X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Ft1_lib.c;h=9c110816218345d2a99ce3d94fb99cb12d7a7fcf;hp=9f6cef3afba8bab3d834a05b4b1d1e5a552dd73f;hb=e2726ce64dc0762d9678fb10639b0f42d9abfc52;hpb=9021a5dfb37fd3a6f7726f07ef0f27dcb71048e2 diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index 9f6cef3afb..9c11081621 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -1,111 +1,10 @@ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). +/* + * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * + * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include @@ -114,7 +13,8 @@ #include #include #include -#include +#include +#include #include #include #include "ssl_locl.h" @@ -140,7 +40,8 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = { tls1_export_keying_material, 0, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, - ssl3_set_handshake_header, + ssl3_set_handshake_header2, + tls_close_construct_packet, ssl3_handshake_write }; @@ -158,7 +59,8 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = { tls1_export_keying_material, SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, - ssl3_set_handshake_header, + ssl3_set_handshake_header2, + tls_close_construct_packet, ssl3_handshake_write }; @@ -177,7 +79,8 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = { SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, - ssl3_set_handshake_header, + ssl3_set_handshake_header2, + tls_close_construct_packet, ssl3_handshake_write }; @@ -221,12 +124,6 @@ typedef struct { unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */ } tls_curve_info; -/* Mask for curve type */ -# define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3 -# define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0 -# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1 -# define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2 - /* * Table of curve information. * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup @@ -261,8 +158,7 @@ static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = { {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ - /* X25519 (29) */ - {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, + {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */ }; static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { @@ -316,18 +212,21 @@ static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = { 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ }; - static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = { 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 }; -int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) +int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags) { + const tls_curve_info *cinfo; /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))) return 0; - return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid; + cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1; + if (pflags) + *pflags = cinfo->flags; + return cinfo->nid; } int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) @@ -353,8 +252,7 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.) */ static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, - const unsigned char **pcurves, - size_t *num_curves) + const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves) { size_t pcurveslen = 0; if (sess) { @@ -487,8 +385,7 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */ return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; if (!tls1_get_curvelist - (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, - &num_pref)) + (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref)) return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; /* @@ -499,7 +396,7 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) supp = eccurves_all; num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; } else if (num_pref == 0 && - (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { + (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { pref = eccurves_all; num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; } @@ -513,7 +410,7 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) continue; if (nmatch == k) { int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1]; - return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id); + return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL); } k++; } @@ -592,8 +489,7 @@ static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) } /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */ -int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, - const char *str) +int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str) { nid_cb_st ncb; ncb.nidcnt = 0; @@ -767,7 +663,7 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* - * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity + * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility * @s: SSL connection * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using * @@ -819,19 +715,19 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ +# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ #else # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ +# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ #else # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC -# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ +# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */ #else # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, #endif @@ -849,8 +745,8 @@ static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001, - TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256, - TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512 + TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256, + TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512 #endif }; @@ -965,8 +861,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, } /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK, - EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), - (void *)sig)) { + EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return 0; } @@ -993,13 +888,13 @@ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0; ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK); ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver); -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ if (!s->psk_client_callback) { s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK; } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; @@ -1024,10 +919,10 @@ int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op) if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0) return 1; if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) - || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) + || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) return 1; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) - || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) + || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) return 1; return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c); @@ -1040,7 +935,8 @@ static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s) return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL); } -static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) { +static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) +{ unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1); unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2); if (u1 < u2) @@ -1059,7 +955,8 @@ static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) { * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error * occurred. */ -static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) { +static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) +{ PACKET extensions = *packet; size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0; unsigned int *extension_types = NULL; @@ -1113,12 +1010,8 @@ static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) { return ret; } -unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, - unsigned char *limit, int *al) +int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) { - int extdatalen = 0; - unsigned char *orig = buf; - unsigned char *ret = buf; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ int using_ecc = 0; @@ -1133,7 +1026,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) - || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) { + || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) { using_ecc = 1; break; } @@ -1141,32 +1034,16 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, } #endif - ret += 2; - - if (ret >= limit) - return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - /* Add RI if renegotiating */ if (s->renegotiate) { - int el; - - if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, + s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; + return 0; } - - ret += el; } /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */ if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION) @@ -1174,62 +1051,36 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ - unsigned long size_str; - long lenmax; - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 for the servername type and entension length - * 2 for servernamelist length - * 1 for the hostname type - * 2 for hostname length - * + hostname length - */ - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 - || (size_str = - strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) - return NULL; - - /* extension type and length */ - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); - s2n(size_str + 5, ret); - - /* length of servername list */ - s2n(size_str + 3, ret); - - /* hostname type, length and hostname */ - *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; - s2n(size_str, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); - ret += size_str; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname, + strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* Add SRP username if there is one */ - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the - * Client Hello message */ - - int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); - if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { + if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) + /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) + /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */ + || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) + || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login, + strlen(s->srp_ctx.login)) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; + return 0; } - - /*- - * check for enough space. - * 4 for the srp type type and entension length - * 1 for the srp user identity - * + srp user identity length - */ - if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) - return NULL; - - /* fill in the extension */ - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); - s2n(login_len + 1, ret); - (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; - memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); - ret += login_len; } #endif @@ -1238,63 +1089,54 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, /* * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ - long lenmax; const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats; - size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len; + size_t num_curves, num_formats; size_t i; - unsigned char *etmp; tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) - return NULL; - if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) - return NULL; - if (num_formats > 255) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) + /* Sub-packet for formats extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; + return 0; } - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); - /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */ - s2n(num_formats + 1, ret); - *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats; - memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats); - ret += num_formats; - /* * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; - if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) - return NULL; - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) - return NULL; - if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) - return NULL; - if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) { + if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; + return 0; } - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); - etmp = ret + 4; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) + /* Sub-packet for curves extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } /* Copy curve ID if supported */ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) { if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { - *etmp++ = pcurves[0]; - *etmp++ = pcurves[1]; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[0]) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurves[1])) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } } - - curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4; - - s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret); - s2n(curves_list_len, ret); - ret += curves_list_len; + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (tls_use_ticket(s)) { int ticklen; @@ -1304,8 +1146,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); - if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) - return NULL; + if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; @@ -1314,113 +1158,124 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) goto skip_ext; - /* - * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for - * ticket - */ - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); - s2n(ticklen, ret); - if (ticklen) { - memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); - ret += ticklen; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, + ticklen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } } skip_ext: - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { size_t salglen; const unsigned char *salg; - unsigned char *etmp; + salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg); - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); - etmp = ret; - /* Skip over lengths for now */ - ret += 4; - salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen); - /* Fill in lengths */ - s2n(salglen + 2, etmp); - s2n(salglen, etmp); - ret += salglen; - } + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) + /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + /* Sub-packet for the actual list */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { int i; - long extlen, idlen, itmp; - OCSP_RESPID *id; - idlen = 0; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) + /* Sub-packet for status request extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) + /* Sub-packet for the ids */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { + unsigned char *idbytes; + int idlen; + OCSP_RESPID *id; + id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); - if (itmp <= 0) - return NULL; - idlen += itmp + 2; + idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); + if (idlen <= 0 + /* Sub-packet for an individual id */ + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes) + || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { - extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); - if (extlen < 0) - return NULL; - } else - extlen = 0; + unsigned char *extbytes; + int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); - if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); - if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) - return NULL; - s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); - *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; - s2n(idlen, ret); - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { - /* save position of id len */ - unsigned char *q = ret; - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - /* skip over id len */ - ret += 2; - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); - /* write id len */ - s2n(itmp, q); + if (extlen < 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes) + || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes) + != extlen) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } - s2n(extlen, ret); - if (extlen > 0) - i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - /* Add Heartbeat extension */ - if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); - s2n(1, ret); + unsigned int mode; + /*- * Set mode: * 1: peer may send requests * 2: peer not allowed to send requests */ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) - *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; + mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; else - *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) + /* Sub-packet for Hearbeat extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { /* - * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support + * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support * for Next Protocol Negotiation */ - if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); - s2n(0, ret); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } #endif @@ -1430,54 +1285,77 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, * (see longer comment below) */ if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { - if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); - s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); - s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); - memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); - ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, + TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) + /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list, + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } s->s3->alpn_sent = 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { - int el; - - /* Returns 0 on success!! */ - if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { + STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); + SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof; + int i, ct; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) + /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */ + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; + return 0; } - - if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { + ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); + for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) { + prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); + if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) + /* Add an empty use_mki value */ + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; + return 0; } - ret += el; } #endif custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext); /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */ - if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al)) - return NULL; -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret); - s2n(0, ret); -#endif + if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret); - s2n(0, ret); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } #endif - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); - s2n(0, ret); + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } /* * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See @@ -1486,7 +1364,13 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, * appear last. */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { - int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + unsigned char *padbytes; + size_t hlen; + + if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { hlen = 0x200 - hlen; @@ -1495,28 +1379,21 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, else hlen = 0; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); - s2n(hlen, ret); - memset(ret, 0, hlen); - ret += hlen; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + memset(padbytes, 0, hlen); } } done: - - if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) - return orig; - - s2n(extdatalen, orig); - return ret; + return 1; } -unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, - unsigned char *limit, int *al) +int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al) { - int extdatalen = 0; - unsigned char *orig = buf; - unsigned char *ret = buf; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int next_proto_neg_seen; #endif @@ -1527,30 +1404,16 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); #endif - ret += 2; - if (ret >= limit) - return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - - if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { - int el; - - if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } - ret += el; + if (s->s3->send_connection_binding && + !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; } /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */ @@ -1558,12 +1421,12 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, goto done; if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 - && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); - s2n(0, ret); + && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (using_ecc) { @@ -1572,66 +1435,54 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, /* * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ - long lenmax; - tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) - return NULL; - if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) - return NULL; - if (plistlen > 255) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; + return 0; } - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); - s2n(plistlen + 1, ret); - *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen; - memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); - ret += plistlen; - } /* * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves * extension */ -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); - s2n(0, ret); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } else { + /* + * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket + * later + */ + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; } if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); - s2n(0, ret); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { - int el; - - /* Returns 0 on success!! */ - if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) - return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); - s2n(el, ret); - - if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; + return 0; } - ret += el; } #endif @@ -1646,28 +1497,32 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 }; - if (limit - ret < 36) - return NULL; - memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36); - ret += 36; - + if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) { - if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); - s2n(1, ret); + unsigned int mode; /*- * Set mode: * 1: peer may send requests * 2: peer not allowed to send requests */ if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) - *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; + mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; else - *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + mode = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, mode) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } #endif @@ -1684,19 +1539,20 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s-> ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); - s2n(npalen, ret); - memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); - ret += npalen; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } } #endif - if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al)) - return NULL; -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac + if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) { /* * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable @@ -1708,37 +1564,41 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; else { - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret); - s2n(0, ret); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } } -#endif if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) { - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); - s2n(0, ret); + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { - const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; - unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; - - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); - s2n(3 + len, ret); - s2n(1 + len, ret); - *ret++ = len; - memcpy(ret, selected, len); - ret += len; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, + TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) + || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, + s->s3->alpn_selected_len) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt) + || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } } done: - - if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) - return orig; - - s2n(extdatalen, orig); - return ret; + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + return 1; } /* @@ -1768,8 +1628,7 @@ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, - &s->s3->alpn_proposed, - &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { + &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -1779,11 +1638,10 @@ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) /* * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. - * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_* * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. - * returns 1 on success, 0 + * returns 1 on success, 0 on error. */ -static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al) +static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al) { const unsigned char *selected = NULL; unsigned char selected_len = 0; @@ -1799,7 +1657,6 @@ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al) s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; return 0; } s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; @@ -1809,7 +1666,6 @@ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al) #endif } else { *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL; - *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; return 0; } } @@ -1880,7 +1736,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt) s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, ext_len); } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of @@ -1920,14 +1776,12 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt); -# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL; -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); @@ -2004,7 +1858,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) /* * Although the server_name extension was intended to be * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the - * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as + * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as * such. * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other @@ -2071,8 +1925,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { PACKET ec_point_format_list; - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, - &ec_point_format_list) + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { return 0; } @@ -2080,7 +1933,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!s->hit) { if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, - &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) { + &s-> + session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2089,8 +1943,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) PACKET elliptic_curve_list; /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ - if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, - &elliptic_curve_list) + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list) || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) { return 0; @@ -2099,18 +1952,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!s->hit) { if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list, &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, - &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) { + &s-> + session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension), PACKET_remaining(&extension), - s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { + s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) + { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2123,7 +1978,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } - if (!s->hit) { + if (!s->hit) { if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs), PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) { return 0; @@ -2134,14 +1989,30 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) { return 0; } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { const unsigned char *ext_data; PACKET responder_id_list, exts; - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list)) + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 + (&extension, &responder_id_list)) return 0; + /* + * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake + * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304 + */ + sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, + OCSP_RESPID_free); + if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { + s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null(); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + } else { + s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; + } + while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { OCSP_RESPID *id; PACKET responder_id; @@ -2153,13 +2024,6 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL - && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = - sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); @@ -2208,7 +2072,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) unsigned int hbtype; if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype) - || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) { + || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2235,7 +2099,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on - * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when + * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing * anything like that, but this might change). @@ -2264,10 +2128,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } #endif -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; -#endif /* * Note: extended master secret extension handled in * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early() @@ -2288,7 +2150,9 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { - /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */ + /* + * tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. + */ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2337,11 +2201,11 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) */ static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt) { - unsigned int len; + PACKET tmp_protocol; while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { - if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len) - || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len)) + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol) + || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) return 0; } @@ -2367,9 +2231,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); #endif -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; -#endif s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; @@ -2391,7 +2253,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) PACKET spkt; if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size) - || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size)) + || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size)) goto ri_check; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) @@ -2413,7 +2275,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length; if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length) - || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { + || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2436,7 +2298,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) } } -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && @@ -2451,8 +2313,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { + } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { /* * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status * request message. @@ -2503,14 +2364,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } - if (s-> - ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, - size, - s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != + if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, + size, + s-> + ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } + /* + * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in + * a single Serverhello + */ + OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated); s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -2536,9 +2402,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len) - || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len - || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len) - || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) { + || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len) + || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2581,15 +2446,12 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) return 0; } #endif -#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) { /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; - } -#endif - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) { + } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) { s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!s->hit) s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; @@ -2610,7 +2472,8 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { if (s->tlsext_hostname) { if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { - s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); + s->session->tlsext_hostname = + OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; @@ -2629,8 +2492,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which - * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on - * initial connect only. + * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence */ if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { @@ -2650,7 +2512,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); return 0; - } + } } return 1; @@ -2709,6 +2571,7 @@ static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) return 1; } } + /* Initialise digests to default values */ void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s) { @@ -2737,7 +2600,8 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) { int al; size_t i; - /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */ + + /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; @@ -2757,7 +2621,7 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */ if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, - SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS); + SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS); al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; goto err; } @@ -2770,10 +2634,13 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) return 0; } -int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) +/* + * Upon success, returns 1. + * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert. + */ +int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al) { - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; - int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; /* * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be @@ -2782,58 +2649,41 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) * influence which certificate is sent */ if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { - int r; + int ret; CERT_PKEY *certpkey; certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ - if (certpkey == NULL) { - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - return 1; - } - /* - * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate - * et al can pick it up. - */ - s->cert->key = certpkey; - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - switch (r) { - /* We don't want to send a status request response */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - break; - /* status request response should be sent */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - else + if (certpkey != NULL) { + /* + * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate + * et al can pick it up. + */ + s->cert->key = certpkey; + ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + switch (ret) { + /* We don't want to send a status request response */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - break; - /* something bad happened */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; + break; + /* status request response should be sent */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) + s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; + break; + /* something bad happened */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: + default: + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } } - } else - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - - if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) { - goto err; } - err: - switch (ret) { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - return 1; - - default: - return 1; + if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) { + return 0; } + + return 1; } int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) @@ -2872,7 +2722,7 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) } } ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = @@ -2993,7 +2843,7 @@ int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, unsigned int type, size; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type) - || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) { + || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) { /* Shouldn't ever happen */ retv = -1; goto end; @@ -3067,7 +2917,7 @@ int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, } if (have_ticket == 0) retv = 0; -end: + end: return retv; } @@ -3075,7 +2925,7 @@ end: * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. * * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. - * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. + * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension. * sess_id: points at the session ID. * sesslen: the length of the session ID. * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to @@ -3100,9 +2950,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; - /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ - if (eticklen < 48) - return 2; + /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (hctx == NULL) @@ -3126,17 +2974,20 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, renew_ticket = 1; } else { /* Check key name matches */ - if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) { + if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) { ret = 2; goto err; } - if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key), EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, - etick + 16) <= 0) { + || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, + tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, + etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= + 0) { goto err; - } + } } /* * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity @@ -3146,10 +2997,16 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, if (mlen < 0) { goto err; } + /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */ + if (eticklen <= + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) { + ret = 2; + goto err; + } eticklen -= mlen; /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 - || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { + || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { goto err; } HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); @@ -3162,8 +3019,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); - if (sdec == NULL - || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { + if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_free(sdec); return -1; @@ -3201,7 +3057,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. */ return 2; -err: + err: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); return ret; @@ -3255,11 +3111,11 @@ static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) return NID_undef; } -int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, - const EVP_MD *md) +int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) { int sig_id, md_id; - if (!md) + + if (md == NULL) return 0; md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md)); if (md_id == -1) @@ -3267,8 +3123,9 @@ int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); if (sig_id == -1) return 0; - p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; - p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id)) + return 0; + return 1; } @@ -3291,9 +3148,11 @@ static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = { {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}, - {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411}, - {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256}, - {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, + TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, + TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512}, }; static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg) @@ -3302,8 +3161,7 @@ static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg) if (hash_alg == 0) return NULL; - for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) - { + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) { if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg) return tls12_md_info + i; } @@ -3337,7 +3195,7 @@ static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: return SSL_PKEY_ECC; #endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001: return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; @@ -3346,7 +3204,7 @@ static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512: return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; -# endif +#endif } return -1; } @@ -3370,8 +3228,7 @@ static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, } if (psignhash_nid) { if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef - || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, - sign_nid) <= 0) + || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0) *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; } } @@ -3437,18 +3294,19 @@ void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op) *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; } -size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen) +int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, + const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen) { - unsigned char *tmpout = out; size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) { if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) { - *tmpout++ = psig[0]; - *tmpout++ = psig[1]; + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0]) + || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1])) + return 0; } } - return tmpout - out; + return 1; } /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ @@ -3597,14 +3455,16 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL) pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1(); #endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL) pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94); if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL) - pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256); + pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = + EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256); if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL) - pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512); -# endif + pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = + EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512); +#endif } return 1; } @@ -3711,7 +3571,7 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) } /* - * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the + * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */ int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) @@ -3725,8 +3585,7 @@ int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client) return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client); } -int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, - int client) +int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client) { unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr; int rhash, rsign; @@ -4072,7 +3931,6 @@ int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); } - #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) {