X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=ssl%2Ft1_lib.c;h=3082a59810525b1272265eb50e74e7d44d432152;hp=1ee7afb64aa789a6286f754cb16253b2f346b692;hb=b04f947941d08b5d077a63b017ecee5e4e2e11cc;hpb=d376e57d6826e56f4c922806e088a111c52f9e92 diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index 1ee7afb64a..3082a59810 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ -/* ssl/t1_lib.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * @@ -110,26 +109,24 @@ */ #include +#include #include #include #include #include +#include +#include #include -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -# include -# include -#endif +#include +#include #include "ssl_locl.h" +#include -const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess); static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s); -int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); -#endif +static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = { tls1_enc, @@ -139,7 +136,6 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = { tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, @@ -158,7 +154,6 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = { tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, @@ -177,7 +172,6 @@ SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = { tls1_change_cipher_state, tls1_final_finish_mac, TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, tls1_alert_code, @@ -208,16 +202,17 @@ int tls1_new(SSL *s) void tls1_free(SSL *s) { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ ssl3_free(s); } void tls1_clear(SSL *s) { ssl3_clear(s); - s->version = s->method->version; + if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) + s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION; + else + s->version = s->method->version; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC @@ -228,9 +223,17 @@ typedef struct { unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */ } tls_curve_info; -# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1 +/* Mask for curve type */ +# define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0 +# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1 +# define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2 +/* + * Table of curve information. + * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup + * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id. + */ static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = { {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */ {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */ @@ -260,6 +263,8 @@ static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = { {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ + /* X25519 (29) */ + {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, }; static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { @@ -268,37 +273,52 @@ static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = { TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2 }; +/* The default curves */ static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = { - 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ - 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ + 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */ + 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ + 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ + 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ +}; + +static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = { + 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */ + 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */ + 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ + 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ + 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ + + /* + * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set + * via an explicit callback or parameters. + */ + 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ + 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */ + 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */ 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */ 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */ - 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ - 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */ 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */ 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */ - 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ - 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */ - 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */ + 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ + 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ + 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ + 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ + 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ + 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ + 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */ 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */ 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */ - 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */ - 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */ 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */ 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */ - 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */ - 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */ 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */ 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */ - 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */ - 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */ - 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */ }; + static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = { 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384 @@ -314,67 +334,12 @@ int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) { - /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */ - switch (nid) { - case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ - return 1; - case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ - return 2; - case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ - return 3; - case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ - return 4; - case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ - return 5; - case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ - return 6; - case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ - return 7; - case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ - return 8; - case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ - return 9; - case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ - return 10; - case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ - return 11; - case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ - return 12; - case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ - return 13; - case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ - return 14; - case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ - return 15; - case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ - return 16; - case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ - return 17; - case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ - return 18; - case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ - return 19; - case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ - return 20; - case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ - return 21; - case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ - return 22; - case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ - return 23; - case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ - return 24; - case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ - return 25; - case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */ - return 26; - case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */ - return 27; - case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */ - return 28; - default: - return 0; + size_t i; + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) { + if (nid_list[i].nid == nid) + return i + 1; } + return 0; } /* @@ -483,8 +448,9 @@ int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) } /*- - * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match. - * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches + * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef + * if there is no match. + * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match. */ @@ -526,6 +492,20 @@ int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch) (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref)) return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef; + + /* + * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them + * are allowed. + */ + if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) { + supp = eccurves_all; + num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; + } else if (num_pref == 0 && + (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) { + pref = eccurves_all; + num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2; + } + k = 0; for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) { const unsigned char *tsupp = supp; @@ -558,7 +538,7 @@ int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, */ unsigned long dup_list = 0; clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2); - if (!clist) + if (clist == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) { unsigned long idmask; @@ -630,46 +610,33 @@ int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) { - int is_prime, id; + int id; const EC_GROUP *grp; - const EC_METHOD *meth; if (!ec) return 0; /* Determine if it is a prime field */ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); if (!grp) return 0; - meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp); - if (!meth) - return 0; - if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) - is_prime = 1; - else - is_prime = 0; /* Determine curve ID */ id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id); - /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */ - if (id) { - curve_id[0] = 0; - curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; - } else { - curve_id[0] = 0xff; - if (is_prime) - curve_id[1] = 0x01; - else - curve_id[1] = 0x02; - } + /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */ + if (id == 0) + return 0; + curve_id[0] = 0; + curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id; if (comp_id) { if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) return 0; - if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { - if (is_prime) + if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { + *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; + } else { + if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME) *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; else *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; - } else - *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; + } } return 1; } @@ -752,16 +719,13 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2]; EVP_PKEY *pkey; int rv; - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (!pkey) return 0; /* If not EC nothing to do */ - if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) { - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC) return 1; - } - rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); if (!rv) return 0; /* @@ -804,21 +768,24 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */ +/* + * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility + * @s: SSL connection + * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using + * + * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using + * is compatible with the client extensions. + * + * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can. + */ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) { - unsigned char curve_id[2]; - EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp; -# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL - /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */ - if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) - return 1; -# endif /* * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other * curves permitted. */ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { + unsigned char curve_id[2]; /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */ if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256; @@ -830,43 +797,12 @@ int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid) /* Check this curve is acceptable */ if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL)) return 0; - /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */ - if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) - return 1; - /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */ - else { - unsigned char curve_tmp[2]; - if (!ec) - return 0; - if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec)) - return 0; - if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1]) - return 1; - return 0; - } - - } - if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { - /* Need a shared curve */ - if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0)) - return 1; - else - return 0; - } - if (!ec) { - if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) - return 1; - else - return 0; + return 1; } - if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec)) - return 0; -/* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */ -# if 0 - return 1; -# else - return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL); -# endif + /* Need a shared curve */ + if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0)) + return 1; + return 0; } # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ @@ -879,32 +815,30 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md) #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /* * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. */ -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA -# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ -# else -# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, -# endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ +#else +# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, +#endif -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA -# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ -# else -# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, -# endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ +#else +# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, +#endif -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC -# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ -# else -# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, -# endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC +# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */ +#else +# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, +#endif -# define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ +#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) @@ -915,21 +849,26 @@ static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001, + TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256, + TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512 +#endif }; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = { tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) }; -# endif +#endif size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs) { /* * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other * preferences. */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) { case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs; @@ -943,7 +882,7 @@ size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs) *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2; return 2; } -# endif +#endif /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */ if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) { *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; @@ -975,11 +914,11 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); return 0; } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id; /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ - if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) + if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) return 0; if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); @@ -1006,7 +945,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, } } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) return 0; -# endif +#endif /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs); @@ -1041,54 +980,58 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s, } /* - * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't - * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike - * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global - * settings. + * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't + * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported + * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level. + * + * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported + * by the client. + * + * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not. */ void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) { - CERT *c = s->cert; - c->mask_a = 0; - c->mask_k = 0; - /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */ - if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) - c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; - else - c->mask_ssl = 0; - ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK); - /* - * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature - * algorithms. - */ - if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA) - c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr | SSL_kECDHr; - if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS) - c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd; - if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA) - c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe; + s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0; + s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0; + ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK); + ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ if (!s->psk_client_callback) { - c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; - c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; + s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; + s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK; } -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) { - c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; - c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; + s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; + s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; } -# endif - c->valid = 1; +#endif } +/* + * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not + * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on + * @c: cipher to check + * @op: Security check that you want to do + * + * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled. + */ int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op) { - CERT *ct = s->cert; - if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k - || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a) + if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k + || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a) + return 1; + if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0) + return 1; + if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) + || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) return 1; + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver) + || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver))) + return 1; + return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c); } @@ -1099,13 +1042,86 @@ static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s) return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL); } +static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) { + unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1); + unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2); + if (u1 < u2) + return -1; + else if (u1 > u2) + return 1; + else + return 0; +} + +/* + * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be + * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. + * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those + * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions + * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error + * occurred. + */ +static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) { + PACKET extensions = *packet; + size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0; + unsigned int *extension_types = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + /* First pass: count the extensions. */ + while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) { + unsigned int type; + PACKET extension; + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) || + !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { + goto done; + } + num_extensions++; + } + + if (num_extensions <= 1) + return 1; + + extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions); + if (extension_types == NULL) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto done; + } + + /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */ + extensions = *packet; + for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) { + PACKET extension; + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) || + !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) { + /* This should not happen. */ + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto done; + } + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto done; + } + /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */ + qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint); + for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) { + if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i]) + goto done; + } + ret = 1; + done: + OPENSSL_free(extension_types); + return ret; +} + unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al) { int extdatalen = 0; unsigned char *orig = buf; unsigned char *ret = buf; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ int using_ecc = 0; if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { @@ -1114,18 +1130,18 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { - SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); + const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; - if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) - || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { + if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) + || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) { using_ecc = 1; break; } } } -# endif +#endif ret += 2; @@ -1165,7 +1181,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, /*- * check for enough space. - * 4 for the servername type and entension length + * 4 for the servername type and extension length * 2 for servernamelist length * 1 for the hostname type * 2 for hostname length @@ -1190,7 +1206,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); ret += size_str; } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* Add SRP username if there is one */ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the * Client Hello message */ @@ -1203,7 +1219,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, /*- * check for enough space. - * 4 for the srp type type and entension length + * 4 for the srp type type and extension length * 1 for the srp user identity * + srp user identity length */ @@ -1217,9 +1233,9 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); ret += login_len; } -# endif +#endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (using_ecc) { /* * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message @@ -1280,7 +1296,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s2n(curves_list_len, ret); ret += curves_list_len; } -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (tls_use_ticket(s)) { int ticklen; @@ -1290,7 +1306,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); - if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) + if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) return NULL; memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); @@ -1315,7 +1331,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, } skip_ext: - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { size_t salglen; const unsigned char *salg; unsigned char *etmp; @@ -1333,6 +1349,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, ret += salglen; } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { int i; long extlen, idlen, itmp; @@ -1376,27 +1393,30 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, if (extlen > 0) i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* Add Heartbeat extension */ - if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); - s2n(1, ret); - /*- - * Set mode: - * 1: peer may send requests - * 2: peer not allowed to send requests - */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; - else - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; -# endif +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* Add Heartbeat extension */ + if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) + return NULL; + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); + s2n(1, ret); + /*- + * Set mode: + * 1: peer may send requests + * 2: peer not allowed to send requests + */ + if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) + *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; + else + *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + } +#endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { /* - * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support + * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support * for Next Protocol Negotiation */ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) @@ -1404,8 +1424,13 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); s2n(0, ret); } -# endif +#endif + /* + * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so + * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation + * (see longer comment below) + */ if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) return NULL; @@ -1414,8 +1439,9 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; + s->s3->alpn_sent = 1; } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { int el; @@ -1437,15 +1463,21 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, } ret += el; } -# endif +#endif custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext); /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */ if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al)) return NULL; -# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac +#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret); s2n(0, ret); -# endif +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT + if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret); + s2n(0, ret); + } +#endif s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); s2n(0, ret); @@ -1487,16 +1519,15 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, int extdatalen = 0; unsigned char *orig = buf; unsigned char *ret = buf; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG int next_proto_neg_seen; -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) - || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); + int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); -# endif +#endif ret += 2; if (ret >= limit) @@ -1536,7 +1567,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); s2n(0, ret); } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (using_ecc) { const unsigned char *plist; size_t plistlen; @@ -1567,7 +1598,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves * extension */ -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) { if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) @@ -1583,7 +1614,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s2n(0, ret); } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { int el; @@ -1604,7 +1635,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, } ret += el; } -# endif +#endif if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) @@ -1623,9 +1654,9 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, ret += 36; } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) { if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) return NULL; s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); @@ -1635,15 +1666,15 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, * 1: peer may send requests * 2: peer not allowed to send requests */ - if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; + if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) + *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; else - *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; } -# endif +#endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { @@ -1664,32 +1695,34 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } } -# endif +#endif if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al)) return NULL; -# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac +#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) { /* * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable * for other cases too. */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD - || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) + || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 + || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT + || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; else { s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret); s2n(0, ret); } } -# endif - if (!s->hit && s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) { +#endif + if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) { s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); s2n(0, ret); } - if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { + if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) { const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; - unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; + unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) return NULL; @@ -1711,76 +1744,85 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, } /* - * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a - * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type - * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the - * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on - * success. + * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. + * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length. + * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. + * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error. */ -static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, - unsigned data_len, int *al) +static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { - unsigned i; - unsigned proto_len; - const unsigned char *selected; - unsigned char selected_len; - int r; - - if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL) - return 0; + PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol; - if (data_len < 2) - goto parse_error; + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - /* - * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit, - * length-prefixed strings. - */ - i = ((unsigned)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned)data[1]); - data_len -= 2; - data += 2; - if (data_len != i) - goto parse_error; + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list) + || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) { + return 0; + } - if (data_len < 2) - goto parse_error; + save_protocol_list = protocol_list; + do { + /* Protocol names can't be empty. */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol) + || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) { + return 0; + } + } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0); - for (i = 0; i < data_len;) { - proto_len = data[i]; - i++; + if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list, + &s->s3->alpn_proposed, + &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } - if (proto_len == 0) - goto parse_error; + return 1; +} - if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len) - goto parse_error; +/* + * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello. + * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_* + * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure. + * returns 1 on success, 0 + */ +static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al) +{ + const unsigned char *selected = NULL; + unsigned char selected_len = 0; - i += proto_len; - } + if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) { + int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, + s->s3->alpn_proposed, + s->s3->alpn_proposed_len, + s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); - r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len, - s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); - if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { - OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); - s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); - if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) { - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return -1; + if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); + s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len); + if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + return 0; + } + s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG + /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ + s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; +#endif + } else { + *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL; + *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + return 0; } - memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len); - s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; } - return 0; - parse_error: - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return -1; + return 1; } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /*- * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X - * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. + * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|. * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: * SNI, * elliptic_curves @@ -1791,10 +1833,12 @@ static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). */ -static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, - const unsigned char *d, int n) +static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt) { - unsigned short type, size; + unsigned int type; + PACKET sni, tmppkt; + size_t ext_len; + static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ @@ -1807,10 +1851,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ 0x01, /* 1 point format */ 0x00, /* uncompressed */ - }; - - /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ - static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { + /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ @@ -1821,103 +1862,108 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ }; - if (data >= (d + n - 2)) - return; - data += 2; + /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */ + static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18; - if (data > (d + n - 4)) - return; - n2s(data, type); - n2s(data, size); + tmppkt = *pkt; - if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type) + || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) { return; + } - if (data + size > d + n) + if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) return; - data += size; - - if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { - const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); - - if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n) - return; - if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) - return; - if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) - return; - } else { - const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - if (data + len != d + n) - return; - if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) - return; - } + ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ? + sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength; - s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; + s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock, + ext_len); } -# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ -static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) +/* + * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of + * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions. + * + * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no + * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise + * ignored. + * + * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. + * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert. + */ +static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { - unsigned short type; - unsigned short size; - unsigned short len; - unsigned char *data = *p; + unsigned int type; int renegotiate_seen = 0; + PACKET extensions; + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; s->servername_done = 0; s->tlsext_status_type = -1; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -# endif +#endif OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | - SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); -# endif + s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; + OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); + s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL; + s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS + s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | + SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); +#endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) - ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); -# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ + ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt); +# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL; -# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac +#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; -# endif +#endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login); s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; -# endif +#endif s->srtp_profile = NULL; - if (data >= (d + n - 2)) + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) goto ri_check; - n2s(data, len); - if (data > (d + n - len)) - goto ri_check; + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) + return 0; - while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { - n2s(data, type); - n2s(data, size); + if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) + return 0; + + /* + * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but, + * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon + * resumption. + */ + while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) { + PACKET extension; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) + return 0; - if (data + size > (d + n)) - goto ri_check; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); + s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension), + PACKET_remaining(&extension), + s->tlsext_debug_arg); + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { - if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) + if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al)) return 0; renegotiate_seen = 1; } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { @@ -1948,230 +1994,185 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { - unsigned char *sdata; - int servname_type; - int dsize; + unsigned int servname_type; + PACKET sni, hostname; - if (size < 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni) + /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */ + || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) { return 0; } - n2s(data, dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize > size) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + + /* + * Although the server_name extension was intended to be + * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the + * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as + * such. + * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types + * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other + * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing. + * + * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type, + * i.e., we can only have a single hostname. + */ + if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type) + || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name + || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) { return 0; } - sdata = data; - while (dsize > 3) { - servname_type = *(sdata++); - n2s(sdata, len); - dsize -= 3; + if (!s->hit) { + if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + return 0; + } - if (len > dsize) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; } - if (s->servername_done == 0) - switch (servname_type) { - case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: - if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = - OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); - s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; - if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); - s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - s->servername_done = 1; - - } else - s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname - && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len - && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, - (char *)sdata, len) == 0; - - break; - - default: - break; - } - dsize -= len; - } - if (dsize != 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } + if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + s->servername_done = 1; + } else { + /* + * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST + * fall back to a full handshake. + */ + s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname + && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname, + strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname)); + } } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { - if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + PACKET srp_I; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I)) return 0; - } - if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + + if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) return 0; - } - if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) - return -1; - memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); - s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; - if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + /* + * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user + * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login. + */ + if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } -# endif +#endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); + PACKET ec_point_format_list; - if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || - ecpointformatlist_length < 1) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, + &ec_point_format_list) + || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) { return 0; } + if (!s->hit) { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; - if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = - OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { + if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list, + &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, + &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = - ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, - ecpointformatlist_length); } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); - ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); - - if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || - ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || - /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ - ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + PACKET elliptic_curve_list; + + /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */ + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, + &elliptic_curve_list) + || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 + || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) { return 0; } + if (!s->hit) { - if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; - if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = - OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { + if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list, + &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, + &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = - ellipticcurvelist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, - ellipticcurvelist_length); } } -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && - !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, - s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) - { + !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension), + PACKET_remaining(&extension), + s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { - int dsize; - if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs || size < 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data, dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + PACKET supported_sig_algs; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs) + || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0 + || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) { return 0; } - if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; + + if (!s->hit) { + if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs), + PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) { + return 0; + } } } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { - - if (size < 5) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, + (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) { return 0; } - s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; - size--; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { - const unsigned char *sdata; - int dsize; - /* Read in responder_id_list */ - n2s(data, dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize > size) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + const unsigned char *ext_data; + PACKET responder_id_list, exts; + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list)) return 0; - } - while (dsize > 0) { + + while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) { OCSP_RESPID *id; - int idsize; - if (dsize < 4) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data, idsize); - dsize -= 2 + idsize; - size -= 2 + idsize; - if (dsize < 0) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + PACKET responder_id; + const unsigned char *id_data; + + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, + &responder_id) + || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) { return 0; } - sdata = data; - data += idsize; - id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); - if (!id) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL + && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = + sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) { + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - if (data != sdata) { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + + id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id); + id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data, + PACKET_remaining(&responder_id)); + if (id == NULL) return 0; - } - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids - && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = - sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) { + + if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } + if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { OCSP_RESPID_free(id); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -2180,61 +2181,63 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, } /* Read in request_extensions */ - if (size < 2) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data, dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize != size) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts)) return 0; - } - sdata = data; - if (dsize > 0) { + + if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) { + ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts); sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = - d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, + PACKET_remaining(&exts)); + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL + || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) { return 0; } } - } - /* - * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. - */ - else + } else +#endif + { + /* + * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it. + */ s->tlsext_status_type = -1; + } } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { - switch (data[0]) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS + else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { + unsigned int hbtype; + + if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype) + || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + switch (hbtype) { case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; break; case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; + s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; break; default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } } -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && - s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 && - s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { + s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { /*- * We shouldn't accept this extension on a * renegotiation. * * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on - * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when + * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing * anything like that, but this might change). @@ -2247,34 +2250,31 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, */ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } -# endif +#endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && - s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { - if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0) + s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { + if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al)) return 0; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG - /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ - s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -# endif } /* session ticket processed earlier */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { - if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) + if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al)) return 0; } -# endif -# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac +#endif +#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; -# endif - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) { - if (!s->hit) - s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; - } +#endif + /* + * Note: extended master secret extension handled in + * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early() + */ + /* * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom @@ -2283,14 +2283,17 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, * ServerHello may be later returned. */ else if (!s->hit) { - if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0) + if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension), + PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0) return 0; } - - data += size; } - *p = data; + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */ + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } ri_check: @@ -2304,19 +2307,23 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, return 0; } + /* + * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly. + * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early. + * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must + * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers. + */ return 1; } -int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, - int n) +int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al = -1; custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext); - if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) { + if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return 0; } - if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); return 0; @@ -2324,74 +2331,76 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, return 1; } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly * fill the length of the block. */ -static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) +static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt) { - unsigned int off = 0; + PACKET tmp_protocol; - while (off < len) { - if (d[off] == 0) + while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol) + || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) return 0; - off += d[off]; - off++; } - return off == len; + return 1; } -# endif +#endif -static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, - unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) +static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al) { - unsigned short length; - unsigned short type; - unsigned short size; - unsigned char *data = *p; + unsigned int length, type, size; int tlsext_servername = 0; int renegotiate_seen = 0; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; -# endif +#endif s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | - SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); -# endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS + s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | + SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); +#endif -# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac +#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; -# endif +#endif - if (data >= (d + n - 2)) + s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length)) goto ri_check; - n2s(data, length); - if (data + length != d + n) { + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } - while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { - n2s(data, type); - n2s(data, size); + while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) { + const unsigned char *data; + PACKET spkt; - if (data + size > (d + n)) + if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size) + || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size)) goto ri_check; if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { - if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) + if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al)) return 0; renegotiate_seen = 1; } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { @@ -2402,12 +2411,11 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, } tlsext_servername = 1; } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { - unsigned char *sdata = data; - int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); - - if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { + unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length; + if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length) + || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2421,11 +2429,16 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, } s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, - ecpointformatlist_length); + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, + s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, + ecpointformatlist_length)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + } } -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && @@ -2453,19 +2466,42 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT + /* + * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation + * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we + * need to let control continue to flow to that. + */ + else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp && + s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { + /* Simply copy it off for later processing */ + if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts); + s->tlsext_scts = NULL; + } + s->tlsext_scts_len = size; + if (size > 0) { + s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); + if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size); + } + } +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { unsigned char *selected; unsigned char selected_len; - /* We must have requested it. */ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } /* The data must be valid */ - if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { + if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2478,7 +2514,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, return 0; } s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); - if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { + if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2486,78 +2522,77 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; } -# endif +#endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { unsigned len; - /* We must have requested it. */ - if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) { + if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) { *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; return 0; } - if (size < 4) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } /*- * The extension data consists of: * uint16 list_length * uint8 proto_length; * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */ - len = data[0]; - len <<= 8; - len |= data[1]; - if (len != (unsigned)size - 2) { - *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - len = data[2]; - if (len != (unsigned)size - 3) { + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len) + || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len + || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len) + || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) { *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); - if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) { + if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } - memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len); + if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { - switch (data[0]) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS + else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { + unsigned int hbtype; + if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + switch (hbtype) { case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; break; case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; - s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; + s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; + s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; break; default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return 0; } } -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { - if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) + if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al)) return 0; } -# endif -# ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac +#endif +#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) { /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC; } -# endif +#endif else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) { + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!s->hit) s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; } @@ -2567,11 +2602,9 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, */ else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0) return 0; - - data += size; } - if (data != d + n) { + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 0; } @@ -2579,7 +2612,7 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { if (s->tlsext_hostname) { if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { - s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); + s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; return 0; @@ -2591,8 +2624,6 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, } } - *p = data; - ri_check: /* @@ -2611,12 +2642,25 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, return 0; } + if (s->hit) { + /* + * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with + * original session. + */ + if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) != + !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS); + return 0; + } + } + return 1; } int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) { - + s->s3->alpn_sent = 0; return 1; } @@ -2630,7 +2674,7 @@ static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. @@ -2639,7 +2683,7 @@ static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. */ -# endif +#endif if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = @@ -2668,18 +2712,26 @@ static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) } } /* Initialise digests to default values */ -static void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s) +void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s) { const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1(); + pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1(); - pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1(); + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) + pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX); + else + pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX); + pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1(); + pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX); +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX); + pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX); + pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX); #endif } @@ -2687,14 +2739,15 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s) { int al; size_t i; - /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */ + + /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL; - s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0; + s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0; } /* If sigalgs received process it. */ @@ -2767,6 +2820,10 @@ int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) } else s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; + if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) { + goto err; + } + err: switch (ret) { case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: @@ -2787,7 +2844,7 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it @@ -2799,8 +2856,7 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) - && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) - || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { + && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { /* we are using an ECC cipher */ size_t i; unsigned char *list; @@ -2819,7 +2875,7 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) } } ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) ret = @@ -2833,29 +2889,12 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); /* - * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the - * callback + * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event + * that we don't receive a status message */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) - && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { - int r; - /* - * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no - * response. - */ - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - if (r == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - if (r < 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - } + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; switch (ret) { case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: @@ -2873,13 +2912,12 @@ int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) } } -int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, - int n) +int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al = -1; if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) return 1; - if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0) { + if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); return 0; } @@ -2893,14 +2931,14 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, /*- * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the - * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle - * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. + * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions + * need to be handled at the same time. * - * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will - * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket - * extension, if any. - * len: the length of the session ID. - * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. + * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master + * secret. + * + * session_id: ClientHello session ID. + * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix) * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to * point to the resulting session. * @@ -2924,63 +2962,68 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. + * + * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present. + * */ -int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, - const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) +int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext, + const PACKET *session_id, + SSL_SESSION **ret) { - /* Point after session ID in client hello */ - const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; - unsigned short i; + unsigned int i; + PACKET local_ext = *ext; + int retv = -1; + + int have_ticket = 0; + int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s); *ret = NULL; s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; + s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; /* * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful * resumption. */ - if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) + if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION)) return 0; - if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) - return 0; - if (p >= limit) - return -1; - /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - i = *(p++); - p += i; - if (p >= limit) - return -1; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) { + retv = 0; + goto end; } - /* Skip past cipher list */ - n2s(p, i); - p += i; - if (p >= limit) - return -1; - /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ - i = *(p++); - p += i; - if (p > limit) - return -1; - /* Now at start of extensions */ - if ((p + 2) >= limit) - return 0; - n2s(p, i); - while ((p + 4) <= limit) { - unsigned short type, size; - n2s(p, type); - n2s(p, size); - if (p + size > limit) - return 0; - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { + while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) { + unsigned int type, size; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type) + || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) { + /* Shouldn't ever happen */ + retv = -1; + goto end; + } + if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) { + retv = 0; + goto end; + } + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) { int r; + const unsigned char *etick; + + /* Duplicate extension */ + if (have_ticket != 0) { + retv = -1; + goto end; + } + have_ticket = 1; + if (size == 0) { /* * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have * one. */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 1; + retv = 1; + continue; } if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { /* @@ -2989,38 +3032,60 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to * calculate the master secret later. */ - return 2; + retv = 2; + continue; + } + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) { + /* Shouldn't ever happen */ + retv = -1; + goto end; } - r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); + r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id), + PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret); switch (r) { case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 2; + retv = 2; + break; case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ - return r; + retv = r; + break; case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 3; + retv = 3; + break; default: /* fatal error */ - return -1; + retv = -1; + break; + } + continue; + } else { + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) + s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; + if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) { + retv = -1; + goto end; } } - p += size; } - return 0; + if (have_ticket == 0) + retv = 0; +end: + return retv; } /*- * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. * * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. - * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. + * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension. * sess_id: points at the session ID. * sesslen: the length of the session ID. * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to * point to the resulting session. * * Returns: + * -2: fatal error, malloc failure. * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. @@ -3033,71 +3098,87 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *sdec; const unsigned char *p; - int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; + int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1; unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - HMAC_CTX hctx; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; + HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ if (eticklen < 48) return 2; /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ - HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); + hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); + if (hctx == NULL) + return -2; + ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + ret = -2; + goto err; + } if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, - &ctx, &hctx, 0); + ctx, hctx, 0); if (rv < 0) - return -1; - if (rv == 0) - return 2; + goto err; + if (rv == 0) { + ret = 2; + goto err; + } if (rv == 2) renew_ticket = 1; } else { /* Check key name matches */ - if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) - return 2; - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, - EVP_sha256(), NULL); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); + if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) { + ret = 2; + goto err; + } + if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, + etick + 16) <= 0) { + goto err; + } } /* * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity * checks on ticket. */ - mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); + mlen = HMAC_size(hctx); if (mlen < 0) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return -1; + goto err; } eticklen -= mlen; /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ - HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); - HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 + || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { + goto err; + } + HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); return 2; } /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ - p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); + p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); + eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); - if (!sdec) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + if (sdec == NULL + || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + OPENSSL_free(sdec); return -1; } - EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); - if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_free(sdec); return 2; } slen += mlen; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + ctx = NULL; p = sdec; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); @@ -3123,6 +3204,10 @@ static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. */ return 2; +err: + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); + HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); + return ret; } /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ @@ -3138,13 +3223,19 @@ static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, - {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} + {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512}, }; static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, - {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} + {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}, + {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001}, + {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256}, + {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512} }; static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) @@ -3186,35 +3277,41 @@ int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) { - return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig)); + return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig)); } typedef struct { int nid; int secbits; - const EVP_MD *(*mfunc) (void); + int md_idx; + unsigned char tlsext_hash; } tls12_hash_info; static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = { -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 - {NID_md5, 64, 0}, -# else - {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5}, -# endif - {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1}, - {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224}, - {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256}, - {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384}, - {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512} + {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, + {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, + {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, + {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, + {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, + {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256}, + {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512}, }; static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg) { + unsigned int i; if (hash_alg == 0) return NULL; - if (hash_alg > OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info)) - return NULL; - return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1; + + for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) + { + if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg) + return tls12_md_info + i; + } + + return NULL; } const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) @@ -3223,25 +3320,35 @@ const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode()) return NULL; inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg); - if (!inf || !inf->mfunc) + if (!inf) return NULL; - return inf->mfunc(); + return ssl_md(inf->md_idx); } static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) { switch (sig_alg) { -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: return SSL_PKEY_ECC; +#endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001: + return SSL_PKEY_GOST01; + + case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256: + return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256; + + case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512: + return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; # endif } return -1; @@ -3251,7 +3358,7 @@ static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg) static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data) { - int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0; + int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef; if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) return; if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { @@ -3265,9 +3372,9 @@ static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, *psign_nid = sign_nid; } if (psignhash_nid) { - if (sign_nid && hash_nid) - OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid); - else + if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef + || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, + sign_nid) <= 0) *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; } } @@ -3277,7 +3384,7 @@ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp) { /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */ const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]); - if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc) + if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL) return 0; /* See if public key algorithm allowed */ if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1) @@ -3292,7 +3399,7 @@ static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp) * disabled. */ -void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op) +void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op) { const unsigned char *sigalgs; size_t i, sigalgslen; @@ -3305,24 +3412,24 @@ void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op) sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs); for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) { switch (sigalgs[1]) { -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs)) have_rsa = 1; break; -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs)) have_dsa = 1; break; -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs)) have_ecdsa = 1; break; -# endif +#endif } } if (!have_rsa) @@ -3412,7 +3519,7 @@ static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); if (nmatch) { salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); - if (!salgs) + if (salgs == NULL) return 0; nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); } else { @@ -3450,46 +3557,21 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) size_t i; const EVP_MD *md; const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md; + uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags; CERT *c = s->cert; TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr; if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) return 0; -# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL - if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { - /* - * Use first set signature preference to force message digest, - * ignoring any peer preferences. - */ - const unsigned char *sigs = NULL; - if (s->server) - sigs = c->conf_sigalgs; - else - sigs = c->client_sigalgs; - if (sigs) { - idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]); - md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]); - pmd[idx] = md; - c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; - if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = - CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; - pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md; - } - } - } -# endif - for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) { idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign); if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) { md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash); pmd[idx] = md; - c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; + pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) { - c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = - CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; + pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md; } } @@ -3504,19 +3586,27 @@ int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s) * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not * supported it stays as NULL. */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL) pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1(); -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) { pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1(); pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1(); } -# endif -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL) pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1(); +#endif +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL) + pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94); + if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL) + pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256); + if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL) + pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512); # endif } return 1; @@ -3564,179 +3654,34 @@ int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; } -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS -int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length) -{ - unsigned char *pl; - unsigned short hbtype; - unsigned int payload; - unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ - - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - p, length, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - /* Read type and payload length first */ - if (1 + 2 + 16 > length) - return 0; /* silently discard */ - hbtype = *p++; - n2s(p, payload); - if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length) - return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ - pl = p; - - if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { - unsigned char *buffer, *bp; - int r; - - /* - * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, - * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding - */ - buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); - if (buffer == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - bp = buffer; - - /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ - *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; - s2n(payload, bp); - memcpy(bp, pl, payload); - bp += payload; - /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) { - OPENSSL_free(buffer); - return -1; - } - - r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, - 3 + payload + padding); - - if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - buffer, 3 + payload + padding, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - OPENSSL_free(buffer); - - if (r < 0) - return r; - } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { - unsigned int seq; - - /* - * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 - * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number - */ - n2s(pl, seq); - - if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { - s->tlsext_hb_seq++; - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char *buf, *p; - int ret = -1; - unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ - unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ - - /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ - if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || - s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); - return -1; - } - - /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ - if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); - return -1; - } - - /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ - if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); - return -1; - } - - /* - * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 - * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. - */ - OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); - - /*- - * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number - * as payload to distuingish different messages and add - * some random stuff. - * - Message Type, 1 byte - * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) - * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) - * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) - * - Padding - */ - buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); - if (buf == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return -1; - } - p = buf; - /* Message Type */ - *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; - /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ - s2n(payload, p); - /* Sequence number */ - s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); - /* 16 random bytes */ - if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - p += 16; - /* Random padding */ - if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); - if (ret >= 0) { - if (s->msg_callback) - s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, - buf, 3 + payload + padding, - s, s->msg_callback_arg); - - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; - } - - err: - OPENSSL_free(buf); - return ret; -} -# endif - -# define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2) +#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2) typedef struct { size_t sigalgcnt; int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN]; } sig_cb_st; +static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str) +{ + if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) { + *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA; + } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) { + *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA; + } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) { + *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC; + } else { + *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str); + if (*phash == NID_undef) + *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str); + } +} + static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) { sig_cb_st *sarg = arg; size_t i; char etmp[20], *p; - int sig_alg, hash_alg; + int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef; if (elem == NULL) return 0; if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN) @@ -3753,19 +3698,10 @@ static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) if (!*p) return 0; - if (strcmp(etmp, "RSA") == 0) - sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA; - else if (strcmp(etmp, "DSA") == 0) - sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA; - else if (strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA") == 0) - sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC; - else - return 0; + get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp); + get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p); - hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p); - if (hash_alg == NID_undef) - hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p); - if (hash_alg == NID_undef) + if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) { @@ -3867,10 +3803,10 @@ static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x) /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */ -# define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \ +#define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \ (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM) /* Strict mode flags */ -# define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \ +#define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \ (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \ | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) @@ -3882,6 +3818,7 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int check_flags = 0, strict_mode; CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL; CERT *c = s->cert; + uint32_t *pvalid; unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s); /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */ if (idx != -1) { @@ -3891,6 +3828,7 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, idx = cpk - c->pkeys; } else cpk = c->pkeys + idx; + pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx; x = cpk->x509; pk = cpk->privatekey; chain = cpk->chain; @@ -3898,22 +3836,14 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, /* If no cert or key, forget it */ if (!x || !pk) goto end; -# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL - /* Allow any certificate to pass test */ - if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) { - rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | - CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; - cpk->valid_flags = rv; - return rv; - } -# endif } else { if (!x || !pk) return 0; idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk); if (idx == -1) return 0; - cpk = c->pkeys + idx; + pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx; + if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT) check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS; else @@ -3946,13 +3876,11 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, switch (idx) { case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC: case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN: - case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA: rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa; default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption; break; case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: - case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA: rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa; default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1; break; @@ -3962,6 +3890,21 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1; break; + case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: + rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001; + default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001; + break; + + case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: + rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256; + default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256; + break; + + case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: + rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512; + default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512; + break; + default: default_nid = -1; break; @@ -4030,7 +3973,7 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, if (!s->server && strict_mode) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn; int check_type = 0; - switch (pk->type) { + switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN; break; @@ -4040,15 +3983,6 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, case EVP_PKEY_EC: check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN; break; - case EVP_PKEY_DH: - case EVP_PKEY_DHX: - { - int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk); - if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA) - check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH; - if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA) - check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH; - } } if (check_type) { const unsigned char *ctypes; @@ -4100,7 +4034,7 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, end: if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { - if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN) + if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN) rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN; else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL) rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN; @@ -4113,10 +4047,10 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, */ if (!check_flags) { if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) - cpk->valid_flags = rv; + *pvalid = rv; else { /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */ - cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; + *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN; return 0; } } @@ -4129,9 +4063,10 @@ void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s) tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN); - tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA); - tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA); tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC); + tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01); + tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256); + tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512); } /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */ @@ -4140,7 +4075,6 @@ int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1); } -#endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) @@ -4148,7 +4082,7 @@ DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) int dh_secbits = 80; if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2) return DH_get_1024_160(); - if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) { + if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) { if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256) dh_secbits = 128; else @@ -4160,17 +4094,20 @@ DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) if (dh_secbits >= 128) { DH *dhp = DH_new(); - if (!dhp) + BIGNUM *p, *g; + if (dhp == NULL) return NULL; - dhp->g = BN_new(); - if (dhp->g) - BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2); + g = BN_new(); + if (g != NULL) + BN_set_word(g, 2); if (dh_secbits >= 192) - dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL); + p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL); else - dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL); - if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g) { + p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL); + if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) { DH_free(dhp); + BN_free(p); + BN_free(g); return NULL; } return dhp; @@ -4183,13 +4120,17 @@ DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s) static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op) { - int secbits; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); + int secbits = -1; + EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x); if (pkey) { + /* + * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default + * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will + * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and + * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice. + */ secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - } else - secbits = -1; + } if (s) return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x); else @@ -4200,6 +4141,9 @@ static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op) { /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */ int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid; + /* Don't check signature if self signed */ + if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0) + return 1; sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x); if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) { const EVP_MD *md;