X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Ft1_lib.c;h=92eb35b61d42f015ded4e60cb8047abf7b2b8083;hp=277280865b89a653f9c9dd46d1d3a7cbf664a33f;hb=6f31dd72d28b5b2b75c50a54ed2666cab963922a;hpb=d0205686bb0c0e471522d12b32deb0d1dd1651a2

diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 277280865b..92eb35b61d 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
 	TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
 	TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
 	tls1_alert_code,
+	tls1_export_keying_material,
 	};
 
 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
@@ -170,6 +171,7 @@ void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
 	}
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+
 static int nid_list[] =
 	{
 		NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
@@ -198,7 +200,36 @@ static int nid_list[] =
 		NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
 		NID_secp521r1  /* secp521r1 (25) */	
 	};
-	
+
+static int pref_list[] =
+	{
+		NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ 
+		NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 
+		NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */	
+		NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 
+		NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+		NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+		NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+		NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ 
+		NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ 
+		NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 
+		NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 
+		NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+		NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ 
+		NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ 
+		NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+		NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 
+		NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ 
+		NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+		NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 
+		NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+		NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+		NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+		NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+		NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ 
+		NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 
+	};
+
 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
 	{
 	/* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
@@ -270,6 +301,64 @@ int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+
+/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
+ * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
+ */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
+#else
+#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
+#else
+#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
+#else
+#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
+#endif
+
+#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
+		tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
+		tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
+		tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
+
+static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
+	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+	tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+	tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
+#endif
+};
+
+int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
+	{
+	size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+	/* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
+	if (FIPS_mode())
+		slen -= 2;
+#endif
+	if (p)
+		memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
+	return (int)slen;
+	}
+
 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
 	{
 	int extdatalen=0;
@@ -341,6 +430,30 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
           ret += el;
         }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+#define MIN(x,y) (((x)<(y))?(x):(y))
+	/* we add SRP username the first time only if we have one! */
+	if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
+		{/* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
+		int login_len = MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) + 1, 255);
+		long lenmax; 
+
+		if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; 
+		if (login_len > lenmax) return NULL;
+		if (login_len > 255)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return NULL;
+			}
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
+		s2n(login_len+1,ret);
+
+		(*ret++) = (unsigned char) MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254);
+		memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254));
+		ret+=login_len;
+		}
+#endif
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 	if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
 	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
@@ -426,6 +539,17 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 		skip_ext:
 
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+		{
+		if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
+			return NULL; 
+		s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
+		s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
+		s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
+		memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
+		ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+		}
+
 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
 	if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
 	    s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
@@ -506,6 +630,25 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		}
 #endif
 
+        if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
+                {
+                int el;
+
+                ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+                
+                if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+
+                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
+                s2n(el,ret);
+
+                if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return NULL;
+			}
+                ret += el;
+                }
+
 	if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) 
 		return p;
 
@@ -618,6 +761,26 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
 		ret += sol;
 		}
 #endif
+
+        if(s->srtp_profile)
+                {
+                int el;
+
+                ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+                
+                if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+
+                s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
+                s2n(el,ret);
+
+                if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+			return NULL;
+			}
+                ret+=el;
+                }
+
 	if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) 
 		&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
 		{ const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
@@ -669,9 +832,13 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 	unsigned short len;
 	unsigned char *data = *p;
 	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+	int sigalg_seen = 0;
 
 	s->servername_done = 0;
 	s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
 
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 		goto ri_check;
@@ -799,6 +966,19 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				}
 
 			}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
+			{
+			if (size > 0)
+				{
+				len = data[0];
+				if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
+					return -1;
+				memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
+				s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';  
+				}
+			}
+#endif
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
@@ -919,6 +1099,28 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				return 0;
 			renegotiate_seen = 1;
 			}
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
+			{
+			int dsize;
+			if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) 
+				{
+				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			sigalg_seen = 1;
+			n2s(data,dsize);
+			size -= 2;
+			if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) 
+				{
+				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
+				{
+				*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+				return 0;
+				}
+			}
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
 		         s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
 			{
@@ -954,6 +1156,7 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 						}
 					n2s(data, idsize);
 					dsize -= 2 + idsize;
+					size -= 2 + idsize;
 					if (dsize < 0)
 						{
 						*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
@@ -992,9 +1195,14 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 					}
 
 				/* Read in request_extensions */
+				if (size < 2)
+					{
+					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+					return 0;
+					}
 				n2s(data,dsize);
 				size -= 2;
-				if (dsize > size) 
+				if (dsize != size)
 					{
 					*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 					return 0;
@@ -1043,6 +1251,13 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 #endif
 
 		/* session ticket processed earlier */
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+                        {
+			if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+							      al))
+				return 0;
+                        }
+
 		data+=size;
 		}
 				
@@ -1093,6 +1308,10 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 	int tlsext_servername = 0;
 	int renegotiate_seen = 0;
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+	s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+#endif
+
 	if (data >= (d+n-2))
 		goto ri_check;
 
@@ -1219,7 +1438,8 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 			s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
 			}
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
+			 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
 			{
 			unsigned char *selected;
 			unsigned char selected_len;
@@ -1249,6 +1469,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				}
 			memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
 			s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
+			s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
 			}
 #endif
 		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
@@ -1257,6 +1478,13 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, in
 				return 0;
 			renegotiate_seen = 1;
 			}
+		else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+                        {
+                        if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
+							      al))
+                                return 0;
+                        }
+
 		data+=size;		
 		}
 
@@ -1352,16 +1580,19 @@ int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 
 		/* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
 		if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
-		s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
+		s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
 		if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
 			{
 			s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
 			return -1;
 			}
-		for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
-				sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
-			s2n(i,j);
+		for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
+				sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
+			{
+			int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
+			s2n(id,j);
+			}
 		}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
 
@@ -1670,26 +1901,56 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
 		}
 	}
 
-/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
- * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
- * session ticket extension at the same time.
+/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
+ * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
+ * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
+ *
+ *   session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
+ *       read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
+ *       extension, if any.
+ *   len: the length of the session ID.
+ *   limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
+ *   ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ *       point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
+ * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
+ * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ *    0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
+ *    1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
+ *       session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
+ *    2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
+ *       couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
+ *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ *   Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
+ *   a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
+ *   (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
+ *   a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
+ *   s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
+ *   Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
  */
-
 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
-				const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
+			const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
 	{
 	/* Point after session ID in client hello */
 	const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
 	unsigned short i;
 
+	*ret = NULL;
+	s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+
 	/* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
- 	 * to permit stateful resumption.
- 	 */
+	 * to permit stateful resumption.
+	 */
 	if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-		return 1;
-
+		return 0;
 	if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
-		return 1;
+		return 0;
 	if (p >= limit)
 		return -1;
 	/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
@@ -1712,7 +1973,7 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
 		return -1;
 	/* Now at start of extensions */
 	if ((p + 2) >= limit)
-		return 1;
+		return 0;
 	n2s(p, i);
 	while ((p + 4) <= limit)
 		{
@@ -1720,39 +1981,61 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
 		n2s(p, type);
 		n2s(p, size);
 		if (p + size > limit)
-			return 1;
+			return 0;
 		if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
 			{
-			/* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
- 			 * trigger a full handshake
- 			 */
-			if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
-				return 1;
-			/* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
- 			 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
- 			 */
+			int r;
 			if (size == 0)
 				{
+				/* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
+				 * currently have one. */
 				s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-				return 0;	/* Cache miss */
+				return 1;
 				}
 			if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
 				{
-				/* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
-				 * generating the session from ticket now,
-				 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
-				 * external mechanism to calculate the master
-				 * secret later. */
-				return 0;
+				/* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
+				 * decrypted rather than generating the session
+				 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
+				 * handshake based on external mechanism to
+				 * calculate the master secret later. */
+				return 2;
+				}
+			r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
+			switch (r)
+				{
+				case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
+					s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+					return 2;
+				case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
+					return r;
+				case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
+					s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+					return 3;
+				default: /* fatal error */
+					return -1;
 				}
-			return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
-									ret);
 			}
 		p += size;
 		}
-	return 1;
+	return 0;
 	}
 
+/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
+ *
+ *   etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
+ *   eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
+ *   sess_id: points at the session ID.
+ *   sesslen: the length of the session ID.
+ *   psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ *       point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ *    2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
+ *    3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
+ *    4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
+ */
 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 				const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
 				SSL_SESSION **psess)
@@ -1767,7 +2050,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 	SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
 	/* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
 	if (eticklen < 48)
-		goto tickerr;
+		return 2;
 	/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
 	HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
@@ -1779,7 +2062,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 		if (rv < 0)
 			return -1;
 		if (rv == 0)
-			goto tickerr;
+			return 2;
 		if (rv == 2)
 			renew_ticket = 1;
 		}
@@ -1787,15 +2070,15 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 		{
 		/* Check key name matches */
 		if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
-			goto tickerr;
+			return 2;
 		HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
 					tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
 		EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
 				tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
 		}
 	/* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
- 	 * integrity checks on ticket.
- 	 */
+	 * integrity checks on ticket.
+	 */
 	mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
 	if (mlen < 0)
 		{
@@ -1808,7 +2091,7 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 	HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
 	HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
 	if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
-		goto tickerr;
+		return 2;
 	/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
 	/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
 	p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
@@ -1821,33 +2104,229 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
 		}
 	EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
 	if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
-		goto tickerr;
+		return 2;
 	slen += mlen;
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
 	p = sdec;
-		
+
 	sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
 	OPENSSL_free(sdec);
 	if (sess)
 		{
-		/* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
- 		 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
- 		 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
- 		 * as required by standard.
- 		 */
+		/* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
+		 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
+		 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
+		 * as required by standard.
+		 */
 		if (sesslen)
 			memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
 		sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
 		*psess = sess;
-		s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
+		if (renew_ticket)
+			return 4;
+		else
+			return 3;
+		}
+        ERR_clear_error();
+	/* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
+	 * ticket. */
+	return 2;
+	}
+
+/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
+
+typedef struct 
+	{
+	int nid;
+	int id;
+	} tls12_lookup;
+
+static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+	{NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+	{NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+	{NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
+	{NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+	{NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
+	{NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
+#endif
+};
+
+static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	{EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+	{EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
+#endif
+};
+
+static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
+	{
+	size_t i;
+	for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
+		{
+		if (table[i].nid == nid)
+			return table[i].id;
+		}
+	return -1;
+	}
+#if 0
+static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
+	{
+	size_t i;
+	for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
+		{
+		if (table[i].id == id)
+			return table[i].nid;
+		}
+	return -1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
+	{
+	int sig_id, md_id;
+	md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
+				sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+	if (md_id == -1)
+		return 0;
+	sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
+	if (sig_id == -1)
+		return 0;
+	p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
+	p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
+	return 1;
+	}
+
+int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
+	{
+	return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
+				sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+	}
+
+const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
+	{
+	switch(hash_alg)
+		{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+		case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
+#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+		if (FIPS_mode())
+			return NULL;
+#endif
+		return EVP_md5();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+		case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
+		return EVP_sha1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+		case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
+		return EVP_sha224();
+
+		case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
+		return EVP_sha256();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
+		case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
+		return EVP_sha384();
+
+		case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
+		return EVP_sha512();
+#endif
+		default:
+		return NULL;
+
+		}
+	}
+
+/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
+
+int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
+	{
+	int i, idx;
+	const EVP_MD *md;
+	CERT *c = s->cert;
+	/* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
+	if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
 		return 1;
+	/* Should never happen */
+	if (!c)
+		return 0;
+
+	c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
+	c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
+	c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
+	c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
+		{
+		unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
+
+		switch(sig_alg)
+			{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+			case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+			idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+			case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+			idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
+			break;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+			case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+			idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
+			break;
+#endif
+			default:
+			continue;
+			}
+
+		if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
+			{
+			md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
+			if (md)
+				{
+				c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
+				if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
+					c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
+				}
+			}
+
 		}
-	/* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
- 	 * send a new ticket
- 	 */
-	tickerr:	
-	s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
-	return 0;
+
+
+	/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
+	 * supported it stays as NULL.
+	 */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
+		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
+		{
+		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
+		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
+		}
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+	if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
+		c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
+#endif
+	return 1;
 	}
 
 #endif