static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) { - const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf; + const unsigned int *pref, *allow, *conf; size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen; size_t nmatch; TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL; @@ -3501,7 +1526,7 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) conf = c->conf_sigalgs; conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen; } else - conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf); + conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf); if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) { pref = conf; preflen = conflen; @@ -3529,9 +1554,11 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) /* Set preferred digest for each key type */ -int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) +int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { CERT *c = s->cert; + size_t size, i; + /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) return 1; @@ -3539,12 +1566,27 @@ int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) if (!c) return 0; + size = PACKET_remaining(pkt); + + /* Invalid data length */ + if ((size & 1) != 0) + return 0; + + size >>= 1; + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); - s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize); + s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size + * sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)); if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) return 0; - s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize; - memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize); + s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size; + for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i]); + i++) + continue; + + if (i != size) + return 0; + return 1; } @@ -3562,9 +1604,16 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) { - idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign); + /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */ + if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) + && (sigptr->rsigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1 + || sigptr->rsigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256 + || sigptr->rsigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384 + || sigptr->rsigalg == TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512)) + continue; + idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->sign_nid); if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) { - md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash); + md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->hash_nid); pmd[idx] = md; pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { @@ -3575,10 +1624,11 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) } /* - * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use - * the certificate for signing. + * In strict mode or TLS1.3 leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't + * use the certificate for signing. */ - if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) { + if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) + && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not * supported it stays as NULL. @@ -3597,14 +1647,16 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL) pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1(); #endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL) pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94); if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL) - pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256); + pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = + EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256); if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL) - pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512); -# endif + pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = + EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512); +#endif } return 1; } @@ -3613,21 +1665,21 @@ int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) { - const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs; - if (psig == NULL) + unsigned int *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs; + size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen; + if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX) return 0; if (idx >= 0) { - idx <<= 1; - if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen) + if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs) return 0; psig += idx; if (rhash) - *rhash = psig[0]; + *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff); if (rsig) - *rsig = psig[1]; - tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig); + *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff); + tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, *psig); } - return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2; + return (int)numsigalgs; } int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, @@ -3635,7 +1687,8 @@ int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash) { TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs; - if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) + if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen + || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX) return 0; shsigalgs += idx; if (phash) @@ -3645,10 +1698,10 @@ int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, if (psignhash) *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid; if (rsig) - *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign; + *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->rsigalg & 0xff); if (rhash) - *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash; - return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; + *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->rsigalg >> 8) & 0xff); + return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; } #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2) @@ -3711,7 +1764,7 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) } /* - * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the + * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */ int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) @@ -3725,35 +1778,50 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client); } -int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, - int client) +/* TODO(TLS1.3): Needs updating to allow setting of TLS1.3 sig algs */ +int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client) { - unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr; - int rhash, rsign; + unsigned int *sigalgs, *sptr; size_t i; + if (salglen & 1) return 0; - sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen); + sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs)); if (sigalgs == NULL) return 0; + /* + * TODO(TLS1.3): Somehow we need to be able to set RSA-PSS as well as + * RSA-PKCS1. For now we only allow setting of RSA-PKCS1 + */ for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) { - rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md)); - rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig)); + size_t j; + const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr; + int md_id = *psig_nids++; + int sig_id = *psig_nids++; + + for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl); + j++, curr++) { + /* Skip setting PSS so we get PKCS1 by default */ + if (SIGID_IS_PSS(curr->sigalg)) + continue; + if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) { + *sptr++ = curr->sigalg; + break; + } + } - if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) + if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl)) goto err; - *sptr++ = rhash; - *sptr++ = rsign; } if (client) { OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; - c->client_sigalgslen = salglen; + c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2; } else { OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; - c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen; + c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2; } return 1; @@ -3822,7 +1890,7 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */ if (idx == -2) { cpk = c->key; - idx = cpk - c->pkeys; + idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys); } else cpk = c->pkeys + idx; pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx; @@ -3865,7 +1933,7 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, */ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) { int default_nid; - unsigned char rsign = 0; + int rsign = 0; if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) default_nid = 0; /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */ @@ -3873,32 +1941,32 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, switch (idx) { case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: - rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; + rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA; default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; break; case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: - rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa; + rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA; default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1; break; case SSL_PKEY_ECC: - rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa; + rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC; default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1; break; case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: - rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001; + rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001; default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001; break; case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: - rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256; + rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256; default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256; break; case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: - rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512; + rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512; default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512; break; @@ -3913,9 +1981,10 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, */ if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) { size_t j; - const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs; - for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) { - if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign) + const unsigned int *p = c->conf_sigalgs; + for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) { + if (tls_sigalg_get_hash(*p) == NID_sha1 + && tls_sigalg_get_sig(*p) == rsign) break; } if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) { @@ -4072,7 +2141,6 @@ int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) { @@ -4091,17 +2159,20 @@ DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) if (dh_secbits >= 128) { DH *dhp = DH_new(); + BIGNUM *p, *g; if (dhp == NULL) return NULL; - dhp->g = BN_new(); - if (dhp->g != NULL) - BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2); + g = BN_new(); + if (g != NULL) + BN_set_word(g, 2); if (dh_secbits >= 192) - dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL); + p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL); else - dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL); - if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) { + p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL); + if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) { DH_free(dhp); + BN_free(p); + BN_free(g); return NULL; } return dhp;